JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS revision petition under sections 435 / 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by surety-applicant Nageshwar of Singhpuri, Ujjain is directed against the order dated 17-2-1965 passed by Shri R. K. Tikku, District magistrate, Ujjain in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 9 of 1964 ordering the forfeiture of the surety bond dated 27-4-1960 for Rs. 2,000 executed by the applicant. ( 2. ) THE controversy in question arises as under. On 28-11-1957 one anandilal was convicted under section 302, Indian Penal Code by the Additional Sessions Judge, Rajgarh and he was undergoing a sentence of 20 years rigorous imprisonment at Bherugarh Jail, Ujjain On 15-1-1960 the said convict made an application f r his temporary release (parole) under section 21 of the M B. Prisoners Act, 1950 (Act No. 56 of 1950) for ten days commencing from 1-2-1960 to 10-2-1960 which was recommended by the Superintendent, jail to the District Magistrate, Ujjain, who is the releasing authority, on 16-1-1960. The District Magistrate, Ujjain forwarded it to the Superintendent of Police, Ujjain on 20-1-1960 asking for bis report. The Superintendent of police, Ujjain made a report on 28-1-1960 stating that he had no objection for the temporary release asked for. On receiving this report, the District magistrate, Ujjain passed an order on 1-2-1960 stating that the convict may be released on certain conditions and one of the conditions was that he should furnish his personal bond for Rs. 2,000 and a surety for the same amount. ( 3. ) THE record of the case does not show that the convict furnished his personal bond. However, the applicant Nageshwar filed his surety bond for rs 2,000 dated 27-4-1960 undertaking to produce the convict at the Jail "bandigrah par upasthit karungd" after the expiry of the parole, but if he failed to do so he would deposit Rs. 2,000 in the Court "agar aisa na kar saka to apane ghar dwara Rs. 2,000 do hajar rupye rakam jamanat nyayalaymen dakhil karunga". The heading of this surety bond shows that it was executed in favour of the District Magistrate and Collector, Ujjain. The surety bond was accepted after verification on 30-4-1960. ( 4. 2,000 in the Court "agar aisa na kar saka to apane ghar dwara Rs. 2,000 do hajar rupye rakam jamanat nyayalaymen dakhil karunga". The heading of this surety bond shows that it was executed in favour of the District Magistrate and Collector, Ujjain. The surety bond was accepted after verification on 30-4-1960. ( 4. ) ACCORDINGLY the District Magistrate, Ujjain, in his capacity as releasing authority issued a warrant dated 2-5-1960 for the temporary release of the convict under section 21 of the Madhya Bharat Prisoners Act, 1960 (Act No 56 of 1950 ). The parole was for ten days and two days in addition were allowed to the convict for his journey to and ho. He was accordingly released on parole on 3-5-1960 and he was to appear on 14-5-1960 in the jail on the expiry of the parole, but he did not appear on that date nor has he appeared probably till today. In other words the convict absconded and all attempts by the police to re-arrest him failed. ( 5. ) ON 18th August, 1964 a show cause notice to the surety-applicant was issued by the District Magistrate under section 514 of the Code of Criminal procedure stating that the surety bond executed by him on 23-4-1960 had been forfeited as the convict was not produced by him on the expiry of the parole and asked him to pay the amount Rs. 2,000 or to show cause why it should not be paid. The applicant filed his statement dated 31-8-1964 raising several objections contending that the said surety bond was not liable to be forfeited for variety of reasons. The learned District Magistrate rejected all these objections by his order dated 17-2-1965, which has been wrongly characterised by him as an appeal, which it was not, as the same was an original order passed by him Being aggrieved by this decision, he preferred this revision petition direct to this Court on 28-6-1965. ( 6. ) IT came up for motion hearing on 16-7-1965 before Sen J. who ordered that the record of the lower Court be sent for and then the case be put up for further action. ( 6. ) IT came up for motion hearing on 16-7-1965 before Sen J. who ordered that the record of the lower Court be sent for and then the case be put up for further action. The record was received and the case was placed before tare J. on 6-8-1965, who after hearing Shri Chhazed, learned counsel for the applicant, admitted the revision and ordered issue of notice to the State for hearing the said revision on merits. ( 7. ) SHRI Chhazed, learned counsel for the applicant