This is an appeal filed by the Union Territory of Tripura and the Superintendent of Police, Tripura, against the judgment and decree of the Subordi­nate Judge, Tripura dated 30-9-1959 in Civil Suit No. 115 of 1954 declaring that the res­pondent Shri Abinash Chandra Gautam con­tinues to be a member of Tripura Police Force in the rank of junior Sub-Inspector of Police (A.S.I.) and directing the appel­lants to pay him a sum of Rs. 10,564 towards arrears of salary, D.A., Compensatory allow­ance and cash allowance from 1-5-1952 to 30-9-1959. (2) Shorn of all details, which are no longer necessary for the purpose of the pre­sent appeal, the brief facts of the case are as hereunder: The respondent, who is a graduate and who was workin0 as a teacher in a local Government school in Agartala, was first appointed as Sub-Inspector of Police in July 1949 by the second appellant. Subse­quently, he was posted as junior Sub-Ins­pector of Police with effect from 2-1-1951 on a monthly salary of Rs. 60. He was given the honorary rank of Sub-Inspector with effect from the said date and was pro­moted as Sub-Inspector on 9-9-1951. But, on 1-10-1951 the second appellant reduced him to his substantive rank of junior Sub-In=pertor with effect from that date. The respondent appealed to the Chief Commis­sioner of Tripura against the order of re­version. But, his appeal was rejected on 22-5-1952. After the respondent served for sometime, the second appellant passed an order on 8-7-1952 discharging the res­pondent from service (3) On 2-12-1952 the respondent filed T. S No 4:7 of 1952 in the lower Court under Sectioi 42 of the Indian Specific Relief Act (Act I of 1877) against the appellants here­in for declaration that the orders of rever­sion and discharge passed by the second ap­pellant or 1-10-1951 and 8-7-1952 were void, illegal and inoperative, that the respondent continued to remain a member of the Tri­pura Police Service in the rank of Sub-Ins­pector of Police and for other reliefs which the Court might deem fit to grant. He paid fixed court-fee of Rs 10 on the ground that the suit was for a declaration pure and sim­ple. The appellants filed written statements and contested the suit. He paid fixed court-fee of Rs 10 on the ground that the suit was for a declaration pure and sim­ple. The appellants filed written statements and contested the suit. The learned Sub­ordinate Judge decreed the suit with costs on 21-3-1955 against both the appellants and also made a direction that the respondent was entitled to the arrears of his salary for the period for which his salary was with­held. (4) The defendants-appellants herein carried the matter in appeal to the District Court, Tripura in Civil Appeal 48 of 1955. The learned District Judge thoroughly dis­cussed the facts and the evidence and allow­ed the appeal in part on 4-1-1958. He set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court in part and remanded the suit to it with directions that the trial Court should give the respondent an opportunity to amend the plaint by adding reliefs which he could have claimed, that the trial Court should decree the suit in part by declaring that the respondent remained a member of the Tri­pura Police Force not in the rank of the Sub-Inspector but in the rank of the junior Sub-Inspector of Police on the date of the institution of the suit and that the trial Court should pass a decree for consequential re­liefs, if proved or otherwise maintainable. Thus, the learned District Judge set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court, in so far as the latter held that the respon­dent continued to be a member of the Tri­pura Police Force in the rank of the Sub-Inspector of Police and that the second ap­pellant's order dated 1-10-1951 reverting the respondent to his permanent post was illegal But. the District Judge upheld the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge that the respondent continued to be a member of the Tripura Police Force in his substantive post, namely, the rank of the junior Sub-Inspector of Police. (5) Alter remand, the respondent am­ended the claim in pursuance of an order of the trial Court dated 11-9-58. The res­pondent prayed for conseauential relief for a decree for arrears of salary from May, 1952 until the date of his reinstatement. (5) Alter remand, the respondent am­ended the claim in pursuance of an order of the trial Court dated 11-9-58. The res­pondent prayed for conseauential relief for a decree for arrears of salary from May, 1952 until the date of his reinstatement. The appellant1 filed additional written statement contending inter alia that the claim of the respondent for arrears of salary was barr­ed by limitation The learned Subordinate Judge held that he considered the plea of limitation raised by the appellants in his earlier judgment dated 21-3-1955 and pass­ed a decree declaring that the respondent remained a member of the Tripura Police Force in the rank of the junior Sub-Inspec­tor of Police on the date of institution of the suit He passed a further decree for payment of Rt,. 