JUDGMENT B. Dayalm, J. - This case has been referred to a Division Bench by a learned single Judge as important questions of law were involved. One Nanhey had two sons, Sheocharan and Ganga Prasad. Sheo Charan died in February, 1952 and Ganga Prasad claiming to be the heir of Sheo Charan filed the present suit for a declaration that he was a cobhumidhar with Smt. Rao Rani who was the widow of Tulsiram a collateral of his father Nanhey. After the death of Nanhey, it has been found by the courts below that his property was inherited by Smt. Rao Rani. Sheo Charan became familiar with Smt. Rao Rani and it appears, he used to help her in cultivation etc. In 1949 Sheo Charan made an application for grant of a joint sanad in his name and in the name of Smt. Rao Rani on which Smt. Rao Rani is stated to have given her consent. But this fact is disputed before us, the application was granted and two sanads were issued in the joint name of Sheo Charan and Smt. Rao Rani in respect of different plots. After the death of Sheo Charan the present suit was filed and Smt. Rao Rani denied that Sheo Charan had any interest in the plots in dispute and that in any case, he not being a co-tenant with her could not acquire the privileges given under Act No. X of 1949. She also contended that she had made full payment for obtaining the sanad and that she had adopted Sheo Charan so that after his death, she alone was his heir as his mother. The trial court held that the Plaintiff was a co bhumidhar with the Defendant after rejecting all the defence raised by Smt. Rao Rani. Smt. Rao Rani then filed an appeal which was heard by the Addl. Civil Judge. The lower appellate court agreed with the trial court that the adoption of Sheo Charan by Sm. Rao Rani was not proved but held that Sheo Charan was not a co-tenant with Smt. Rao Rani under the UP Tenancy Act as the consent of the landholder had not been obtained for making him a co-tenant and any entry in his name in the revenue records was of no avail. Rao Rani was not proved but held that Sheo Charan was not a co-tenant with Smt. Rao Rani under the UP Tenancy Act as the consent of the landholder had not been obtained for making him a co-tenant and any entry in his name in the revenue records was of no avail. The lower appellate court also repelled the contention that on account of obtaining a declaration u/s 3-B of Act No. X of 1949, Sheo Charan became a cobhumidhar. It has been held that Sheo Charan had no right to make an application under those sections and no rights could be conferred on him. It also held that the consent of Smt. Rao Rani had not been given in writing and in any case, even if Sheo Charan had a right to make an application under the aforesaid sections, he could not get the sanad. On these findings, the appeal was allowed and the Plaintiff's suit was dismissed. Against this decree, the present Second Appeal has been filed. 2. The first contention raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellant is that u/s 3-B of Act No. X of 1949 Sheo Charan, by making an application with the consent of Smt. Rao Rani, could become a co-bhumidhar and the lower appellate court was wrong in coming to a different conclusion. It is conceded that he was not a co tenant before the sanad. The second question that has been argued is that Smt. Rao Rani had given her statement on the application and this statement was her consent in writing within the meaning of the section which had been duly proved on the record and the court below was wrong in holding that Smt. Rao Rani had not given her consent in writing as required by the Act. 3. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties at a considerable length and we have come to the conclusion that the court below was right in holding that Sheo Charan not being a co-tenant with Smt. Rao Rani under the UP Tenancy Act could not acquire the privileges under Act No. X of 1949 and it is, therefore, unnecessary to go into the second question. 4. 4. In 1949 when the UP ZA and LR Act was being drafted and zamindari was about to be abolished, the question before the Government was of acquiring funds for paying compensation to the zamindars whose interests were being taken over by the Government and since new rights were being conferred upon the tillers of the soil, the Government thought it convenient to pass the UP Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act X of 1949 for permitting the tenants to deposit ten times their annual rental in order to acquire special privileges in their tenancy holdings. The main benefits which the tenants were to get under the Act, are mentioned in Section 7 of the Act, namely, (i) that the tenant would not be liable to ejectment and (ii) that the rent payable was to be reduced fifty per cent. Persons who could make an application for acquisition of the privileges were originally mentioned in Section 3 of the Act as follows: "A tenant holding on special terms in Avadh and ex-proprietary tenant and occupancy tenant or a hereditary tenant of Land...." Under this section, therefore, only persons who were tenants of the land had privileges of making a deposit of ten times their annual rental. Obviously difficulties must have arisen in cases where persons were joint tenants but their names were not actually on the revenue record and in order to quickly dispose of the applications involving tenants whose names were not on the revenue record, a summary procedure was introduced by Sections 3-B and 3-C thereof by Amending Act No. VII of 1950 Section 3B with which we are mainly concerned is reproduced below: 3-B (1) Any person claiming to be entitled as co-tenant of holding along with the recorded tenants thereof but whose name is not recorded in the record of rights relating thereto may apply u/s 3 for a declaration in respect of the whole of the holding or his share therein. (2) No application Under Sub-section (1) shall be granted unless the tenants whose names are recorded in the record of rights give their consent in writing. (2) No application Under Sub-section (1) shall be granted unless the tenants whose names are recorded in the record of rights give their consent in writing. (3) If the application is allowed, the Assistant Collector shall order the name of the Applicant to be recorded as co-tenant and all the provisions of Sections 4 to 16 shall apply to him as if he had been a tenant whose name was already entered in the record of rights. 