has assailed the impugned order on the following grounds :- (1) The Madhya Bharat Prisoners Act, Samvat 2007 (Act No 56 of 1950) came into force in Madhya Bharat region in 1950. The Madhya pradesh Extension of Laws Act, 1958 (No. 23 of 1958) came into force on 1-1-1959. By virtue of section 3 (1) of the Extension of Laws Act and the schedule Part A attached to it, the Prisoners Act, 1900 (No. III of 1900)which was in force in the Mahakoshal region was extended to all other regions of the State including Madhya Bharat and under section 6 of the extension of Laws Act the Madhya Bharat Prisoners Act, 1950 was repealed. So on the date on which the application for parole was made the release warrant issued and the surety bond in question was taken, it was Prisoners act, 1900 as applied to the State of Madhya Pradesh which was in force and the Madhya Bharat Prisoners Act, 1950 stood already repealed with effect from 1-1-1959 and, therefore, the release warrant and the surety bond in question etc. were void having been taken under the repealed Act hence the surety bond could not be enforced. (2) (a) Assuming that the proceedings including the bond in question were taken under the provisions of the Prisoners Act, 1900 as applied to madhya Pradesh even then in the case of such a bond, the provisions of section 514 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure are not attracted because it was not a bond taken under the provisions of the Code of Criminal procedure nor was it a bond for appearance before any Court. On the other hand, the bond was taken by an executive authority i. e. releasing authority and the same was under the provisions of the Prisoners Act and not under the Code ; similarly it was for appearance before the Jail authorities and not before the Court and, therefore, it was not covered by the provisions of section 514 (1) and hence unenforceable thereunder. (b) Further it was executed by surety alone and not also by the convict and, therefore, on this ground also it could not be forfeited under section 514 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 8. ) SHRI Sohani, learned Deputy Government Advocate raised a preliminary objection to the effect that as the revision petition has been filed direct in this Court without first moving the Sessions Judge in die matter as required by rule 15, Chapter 4 of the High Court Manual, the revision is not maintainable. On merits he admitted that at the time of the proceedings in question, the Prisoners Act, 1900 as applied to Madhya Pradesh was in force, but he urged that section 21 of the Madhya Bharat Prisoners Act, 1950 is exactly the same as section 31-A of the Prisoners Act, 1900 as applied to Madhya pradesh and, therefore, the wrong mentioning of the section in the release warrant or the surety bond would not invalidate the proceedings and in support he relied on Afzal Ullah v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1964 S C 264.) He also urged that a bond executed by surety alone can be enforced. He further urged that the surety bond in question falls within the ambit of section 514 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, therefore, the same was rightly forfeited. Accordingly he supported the impugned order ( 9. ) ON the point of preliminary objection Shri Chhazed, learned counsel for the applicant, urged that as in the instant case the revision application directly made to the High Court has already been admitted, the objection raised cannot be entertained. ( 10. ) FIRST I shall deal with the preliminary objection. The law on the point is that ordinarily revision petition is not directly entertained by the High court where the applicant might have moved in the first instance the Sessions judge and on this point there are several well-known authorities which need not be cited here. ( 10. ) FIRST I shall deal with the preliminary objection. The law on the point is that ordinarily revision petition is not directly entertained by the High court where the applicant might have moved in the first instance the Sessions judge and on this point there are several well-known authorities which need not be cited here. Rule 15 of Chapter 4 of Part I of the High Court Manual is consistent with the above mentioned practice. However, these decisions should not be understood to lay down that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain revision in the first instance. Similarly there is quite a quantity of authorities to show that this is not an inflexible rule of invariable application and in special cases the High Court will directly entertain a petition. In this connection, I may cite Shaukat Hussain and another v. Sheodayal Saksen (1957 M PL