10.564 towards arrears of salary. D A.. C.A and cash allowance from 1-5-1952 to 30-9-1959 and directed the ap­pellants to pay the same to the respondent with costs He directed the respondent to pay additional court-fee upon the amount decreed Hence the present appeal by the two defendants in the suit (6) So far as the declaratory decree granted by the learned Subordinate Judge that the respondent continued to be a mem­ber-of the Tripura Police Force in the rank of the junior Sub-Inspector of Police is con­cerned, the learned Counsel for the appel­lants stated that the appellants have no grievance and that they did not file the pre­sent appeal challenging the said declaratory decree. In fact, the appellants would not be entitled to challenge the same, because the learned Subordinate Judge passed the decree in pursuance of the observation made by the learned District Judge in Civil Ap­peal No. 48 of 1955, against the judgment and decree in which the appellants wherein did not prefer any second appeal. So, the judgment and decree of the District Judge and the Subordinate Judge that the respon­dent continued to be a member of Tripura Police Force in the rank of the junior Sub-Inspector (now A. S. I.) of Police on 2-12-1952, the date of the institution of the suit, stand (7) The contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants with regard to the arrears of salary etc. decreed against them are three-fold. His first contention is that the respondent should have filed a separate suit for arrears of salary etc. decreed against them are three-fold. His first contention is that the respondent should have filed a separate suit for arrears of salary etc. and that they cannot be determined in the suit, as in the case of mesne profits under Order 20 Rule 12, C. P. C. Obviously, Order 20 Rule 12, C P. C. does not apply, as the suit was not for recovery of immovable property and mesne profits. According to the learn­ed counsel for the respondent. Order 7 Rule 7 C. P. C. applies. It is a general provision, under which the Court may always grant the parties such reliefs as it deems fit. But. so far as arrears of salary which accrued prior to the suit are concerned, the claim can be made as 3 consequential relief in a suit for declaration under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. However, regarding the claim for arrears, which accrued pen-dente lite it is doubtful whether it can be made in the suit itself. The proper remedy would be a separate suit. But, as evidence was adduced and as the litigation is pending since 1952 I do not propose to drive the res­pondent to another suit. (8) The second contention of the learn­ed counsel for the appellants is that by 11-9-1958, the date of the amendment of the plaint, under which the respondent claimed arrears of salary etc. his claim was barred by limitation under Article 102 of the then prevailing Indian Limitation Act (Act IX of 1908) as the respondent must be held to have made his claim for the first time on 11-9-1958 for arrears of salary and that his claim to the same could be in time only for a period of 3 years prior to that date. The respondent had filed the Title Suit No. 47 of 1952 on 2-12-1952 So, 5 years 9 months and 9 days elapsed from the date of the institution of the plaint, when the respon­dent amended the same claiming the relief of arrears of salary etc. The respondent had filed the Title Suit No. 47 of 1952 on 2-12-1952 So, 5 years 9 months and 9 days elapsed from the date of the institution of the plaint, when the respon­dent amended the same claiming the relief of arrears of salary etc. The learned Sub­ordinate Judge framed issue No. 1 after remand raising the contention of the ap­pellants that the relief for recovery of ar­rears of salary was barred by limitation and observed in his judgment after remand that he disposed of the contentions of the parties regarding the said issue in his previous judg­ment dated 21-3-1955 and that the appel­lants advocate did not press the same. A perusal of his judgment dated 21-3-1955 shows that he never considered the question of limitation and that his observation that he considered it in his previous judgment is not correct. (9) The respondent filed T. S. No. 47 of 1952 for a simple declaration under S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act (Act I of 1877) that the orders dated 1-10-1951 and 8-7-1952 passed by the second appellant were void, illegal and inoperative and that he continu­ed to be a member of the Tripura Police Service. He paid a fixed court-fee of Rs. 10 on the ground that he prayed for a mere declaration pure and simple. Under the proviso to Section 42 of the Indian Specific Relief Act, no Court shall make any de­claration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so The respondent omitted to pray for the consequential re­lief for nayment of the arrears of salary. Under the proviso to Section 42 of the Indian Specific Relief Act, no Court shall make any de­claration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so The respondent omitted to pray for the consequential re­lief for nayment of the arrears of salary. The learned District Judge considered this aspect of the case in his iudgment in Civil Appeal No. 48 of 1955 and repelled the con­tention of the respondent's Advocate that on account of the decision of the Privy Council in High Commissioners for India & Pakistan v. I. M. Lall, 52 Cal WN 761 = (AIR 1948 PC 121) which laid down that a dis­missed Government servant was not entitl­ed to recover arrears of Day, the respon­dent did not pray for the consequential re­lief for payment of arrears of salary, but that the said decision was overruled by the Supreme Court in the State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid, AIR 1954 SC 245 but that there was a decision to the contra in Pun­jab Province v Tara Chand, AIR 1947 FC 23 and that, therefore there was no justifi­cation for the respondent in omitting to claim the consequential relief for payment of arrears of salary. The District Judge ob­served that instead of dismissing the suit he wanted to give an opportunity to the respondent to amend the claim to pray for the consequential relief for payment of ar­rears of salary, if it was otherwise main­tainable. (10) The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the claim