NAYUDU, C. J.:- In this Civil Rule, the notification dated 15th January, 1965, issued by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Assam, Revenue Department, under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, hereinafter called the Act, acquiring one bigha two kathas and two lessas of land of the peti­tioner for the purpose of the Bebejia Girls' M. E. School, Tokolai-Bebejia, is questioned. 2. The case of the petitioner is that the land in question was the family cremation ground in use by the petitioner's family, that ade­quate notice and opportunity to be heard was not given to the petition­er and the other heirs of the pattadar of the land, that the acquisition was not for a public purpose, that the expendi­ture for acquisition of the land or part of it was not incurred from public reve­nues, and that, therefore, the acquisition is bad, and accordingly prayed that an appropriate writ • be issued to quash the said notification. 3. Annexure 'A' to the petition is a copy of the declaration made on the 15th January, 1965 firstly withdrawing an area of ten lessas out of the total 5 area of 1 bigha 12 lessas of land notified to be acquired under notification No. RLA.4/62/2 dated 3rd May, 1963, T and also the declaration of the same date to the effect that the Government of Assam required the aforesaid land to f be taken by the Government at the public expense for a public purpose, namely, for the construction of Bebejia Girls School Building in the village Tokolai-Bebejia, mouza Kachamari, Zilla Nowgong, and to that end it was declared that the said land measuring 1 bigha, 2 kathas, 2 lessas is required for the aforesaid purpose, under the a provisions of Section 6 of the Act. 4. Annexure 'B' is an order of the Deputy Commissioner and the Collector a of Nowgong, giving time till 1-5-1965 for t the petitioner to obtain a stay order t from the Government. The Government t having refused to interfere, possession of the land was made over to the par­ties, on whose behalf it has been acquired (Vide Annexure 'C'). 5. The simple point that arises for consideration in this Civil Rule is whether the declaration made by the Gov­ernment under Section 6 of the Act is p legal and valid and, if not, whether it should not be set aside, 6. 5. The simple point that arises for consideration in this Civil Rule is whether the declaration made by the Gov­ernment under Section 6 of the Act is p legal and valid and, if not, whether it should not be set aside, 6. In this context, it would be useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 6 is as follows: "6. Declaration that land is required for public purpose:- (1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when the appropriate Government is satisfied after considering the report, if any, made under Section 5A, sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company, a de­claration shall be made to that effect under the signature of Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorized to certify its orders. Provided that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. (2) The declaration shall be publish­ed in the Official Gazette, and shall state the district or other territorial division in which the land is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area and, where a plan shall have been made of the land, the place where such plan may be inspected. (3) The said declaration shall be con­clusive evidence that the land is need­ed for a public purpose or for a Com­pany, as the case may be; and, after making such declaration, the appro­priate Government may acquire the land in manner hereinafter appearing." That a declaration under Section 6 of the Act has been issued, is not disputed, as it is this declaration that is sought to be quashed by the petitioner. The only point, therefore, to consider is (l) whe­ther it would be open to the petitioner to question whether the purpose for which the acquisition was made, was a public purpose and also (2) whether the proviso to Section 6 (1) bars the present acquisition. 7. On the first question, sub-sec. (3) of Section 6 is clear on the point, name­ly, that the declaration made under sec­tion 6 (1) shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose. It is contended by Mr. 7. On the first question, sub-sec. (3) of Section 6 is clear on the point, name­ly, that the declaration made under sec­tion 6 (1) shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose. It is contended by Mr. Ghose, the learned counsel for the petitioner that having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. P. N Talukdar, AIR 1965 SC 646 , even the question whether it was for a public purpose is justiciable and could be examined in two cases, namely where the declaration that it is for a public purpose is a colourable one or is made in fraud of the Statute. In this context, reliance is placed on the fol­lowing observations: (at page 652): "Learned counsel for the Mission, however, relied on the presumption con­tained in Section 6 (3) of the Act which lays down that the declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company, as the case may be. It is urged that in view of this presumption the notification is conclusive evidence of the fact that the land is needed for a public purpose as it says so in the opening part. That however in our opin­ion does not mean that the court is pre­cluded from enquiring whether the noti­fication that the land was needed for a public purpose was made in fraud of the Act, namely, against the proviso to Section 6 (1), which requires that such a notification cannot be made unless part' or whole of the compensation comes out of public revenue or some fund managed or controlled by a local authority." This decision does not support the con­tention of Mr. Ghose that independent of the proviso to Section 6 (1) it would be open to this Court to examine the ques­tion whether the acquisition is for a public purpose or not. As in the instant case, it is not contended that independent of the proviso the acquisition was not for a public purpose, it is unnecessary to examine further this question. But we feel that the question whether the acquisition is made for a public pur­pose de hors the provisions of Sec. 6 (1) is not justiciable in view of the plain language of Section 6 (3) of the Act. But we feel that the question whether the acquisition is made for a public pur­pose de hors the provisions of Sec. 6 (1) is not justiciable in view of the plain language of Section 6 (3) of the Act. This leads us to the consideration of the scope and application of the proviso to Section 6 (1). This proviso places a bar on the making of a declaration under Section 6 (1), unless one or other of the following conditions are fulfilled; name­ly: (1) The compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, where the acquisition is for the Company; or (2) wholly or partly out of public revenues; or (3) out of some fund controlled or managed by a local authority; the latter two conditions being applicable where the acquisition is for a public purpose. 8. In the instant case, we are not concerned with the case of a Company, and we have only to examine whether one or other of the conditions (2) and (3) indicated above are fulfilled in this case. The latter may be disposed of first. 8. In the instant case, we are not concerned with the case of a Company, and we have only to examine whether one or other of the conditions (2) and (3) indicated above are fulfilled in this case. The latter may be disposed of first. The expression 'local authority' has not been defined in the Act, but this expression has been defined in the General Clauses Act, sub-section (31), Section 3 as follows: '"Local authority' shall mean Munici­pal Committee, District Board, body of Port Commissioners or other authority legally entitled to, or entrusted by the Government with the control or management of a Municipal or Local fund." This expression has been defined in the Local Authorities Loans Act, 1914 (Cen­tral Act IX of 1914) as follows: "In this Act, 'local authority' means any person legally entitled to the con­trol or management of any local or municipal fund, or legally entitled to impose any cess, .rate, duty or tax with­in any local area." The expression 'funds' has also been defined in this Act as follows: " 'funds', used with reference to any local authority, includes any local or municipal fund to the control or management of which such authority is legally entitled, and any cess, rate, duty or tax which such authority is legally entitled to impose and any property vested in such authority." It is clear from these definitions that the Girls' School in question cannot be regarded as a 'local authority' inasmuch as it is neither a Municipal Committee, nor a District Board, nor a body of Port Commissioners, nor any other authority legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government with the control or management of a Municipal or local fund. Such being the case, the second of the above two conditions is not fulfilled by this declaration. 