J 633) in which non-applicant there raised similar objection, namely, that unless the applicants there had applied to the Sessions Court a revision could not be entertained under rule 15, Chapter 4 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court manual. Chaturvedi J. there held that "the High Court should not ordinarily interfere when a party does not exhaust his remedy by applying to the sessions Court but the jurisdiction conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code on the High Court under sections 435 and 439 is very wide and it should not be fettered by any hard and fast rule". ( 11. ) BUT the position becomes quite different when in a case a revision application has been directly made to the High Court and the same has already been admitted. In several cases it has been held that once the revision application has been entertained and admitted and the record called for, such a technical objection should not be entertained and the revision should be disposed of on merits ; vide Shailabala Devi v. Emperor (AIR 1933 All. 678 (F B ).) Bholanath Dhar and others v. Gour Gopal ( AIR 1953 Cal. 777 /778.) Prasad Gareri v. Mt. Kesari and another (AIR 1941 Pat. 444.) Chairman, Bihar municipality v. Mt. Ramnandi Kuer and others (AIR 1941 Pat. 548.) Suraj i ali v. Emperor through hazul Officer, Lucknow (AIR 1942 Oudh 438.) Manciple Board, Bijnor v. Bhimshgh ( AIR 1962 All. 450 .)and Shaukat hussain and another v. Sheodayal Saksena. 777 /778.) Prasad Gareri v. Mt. Kesari and another (AIR 1941 Pat. 444.) Chairman, Bihar municipality v. Mt. Ramnandi Kuer and others (AIR 1941 Pat. 548.) Suraj i ali v. Emperor through hazul Officer, Lucknow (AIR 1942 Oudh 438.) Manciple Board, Bijnor v. Bhimshgh ( AIR 1962 All. 450 .)and Shaukat hussain and another v. Sheodayal Saksena. However, a contrary view was taken in Ramayya v. Venkata (AIR 1956 A P 97,) where it was observed that the mere fact that a revision has been admitted by the High Court cannot make any difference in the enforcement of the rule of practice, for the party, who with open eyes ignored the practice and filed a revision direct in the High Court, cannot take advantage of his deviation from the rule of practice. Even so in para 18 of this authority their Lordships observed as under :- "we should not be understood to have laid down that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a revision in the first instance. The Criminal Procedure Code in terms expressly confers the jurisdiction. Nor do we say that it is an inflexible rule of law that under no circumstances should the High Court entertain a revision if the aggrieved party did not file a revision in the first instance in the inferior Court. Nor do we intend to lay down any rule, which, directly or indirectly affects the undoubted inherent powers of the High Court to pass orders, to prevent grave and substantial injury to the parties. " ( 12. ) WITH respect, I agree with the view taken by the majority of the high Courts in the various rulings cited above and hold that once an application directly made to the High Court has already been admitted and record called for, then the objection that the party should have moved the Sessions court or the District Magistrate in revision may not be entertained and the revision should be disposed of on merits. In the instant case, as already stated the case was placed before Sen J. on 16-7-1965 for admission, but His Lordship ordered that the record of the lower Court be sent for and then the case he put up for motion hearing. In the instant case, as already stated the case was placed before Sen J. on 16-7-1965 for admission, but His Lordship ordered that the record of the lower Court be sent for and then the case he put up for motion hearing. Accordingly the record was called and subsequently this revision petition along with the record was put up for motion hearing on 6-8-1965 and Tare J. admitted the revision petition after hearing shri Chhazed, learned counsel for the applicant and then issued notice to the state for the final hearing of the revision on merits. Such being the position the preliminary objection now raised by the learned Deputy Government advocate cannot be entertained in view of the ruling cited above Accordingly the preliminary objection is rejected. ( 13. ) NOW as to the first contention that all the proceedings including release warrant and the surety bond in question were taken under the repealed act, the counsel for the applicant seems to be on sound ground on this point. The line of argument taken by petitioners counsel on this point has already been quoted by me in para 7 (i) of this Order and the learned Deputy Government Advocate has substantially