Judgment :- 1. A short but interesting question has been raised in this second appeal by the plaintiff, who lost before both the lower courts. A few facts may be stated. 2. The appellant filed O. S. No. 755 of 1949 for eviction of the respondents with arrears of rent. The case arose in Hosdrug; and to that area the Malabar Tenancy Act and the Malabar Compensation for Tenants' Improvements Act were made applicable only in 1951. In 1952 the parties compromised the suit and a decree in terms of the compromise was passed. The decree provided that the respondents (the defendants in that suit) would surrender the property on receiving a sum of Rs. 2,400/- being the value of the improvements effected by them. It was also recited that the respondents gave up their right to claim benefits under the Malabar Tenancy (Amendment) Act of 1951 regarding fixity of tenure. Nevertheless, the appellant did not deposit the amount: on the other hand, she brought the present suit in 1959 for arrears of rent for one year. The lower courts have dismissed the suit on the ground that the appellant cannot claim arrears of rent since there is no provision in the compromise decree for claiming arrears of rent or mesne profits, the appellant's only remedy being to deposit the amount mentioned in the compromise decree and recover possession of the property. The short question for consideration is whether that decision can be sustained. 3. At the time when the compromise decree was passed both the Malabar Tenancy Act and the Compensation for Tenants' Improvements Act applied to Hosdrug. In other words, the tenant could have then claimed fixity of tenure and also value of improvements if he chose to surrender. He could have also claimed 10 remain in possession until the value of improvements was paid. The relevant portions of the compromise petition may now be extracted: "That the defendants hereby agree to surrender possession of the suit property to the plaintiff on receiving a sum of Rs. 2,400/- being the value of improvements effected by them in the property." "The defendants hereby give up their right to claim the benefits under the Malabar Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1951 regarding fixity of tenure as they are now satisfied that it is in their best interests and more beneficial to them to receive the value of improvements amounting to Rs. 2,400/- being the value of improvements effected by them in the property." "The defendants hereby give up their right to claim the benefits under the Malabar Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1951 regarding fixity of tenure as they are now satisfied that it is in their best interests and more beneficial to them to receive the value of improvements amounting to Rs. 2,400/- and to surrender possession of the suit property to the plaintiff. The defendants, therefore, have no objection for a decree for recovery of possession of the suit property being passed in favour of the second plaintiff. The second plaintiff will deposit Rs. 2,400/- into court towards the value of improvements due to the defendants". The first clause shows that the respondents agreed to surrender possession or receiving a sum of Rs. 2,400/-, which means that until the amount was deposited the relationship between the parties would remain unaffected. In other word; until the agreed amount was deposited, the tenancy was not terminated. Putting the idea again differently, the compromise decree did not put an end to the relationship of landlord and tenant. It follows that if the amount was not deposited, the landlord and tenant relationship continued. 4. The position in law appears also to be the same, because under S.5 of the Compensation for Tenants' Improvements Act the possession of the tenant does not become unlawful or that of a trespasser on the passing of the decree. In other words, he continues to be a tenant until his improvements are paid for. If the tenant remains a tenant, can it be said that the landlord is no landlord? Obviously not. If the tenant makes further improvements on the property before the amount is deposited, he will be entitled to claim value for the same. The only bar against him will be that the improvements already assessed by agreement at Rs. 2,400/-will not be revalued. The further improvements effected by him and the further value of the same improvements due to their change of condition will have to be paid. Until the said amounts are deposited, the tenant is entitled to continue in possession as tenant. Then also it must follow that the appellant is a landlord. 5. In this connection, the analogy of a second suit for redemption of a mortgage may be usefully considered. Until the said amounts are deposited, the tenant is entitled to continue in possession as tenant. Then also it must follow that the appellant is a landlord. 5. In this connection, the analogy of a second suit for redemption of a mortgage may be usefully considered. The law is that if a mortgagor obtains a decree for redemption and the same gets barred, he can file a fresh suit for redemption so long as the mortgage is alive. It will also be instructive to consider the decision of the Privy Council in Mt. Maina Bibi v. Chaudhti Vakil Ahmad (AIR. 1925 PC. 63). In that case when a Mahomedan widow was lawfully in possession of the property left by her husband, his heirs brought a suit for recovery of possession alleging that the mahar was paid; but the court found that it was not paid. The court passed a conditional decree that on payment of a particular amount as the balance of mahar within a stated time the widow should surrender possession of the property. The amount was not deposited within the time; and the widow dealt with the property stating that she acquired absolute title to it on the failure of the condition to deposit the balance of mahar by the heirs of the husband. The heirs brought a second suit for recovery of possession and the Privy Council observed that on the failure of the heirs to deposit the mahar as directed in the decree the possession of the widow did not become adverse to the heirs. I am of opinion that the same principle must apply to the present case. For one thing, if the amount agreed upon in the compromise decree is not deposited and the decree becomes barred, there cannot be any doubt that a second suit for recovery of possession will lie on the analogy of a second suit for redemption of a mortgage and on the principle laid down by the Privy Council in the decision cited; the possession of the respondents after the decree would not have been adverse to the appellant. The only further question is whether in such a case the landlord can claim rent after the compromise decree. The only further question is whether in such a case the landlord can claim rent after the compromise decree. It is certainly reasonable to hold that the landlord cannot rely on the compromise decree for recovery of possession and also ask for arrears of rent or mesne profits, if there is no provision in the decree for arrears of rent or mesne profits; she will not be allowed to blow hot and cold. But, if the relationship of landlord and tenant is not put an end to by the compromise decree, both parties can rely upon that relationship and claim their respective rights as landlord and as tenant. Since I have already held that the relationship of landlord and tenant has not come to an end by the mere passing of the compromise decree, it must follow that the appellant is entitled to claim arrears of rent. This naturally means that if the respondents claim fixity of tenure under the existing law, they will be entitled to it. 6. Then about the rate of rent. The appellant claimed 71/2 paras of paddy as the annual rent; but both the lower courts have concurrently held that the annual rent is only Rs. 6/-. That finding is confirmed. 7. In the result, the concurrent decision of the lower courts is set aside and the suit is decreed. A decree for Rs. 6/- is passed. In the circumstances, I direct both parties to bear their respective costs throughout. Allowed.