JUDGMENT R. Chandra, J. - This is a defendant's appeal, and arises out of a suit for arrears of rent, mesne profits and ejectment. 2. N. Sultan Zamani Begam filed the suit for ejectment of the defendant from the house situate in Kandhari Lane, Hazratganj Ward, City of Lucknow, on the grounds: 1. that he had failed to pay off the arrears within one month of the service of notice of demand; and 2. that he had sublet the premises. 3. It was said that he was liable to ejectment under Section 3 (1) (a) and (e) of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of rent and Eviction Act, and the tenancy had also been terminated under a valid notice. On these grounds, she claimed a decree for possession and Rs. 1001- as mesne profits, for the period from 1st September, 1955 to 31st January, 1956. 4. Defendant contested the suit on a variety of grounds. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Munsif framed the following issues. 1. Whether the defendant has sublet the house as alleged? 2. Whether the notice is invalid? 3. Whether the defdt. committed default in payment of rent? 4. To what relief and amount, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? 5. The trial court found that the defendant had not sublet the building. It also held that he committed no default in the payment of arrears of rent. In this view, it refused to grant any relief to the plaintiff. Being aggrieved with that order, the plaintiff went up in appeal. The learned Civil Judge agreed with the Munsif, that no part of the building had been sublet by the defendant. As regards the other ground, he disagreed with the trial court, and found that the defendant had really committed default in the payment of arrears of rent, and was liable to ejectment. In this view, he granted the plaintiff a decree for possession and mesne profits. Against that order, the present appeal is directed. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. On behalf of the appellant, only the following two submissions have been made: 1. That the defendant committed no default in the payment of arrears of rent. 2. That the notice for ejectment was bad in law. I shall deal with these points seriatim. 6. There appears to be no serious dispute about the facts. On behalf of the appellant, only the following two submissions have been made: 1. That the defendant committed no default in the payment of arrears of rent. 2. That the notice for ejectment was bad in law. I shall deal with these points seriatim. 6. There appears to be no serious dispute about the facts. The tenancy originally the started some time in May, 1948. The agreed rate of rent was probably Rs. 301-per mensem. Subsequently, some dispute arose about the rate of rent. On 23rd November, 1951, a suit for fixation of rent was filed. Before the decision of that suit, another case was filed by the landlord in June, 1954 for arrears of rent, for the period from 1st September, 1951 to 1st June, 1954. The suit for fixation of rent was decided on 9th October, 1954. It appears that under a compromise decree the rent of the premises was fixed at Rs. 201/- per mensem. (The decree was passed under Order XXIII, rule 3, C. P. C.) The appeal against that decree, was also dismissed on 20th January, 1955. The suit for arrears of rent was actually decided on 27th February, 1956. In view of the rate of rent being reduced to Rs. 201/- per mensem, the landlord's claim was partly allowed. It appears that on 31st March, 1955, defendant sent a money order to the plaintiff on account of rent for the period from 1st January, 1954 to 1st March, 1955, but it was refused. On 28th July, 1955, the plaintiff gave a notice to the defendant claiming arrears of rent from 1st September, 1951. That notice was duly served on 1st August, 1955. On 27th August, 1955, defendant sent a money order on account of rent for the period from 1st June, 1954 to 31st August, 1955. Plaintiff refused to accept that money order also. So, the money was deposited in court on 31st August, 1955. For the subsequent period also, the defendant continued depositing the rent in Court. The contention of the plaintiff-landlord is, that since the arrears of rent for the period from 1st September, 1951 to 1st June, 1954 were not paid by the defendant within one month of the notice of demand, he committed default, and was liable to ejectment, under law. For the subsequent period also, the defendant continued depositing the rent in Court. The contention of the plaintiff-landlord is, that since the arrears of rent for the period from 1st September, 1951 to 1st June, 1954 were not paid by the defendant within one month of the notice of demand, he committed default, and was liable to ejectment, under law. It was, however, pleaded on behalf of the defendant, that since rent for that period was involved in the case, which was already pending between the parties, he was justified in withholding the rent for that period. The suit giving rise to the present appeal, was actually filed on 19th June, 1956. 