accepted the said argument. It is thus clear that by virtue of section 3 (1) of the Extension of Laws Act, the Prisoners Act, 1900 as applied to Mahakoshal region was extended to the State of Madhya pradesh including Madhya Bharat region where Ujjain is situated, with effect from 1-1-1959 and under section 6 of the Extension of Laws Act, the Madhya bharat Prisoners Act, 1950 which was in force in the Madhya Bharat region immediately before 1-1-1959 being the corresponding law, stood repealed from 1-1-1959. All the proceedings in connection with the temporary release of convict Anandilal were taken in the year 1960 under the M. B. Prisoners Act, 1950 though it was not in force then as the same stood repealed on 1-1-1959. ( 14. ) THE convict Anandilal preferred his application for temporary release on 15-1-1960 and the heading of the said application shows that it was made under sectton21 of the M. B. Prisoners Act, 1950 read with Madhya Bharat jail Manual para 1057 (para 1957 given therein is obviously a clerical mistake for 1057 ). ( 14. ) THE convict Anandilal preferred his application for temporary release on 15-1-1960 and the heading of the said application shows that it was made under sectton21 of the M. B. Prisoners Act, 1950 read with Madhya Bharat jail Manual para 1057 (para 1957 given therein is obviously a clerical mistake for 1057 ). The release warrant dated 2-5-1960 was also issued by the District magistrate and Releasing Authority, Ujjain under section 21 of the Prisoners act, 1950 and this is clear by the heading as under :- "warrant for the temporary release of Prisoner under section 21 of the Prisoners Act, 1950 (Act No. 56 of 1950 ). " This warrant was issued in the prescribed form as given in the schedule annexed to the Jail Manual and referred to in para 1061 of the said Manual. Then as the convict did not surrender after the expiry of period of parole, the Superintendent of Jail Ujjain sent a letter dated 16-5-1960 to the District Magistrate, ujjain acquainting him of the facts and circumstances of the case and requesting him to take action under section 22 (2) of the M. B. Prisoners Act, 1950. One of the conditions of the temporary release of the convict was that he should furnish security of Rs. 2,000 and this condition was consistent with the rule embodied in para 1056 of the M B. Jail Manual and this rule was framed under section 21 of the M. B Prisoners Act, 1950. Accordingly, the applicant nageshwar executed a surety bond dated 27-4-1960. Hence the surety bond was given by the applicant under the provisions of the M. B. Prisoners Act, 1950 and the rules framed thereunder. Thus it is abundantly clear that all the proceedings including the release warrant and the surety bond in question etc. in connection with the temporary release of the convict Anandilal were taken under the repealed Act and the rule made thereunder. Accordingly, shri Chhazed, learned counsel for the applicant contended that the surety bond was illegal and void and, therefore, could not be forfeited or enforced. In my opinion, the contention is sound. ( 15. in connection with the temporary release of the convict Anandilal were taken under the repealed Act and the rule made thereunder. Accordingly, shri Chhazed, learned counsel for the applicant contended that the surety bond was illegal and void and, therefore, could not be forfeited or enforced. In my opinion, the contention is sound. ( 15. ) SHRI Sohani, learned Deputy Government Advocate admitted that the M. B. Prisoners Act, 1950 and the rules made thereunder were not in force at the time the proceedings in question were taken and it was Prisoners Act, 1900 as applied to the State of Madhya Pradesh which was in force then; but he urged that sections 21, 22 and 23 of the M. B Prisoners Act, 1950 are almost identical with sections 31-A, 31-B and 31-C of the Prisoners Act, 1900 as applied to the State of Madhya Pradesh and so contended that all these proceedings must be deemed to have been taken under the Prisoners Act, 1900 as applied to Madhya Pradesh. He contended that in both the Acts the power to release the prisoner temporarily is there and mere incorrect or inaccurate mentioning of the section of the Act would not invalidate the surety bond in question. In support he relies on Afzal Ullah v. State of Uttar Pradesh as already stated. In my opinion, the Supreme Court authority does not apply to the facts of this case In that case the question was whether the tanda Municipality Bye-laws framed under the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities act No. 2 of 1916 were valid or not. It was found that the said bye laws were within the competence of the Municipality. The