9. We have, therefore, next to exa­mine whether the proviso to S. 6 (1) is attracted by reason of the fact that no part of the compensation awarded for the property was to be paid wholly or part­ly out of public revenues, as claimed by the petitioner. 9. We have, therefore, next to exa­mine whether the proviso to S. 6 (1) is attracted by reason of the fact that no part of the compensation awarded for the property was to be paid wholly or part­ly out of public revenues, as claimed by the petitioner. In Shyam Behari v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 427 , it was clearly laid down that no valid notification under Section 6 could be made in the circumstances of that case declaring that the land was needed for a public purpose, for no part of the compensation was to be paid out of the public revenues or some fund control­led or managed by local authority. In that case, although the acquisition was made for a factory and the entire com­pensation money was paid by the fac­tory itself, the declaration was made as if it were for a Company and needed for a public purpose, and in that con­text their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed -as follows: "The mere fact that the public pur­pose mentioned was for the Premier Re­fractory Factory and work connected therewith, therefore, cannot mean that the land was needed for a company; as one reads the notification of April 19, 1961 one can only come to the conclu­sion that the land was needed for a public purpose, namely, for the con­struction of some work for a factory. There is no mention of any company anywhere in this notification and it can­not necessarily be concluded that the Premier Refractory Factory was a com­pany for a "factory" is something very different from a "company" and may belong to a company or to Government or to a local body or even to an indivi­dual. The mere fact that the- public purpose declared in the notification was for the Premier Refractory Factory and work connected therewith cannot there­fore lead to the inference that the ac­quisition was for a company. It fol­lows that when the two notifications declared that the land was needed for a public purpose in a case where no part of the compensation was to come out of public revenues or some fund control­led or managed by a local authority, they were invalid in view of the pro­viso to Section 6 (1) of the Act. All proceedings following on such notifica­tions would be of no effect under the Act." 10. All proceedings following on such notifica­tions would be of no effect under the Act." 10. It is clear from this decision that if the acquisition is for a Company there need not and ought not to be a declara­tion that it is for a public purpose and that it is necessary that the entire com­pensation money should be paid by the Company but where the acquisition is not for a Company, then the acquisition should be for a public purpose and the compensation money, to be awarded must either whol­ly or in part come out of the public revenues, or from out of a fund con­trolled by local authority. Bearing these principles in mind, it is not difficult to reach the conclusion that in this case the declaration under Section 6 would be valid only if it is established that the compensation money payable is to be paid wholly or partly from out of public revenues. 11. On this question, our attention has been invited by Mr. Ghose to Annexure 'A', the declaration, wherein it is stated that the "land is required to be taken by the Government at the public expense for a public purpose, viz., for construction of Bebejia Girls' M. E. School Building in the village Tokolai-Bebejia Mouza Kachamari, zilla Nowgong." Although the notification says in so many words that the acquisi­tion is at the public expense, there is nothing in the notification to show that any part of the compensation amount is to come out of the public revenues. It is pointed out that the entire com­pensation money to be awarded in the case was deposited by the School autho­rities into the Government Treasury and that a sum of Rs. 600/- and odd has been deposited and the compensation awarded was only Rs. 520-70 and that as no claim has been preferred, there was no question of any additional com­pensation and hence it is contended that the entire compensation amount award­ed in the case has come out of the money deposited by the School Authori- ties and not out of the public revenues. In this connection, reliance has been placed on the counter-affidavit filed in this case by Shri Padma Kanta Sarma, Respondent No. 7, wherein he stated that put of the fund of the school he deposited a sum of Rs. In this connection, reliance has been placed on the counter-affidavit filed in this case by Shri Padma Kanta Sarma, Respondent No. 7, wherein he stated that put of the fund of the school he deposited a sum of Rs. 639-08 by a challan No. 1189 dated 26-10-1961 in the Treasury as was ordered and he ap­pended Annexure 'E', the challan in the case, which shows that the sum of Rs. 639-08 was deposited for acquisition of the land for the Bebejia Girls' M. E. School. Taking these documents into consideration, we are satisfied that the entire amount of compensation to be awarded in this case was paid by the School Authorities and thus it is clear that the entire compensation money or any part thereof did not come out of the public revenues, but was entirely paid by the school authorities for that purpose. 12. In this context, it is contended by the learned Advocate General that as money was deposited by the School authorities into the Government Trea­sury and the compensation awarded is to be paid from out of the funds in the Government Treasury, the money must be deemed to be Government money and, therefore, must be deemed to have come from out of the public revenues, and he placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Girdharilal v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1966 SC 1408 . In that case, the Government of Gujarat issued a notification under Section 4 of the Act stating that the land described was likely to be needed for a public purpose namely, for the construction of houses for a Co-opera­tive Housing Society at Ahmedabad. On July 18, 1961, the State Government issued a notification under Section 6 of the Act stating that the land was re­quired for the aforesaid purpose at the expense of the said Shri Krishmakunj Government Servants Co-operative Housing Society, Ltd. On September 22, 1961, the appellants filed a writ ap­plication in the High Court of Gujarat praying for an order quashing the noti­fication under Section 6 of the Act dated the 18th July 1961. During the pen­dency of this application, the Govern­ment issued a notification dated 28th April, 1964 cancelling the aforesaid noti­fication dated July 18, 1961. During the pen­dency of this application, the Govern­ment issued a notification dated 28th April, 1964 cancelling the aforesaid noti­fication dated July 18, 1961. On August 14, 1964, the Government issued a fresh notification under Section 6 stating that the land was needed to be acquired at the public expense for a public purpose namely, for the housing scheme under­taken by the said Co-operative Hous­ing Society. The appellants were thereupon allow­ed to amend the writ petition, and by the amended writ petition, they pray­ed for an order quashing the notifica­tion under Section 6 dated 14th August, 1964 as also the notification under Sec­tion 4 dated 3rd August, 1960. On 2nd April, 1965, the High Court dismissed the application. The appellants there­upon appealed to the Supreme Court on a certificate granted by the High Court. It was therein held that so far as the notification issued under Sec. 6 dated 18th July, 1961 was concerned, the Government had no power to issue the notification, for, having regard to the proviso to Section 6 of the Act, a declaration for acquisition of the land for a public purpose could only be made if the compensation to be awarded for it was to be paid wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority and that the Govern­ment had no power to issue a notifica­tion for acquisition for a public purpose where the compensation was to be paid entirely by a company. This notifica­tion was accordingly struck down as not valid, following the decision in AIR 1965 SC 427 , referred to above. 