7. The only question for consideration in present appeal is, whether the defendant-appellant was justified in withholding the rent for the period from 1st September, 1951 to 1st June, 1954, in compliance with the notice of demand made by the plaintiff, on the ground that the suit for arrears of rent for that period was already pending. It could not be doubted that on the date the notice of demand was served on the defendant, there existed no dispute about the rate of rent between the parties. As already pointed out earlier, the rate had been fixed at Rs. 201- per mensem under the decree of a competent court. (The decree was passed on 9th October, 1954, and the appeal was dismissed on 20th January, 1955) . So, it clearly follows, that on 1st August, 1955 when the notice was actually served on the defendant, he fully knew, about his exact liability to the landlord. In compliance with the notice of demand, he should have paid off the entire arrears at the rate fixed by the court. But he failed to do so. Now, the next question for consideration would be whether he really committed a default as contemplated under law. Section 3 (1) (a) of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, reads: "(1) Subject to any order passed under sub-sec. But he failed to do so. Now, the next question for consideration would be whether he really committed a default as contemplated under law. Section 3 (1) (a) of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, reads: "(1) Subject to any order passed under sub-sec. (3) no suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation, except on one or more of the following grounds; (a) That the tenant is in arrears of rent for more than three months and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand. ..............................." 8. It is not disputed that on the date the notice of demand was sent to the defendant, he was actually in arrears of rent for more than three months. He also failed to offer or pay the rent for the period from 1st September, 1951 to 1st June, 1954, within one month of the service of notice of demand. The term 'arrears of rent' occurring in Section 3 of the Act, was the subject of interpretation in various decisions of this Court. In Chotey Lal v. Chhakkilal, A.I.R. 1953 Alld. 113 it was held: "The words, 'arrears of rent' have no technical meaning. Rent that is not paid on the date on which it falls due becomes an arrear of rent and it remains so even though a suit is brought for its recovery and decreed. The only effect of the passing of the decree is that the cause of action is merged in the decree and that the landlord can realise the decreed amount in a certain manner; it has not the effect of changing the arrear of rent into something other than arrears of rent. So long as the rent has not been paid, whether a decree has been passed for the same or not, it is rent in arrear. It remains 'rent' even if a decree is passed, and so long as it is not paid it is in arrear. There is no reason for thinking that the words 'arrears of rent' in Section 3 (a) mean only undecreed arrears of rent. 9. It remains 'rent' even if a decree is passed, and so long as it is not paid it is in arrear. There is no reason for thinking that the words 'arrears of rent' in Section 3 (a) mean only undecreed arrears of rent. 9. If a tenant can be ejected on the ground of his failure to pay undecreed arrears of rent within a month of the receipt of a notice of demand, there is all the greater reason for his being ejected on the ground of his failure to pay the arrears of rent within a month of the receipt of a notice of demand in spite of a decree for the same having been passed against him. A tenant who does not pay the arrears of rent in spite of a decree having been passed against him undoubtedly stands in a weaker position than one against whom no decree has been passed. Because the landlord can realise the decreed an-ears by executing the decree, he gets no licence for not executing the decree, he gets no licence for not paying them at all, or unless a warrant of attachment or arrest is issued against him". In S.L. Kharbanda v. Dr. Sri Ram Sinha, 1957 A.L.J. 503 it was held: "...............The plain and natural meaning of the expression 'arrears of rent' is that the rent for a certain period which should have been paid when it became due was not paid. The recovery of past arrears may be barred by law of limitation, nevertheless the default made in the payment of rent remains an an-ear. The expression 'arrears of refit' i5 wide enough to include even those arrears which could not be recovered in a court of law. The reason is obvious. The remedy of a landlord to recover an arrear may be lost by reason of the law of limitation but the tenant' liability in equity to pay the