5. On the phraseology of the above section, it is quite clear that this section merely provides a procedure to summarily dispose of cases where tenants whose names are not on the record make an application for acquiring the privileges. Sub-section (1) authorises such persons to make an application u/s 3 so that it is assumed that these persons are tenants and are entitled to make an application u/s 3 of the Act. Moreover, the section provides that the person must be claiming to be entitled as a tenant. He cannot, therefore, be a person who has absolutely no claim to be a co-tenant. Section 6 authorises the Assistant Collector before whom the application is presented to make an enquiry "regarding the merits of the case". Thus the Applicant u/s 3-B has to claim to be entitled as a co-tenant and the Assistant Collector as to make an enquiry as to the correctness of this application. It cannot, therefore, be contended with any reason that the legislature wanted a person who had absolutely no right to make false allegations that he had a claim to be a joint tenant and the Assistant Collector after an enquiry having come to the conclusion that he had no claim to be a joint tenant, would still grant the application and allow him to be a joint tenant. The contention of the earned counsel for the Appellant that any person can apply under this section to be granted a sanad jointly with the tenant and it is not necessary that such a person should also be a co-tenant from before, has no legs to stand. Moreover, Sub-section (1) quoted above goes on to say that the person who has made an application should be a person whose name is not recorded. Moreover, Sub-section (1) quoted above goes on to say that the person who has made an application should be a person whose name is not recorded. This also necessarily means that the Applicant is a person whose name should normally be on the record along with other co-tenants whose names are recorded but in fact his name is not there. This phrase cannot possibly apply to a person who was not a co-tenant and whose name could not be on the record. The language of Sub-section (1) therefore makes it quite clear that the Applicant u/s 3-B can only be a person who was in fact a co-tenant but whose name was not on the record and he was therefore permitted to make an application u/s 3 as a tenant. Sub-section (2) makes a further condition necessary that co-tenants whose names are on the record must consent in writing to the inclusion of the name of the Applicant before the application can be granted. The reason is obvious. This deposit of ten times the annual rental under the Act was not intended to start an elaborate enquiry into the rights of those persons whose names were not on the record and consequently a summary procedure was prescribed Under Sub-section (2) of Section 3-B so that in cases where recorded co-tenants did not agree to the inclusion of the name of the Applicant the application would be rejected and the Applicant would be left free to file a regular suit and get his rights declared. 6. In this connection Section 7-A is also relevant and it provides: "No person shall by virtue of any declaration made u/s 6 be entitled to any larger share in the holding than to which he is otherwise entitled and notwithstanding the declaration the interest of any other tenant in the holding shall continue unaffected." This section assures that by obtaining a sanad under the summary procedure, the real rights of the co-tenants will not be affected. If a sanad is wrongly issued by the summary procedure, the rights of the other co-tenants will not be affected so that the sanad by itself is not meant to vest any new rights in any person which he did not possess before the sanad was granted. If a sanad is wrongly issued by the summary procedure, the rights of the other co-tenants will not be affected so that the sanad by itself is not meant to vest any new rights in any person which he did not possess before the sanad was granted. Section 12 of the Act provides for an application for cancellation of a sanad granted u/s 6 in case it was obtained fraudulently or by making false allegations or on account of the fact that the rights of the parties had been declared by a competent court which were inconsistent with the sanad. Thus Section 7-A and Section 12 of the Act combined together leave no doubt that the sanad was not intended to create any rights whatsoever in favour of persons who were not tenants. 7. Learned Counsel for the Appellant, however, contended that the difference of language between Sections 3-B and 3-C indicates that Section 3-B was meant to create new rights in favour of persons who were not co-tenants in fact, but Section 3-C was intended to apply only to those persons who were already co-tenants before the application. The contention is that in Section 3-C the words used are "in case of a holding belonging jointly to two or more persons as tenants but the name of some of the tenants being entered in the record of rights, the person recorded may in the application u/s 3 require the Assistant Collector to grant a declaration in favour jointly of himself and such person". The contention is that here the phraseology makes it quite clear that the person whose name was sought to be added in the sanad was in fact a person who was the joint tenant of the holding but whose name was not on the record. If the legislature intended that Section 3-B should also apply only to those persons who were already joint tenants, it could use the same phraseology. We have considered this argument of the learned Counsel but we think that although the phraseology is different but the intention of the legislature is not different. Section 3-B applied to a case where the person whose name was not on record made an application. We have considered this argument of the learned Counsel