ORDER S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a Defendant's second appeal from the decree of the Civil Judge of Saharanpur affirming that of the Munsif Haweli Saharanpur decreeing the Plaintiff-Respondents' suit for the recovery of possession of a shop. This shop is situate in the city of Hardwar. The entire dispute centres, round the validity of an order purporting to "allot" this shop u/s 7(2) of the UP Control of Rent and Eviction Act. As there have been several persons claiming the rights of tenancy, a number of suits have been filed by different persons at different times. The shop is owned by an institution called The Akhara Panchayati Niranjani (to be called the Akhara). It is common ground that in the beginning one Jiwan Das was the tenant of this shop. He was a proforma Defendant in the suit and is a porforma Respondent in this appeal. On 28th July, 1954 the shop was "allotted" by the Resident Magistrate, Hardwar, u/s 7 of the UP Control of Rent and Eviction Act (to be called the Act) to Ramji Lal who is the principal Defendant in the suit and the sole Appellant in this appeal. The order stated that the shop was in the tenancy of Jiwan Das but occupied by one Hari Ram. There was resistance to this "allotment", resulting in litigation, civil and criminal. Delivery of possession to Ramji Lal was held up for nearly a year after the allotment, but ultimately Hari Ram the alleged occupant, was evicted u/s 7A of the Act and on 22nd April, 1955 the Appellant Ramji Lal put in possession with the aid of the Police. This however did not end the trouble, because Jiwan Das the original tenant took the law in his own hands and tried to oust the Appellant Ramji Lal. This led to his prosecution u/s 448 of the Penal Code and also proceedings u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure. This was in 1958-four years after the passing of the allotment order and three years after the Appellant Ramji Lal had been put in possession. The proceedings u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure resulted in favour of the Appellant on 2nd August, 1958 when the Resident Magistrate held the Appellant Ramji Lal entitled to possession and directed possession to be delivered to him. The proceedings u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure resulted in favour of the Appellant on 2nd August, 1958 when the Resident Magistrate held the Appellant Ramji Lal entitled to possession and directed possession to be delivered to him. The prosecution of Jiwan Das u/s 448 resulted in his conviction but as he confessed his guilt and threw himself at the mercy of the court, he was only imprisoned till the rising of the court. 2. At the last stage of the proceedings u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure the Plaintiff-Respondent Balwant Singh came on the scene and made an application alleging that the possession of the shop bad been delivered to him by the Kurk Amin of the Civil Court by virtue of a compromise in the Civil proceedings. The application was not supported either by an affidavit or any evidence or any order of the Civil Court and the Magistrate disbelieved Balwant Singh and directed the delivery of possession of the shop to the Appellant Ramji Lal. On the next day-3rd of August, 1958-Balwant Singh filed the present suit which has been decreed by both the courts below and resulted in this second appeal. 3. In his plaint, the Respondent Balwant Singh alleged that the shop belonged to the Akhara; that in the beginning Jiwan Das was the tenant under a monthly tenancy; that the Plaintiff entered into a partnership with Jiwan Das whereupon the Akhara filed a suit for the ejectment of Jiwan Das in 1956; that this suit was decreed and the decree for ejectment put in execution, but the Plaintiff Balwant Singh filed an objection which resulted in a compromise; that under the terms of this compromise the Akhara recognised the Plaintiff Balwant Singh as their tenants on payment of rent; that the Plaintiff had learnt shortly before the suit that the Defendant Ramji Lal procured in his favour an allotment order dated 28th July, 1954; that this order was obtained by suppressing the fact that the shop was not vacant and misleading the authorities; that the Plaintiff had always been in possession-first as a partner of Jiwan Das and afterwards as the sole tenant after Jiwan Das had left the business and vacated the shop. The Plaintiff contended that the order of allotment was void, illegal and of no effect. He asked for a decree for delivery of possession of the shop to him. The Plaintiff contended that the order of allotment was void, illegal and of no effect. He asked for a decree for delivery of possession of the shop to him. The Plaintiff had impleaded four persons as Defendants-the Akhara, Jiwan Das, Appellant Ramji Lal and one Jawahar Lal who had been appointed as supurdar in the proceedings u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure. But the suit was contested only by the Appellant Ramji Lal and the other three Defendants did not appear. Ramji Lal denied the allegations of the Plaintiff and gave his own version. He alleged that Jiwan Das the original tenant, left the shop but put an unauthorised person, one Hari Ram, in possession; that the shop was treated as vacant and "allotted" to the Appellant Ramji Lal under the allotment order dated 27th July, 1954; that Jiwan Das, at the instigation of Hari Ram filed a