past rent subsists. Clause (1) of Section 3 made the position very clear by using the words 'any arrears'. The reason is obvious. The remedy of a landlord to recover an arrear may be lost by reason of the law of limitation but the tenant' liability in equity to pay the past rent subsists. Clause (1) of Section 3 made the position very clear by using the words 'any arrears'. By the use of the word 'any' the Legislature wanted to emphasise that if a tenant is desirous of preventing the landlord from exercising his right of forfeiture by reason of the default made by the tenant in the payment of rent, then irrespective of the fact whether arrears due were time barred, the tenant should put the landlord in the same position as if no default in payment was made. If the tenant is not prepared to pay up all arrears, he cannot in equity ask the landlord not to exercise his right of forfeiture allowed to him under cl. (1) of Section 3. In our opinion, therefore, the words 'any arrears' occurring in cl. (1) of Section 3 include even those arrears the recovery of which has become barred under the law of limitation." In Bachchan Lal v. Ram Asre, 1960 A.L.J. 147, the learned Judge observed: "...............This Court has taken the view in several cases that the tenant must even in a case where the amount of rent is disputed, tender the amount which he thinks is due. He cannot take the attitude that as the landlord has made an exaggerated claim, he is entitled to pay nothing." In Mahipal Singh v. Mum Chand, 1963 A.L.J. 496 it was held: "Even though, therefore, the word 'any' which was used prior to 1954, is not used in the present Cl. (a) the intention behind the use of words 'arrears of rent' has been to include any arrears recovery of which may be within or beyond time .................. 10. The Legislature has been only fair to the landlords in making the provision for the ejectment of the tenant to that effect, inasmuch as a tenant who does not pay arrears of rent cannot in equity be said to be entitled to retain possession over it merely because the arrears of rent cannot be recovered by the landlord. 11. The meaning of Cl. (a) of Sub-Sec. (1) of Section 3 of the U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act is, therefore, clear. 11. The meaning of Cl. (a) of Sub-Sec. (1) of Section 3 of the U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act is, therefore, clear. The tenant is liable to be ejected if he does not pay even those arrears of rent recovery of which has become barred by time". 12. I respectfully agree with the consistent view expressed by the learned Judges in the above decisions. It is well-settled that when the rent falls in arrears, the landlord has two distinct remedies against the tenant. He is entitled to file a suit for arrears of rent. The other remedy open to him is, that he can demand the entire arrears under a notice, and if the tenant fails to pay off the dues within one month of the service of the notice, he renders himself liable to ejectment. On the ground of default in the payment of arrears, the landlord is entitled under law, to file a suit for ejectment. So, it could not be said that the suit for arrears of rent had been filed, the other remedy, namely, of demanding the arrears and filing the suit for ejectment on the ground of default, would become barred. The lower court has rightly found that the defendant was not at all justified in withholding rent for the period from 1st September, 1951 to 1st June, 1954. He should have at least paid the rent for that period at the rate, which he thought he was legally liable to pay. In not complying with the notice of demand, he committed default as contemplated under law. So, on that ground he was certainly liable to ejectment. 13. Now, coming to the second question regarding the validity of the notice, it may be pointed out that this matter was never raised before the lower appellate court. I have also been taken through the written statement of the defendant. Even there, no such ground was specifically taken. Since this was a legal question, the appellant's counsel was permitted to argue it out. It has been pointed out that the date of the notice as given in the plaint, namely, 28th June, 1965, was obviously wrong. An attempt was made to build up the argument that on account of that defect, the very foundation of the plaintiff's suit collapsed. It has been pointed out that the date of the notice as given in the plaint, namely, 28th June, 1965, was obviously wrong. An attempt was made to build up the argument that on account of that defect, the very foundation of the plaintiff's suit collapsed. The trial court has also dealt with this matter and disposed it of, with the following observations: "......I may first mention that in para. 6 of the plaint the date GI the notice is clearly wrong. In fact the plaintiff applied for amendment of his plaint twice (vide 19C and 48C) and the same were allowed but the plaintiff was extremely negligent and in spite of an order to that effect never cared to incorporate the amendments in the plaint. However, un-disputedly the notice in question was given on 28-7-55 and was served on 1-8-55. I accordingly take these dates as correct ...." 