of the respondent for recovery of arrears of salary by way of the consequential relief is governed by Article 102 of the Indian Limi­tation Act (Act IX of 1908) is supported by a direct authority in AIR 1947 FC 23 which is on all four1- with the facts of the present case. In that case the respondent, who was appointed a-? Sub Inspector of Police, was illegally dismissed from service After ex­hausting his remedies in the department, he filed a suit on 14-4-1942 against the Punjab Province for declaration that the order of the Superintendent of Police dismissing him from service was void and of no effect. In that case the respondent, who was appointed a-? Sub Inspector of Police, was illegally dismissed from service After ex­hausting his remedies in the department, he filed a suit on 14-4-1942 against the Punjab Province for declaration that the order of the Superintendent of Police dismissing him from service was void and of no effect. He further claimed arrears of pay from 20-3-1938 to 2-1-1941 The Federal Court held that the order of dismissal of the respondent was illegal being contrary to the provisions of Section 240(2) of the Constitution Act (which corresponds to the present Article 311 of the Constitution of India). The Fede­ral Court further held that the consequen­tial relief for payment of arrears of salary was governed by Art. 102, which prescribed a period of 3 years, since Art. 102 applied to suits for wages, not otherwise provided for by the Sch 1 and covered a suit to recover arrears of pay Their Lordships repelled the contention that the residuary Art. 120, which prescribed a period of 6 years in cases, not otherwise provided for in the Schedule I was applicable, inasmuch as the period of limitation for a suit to recover ar­rears of pay was provided for in Art. 102. This decision was followed by the Nagpur High Court in Provincial Government, Cen­tral Provinces and Berar v. Shamshul Hus-sain, AIR 1949 Nag 118. So, the claim of the respondent to recover arrears of salary etc. for a period beyond 3 years from 11-9-1958 was barred by limitation i.e. he would be entitled to the pay etc. (if legally admis­sible) from 11-9-1955. (11) The contention of the learned coun­sel for the respondent is that the amend­ment would relate back to 2-12-1952, the date of the institution of the suit and that the period of limitation for recovery of ar­rears of salary is 6 years under Art. 120 of the Limitation Act (Act IX of 1908), which was also applicable to the suit itself, which was filed for declaration under S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, (Act I of 1877). That an amendment can be allowed under O. 6, R. 17, C. P. C provided a totally different, new and inconsistent case is not introduced or substituted for another or where the character of the suit is not changed is clear from a decision of this Court reported in Bideshi Noonia v Sjkta Sovarani Ghua, AIR 1958 Tri 3fi. In the present case the Sub­ordinate Judge allowed the respondent to amend the claim on account of the judg­ment and decree of the District Judge in Civil Appeal No. 48 of 1955. But, the Dis­trict Judge was aware of the fact that there might be possible objections and therefore stated in his judgment that the Subordi­nate Judge should give opportunity to the respondent to add the consequential reliefs by way of amendment, if they were other­wise maintainable So, the Subordinate Judge was bound to consider the question of limitation raised by the appellants. The only decision relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent in support of his contention that Art. 120 of the Lim. Act of 1908 would govern a declaratory suit with a consequential relief for payment of arrears of salary in Ranjit Kumar v. State of West Bengal, 62 Cal WN 622= ( AIR 1958 Cal 551 ). It can be seen from the judgment at pages 632 and 633 that the Counsel for the Government argued that Art. 115 and not Art. 120 would apply to a case for recovery of arrears of salary Mallick J. repelled that argument and held that Art. 120 of the Lim. Act would apply. But the decision of the Federal Court which is binding on all the High Courts, reported in AIR 1947 FC 23 was neither cited nor referred to in the judgment. The Federal Court discussed at page 29 the applicability of the relevant Articles namely, Articles 102, 115, 120 and 131 of the Sch. I of the Indian Limitation Act (Act IX of 1908) and held that out of these Articles Art. 102 alone would apply. The Federal Court held that Articles 115 and 120 would not apply. So, with due respect, the above ruling of Mallick J. cannot be said to be correct. I of the Indian Limitation Act (Act IX of 1908) and held that out of these Articles Art. 102 alone would apply. The Federal Court held that Articles 115 and 120 would not apply. So, with due respect, the above ruling of Mallick J. cannot be said to be correct. It cannot apply to a suit for recovery of arrears of salary, even though it is a suit for declaration under S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act (Act I of 1877) with a consequential relief for payment of arrears of salary. As such, the claim of the res­pondent made in the amended plaint for payment of arrears of salary for the period prior to 11-9-1955 is barred by limitation. (12) The third contention of the learn­ed Counsel for the appellants is that the res­pondent did not file any report before the appellants to permit him to join, that he did not join in service, but that, on the other hand, he has been working as a school teacher in Pragati School in Agartala from about 1-1-1955 on a monthly salary of Rs. 100. After remand, the respondent was recalled and examined. He deposed that, after