13. The State Government realising that the notification issued by them was invalid and without waiting for an order of the Court, cancelled the noti­fication on 28th April, 1964, recognising the invalidity of the notification. Soon after the cancellation the Government issued a fresh notification under Sec­tion 6. This case AIR 1966 SC 1408 dealt with the Government issuing a fresh notification correcting the previ­ous error committed by them. It is not clear from the details of the report whether under the second notification the compensation money was being paid by the Government or exclusively by the Society. It is possible that when the previous mistake was detected by the Government, they had taken care to avoid the consequences of a further mis­take. It is not clear from the details of the report whether under the second notification the compensation money was being paid by the Government or exclusively by the Society. It is possible that when the previous mistake was detected by the Government, they had taken care to avoid the consequences of a further mis­take. In fact, the second notification stated, as per the report, that the amount was paid out of public funds, if that is so, there can be no objection under the proviso to section 6 (1) of the Act. Hence, this decision is of no assist­ance for us in deciding this case. 14. The learned Advocate General also placed reliance on the decision re­ported in Somawanti v. State of Pun­jab, AIR 1963 SC 151 . That was a case wherein 'public purpose' came to be considered and it was therein held that the bar created by Section 6 (3) would not stand in the way of the Supreme Court while dealing with a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution and, therefore, it is open to it to ascertain whether an acquisition is for a public purpose or not. In that context, it was observed as follows: "Though we are of the opinion that the courts are not entitled to go behind the declaration of the Government to the effect that a particular purpose for which the land is being acquired is a public purpose, we must emphasise that the declaration of the Government must be relatable to a public purpose ,as distinct from a purely private purpose. If the purpose for which the acquisition is being made is not relatable to public purpose then a question may well arise whether in making the declaration there has been on the part of the Govern­ment a fraud on the power conferred upon it by the Act. In other words the question would then arise whether that declaration was merely a colourable exercise of the power conferred by the Act, and, therefore, the declaration is open to challenge at the instance of the party aggrieved. To such a declaration the protection of Section 6 (3) will not extend. For, the question whether a particular action was the result of a fraud or not is always justiciable, pro­visions such as Section 6 (3) notwith­standing." 15. To such a declaration the protection of Section 6 (3) will not extend. For, the question whether a particular action was the result of a fraud or not is always justiciable, pro­visions such as Section 6 (3) notwith­standing." 15. But once it is conceded, as it was done by the Supreme Court in that case that the question whether the pur­pose for which the land is needed is a public purpose is for the State Govern­ment to be satisfied about, and it is within the exclusive competence of the State Government and the declaration of the Government in this regard will be final and conclusive, it is not under­stood how the question whether it is for a public purpose or not, could -^be examined by Courts. Any such exami­nation would seem to militate against section 6 (3), which declares that the declaration when once made is conclu­sive between the Collector and the claimant. The expression 'conclusive' means that no evidence will be allow­ed to be given to disprove the fact de­clared conclusive. The sub-section does not lay down that the declaration is conclusive only when fraud is not al­leged. To permit under any circum­stances evidence to be given at the in­stance of the claimant to disprove public purpose would amount to doing some­thing which the sub-section uncondi­tionally prohibited. The view expressed in this decision by the majority Judges of the Supreme Court that in certain cases the question whether the acquisi­tion is for a public purpose or not could be examined notwithstanding Sec. 6 (3). in our humble opinion, seems to require reconsideration. In view of the fact that according to Section 6 (3) once a decla­ration is made by the Government that the acquisition is for a public purpose, the Government being considered the best and only authority to decide the matter and the Act having declared that that declaration is conclusive, it would appear to be difficult to reconcile this situation with the theory that notwith­standing the declaration by the Govern­ment that the acquisition is for a public purpose and notwithstanding the fact that that declaration is conclusive be­tween the Collector and the claimant, the matter could still be agitated and examined whatever may be the situa­tion. 16. But the position is quite differ­ent when we have to consider the appli­cation of the proviso to Section 6 (1) of the Act. 16. But the position is quite differ­ent when we have to consider the appli­cation of the proviso to Section 6 (1) of the Act. Unless the compensation to be awarded is to be paid wholly or partly out of public reve­nues, the declaration under Sec. 6 (1) is barred. Hence, it would be necessary to examine whether the compensation that is being awarded was being paid either wholly or partly out of public revenues. It is clear from the materials placed before us that the money that is being paid under the award is the money that is paid by the School Autho­rities. Such being the case, it is im­possible to hold that any part of the public revenues is being utilised for payment of the compensation. In this context, reliance is placed on two deci­sions of this High Court reported in Samiruddin Sheikh v. Sub-Divisional Officer, AIR 1954 Assam 81 and Maheswar v. Assam State, AIR 1956 Assam 190. In AIR 1954 Assam 81, the costs of acquisition were deposited by the vil­lagers. The learned Judges who decided that case, while conceding that the amount to be awarded must wholly or partly come out of public revenues, ob­served as follows: "Now, it is true that the costs, as tentatively estimated, have been de­posited by the villagers. But the costs have been deposited in Government Trea­sury and presumably the purpose of the deposit is that the costs would be con­trolled and managed by that local authority. It is not that the villagers themselves would be managing and financing the acquisition proceed­ings. So, the mere fact that the estimated costs have been for the present raised by the villagers, will not necessarily invalidate the proceeding. It is also to be remember­ed that the actual costs of acquisition may be more than the amount deposit­ed by the villagers, and it may be that the costs in excess of the deposit may have to be contributed from the public revenues, and even if a small amount of the costs is so contributed, that would be sufficient compliance with this pro­viso." This decision has no application to the facts of the instant case, where the school authorities contributed more than the award amount and there is no ques­tion of any possibility of Government revenues being utilised for payment of the compensation. If this decision were to be understood that merely because the money was deposited into the Treasury, that would amount to compliance with the proviso to Section 6 (1), we respect­fully disagree with the view expressed and we hold that this case has not been correctly decided. 