J. B. MEHTA, N. M. MIABHOY, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition raises an important question relating to Court deposits but unfortunately having regard to the facts of the case it is not possible for us to decide that point finally so as to be of any help either to petitioner or to Court depositors in general. ( 2 ) THE facts leading up to the presentation of the petition are as follows:- Petitioner entered into a contract for sale of an immovable property with two persons named (1) Mrs. Dhanbai Lallubhai and (2) Suleman Lallubhai and paid Rs. 900/by way of earnest money. Subsequently she filed Special Suit No. 5 of 1963 in the Court of the learned Civil Judge Senior Division Baroda for specific performance of that contract. At that time she paid a sum of Rs. 19 100 in cash by way of deposit to be credited to the above cause. The suit was ultimately compromised on 16th January 1965 by which the purchase price was fixed at Rs. 47 0 Petitioner having already paid Rs. 900/and deposited Rs. 19 100 in Court deposited a further amount of Rs. 27 0 on 17th May 1965 towards the above cause thus completing the sale price of Rs. 47 0 From out of the amount so lying in deposit defendants of the above special suit withdrew Rs. 35 0 on 16th June 1965. The result of all the above transactions was that a sum of Rs. 11 100 Is lying by way of deposit in the above Court to the credit of the above cause. Now it appears that during the pendency of the above litigation one Bai Jiji claiming to be an heir of one deceased Lallubhai apparently the predecessor-in-title of the two defendants in the special suit filed Suit No. 1310 of 1961 in the Court of the learned Civil Judge Junior Division Baroda for administering the properties of Lallubhai. That suit was dismissed and a regular Civil Appeal No. 433 of 1963 in the District Court at Baroda was also dismissed. Jijibai thereafter filed a second appeal in this Court bearing No. 453 of 1965. In that second appeal she got an order for stay restraining the defendants in the special suit from transferring the suit property as far as the interest of Jijibai was concerned. Jijibai thereafter filed a second appeal in this Court bearing No. 453 of 1965. In that second appeal she got an order for stay restraining the defendants in the special suit from transferring the suit property as far as the interest of Jijibai was concerned. This order is being interpreted by petitioner as a direction that the amount of Rs. 11 100 is not to be paid to the above two defendants so long as the above suit continues. We are not concerned in the present petition as to whether this particular interpretation of the stay order is correct or otherwise. From the facts aforesaid it will be noticed that at least from 16-6-65 till upto date the sum of Rs. 11 100 is lying idle in Court and that though petitioner has performed her part of the decretal direction she is not in a position to get the sale deed executed and to recover possession of the property. From the point of view of the defendants in the above suit also it is quite clear that the amount of Rs. 11 100 is lying in Court deposit idly without earning any interest. Therefore it appears that petitioner made an application on 24 September 1965 before the learned Civil Judge Senior Division Baroda requesting that the above amount of Rs. 11 100 be ordered to be invested in the Central Bank of India Baroda Branch for periods of six months at each time. On the same day the learned advocate for defendants made an endorsement below that application stating that he had no objection if the amount is deposited as prayed for by petitioner. However in spite of such consent the learned Judge rejected the application of petitioner for depositing the amount in the above bank by his order dated 28-9-65. That order is impugned in the present petition. In support of the above order the learned Judge has relied upon an endorsement made by this High Court on the administrative side below a letter of the Legal Department bearing No. CCD. 1063/5413 dated 22nd October 1963 by which the attention of the High Court was drawn to the provisions contained in Article 284 clause (a) [sic. clause (b)]. In support of the above order the learned Judge has relied upon an endorsement made by this High Court on the administrative side below a letter of the Legal Department bearing No. CCD. 1063/5413 dated 22nd October 1963 by which the attention of the High Court was drawn to the provisions contained in Article 284 clause (a) [sic. clause (b)]. He thought that the matter was administrative and because the objection raised by the Legal Department was endorsed by the High Court he was bound by the order made by the High Court on the administrative side. The grievance of Mr. Parghi is to some extent justified inasmuch as the learned Judge relied upon an administrative endorsement made by the High Court in a Judicial matter. The correct thing to do in such a case was for the learned Judge to interpret or to have regard to the provisions contained in Article 284 (b) and then pass a judicial order. Therefore in order to dispose of the present petition we have to turn to the provisions of Article 284 clause (b) which is relevant for the purposes of the present petition. Before reading