he obtained the decree in the trial Court, he reported himself to the second appellant Superintendent of Police for neces­sary orders, but that the second appellant informed him after one month that the Gov­ernment intended to file an appeal and that after the disposal of the appeal, necessary orders would be issued to him. He further deposed in his cross-examination that after the disposal of appeal the second appellant did not inform him anything and that the respondent also did not file any report be­fore the second appellant. So, there is noth­ing on record to show that the respondent filed an\ report before the second appel­lant .after the suit was decreed in the first instance by the trial Court and that the second appellant refused to permit him to join. Admittedly, after the disposal of the Civil Appeal No. 48 of 1955, the respondent did not file any report before the appel­lants seeking their permission to allow him to join (13) On the other hand, there is the ad­mission of the respondent as P. W. 1 in his cross-examination that from about 1-1-1955 he is working as a School teacher in Pragati School in Agartala. He stated that he was discharged from service on 11-5-1952. that for about 2? years thereafter he has been serving as teacher in Pragati School at Agartala, that at first he was appointed on monthly salary of Rs. 70 that the School sent him in Calcutta for B. T. training and that he is now drawing a monthly salary of Rs. 100 since 20-8-1959. So. from 1-1-1955 the respondent is working as a teacher in a School. Under Rule 12(1) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules of 1955, no Government Servant shall except with the previous sanction of the Government, engage directly or indirectly, in any trade or busi­ness or undertake any employment. But, under the proviso to the said sub-rule (1) a Government servant may, without such sanction, undertake honorary work of soci­al or charitable nature or occasional work of a literary, artistic or scientific character subject to the condition that his official duties do not thereby suffer. But, in the present case the respondent did not take the permission of the Government to work as a teacher in the school. As such, though ac­cording to the judgments and decrees pass­ed by the Subordinate Judge and the Dis­trict Judge, he continued to be a member of the Tripura Police Force in the cadre of the A. S. I. he must be said to have ceas­ed to be so by contravening Rule 12(1) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules and by working as a teacher in a school without the permission of the appellants. (14) The learned Counsel for the res­pondent contended that the appellants did not take up this plea in their additional written statements and that in the absence of any such plea the evidence regarding it cannot be considered. He relied on Siddik Mahomed Shah v Mt. Saran, AIR 1930 PC 57 (1), where it was held that where a claim has been never made in the defence present­ed, no amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was never put for­ward. The appellant's Counsel stated that the appellants were not aware of the appointment of the respondent as a school teacher that therefore, they could not take up any such plea in their additional written statements and that under Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act an admitted fact need not be proved. The appellant's Counsel stated that the appellants were not aware of the appointment of the respondent as a school teacher that therefore, they could not take up any such plea in their additional written statements and that under Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act an admitted fact need not be proved. The appellants might not have known that the respondent is working as a teacher. But, his categorical and doubtless admission that he is working as a teacher since about 1-1-1955. cannot be ignored. The learned Counsel for the respondent further contended that some school teachers earn money by taking up private tuitions, but that thereby they are not deprived of their salaries and that, therefore, the respondent who was out of Government service had to eke out his livelihood by working as a teacher. This analogy does not hold good in the case of a Government servant, since he is enjoined to take the permission of the Government to carry on some other pro­fession (under Rule 12 (1) of the aforesaid Rules) other than his official Government duties. In equity, the respondent cannot claim salary etc from the appellants, when he has been drawing the same under ano­ther employer. So. he is not entitled to claim any salary from the Government from 1-1-1955. (15) Thus, the claim of the respondent for arrears of salary from 1-1-1955 to 11-9-1955 is not maintainable and his claim for the arrears for the subsequent period upto 11-9-1958 is barred by limitation. Since he is still continuing to be a teacher, his fur­ther claim from 11-9-1958 is also barred. (16) Then remains the decree passed by the lower Court for arrears of salary from 1-5-1952 to 2-12-1952. the date of the insti­tution of the suit i. e. for a period of 7 months prior to the suit. The respondent claimed the said arrears also by his amen-ed claim made on 11-9-1958 So. this was also barred by limitation (17) As such, the respondent is not en­titled to any decree for any arrears of sal­ary or D.A. or compensatory allowance or cash allowance (18) In the result, the judgment and decree of the lower Court regarding the ar­rears of salary are set aside and the ap­peal is allowed in part accordingly. Under the circumstances of the case. I direct the parties to bear their respective costs. TC/D.VC. Appeal allowed in part.