collusive suit (No. 156 of 1955) challenging the validity of allotment order but it was dismissed for want of notice u/s 80 Code of Civil Procedure; that Jiwan Das then filed another suit (No. 559 of 1956) for the same relief and on the same allegations, but after serving notice u/s 80 Code of Civil Procedure, but it was dismissed for default; that after this Hari Ram persuaded the landlord (the Akhara) to file a fictitious suit for the ejectment of Jiwan Das on the ground of non-payment of rent, but as the suit was collusive it was not defended by Jiwan Das and resulted in an exparte decree for ejectment; that during the execution proceedings in pursuance of this collusive decree the Plaintiff Balwant Singh entered into some kind of a compromise agreement with the landlord which was fictitious and conferred on him no right whatsoever. The Appellant contended that the Plaintiff Balwant Singh never acquired any rights in the shop in dispute, he had no locus standi as a Plaintiff and was incompetent to challenge the validity of the allotment order dated 27th July 1954. 4. The trial court held that the Plaintiff Respondent Balwant Singh had acquired tanancy rights under-his partnership agreement with Jiwan Das and was therefore competent to challenge the allotment order, that the shop was not vacant when this order was passed and consequently it was without jurisdiction and void. It also held that Balwant Singh was entitled to recover possession and decreed the suit. It also held that Balwant Singh was entitled to recover possession and decreed the suit. Ram Ji Lal appealed. The learned Civil Judge confirmed the finding of the trial court that Balwant Singh had acquired tenancy rights in the shop and was therefore competent to file a suit challenging the validity of the order allotting the shop to the Appellant. He also held that the shop was neither vacant nor about to fall vacant when the order of allotment was passed and consequently this order was without jurisdiction. He dismissed the appeal and Ram Ji Lal has come to this Court in second appeal. 5. I have heard Mr. Sharafat Ali for the Appellant and Mr. K.C. Saksena for the Respondent at considerable length and read the judgments of the courts below. I have also persued the plaint, the written statement and almost the entire evidence of parties, oral and documentary. In my opinion the decision of the courts below is erroneous. 6. u/s 9 of the CPC the courts have jurisdiction to try suits of a civil nature-that is, suits for the enforcement of civil rights. Therefore a person challenging the legality of an order must establish that it has invaded or threatens to invade any civil right vested in him. A person whose rights are not affected by the order cannot challenge its legality. In fact the pimary issue before the court in such a suit is whether the Plaintiff's right has been infringed and the question of the legality of the impugned order arises because the Defendant relies on it to justify his infringement or invasion of the right. The defence is rejected if the order is shown to be contrary to law and the court ignores it as illegal and gives relief against the infringement of the right. Thus the existence of a right and its infringement, actual or threatened, by an order is an essential condition for the maintainability of a suit for a declaration that the order is illegal. If that were not so any body could file a suit challenging any order; worse, any person can file such a suit because he is paid to do so. In this suit the Plaintiff Balwant Singh has challenged the legality of an order of "allotment" passed in favour of the Appellant on 20-7-1954. If that were not so any body could file a suit challenging any order; worse, any person can file such a suit because he is paid to do so. In this suit the Plaintiff Balwant Singh has challenged the legality of an order of "allotment" passed in favour of the Appellant on 20-7-1954. To maintain the suit he must establish that on the date when the order was passed, he had a legal right which was infringed and entitled him to challenge the validity of the order by means of a suit. This he can establish only if he proves that on the date when the order was passed, he was in possession of the shop as a tenant and it was not vacant. It was not enough for him to show that he acquired any right or semblance of a right after the allotment had been passed; for even if he did, this would not affect an order of allotment which had already been pissed. I regret to say that both the courts below did not apply their minds to the simple but vital question whether the Plaintiff had any legal rights in the accommodation on the date of the allotment order. The lower appellate court had found that the Plaintiff became a partner and therefore a tenant. But on what date? Had the Respondent acquired any tenancy rights in the shop on the date when the allotment order was passed? The Court did not apply its mind to this vital question. After considerable argument, Mr. K.C. Saksena was forced to concede that these vital questions had not been satisfactorily decided by the court below and the Appellant's appeal had riot been properly heard Learned Counsel suggested that I should remand the case for a fresh hearing of the appeal before the Civil Judge but I do not think that a remand will serve the interest of justice. The entire evidence has been read out before me and all the points have been argued at length by Mr. Saksena. They can be decided conveniently by this Court without causing any prejudice to either party. Moreover, the order of allotment was passed thirteen years ago and it is not proper that there should be any further delay in deciding a suit challenging its validity. 