Article 284 it is necessary to refer to the provisions of Article 283 clause (2 ). It is well-known that the Constitution contemplates three funds (1) consolidated fund (2) contingency fund and (3) a fund the amounts of which are to be credited to the public account. We are not concerned with the first two kinds of funds in the present petition. As regards the third kind of fund clause (2) of Article 283 makes a provision. But that provision is not in respect of all amounts which are to be deposited in public account fund but it deals only with those public moneys which are to be deposited to that account. Clause (2) of Article 283 inter alia deals with (1) custody (2) payment into the public account and (3) withdrawal thereof. In regard to all these three matters in respect of public moneys which are to be paid into public account clause (2) says that these matters and all other matters connected with or ancillary to such matters shall be regulated by law made by the Legislature of the State and until provision in that behalf is so made shall be regulated by rules made by the Governor of the State. Then comes Article 284 which is as follows:-284 All moneys received by or deposited with (a) any officer employed in connection with the affairs of a State in his capacity as such other than revenues or public moneys raised or received by the Government of the State. . . . or (b) any Court within the territory of India to the credit of any cause matter account or persons shall be paid within the public account of the Statenow there is no doubt whatsoever that this is a Constitutional direction which Courts are bound to carry out in regard to moneys received or deposited with them. The direction is clear and unambiguous. The direction is that all such moneys shall be paid into the public account of the State. Therefore in so far as petitioner applies to the Civil Court that the amount of Rs. 11 100 which is lying in deposit with that Court should be invested in a private bank the prayer is directly opposed to the provision contained in Article 284. From that standpoint undoubtedly the order of the learned Civil Judge is perfectly justified. But however there is one aspect of the matter which needs to be mentioned. It is noteworthy that whereas clause (2) of Article 283 which deals with public moneys contains provisions not only regarding payment of public moneys into the public account but also deals with the questions of their withdrawal and all other matters connected with or ancillary to the matters of custody payment and withdrawal Article 283 deals only with the subject of payment into the public account but does not deal with the question of withdrawal therefrom or other allied matters. The Constitution therefore has made a clear distinction between public moneys on the one hand and moneys which are received or deposited inter alia with Courts to the credit of matters mentioned in clause (b) in the matter of withdrawal thereof or such allied matters. There appears to be good reason behind this distinction. Whereas public moneys must be dealt with at all stages in accordance with law so far as non-public moneys are received or deposited obviously they cannot be dealt with at all stages by provision of law but must necessarily be dealt with according to the facts of each particular case. There appears to be good reason behind this distinction. Whereas public moneys must be dealt with at all stages in accordance with law so far as non-public moneys are received or deposited obviously they cannot be dealt with at all stages by provision of law but must necessarily be dealt with according to the facts of each particular case. Therefore the Courts of law are not precluded from passing proper orders in regard to investment of moneys which may lie idle before them provided of course in doing so they do not offend the provisions contained in Article 284 (b ). So long as moneys remain received by Court or deposited with it those moneys must remain in public account. But if on the facts of a particular case the parties want that the moneys should be invested in some other way then the Court is not entirely helpless in the matter provided the first step that it takes is that the moneys cease to have their character of receipt by or deposit with the Court. Now on the facts of the present case we cannot give any direction of the kind which petitioner wants. Petitioner as already stated is aggrieved by the order of the Court rejecting her application for depositing the moneys lying in Court as a deposit with a private bank. That obviously the Court cannot do. But in the present case if both the parties had agreed for the withdrawal of the amount and that way the amount were to cease to retain its character as a receipt or deposit then suitable order could have been passed by the Court. But as already stated petitioner is not inclined to have that recourse for some reason best known to herself. As we have already pointed out that petitioner has interpreted that stay order granted in Second Appeal No. 458 of 1965 as an injunction restraining the withdrawal of the above deposit. Under the circumstances in our judgment no order can be passed in favour of petitioner and the rule must be discharged. ( 3 ) RULE discharged. Rule discharged. .