preamble to the bye-laws referred to clauses A (a), (b) and (c) and J (d) of section 298 and these clauses were found to be inapplicable. In these circumstances it was observed that "the validity of the bye-laws must be tested by reference to the question as to whether the Board had the power to make those b\e-laws If the power is otherwise established, the fact that the source of the power has been incorrectly or inaccurately indicated in the preamble to the bye-laws, would not make the bye-laws invalid". It is thus clear that the Supreme Court case mentioned above did not relate to any action or actions under the repealed Act as is the case in the instant case and that being so I am of the opinion that the Supreme court case does not apply to the facts of this case. The position appears to me simple. It has been established that all the proceedings in connection with the temporary release of the convict Anandilal including the release warrant and the surety bond in question were taken under the repealed Act and accordingly they are null and void and hence the bond in question cannot be enforced. On this ground, therefore, the said bond being void could not be forfeited ( 16. ) NOW let us assume that the proceedings in question including the surety bond were taken under the provisions of the Prisoners Act, 1900 as applied to Madhya Pradesh, then the question arises whether the provisions of section 614 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure are attracted in this case. This, therefore, brings us to the consideration of questions 2 (a) and (b) as raised by the learned counsel for the applicant. Section 514 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as under :- "whenever it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court by which a bond under this Code has been taken, or of the Court of a Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class, or, when the bond is for appearance before a Court, to the satisfaction of such Court, that such bond has been forfeited, the Court shall record the grounds of such proof, and may call upon any person bound by such bond to pay the penalty therefor, or to show cause why it should not be paid. " ( 17. ) IT is clear that the section deals with two classes of bonds as under :- (i) When a bond under this Code has been taken by any Court, it is that Court alone or the Court of a Presidency Magistrate or of a Magistrate of the first class that can initiate a proceeding under section 514. (ii) When a bond is for appearance before a particular Court, it is only again that Court which can start a proceeding for forfeiture. Bonds of this class include those taken by the police for appearance before a Court. (ii) When a bond is for appearance before a particular Court, it is only again that Court which can start a proceeding for forfeiture. Bonds of this class include those taken by the police for appearance before a Court. ( 18. ) IN other words, the section expressly refers to two classes of bonds ; firstly, a b md under the Code taken by a Court, and secondly, a bond for appearance before a Court. The first class is subject to two limitations, the bond must be taken by a Court and it must be taken under the Code. Bonds of the second class must be for appearance before a Court , vide M. Homi and another v Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum and another (A. I R 1953 Pat. 302.) So the problem before us resolves itself into the question whether the surety bond in question given by the applicant is a bond of either of these classes. ( 19. ) I have already referred to the relevant contents of the surety bond in question and they are that the surety would produce the prisoner Anandilal before the Jail Authorities at the Ujjain Jail Mat Anandilal Ko Bandigrah par upasthit karunga". Thus it was not a bond for the appearance of the prisoner anandilal before a Court because neither the Jail Authorities nor the Ujjain jail can be construed a Court by any stretch of imagination. That being so, it is not a bond falling within the second class. ( 20. ) NOW the question is whether it falls within the category of bond of the first class, name is it a bond taken by a Court and fun her has it been taken under the Cole. As held in Rameshwar Bhartia v The State of Assam (AIR 1952 S C 405)under section 514 of the Code of Criminal Procedure action rat be taken only when the bond is taken by the Court under the provisions of the Code such as section 91 for appearance, the several security sections or those relating to bail. The perusal of the bond in question would show that the. applicant surety nageshwar has executed it in favour of the District Magistrate and Collector, district