17. Another decision, on which reli­ance is placed is Maheswar v. Assam State, AIR 1956 Assam 190. This deci­sion followed the decision reported in AIR 1954 Assam 81. In that case, the acquisition of land was for the purpose of a School and it was found as a fact that the declaration was issued after deposit of the money regarded as suffi­cient for payment of compensation to the owners, in the Gauhati Treasury by the school authorities. It was therein held that the fact that the entire money has been paid by the school authorities made no difference and did not affect the validity of the declaration made under Section 6 (1). In this case also, it was observed that it could not be stated that the money deposited was sufficient for payment of compensation that is found to be payable ultimately. Here again, the view seems to be that the fact that the entire compensation amount had already been deposited by the school authorities into the Treasury in excess of payment did not affect the validity of the declaration under sec­tion 6 (1). This view taken in this Divi­sion Bench decision in this respect is wrong and the decision, following the earlier decision in AIR 1954 Assam 81, we feel, has been wrongly decided. The mere fact that the notification by the Government says that the land is required to be taken by the Government at the public expense and for a public purpose could not by itself serve to satisfy the requirements, in our opinion, of the proviso to Section 6 (1). It must be established that some part of the public revenues had contributed towards the payment of compensation for the land acquired and this condition, as, already pointed out, has not been fulfilled in this case. The mere depo­sit of money into the Government Trea­sury would not make it Government money, but it still continues to be the money deposited by the School authori­ties for a particular purpose and would not, by mere deposit, become public revenues. 18. The mere depo­sit of money into the Government Trea­sury would not make it Government money, but it still continues to be the money deposited by the School authori­ties for a particular purpose and would not, by mere deposit, become public revenues. 18. It is next contended by the learn­ed Advocate General as well as by the School Committee, that as Bebejia Girls' M. E. School is a Government aided school and as most of its funds are con­tributed by the Government, any money paid by the School authorities would be in the nature of Government money and can be regarded as coming out of public revenues. This point has been answered in the decision reported in Valjibhai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1963 SC 1890 . In that case also it was argu­ed by the learned Attorney General that the funds of the Corporation have themselves come out of public reve­nue inasmuch as they consist of moneys provided by the State of Bombay. In that context it was observed as follows: "Even assuming that the funds of the Corporation consist only of the moneys which have been provided by the State of Bombay it is difficult to appreciate how they could be regarded as part of the public revenues. No doubt, the source of the funds would be public revenue but the funds themselves belong to the Corporation and are held by it as its own property. They cannot, therefore, be regarded as 'public revenue' in any sense. It was then said by reference to several provisions of the Act that the Government is entitled to exercise control over the Corporation, that the profits earned by the Corpo­ration would go to the Government, that if the Corporation was wound up all its assets would also go to the Govern­ment and that, therefore, the Corpora­tion could be regarded as nothing more than a limb of the Government. Even though that may be so, the Corporation is certainly not a department of Gov­ernment but is a separate legal entity and, therefore, moneys coming out of public revenue whether invested, loan­ed or granted to it would change their original character and become the funds or assets of the Corporation when they are invested in or transferred or loaned to it." 19. We are clearly of opinion that whatever grants-in-aid might have been paid to the School by the Government for running the School and maintaining it, they become the property of the School management and are intended to be utilised for purposes of running the School and that they do not continue to retain the character of public revenue, whatever the source of the money might have been, as has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in the above case. Such being the case, the mere fact that grants-in-aid are given to the school authorities would not make the amount deposited into the Government Treasury by the School authorities for acquiring the land in question, money coming out of 'public revenue' at all and hence, we feel that the proviso to Section 6 (1) of the Act had not been complied with in this case. In the view we have taken, we have no other option but to declare that the declaration under Section 6 (1) is bad in this case and must be quashed and we, accordingly, quash the same. At the same time we wish to point out that it would be open to the State Govern­ment to comply with the requirements of the proviso by paying money towards the compensation awarded, either whol­ly or in part, for the acquisition of the land, from out of the public revenues. Once such provision is made and com­plied with, the proviso to Section 6 (1) would have been fulfilled and there could be no objection to the acquisition being proceeded with. In the entire cir­cumstances of the case, we consider that there should be no order as to costs. GOSWAMI, J.: 20. I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment of My Lord the Chief Justice and I regret that I have the misfortune to disagree with his Lordship. 21. The facts arising out of this Civil Rule are as follows. GOSWAMI, J.: 20. I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment of My Lord the Chief Justice and I regret that I have the misfortune to disagree with his Lordship. 21. The facts arising out of this Civil Rule are as follows. Originally a pre­liminary notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act (Act I of 1894) as amended by Act XXXVIII of 1923, hereinafter called the Act, was made on 3-5-63 notifying all concerned that the land measuring more or less 1 Bigha 12 Lechas of periodic land in village Tokolai-Bebejia in the district of Nowgong was likely to be needed for a public purpose, namely for construc­tion of Bebejia Girls' M. E. School build­ing, and objection under Section 5A of the Act called for. Government also by that notification authorised their officers to do all other acts required or provid­ed by sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Act. Objection was raised by the peti­tioner under Section 5A objecting to the acquisition stating that the land had been reserved by their family for cre­mation purpose and they had necessarily a sentimental value attached to this land. The Land Acquisition Officer exa­mined the petitioner and also visited the locality and enquired into the mat­ter and found that only a small portion of the land at the corner had been used for cremation and the major portion had been utilised for cultivation, and since this land was most suitable being con­veniently situated and there being no other land, recommended to the Govern­ment for acquisition of the same b> ex­cluding 10 Lechas out of the total land originally notified. Finally after receipt of the report under Section 5A from the Collector, the Government were satisfied that the land was needed for a public purpose and made the necessary declaration under Section 6 for acquiring the land in question excluding 10 Lechas by a separate notification under Sec. 43 (1) of the Act on 15-1-65 out of the total area of 1 Bigha 12 Lechas of land co­vered by notification dated 3-5-63. The Declaration No. RLA.4/62/31 made under Notification No. RLA.4/62/30 dated 15-1-65, which is impugned before us in this Civil Rule, is set out below: "Whereas it appears to the Govern­ment of Assam that land is required to be taken by the Government at the public expense for a public purpose, viz., for construction of Bebejia Girls' M. E. School Building in the village Tokolai-Bebejia, mouza Kachamari, zilla Now-gong it is hereby declared that for the above purpose land measuring more or less 1 bigha, 2 kathas 2 lessas of stand­ard measurement bounded on the North - By the dag no. 586 South - By the dag nos. 583 and 584 East - By the dag no. 581 West - By the dag no. 585 is required within the aforesaid village of Tokolai-Bebejia. This declaration is made, under the provisions of Section 6 of Act I of 1894, to all whom it may concern. A plan of the land may be inspected in the office of the Collector, and Land Acquisition Officer, Nowgong. Nothing in this declaration will be considered to apply to land which is re-sumable for the said purpose under the terms of the lease and which the Govern­ment elect to resume instead of acquir­ing under the Act." 22. It may be necessary to mention here the background of this acquisition. The Managing Committee of the school authority, which is represented before us as Respondent No. 8, backed by the Educational authority requested the Collector for acquisition of this land. The Collector asked the school authority to deposit Rs. 639.08, being estimated cost of acquisition, in the Government Trea­sury before he could move the Govern­ment for acquisition of the land. The school authority through their Secretary deposited the amount estimated by the Collector by Challan No. 1189 (Annexure F) dated 26-10-61 in the Government Treasury under the Head of account "Works done for public bodies." 