7. Saksena. They can be decided conveniently by this Court without causing any prejudice to either party. Moreover, the order of allotment was passed thirteen years ago and it is not proper that there should be any further delay in deciding a suit challenging its validity. 7. After examining the entire record I am of the opinion that the Plaintiff Balwant Singh has failed to prove that on the date when the order of allotment was passed he had acquired any rights in the shop which could be affected by this order; therefore he was not competent to challenge its legality. His right to challenge the allotment order is claimed on one ground alone namely that he became a tenant of the shop by virtue of the alleged agreement of partnership with Jiwan Das. The agreement is alleged to be oral. There is no evidence of the date when it was made-whether it was made before or after the allotment order was passed. The Plaintiff did not reveal the date of the alleged agreement either in his plaint or testimony. (In fact his entire evidence in support of partnership is vague). Therefore, the Respondent failed to prove that he had become a partner in the shop when the allotment order was passed. 8. Moreover, irrespective of when it was made, the alleged partnership did not make him a co-tenant of the shop. A new partner, merely by joining a business which is being carried on by the old partner in a shop, does not become a tenant of the shop The plain-tin's story is that originally Jiwan Das was the tenant, but after the partnership Jiwan Das and he became joint tenants. This created a new tenancy with two tenants instead of one. This change could not be made without the consent of the landlord. A partnership can be created by agreement between the partners, but a tenancy cannot be created except by agreement with the landlord. There is no evidence whatsoever of such an agreement. Therefore, the alleged partnership with Jiwan Das could not have the effect of making the Respondent Balwant Singh a co-tenant, Jiwan Das continued to be the sole tenant and after he ceased to occupy the shop, it became vacant as contemplated u/s 7(2) of the Act. 9. There is no evidence whatsoever of such an agreement. Therefore, the alleged partnership with Jiwan Das could not have the effect of making the Respondent Balwant Singh a co-tenant, Jiwan Das continued to be the sole tenant and after he ceased to occupy the shop, it became vacant as contemplated u/s 7(2) of the Act. 9. Furthermore, if the partnership agreement was intended to make the Respondent Balwant Singh a co-tenant without the permission of the District Magistrate, it was void as its object was to defeat the provisions of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The Plaintiff's case is that Jiwan Das and he continued as a co partner and co-tenant for about a year and then Jiwan Das left the business as well as the shop, leaving the Plaintiff as the sole proprietor of the business and the sole tenant of the shop. It was conceded by learned Counsel that this arrangement was made without the permission or even the knowledge of the District Magistrate. If a transaction of this nature is recognized or enforced by the court the result will be that any tenant of an accommodation governed by U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act can, without the permission of the District Magistrate, transfer his tenancy rights to another person and put him in possession by the simple device of first creating a partnership and then walking out of it. If this is permitted, the powers of the District Magistrate controlling the letting of accommodation will be circumvented and the provisions of the Act defeated. For these reasons I think the alleged partnership being made with the intention of making Balwant Singh a co tenant of the shop, was unlawful u/s 23 of the Contract Act and not enforceable. The court will not recognize such a transaction, nor any rights claimed under such an agreement will not (?) be recognized. Ex Turpis Causa Nor Actic: the court will not recognize a claim or cause of action based on a turpitude. 10. Moreover, I am not prepared to believe the Respondent's story of partnership. Apart from his own testimony and that of two witnesses there is nothing to support it. As admitted by the Respondent there was no written agreement making him a partner or co-tenant. 