14. The view taken by the Munsif is quite just and reasonable. It was the admitted case of the parties, that the notice dated 28th July, 1955, was actually served on the defendant on 1st August, 1955. There was no other such notice like 28th June, 1955. So, the mere omission of correcting the date in the plaint, could not be fatal to the case. 15. Under the notice dated 28 July, 1955, the arrears were claimed from 1st September, 1951 at the rate of Rs. 301- per mensem, and from 16th April, 1953 at the rate of Rs. 201/- per mensem. It was clearly mentioned that the plaintiff-landlord did not want to keep the defendant as her tenant any more. Lastly, he was asked to pay the entire arrears of rent within a month of the receipt of the notice. He was further required to vacate the premises after the expiry of thirty days from the date of receipt of notice, vide Ext. 1. It is true that part of the claim was exaggerated, but that by itself would not render the notice invalid. 16. The next objection taken on behalf of the appellant was that since this was a composite notice, it should have been clearly mentioned that the defendant would be liable to ejectment, only, if he failed to pay off the arrears of rent within one month of the receipt of the notice. I, however, do not agree with this contention. 16. The next objection taken on behalf of the appellant was that since this was a composite notice, it should have been clearly mentioned that the defendant would be liable to ejectment, only, if he failed to pay off the arrears of rent within one month of the receipt of the notice. I, however, do not agree with this contention. A composite or combined notice under Section 3 (1) (a) of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act and Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is a valid and legal notice. The two periods can be synchronised in the same notice. It is not necessary that the two periods should expire one after the other or they should run consecutively and not concurrently. There is nothing in the provisions of clause (a) Sub-Sec. (1) of Section 3 of the Act which impairs the right of the landlord to terminate the tenancy by a notice given under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is also not correct to say that a landlord must wait for another thirty days before he can file a suit which he is at liberty to file without obtaining the permission of the District Magistrate as he has served a notice of demand on the tenant who failed to pay off the arrears of rent within one month of the receipt of that notice. The right of landlord to terminate tenancy at any time is a right which is not at all fettered by Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. As already pointed out earlier, the notice definitely stated that plaintiff did not want to continue any further relationship of the landlord and the tenant and called upon the defendant to vacate the premises at the expiry of thirty days from the receipt of notice. There could not be any doubt about the real intentions of the plaintiff. It was a clear intimation to the defendant who was the tenant that after the expiry of thirty days from the receipt of the notice he was to vacate the premises because the plaintiff did not want to continue him to remain in occupation as a tenant. The language of the notice was clear and unequivocal. No material defect in the notice could be pointed out. In a similar case Ahmad Ali v. Mohd. The language of the notice was clear and unequivocal. No material defect in the notice could be pointed out. In a similar case Ahmad Ali v. Mohd. Jamal Uddin, 1963 A.L.J. 567, it was held: "There is nothing in Sections 106 and 111 (h) of the Transfer of Property Act to indicate that if a notice terminating the tenancy contains another demand it is invalid or ceases to be a notice terminating the tenancy ......... There is nothing whatsoever in Section 3 (1) (a) to suggest that it should have been given at a particular time or should not have been given at a particular time. It is not required to have any relation with the notice terminating the tenancy; the two notices may be given in one document or they may be absolutely independent of each other............ .......... A notice terminating the tenancy is not invalid because it called upon the tenant to deliver possession on the 30th clay after the receipt of notice." 16. So, this ground too has no substance. 17. No other point was pressed 18. The appeal is devoid of merit, and must fail. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with costs.