23. It appears from the records of the land acquisition proceedings, which have been called for in this case, that action was taken for acquisition only after the deposit of the estimated cost and the preliminary notification was therefore published, as noticed above, on 3-5-63. It is claimed that the Girls' M. E. School was started on and from i-1-61 and the same received grant from the Education department on 1-10-62. It is claimed that the Girls' M. E. School was started on and from i-1-61 and the same received grant from the Education department on 1-10-62. After delivery of possession on 15-3-65 the school authority constructed a thatch­ed house to accommodate the classes and the classes are being held there. It is further claimed that a pucca R. C. C. building is also under construction. The school is claimed to be a Government Aided M. E. School. 24. The petitioner obtained a Rule on 31-8-65 and also stay of the notice under Section 6. It was further order­ed that if possession had already been taken it need not be re-delivered to the petitioner. As, however, possession had already been delivered on 15-3-65 per­haps this stay order was ineffective. The matter came up for hearing before the Division Bench consisting of the Chief Justice and myself, and on 16-8-67 the matter was referred to this Full Bench with the following order: "The Land Acquisition Authorities in this case appear to have followed the law as laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in the case reported in AIR 1956 Assam 190. We have been taken to this decision and we feel that law as laid down therein may require reconsideration, and as the decision in that case is of a Division Bench, it would be necessary that a Full Bench should be constituted for heaung the points that arise for decision in this case particularly with reference to the con­struction and interpretation of Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act......." (That is how the matter has come be­fore us.) 25. Mr. S. K. Ghose, the learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the declaration under Section 6 of the Act is void and invalid as the entire compensation money had been paid by the school authority and did not come out of public revenue. We have, there­fore, to consider the provisions of Sec­tion 6, which is quoted below: "6. Mr. S. K. Ghose, the learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the declaration under Section 6 of the Act is void and invalid as the entire compensation money had been paid by the school authority and did not come out of public revenue. We have, there­fore, to consider the provisions of Sec­tion 6, which is quoted below: "6. (1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when the appro­priate Government is satisfied, after con­sidering the report, if any, made under Section 5A, sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a company, a declara­tion shall be made to that effect under the signature of Secretary to such Gov­ernment or of some officer duly autho­rised to certify its orders: Provided that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. (2) The declaration shall be published in the official Gazette, and shall state the district or other territorial division in which the land is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area, and where a plan shall have been made of the land, the place where such plan may be inspected. (3) The said declaration shall be con­clusive evidence that the land is need­ed for a public purpose or for a com­pany, as the case may be; and, after making such declaration, the appropriate Government may acquire the land in manner hereinafter appearing." Mr. Ghose submits that in view of the proviso to Section 6 (1), no declaration should have been made in this case as the compensation was not paid out of public revenue, wholly or partly, or from some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. We are not concerned in this case about local authority, as admittedly the school authority cannot be a local authority, and this aspect of the matter has been dealt with very exhaustively in the judgment of My Lord the Chief Justice with which I am in full agreement. We are not concerned in this case about local authority, as admittedly the school authority cannot be a local authority, and this aspect of the matter has been dealt with very exhaustively in the judgment of My Lord the Chief Justice with which I am in full agreement. The whole point is whether the declaration in this case is beyond the jurisdiction of the State Government in view of the fact that it had no authority to make the declaration in the instant case, the money having been paid entirely from the fund of the school authority, as con­tended. In order to appreciate this argument we have got to take into consideration the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act. Under Section 4 of the Act a prelimi­nary notification is made by the appro­priate Government where it appears to it that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose, and on publication of this pre­liminary notification it becomes lawful under sub-section (2) of Section 4 for any officer authorised by State Govern­ment to do various acts mentioned therein in order to make an exact ap­praisal of the situation of marking out the land actually required for acquisi­tion. Section 5 authorises the officer who enters the land to pay all neces­sary damages, if any, done in under­taking the duties referred to in sub­section (2) of Section 4. Section 5A provides for hearing of objections. Under this section, any person interest­ed in the land within thirty days after the issue of the notification can object to the acquisition of the land. The Col­lector on receipt of the objection in writing is to give the objector the op­portunity of being heard and after hear­ing all objections and making such fur­ther enquiry, if any, as he thinks neces­sary, submit the case for decision of the appropriate Government on the objec­tions and a report containing his recommendations on the same. The deci­sion of the appropriate Government on the objections is made final under Sec­tion 5A. It is only after this procedure has been complied with, the State Gov­ernment after considering the report under Section 5A is in a position to de­clare that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company. The deci­sion of the appropriate Government on the objections is made final under Sec­tion 5A. It is only after this procedure has been complied with, the State Gov­ernment after considering the report under Section 5A is in a position to de­clare that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company. Admittedly this land is not required for a company and so we have only to consider whether the same is needed for a public purpose, and if the purpose is fulfilled we have further to see whether under the proviso to Section 6 (1) the declaration could not have been made because of the Chalan deposit dated 26-10-61 made by the school authority to­wards the estimated cost of compensa­tion. It will be noticed that under sub­section (3) of Section 6, the declaration under this section shall be a conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose, and the appropriate Government may then acquire the land in accordance with the provisions that follow. Section 7 enables the Collector to take order for the acquisition of the land after the declaration under the authority of the local Government or of an officer authorised by it. Section 8 enables the Collector to mark out and measure the land and to make a plan of the same. Section 9 provides for notice to persons interested. The Col­lector hereunder, inter alia, gives public notice at convenient places on or near the land to be taken stating that the Government intends to take possession of the land and that claims to compen­sation for all interests in such land may be made to him. Section 11 provides for enquiry and award by the Collector. The Collector under this section after due hearing makes an award under his hand. Under Section 12 such award when filed in the Collector's office becomes final and conclusive evidence as between the Collector and the persons interest­ed, whether they have respectively ap­peared before the Collector or not, of the true area and value of the land and the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. It is, therefore, clear that the award is final unless it is varied or modified in a reference under Section 18 of the Act. Section 16 of the Act may be use­fully quoted here: "16. It is, therefore, clear that the award is final unless it is varied or modified in a reference under Section 18 of the Act. Section 16 of the Act may be use­fully quoted here: "16. When the Collector has made an award under Section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall there­upon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances." Section 17 is the emergency provision with which we are not concerned. Sec­tion 18 we have already noticed. 