but we think that although the phraseology is different but the intention of the legislature is not different. Section 3-B applied to a case where the person whose name was not on record made an application. In his case, therefore, he would come with an allegation only that he was a co-tenant and therefore it was provided that a person claiming to be entitled as a co-tenant could make an application. Of course this claim was to be investigated and found correct and was to be agreed to by the other recorded co-tenants. But in the case of an application u/s 3-C, the application was to be made by the recorded co-tenants and the recorded co-tenants would naturally state that somebody else was also a co-tenant whose name was not recorded. A different phraseology was therefore used and this difference does not lead to the conclusion that Section 3-B was meant to enable the strangers to make an application for being granted the privilege under the Act as co-tenants. If the legislature so intended, there was difficulty in merely saying that any person could make an application u/s 3 to be joint co-tenant in the sanad if the recorded co-tenants agreed. If this was the intention of the legislature, it would not have expected the Applicant to make a false claim of being a co-tenant, as the section at present requires. 8. Lastly, it is also note-worthy that this Act was passed in order to confer privileges upon existing tenants and not to create new tenancies. The preamble to this Act runs as follows: "Whereas it is expedient to provide for payment by tenants with a view to facilitate the abolition of zamindari...." The preamble also clearly specifies that the Act was meant for the benefit of tenants only and not to confer rights on strangers. We are, therefore, of the opinion that u/s 3-B of the Act only a person who is a co-tenant is authorised to make an application and in the present case Sheo Charan was not a co-tenant when he made an application and he, therefore, could not acquire any privileges under the Act. The court below was, therefore, right in coming to that conclusion. 9. Learned Counsel has brought to our notice two single judge cases of this Court in which a different view was expressed. The court below was, therefore, right in coming to that conclusion. 9. Learned Counsel has brought to our notice two single judge cases of this Court in which a different view was expressed. The first is the case of Noor Mohd. and Anr. v. Mohd Qasim 1963 AWR 312. In that case, the Plaintiff had made a joint application with one Kalandar stating that both of them were joint tenants of the plots in dispute and the necessary joint sanad was granted and the question was whether the Plaintiff could get any privileges under the Act. The learned Judge went on to observe that originally u/s 3 of the Act, an application could be made only by persons mentioned therein but by addition of Section 3-B the position changed and any person claiming to be entitled as a co-tenant of the holding was permitted to make an application and the learned Judge, therefore, held that the expression 'claiming to be entitled as a co-tenant' is quite distinct and different from the expression 'entitled as a co-tenant'. Merely upon a consideration of this phrase 'claiming to be entitled as a co-tenant' the learned Judge held that it was not necessary for the person so claiming to be in fact a co-tenant. We have carefully considered this phraseology used in the section and are clearly of the opinion that it was not intended that persons having no claim could make a false claim and become co-tenants. We do not agree with the view expressed in that case. This case was followed by another learned single Judge in Siddiq Ahmad and Ors. v. Zahur Ali and Ors. Second Appeal No. 172 of 1960. He did not scrutinise the provisions of the Act but merely followed Noor Mohd.'s case mentioned above. On the basis of these decisions and some observations of the Board of Revenue, it was contended that on the principle of stare decisis the law having been settled in one way should not be unsettled even though another view was possible. So far as the Board of Revenue is concerned, we have noted that there is a conflict of decisions. In Saggu v. Chhajju 1956 AWR Rev. 94, one member of the Board of Revenue held that the section was not meant to create new rights in favour of strangers. So far as the Board of Revenue is concerned, we have noted that there is a conflict of decisions. In Saggu v. Chhajju 1956 AWR Rev. 94, one member of the Board of Revenue held that the section was not meant to create new rights in favour of strangers. In the same year, a Division Bench of the Board of Revenue came to a different conclusion. The only decision of this Court came in 1963 long after all the applications u/s 3-B of the Act had been made and disposed of by the subordinate courts. Thus neither the transactions of the parties nor most of the decisions of subordinate courts have been guided by these pronouncements and we see no reason not to upset the conclusion which is clearly untenable. 10. Apart from the question of law discussed above, in the present case the application which was given by Sheo Charan has not been produced before this Court. It is not even known whether he made any claim for joint tenancy in that application and it so, on what basis. In the absence of any proof that Sheocharan applied claiming to be the joint tenant even the plain words of the section are not satisfied. It was for the Plaintiff who claimed to be the successor of Sheocharan, to prove that Sheocharan was the person who was entitled to get the privilege and had rightly acquired the same. The burden was there upon the Plaintiff to prove all the facts necessarily to establish the right of Sheocharan. The application of Sheocharan not having been filed in court, it cannot be assumed that he made all the relevant allegations in his application. This ground was alone sufficient to dismiss the suit. 11. The result therefore is that we see no force in this appeal and dismiss the same. But we direct the parties to bear their own costs, as was done by the courts below.