10. Moreover, I am not prepared to believe the Respondent's story of partnership. Apart from his own testimony and that of two witnesses there is nothing to support it. As admitted by the Respondent there was no written agreement making him a partner or co-tenant. If he had become a co tenant with Jiwan Das, the landlord-the Akhara-would have impleaded him as a co-Defendant in the suit for ejectment. But it is admitted that that suit was Bled against Jiwan Das alone. Moreover, if he was a co-tenant with Jiwan Das the latter would have alleged this fact in his suit challenging the validity of the allotment order and also impleaded the Respondent either as a co Plaintiff (with his consent) or as proforma Defendant. But a copy of the plaint in that suit has been filed in the present suit and it contains no allegation or even a hint or suggestion by Jiwan Das that he had taken a partner in the business and made him a co-tenant. On the contrary, Jiwan Das asserted that he was the tenant of the suit. Learned Counsel for the Respondent was unable to explain, inspite of repeated questions by me, why the Respondent was not a co-Plaintiff in that suit if he had acquired the rights of a partner and co-tenant. Another significant fact disproving the Respondent's story of partnership is that the landlord (the Akhara) filed a suit for the ejectment of Jiwan Das in 1956, but did not implead the Respondent Balwant Singh as a co-Defendant. This omission is incredible if he had become a partner in the business and a co-tenant in the shop. Mr. Saksena relied on the statement made by the landlord in the compromise agreement filed in the execution proceedings in that suit. I have read that agreement, but I do riot think it supports the Respondent's story of partnership with Jiwan Das; on the contrary, it shows that for some reason the Akhara had entered into a collusive agreement of compromise. The application for compromise signed on behalf of the Akhara says that they had realized that the objector Balwant Singh had been a tenant for a long time ("arsese"). Now, if Balwant Singh had been in possession of the shop for a long time, the Akhara people, as owners, mast have been aware of it when they filed the suit for ejectment. Now, if Balwant Singh had been in possession of the shop for a long time, the Akhara people, as owners, mast have been aware of it when they filed the suit for ejectment. But if they knew, why did they not implead him as a co-Defendant? There is no explanation and none was offered by counsel. For these reasons I am inclined to believe that the Respondent Balwant Singh, at a very late stage in the execution proceedings, appeared and somehow persuaded the Akhara people to enter into a collusive agreement with him and recognize him as a tenant "arse se." 11. On the evidence I hold that the Respondent Balwant Singh failed to establish that on the date when the allotment order of 27th July 1954 was passed he had any rights affected by it. Consequently he was not competent to file a suit challenging its validity. 12. Moreover, the Respondent failed to establish that the shop was not vacant on the date when the order of allotment was passed. The order itself says that the shop was in the tenancy of Jiwan Das, but occupied by Hari Ram. The order, which was passed in the course of business, must be presumed to be valid and the statements made in it correct unless and until the contrary is proved. The onus was on the Respondent but he has not discharged it. He has not proved that the shop was not vacant on 27th July 1954 when the order was passed. Jiwan Das himself filed a suit challenging the validity of the order on the ground that he was in possession of the shop on the date when it was passed, but it was dismissed. Subsequently, the Respondents filed the present suit, but he led no reliable evidence to establish that on the date when the order was passed he was in lawful possession. He cannot rely on the alleged possession of Jiwan Das because the latter's suit has been dismissed. 13. I allow this appeal, set aside the decree of the courts below and dismiss the Plaintiff-Respondent's suit with costs throughout. 14. Before leaving this case I would like to point out that the learned Civil Judge made some observations indicating that he was of the opinion that the Resident Magistrate Hardwar was not competent to pass the allotment order. 13. I allow this appeal, set aside the decree of the courts below and dismiss the Plaintiff-Respondent's suit with costs throughout. 14. Before leaving this case I would like to point out that the learned Civil Judge made some observations indicating that he was of the opinion that the Resident Magistrate Hardwar was not competent to pass the allotment order. To quote the learned Judge "I may say, at the outset, that there was nothing on record to show that if any delegation of powers under the Act has been made by the District Magistrate. The allotment order, no doubt, proceeds to state that the Resident Magistrate was making that order in exercise of the powers delegated to him by the District Magistrate. The argument on behalf of the Plaintiff was that a mere recital to that effect in the allotment order was not sufficient and the Defendant Appellant was bound to file the actual order whereby powers were so delegated by the District Magistrate. I do not think I am required to dwell upon this point any further for I am of the view that the allotment order was bad and invalid on another and more important ground." From these remarks it appears that the learned Judge was of the opinion that the onus was on the Appellant to prove that the Resident Magistrate who passed the order had the authority to do so. The learned Judge did not formally decide this point, but I must point out that his appraoch to the question of the proof of the validity of the order was wrong. If an order purports, on the face of it, to have been passed in the exercise of power which is specified in the order itself and there is nothing to show that the order was pissed otherwise than in the course of normal business, it will be presumed to be valid and the onus is on the party alleging want of authority to establish this fact.