Ujjain In view of this, it may be accepted that the bond in question was taken by a Court. But this will not take the State out of the woods. The perusal of the bond in question would show that the. applicant surety nageshwar has executed it in favour of the District Magistrate and Collector, district Ujjain In view of this, it may be accepted that the bond in question was taken by a Court. But this will not take the State out of the woods. They shall have further to establish that the said bond was taken under the code namely the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure as illustrated by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above mentioned authority. ( 21. ) I have already referred to the nature of the bond in question. It is clear that the said bond has been taken under the provisions of the Prisoners act and the rules made thereunder and for this purpose it is immaterial whether it is taken under the M. B. Prisoners Act, 1950 or the Prisoners Act, 1900 as applied to Madhya Pradesh. In either case it would be a bond taken under the Prisoners Act and not under the Code In Dhannu Lal v The State (AIR 1953 MB 94.) where a bond was taken under the Opium Act and not under the Code and the surety had undertaken to produce the accused persons before the Police or the customs Department as well as before the Court it was held that the said bond could not be dealt with under section 514 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Similarly in In re Hubert Crawford (A I R 1918 Bom. 226.) where the bonds for appearance before the Court were executed under sections 106 and 107 of the Bombay Police Act, it was held that such bonds were not bonds taken under the Code of Criminal procedure In H. Homi and another v. Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum and another, it was also held that it is not the intention of the Legislature to include a bond executed otherwise than under the provisions of this Code to be governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the Code is complete by itself. The same view flows from Rameshwar Bhartia v. The State of Assam therefore, it must be held that as the bond in question was taken under the provisions of the Prisoners Act and the rules made thereunder and not under the Code of Criminal Procedure section 514 does not apply to it as it is not a bond under the Code. Accordingly its forfeiture was without jurisdiction and, therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside ( 22. ) NOW the last question urged by Shri Chhazed was that as the bond in question was executed by surety alone and not also by the convict the same cannot be forfeited under section 514 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and in support he relies on Sailesh Chandra Chakraborty v. The State ( AIR 1963 Cal. 309 .) Chamra Mehar and another v. State of Orissa (AIR 1951 Orissa 179.) and Govind Chandra v Stale (AIR 1951 Orissa 18.) Suffice it to say that these authorities relate to bonds of accused and sureties under section 499 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, therefore, they would not apply to the present case. Even otherwise the contention does not appear to be sound. There are conflicts of views on this point. One view is that a bond by a surety alone without also the bond of the accused would not be valid and the rulings cited above support this view. The other view is that though section 499 clearly contemplates two bond--, where in fact only one bond is executed by the surety, it is not invalid as the contract of the surety and the contract of the person released are independent of each other vide; Nisar Ahmad v. Emperor (A I R 1945 All 389.) Abdul Aziz and another v. Emperor (AIR 1946 All. 116.)Siripa Singh and another v. The State (1952 A L J 363.) Mewa Ram and another v. State (AIR 1953 All. 491.) Bahar Hussain and others v. State ( AIR 1956 All. 78 ) lnnder v Emperor (AIR 1940 Lah. 339.) Keshav Narain Choudhary and others v. The State ( AIR 1954 Pat 200 .)and In Re Sivaswami Servai and another ( AIR 1962 Mad. 340 .) With respect I would follow the latter view and, therefore the contention is rejected. ( 23. 78 ) lnnder v Emperor (AIR 1940 Lah. 339.) Keshav Narain Choudhary and others v. The State ( AIR 1954 Pat 200 .)and In Re Sivaswami Servai and another ( AIR 1962 Mad. 340 .) With respect I would follow the latter view and, therefore the contention is rejected. ( 23. ) ACCORDINGLY in view of the conclusions of law arrived at by me above, the revision is allowed and the forfeiture proceedings must be held to be without jurisdiction and, therefore, they are quashed and the impugned order is set aside. Revision allowed.