26. The next important section we have to notice is Section 31 (1), which may be set out: "31. (1) On making an award under Section 11, the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitl­ed thereto according to the award, and shall pay it to them unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in the next sub-section." We need not refer to the other sub-sec­tions for our present purpose. Under Section 34 when the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the time of taking possession until it has been so paid or deposited Part VII of this Act deals with acquisition of land for compensation and Sections 38 to 44 provide for various things mentioned therein. It will be noticed that Sec. 6, as already noticed, is subject to the pro­visions of Part VII of this Act. When a land is acquired for the company, Part VII comes into play. The provi­sions of Section 39 may be set out: "39. The provisions of Sections 6 to 37 (both inclusive) shall not be put in force in order to acquire land for any company, unless with the previous con­sent of the appropriate Government nor unless the company shall have exe­cuted the agreement hereinafter men­tioned." Section 40 provides for a previous en­quiry before such consent is given and also refers to the report of the Collector under Section 5A. Section 41 provides as follows: "41. Section 41 provides as follows: "41. If the appropriate Government Is satisfied after considering the report, if any, of the Collector under Section 5A, sub-section (2), or, on the report of the Officer making an enquiry under Section 40 that the proposed acquisition is for any of the purposes referred to in clause (a) or clause (aa) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 40, it shall require the Company to enter into an agreement with the appropriate Govern­ment, providing to the satisfaction of the appropriate Government for the fol­lowing matters, namely:- (1) the payment to the appropriate Government of the cost of acquisition; (2) the transfer, on such payment, of the land to the company; (3) the terms on which the land shall be held by the company; **" ** **" Section 48 provides for withdrawal from the acquisition of land of which posses­sion has not been taken, and we have already seen that 10 Lechas of land in this very case has been withdrawn from acquisition by an appropriate noti­fication. Under Section 50 the charges of and incidental to acquisition of land at the cost of local authority or com­pany shall be defrayed from or by such fund or company, but such local autho­rity or company shall not be entitled to demand a reference under Sec. 18. 27. From a perusal of the above pro­visions the scheme of acquisition clearly emerges that the Government under section 4 makes the preliminary notifi­cation and after receipt of the report under Section 5A, the Government alone makes the declaration. It is the Col­lector as an agent of the Government who has got to make the award regard­ing the compensation and it is he again as an agent of the Government, who is required to tender the money to the claimant or to deposit the money in Court under certain contingencies. If the deposit is not made after the award it is the Collector who is to pay the interest from the date of delivery of possession till payment. All the provi­sions of the Act underline a liability of the Government, and that is exactly which is owned by the Government in the declaration made under Sec. 6 (1) of the Act. All the provi­sions of the Act underline a liability of the Government, and that is exactly which is owned by the Government in the declaration made under Sec. 6 (1) of the Act. It further clearly emerges that if the land is acquired for a com­pany, Part VII of the Act has got to be complied with and the compensation is to be paid by the company. If, how­ever, the acquisition is for a public pur­pose, the compensation is to be paid wholly or partly out of public revenue or some fund controlled or managed by the local authority. In both types of acquisition, we find that it is the Government which acqui­res and makes all necessary provisions for payment of compensation. In the case of the company, the Government is required to make an agreement prior to the declaration on the terms, which I have already noticed, as provided for under Section 41, a company is requir­ed to provide to the satisfaction of the appropriate Government by entering into an agreement with it regard­ing the payment of the cost of the acquisition and regarding • the trans­fer, on such payment of the land to the company. Under Section 16, I have al­ready noticed, the acquired land after the award has been made is taken pos­session of by the Collector and there­upon the land vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrancer. When the land is acquired for a public purpose and not for the company, the land acquired vests in the Government under- Section 16. It is only when the land is acquired for the company, the land by an agreement is transferred to the company by the Government. The vesting, therefore, in either case is with the Government in one case, when It is acquired for a public purpose it al­ways remains and vests with the Gov­ernment whereas in the case of a company in accordance with the agreement made in that behalf the land is trans­ferred to the name of the company under Section 41. 28. The vesting, therefore, in either case is with the Government in one case, when It is acquired for a public purpose it al­ways remains and vests with the Gov­ernment whereas in the case of a company in accordance with the agreement made in that behalf the land is trans­ferred to the name of the company under Section 41. 28. It is, therefore, clearly seen that the money has to be provided for by the Government and it is the Government which actually takes upon itself the responsibility of making the pay­ment, in one case, namely when the land is needed for a public purpose, out of public revenue, and, in the second case, when it is required for a company, by making the company agreed to pay all costs and compensation by means of an appropriate agreement. The person from whom the land has been acquired will only claim from the Government and not from the company in one case nor from the institution for whom the land may be acquired for a public pur­pose. In the instant case, it is not dis­puted that the land being acquired ior an educational institution is not for a public purpose. Indeed the object of providing for female education in a village cannot be anything but public purpose. The expression "public pur­pose" is defined in section 3 (f) and necessarily it cannot be exhaustive. An ancient Act like Act I of 1894 could not have conceived all the needs of the com­munity, the progressive social urges of the people in general and various other factors that have come to operate in the public life of a nation wedded to demo­cratic ideals. The purpose, in the in­stant case, therefore, is undoubtedly a public purpose within the meaning of that expression. That, however, does not conclude the matter. Even if the acquisition is for a public purpose as described, the proviso does not authorise for making a declaration if the compensation is not met out of the public revenue. I have, therefore, to consider whether, in the instant case the entire source of the money being from the school fund it could be validly stated in the declaration that the land is acquired for a public purpose at the public expense. I have, therefore, to consider whether, in the instant case the entire source of the money being from the school fund it could be validly stated in the declaration that the land is acquired for a public purpose at the public expense. I have noticed hereinbefore that the impugned notifi­cation clearly describes that the land is required to be taken by the Government at the public expense for a public pur­pose. What is meant by the words "public revenues" mentioned in the proviso to Section 6 (1) of the Act? The Oxford Dictionary gives the first meaning of the word 'revenue' as follows: "Annual income of a Government or State from all sources out of which the public ex­penses are defrayed". Chambers's Twentieth Century Dictionary gives the mean­ing of the word "revenue" as "Receipts or return from any source". Could it not be said that once the money has been deposited into the Government Treasury under the head "works done for public bodies", which is a recogni­sed Head under which alone money could be deposited when passed by the concerned officer, that this money after being transferred from the school fund to the Government account became a part of the public revenue? In dealing with the proviso to Sec­tion 6 (1) of the Act, their Lordships had to consider the effect of the trans­fer of money from the State Govern­ment to the State Transport Corpora­tion, in the case of AIR 1963 SC 1890 . This was a case in which certain land acquisition proceeding instituted by the then Government of Bombay for ac­quiring a piece of land for the purpose of constructing a bus depot required by the State Transport Corporation and for constructing office and other buildings by the said Corporation, was challeng­ed, as the entire compensation money came out of the fund of State Trans­port Corporation and not from public revenue of the Government. The argu­ment was that the money of the Corpo­ration having been derived from Gov­ernment source was in effect a part of the public revenue. This argument was repelled and their Lordships observed as follows: "Assuming that the funds of a State Transport Corporation consist only of. the moneys which have been provided by the State Government, they cannot be regarded as part of the public revenue. This argument was repelled and their Lordships observed as follows: "Assuming that the funds of a State Transport Corporation consist only of. the moneys which have been provided by the State Government, they cannot be regarded as part of the public revenue. No doubt, the source of the funds would be public revenue but the funds them­selves belong to the Corporation and are held by it as its own property. They cannot, therefore, be regarded as 'public revenue' in any sense. Further, the Corporation is not a department of Gov­ernment but is a separate legal entity and, therefore, money coming out of public revenue whether invested, loan­ed or granted to it would change their original character and become the funds or assets of the Corporation when they are invested in or transferred or loan­ed to it." 29. The important principle which can be culled from this decision is that the source of the money is irrelevant. The source of the money in the case be­fore their Lordships was indeed from public revenue but since the amount had already been transferred and was under the control of the State Transport Cor­poration that, according to their Lord­ships, deprived the money of the Gov­ernment character, the money being converted into Corporation's money. Ap­plying the above test, could it not be said, in the instant case, that when the school authority deposited the money into the Government treasury under a recognised head of the Govern­ment and the money was transferred to Government which from the date of the transfer came under the control of the Government that money became a part of the Government money, and hence public revenue, namely money coming from any source whatsoever? In my considered opinion, the compensation money which had been deposited as early as 1961, has ever since the deposit become a part of the public revenue of the State. No other agency than the Government was in a position to take that money out or order its transfer to any other person from the Government account. The person whose land is ac­quired is only entitled to compensation from the Government and as long as that compensation has been tendered to him under the law or deposited in the Court, he is precluded from question­ing the source of that money. The person whose land is ac­quired is only entitled to compensation from the Government and as long as that compensation has been tendered to him under the law or deposited in the Court, he is precluded from question­ing the source of that money. In fact, in this Civil Rule we are in­vited to go behind the Government noti­fication to scan the source from which this particular money was obtained by the Government. The Government may derive its income or obtain money from any source whatsoever and as long as it is able to control the money and the amount is in the Government exchequer and it is able to disburse the same with­out any fetter whatsoever, it is none of the business of the persons who claim compensation to urge that it was not Government money. In this particular case, as already pointed out, the money had been deposited in 1961, the decla­ration was made in 1963 and possession delivered in 1965. The entire procedure which is contemplated under the Land Acquisition Act has been complied with. The petitioner or the persons interested did not object to the compensation which was awarded. The only objection taken before the Government was with respect to some other grounds which did not weigh with the Government which only modified the original order by excluding some portion of the land in favour of the petitioner. It is for the first time in this Civil Rule the peti­tioner has after about five months of the declaration questioned the same on the ground that the money had come out of the school fund and not out of the public revenue. I am, therefore, of the opinion that this money which was in the Government treasury ear-mark­ed for a particular purpose became part of the public revenue of the State and when the Collector tendered a part of this money as compensation it was dealing with money emanating from public revenue. 30. We may also look at the matter from another aspect. 30. We may also look at the matter from another aspect. When the declaration is made by the Government that the land is required to be taken by the Government at the public expense for a public purpose under Section 5 and if there is no dispute about the public purpose, all that is contemplated under the proviso to Section 6 (1) is that the Government declares its mani­fest intention to pay the money out of public revenue. The proviso states that no such declaration shall be made un­less the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid out of public revenues. The most important point is that on the date the declara­tion is made by the Government it should unmistakably decide and declare that Government alone was responsible to make the payment of compensation and it is alone accountable to compen­sation. The proviso does not indicate or deal with the factum of payment but the accountability to pay by the Government. If from this declaration Government makes it abundantly clear that it unmistakably intends to acquire the property at public expense, that is to say, to pay the money out of public revenue and out of the Government ex­chequer, the source from which the money was or is obtained is irrelevant. Reading the notification, I am definitely of the opinion that the Government having already arranged for the amount and having taken care- to keep the money under its control for disburse­ment has made a proper declaration under Section 6 that the land is acquir­ed for public purpose and at public ex­pense, and hence no valid objection in law could be taken to the impugned notification. 31. As noticed earlier, there are two types of acquisition and in each case the Government takes the respon­sibility ultimately to pay, in the case of a company by means of an agreement properly entered incorporating all the terms required under the law, and in the case of a Government Aided institu­tion like the present one, it was open to the Government to pay out of the public revenue pure and simple with­out asking the school fund to reimburse. But if it chose to ask the school autho­rity to deposit the money in Govern­ment account and thereafter having en­sured that the money was already in the Government exchequer, the Gov­ernment acquires the property and makes the necessary declaration, there could be no objection to such a proce­dure being followed. 32. In this view of the matter, it might not have been necessary to consider the decisions of this Court re­ported in AIR 1956 Assam 190 follow­ing the decision reported in AIR 1954 Assam 81, for reconsideration of which this Full Bench was constituted. In 1954 Assam case, their Lordships relied on a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Suryanarayana v. Province of Madras, reported in AIR 1945 Mad 394 (FB) and Chief Justice Sarjoo Prosad, speaking for the Court, observed as follows: "A declaration by Government under Section 6 (1) of the Act that the acqui­sition is for a public purpose, would be final and it would not be open to the High Court to go into that question in the proceedings under Article 226 xxxxxxxx The mere fact that the estimated costs of acquisition of land required for the construction of a village pathway have been, for the present, raised by the vil­lagers, will not necessarily invalidate the proceeding where the costs have been deposited in Government treasury presumably with the purpose that the costs would be controlled and managed by the local authority and not by the villagers themselves. Further the actual costs of acquisition may be more than the amount deposited by the villagers, and it may be that the costs in excess of the deposit may have to be contribu­ted from the public revenues, and even if a small amount of the costs is so contributed, that would be sufficient . compliance with the proviso to S. 6 (1)." In this case the fact that the Govern­ment would ultimately be required to pay something more than the amount deposited by the villagers for a village path was a consideration that weighed with their Lordships in interpreting the proviso to Section 6 (1). This was fol­lowing the principles laid down in the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court reported in AIR 1945 Mad 394 , referred to above. 33. This was fol­lowing the principles laid down in the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court reported in AIR 1945 Mad 394 , referred to above. 33. The learned Counsel for the petitioner tried to distinguish this case on the ground that in the instant case more than the entire estimated compen­sation money had been deposited by the school authority and the petitioner has not objected to the compensation or asked for any reference. That being the position, the award is final under Sec­tion 12 of the Act and hence the entire money has come from the school autho­rity and there is no future contingency of any money being required to be given by the Government in addition to what has already been deposited by the school authority. This argument fails to take note of the fact that the declara­tion has got to be judged in the light of the facts obtaining on that date and not from the conduct or attitude of the party whose land is acquired. True in this case on the date the declaration was made already an amount had been deposited under the orders of the Col­lector following his estimate. The Col­lector or the Government, however could not envisage on the date of the declaration that there would be no ob­jection to the estimated compensation which has been ordered to be deposited. As is clear, notice to a person inte­rested regarding his claim to compensa­tion is given under Section 9 after the declaration under Section 6 and the Collector has taken order for acquisi­tion. That being the position, the fact that the petitioner did not choose to raise any objection to the compensation nor to ask for a reference under Sec­tion 18 of the Act would not affect the assessment. On 15-1-65 when the declara­tion was made the Government clearly intended that the compensation which would be ultimately awarded would be at public expense. The petitioner can­not take advantage of the fact that he has not chosen to object to the com­pensation or that a Court has not in a reference against the award adjudged some compensation in excess of the de­posit made by the school authority. As pointed out earlier, the intention of the Government to pay out of the public revenue is the governing factor and that is explicit in the impugned notification making the declaration. As pointed out earlier, the intention of the Government to pay out of the public revenue is the governing factor and that is explicit in the impugned notification making the declaration. That being the position, the fact that a greater amount than the estimated compensation had been deposited would not be decisive of the matter. 34. In addition to the reasons given by their Lordships in the Madras case, reported in AIR 1945 Mad 394 (FB), and the Assam cases, reported in AIR 1954 Assam 81 and AIR 1956 Assam 190, referred to above, one may not fail to notice the words used in the proviso to Section 6 (1) to the effect namely "a compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid ........ out of public revenues ........" (the under linings are mine), which make it abundantly clear that this has reference to some futurity, namely a stage which will have to be reached subsequent to the declaration under Section 6, taking order for ac­quisition under Section 7, notice under Section 9 and finally enquiry and award by the Collector under Section 11, nay, something more in the future still, to wit, if aggrieved by the award a refer­ence to Court under Section IS and perhaps still further an appeal under Section 54 to the High Court and the Supreme Court. The declaration by the Government states clearly that the ac­quisition is at public expenses. This ex­pression "at public expenses" cannot be understood in a casual or light-hearted sense. It should be presumed that the Gov­ernment at the time of declaration knew the law and the consequences following from the declaration to which it was committed in most unambiguous terms by virtue of a statutory notifica­tion. That being the position in law so far as the Government's liability is concern­ed, in respect of the payment of compensa­tion it is idle to enquire wherefrom the Government has obtained or will obtain the funds. In my considered view, such an enquiry in face of the Government de­claration that the compensation would be paid (I am using this expression "would be paid" deliberately instead of "is to be paid") out of public revenues is out of place, irrelevant and foreign to the scheme of the Act. In my considered view, such an enquiry in face of the Government de­claration that the compensation would be paid (I am using this expression "would be paid" deliberately instead of "is to be paid") out of public revenues is out of place, irrelevant and foreign to the scheme of the Act. It is not legi­timate to interpret the validity of a notification under Section 6 by subse­quent events or by the subsequent con­duct of the parties. 35. Mr. Ghose submits that the facts of the present case are distinguish­able from those obtaining in those two reported decisions of this Court, name­ly AIR 1954 Assam 81 and AIR 1958 Assam 190. In the view I have taken about the deposit of the amount of com­pensation in the Government treasury and its effect I am in respectful agree­ment with the views expressed in those two decisions and hold that the said decisions are correct. 36. It must be pointed out that this land, which has been acquired for the school, vested in the Government under Section 16 and although posses­sion had been delivered to the school for the purpose of construction of the school house and to run the school, the land would stand in the name of the Government under the said section. This is a feature which should not be lost sight of. The acquisition of the land is for a public purpose and the same has been acquired by the Govern­ment and would vest in the Govern­ment and would remain vested in the Government for all times. The school authority will only deal with the land under permissive occupation from the Government for the purpose of running the school. That being the position, it cannot be questioned that the notifica­tion acquiring the land for a public purpose and at public expense is invalid in law. 37. Mr. Ghose has also submitted that if a declaration of the kind is held to be valid it will give individual persons who may be able to influence the Government to acquire property as they choose and thus the Land Acquisi­tion Act will be an instrument of oppression in the hands of the Government. This argument does not bear close scrutiny. The dominant object of acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act is a public purpose. This argument does not bear close scrutiny. The dominant object of acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act is a public purpose. A private in­stitution or an individual cannot there­fore succeed in invoking the provisions of this Act for acquiring property for their own use, as such acquisition will be foreign to the purpose and objects of the Act. The acquisition must be referable to a public purpose and unless that exists, no acquisition can be valid under the law. The apprehension of the learned Counsel is therefore absolutely unfounded. 38. In the result, the application is dismissed and the Rule is discharged, but I make no order as to costs. ORDER OF THE COURT 39. In view of the majority opinion, the petition is allowed and the rule is made absolute, but there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.