Judgment U.N.Sinha, J. 1. This appeal has been filed by the defendant. It arises out of a suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent for declaration of her title to and for recovery of possession of shop No. 16, line No. 2 in Bistupur Market, along with certain furniture & articles of the shop. This suit was decreed by the trial court and on appeal, the decree has been affirmed. 2. The relevant facts for decision are as follows: The plaintiff alleged in the plaint that defendant No. 1 was her brother & defendant No. 2 was her son. According to the plaintiff, her husband was an employee of the Tata Iron Steel Company & her family lived in Jamshedpur. In 1938 or 1939, defendant No. 1 had come from his native place and had requested the plaintiff to advance him some money so that he could start a pan shop. The younger brother of the plaintiffs husband had a number of pan shops and at the request of the plaintiffs husband, he gave up two shops to defendant No. 1, who started a Pan shop taking a loan of Rs 500 from the plaintiff Then, the Company wanted to demolish some tinned shops so they offered shop No. 17 in line No. 5 to defendant No. 1. This offer was accepted by him and he shifted his shop there. Later on. this shop was again given up for shop No. 16 in line No. 2 from April 1958. Defendant No. 1, thereafter, wanted to close down his business at Jameshedpur and as he was unable to return the advance made by the plaintiff, he executed a deed of relinquishment in her favour, giving up all his right, title and interest in the shop and delivered possession of shop No. 16 to the plaintiff. Thereafter, the plaintiff started Pan shop in this particular shop. As this defendant had sold away the furniture and the utensils of this shop., the plaintiff had to purchase new furniture and utensils at time when defendant No. 1 had delivered possession of the shop He bad also given old rent receipts and other papers. The plaintiff, thereafter, put defdt. No. 2 in charge of the shop, but thereafter, there was a dispute ending in a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was decided against the plaintiff. The plaintiff, thereafter, put defdt. No. 2 in charge of the shop, but thereafter, there was a dispute ending in a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was decided against the plaintiff. It was held therein that defendant No. 2 was in possession of the shop. Two separate written statements were filed by the defendants. The case of defendant No. 1 was as follows: It was alleged that this defendant had got settlement of shop No. 16 and all allegations of the plaintiff as to how this shop was settled with defendant No. 1 were denied as false. According to this defendant he was in possession after the settlement until defendant No. 2 had come in possession. With respect to the deed of relinquishment. the case of defendant No. 1 was that he had executed it at the request of his sister on a promise of payment of Rs. 500. but this amount had never been paid. According to this defendant, the plaintiff had never come in possession of the shop and the rent receipts were said to have been stolen away by the plaintiff in the absence of defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 2 supported the case of his uncle as against the claim of his mother 3. Upon these contentions of the parties, the court of appeal below has come to the following conclusions. The plaintiffs case that she had advanced Rs. 500 to defendant No. 1 for starting a shop has not been accepted. The learned Subordinate Judge has held that the plaintiffs contention in this respect was incongruous. But, the learned Judge has concluded that defendant No. 1 had made a declaration in May 1958. which is the basis of the plaintiffs case This transaction has not been accepted as a transfer, but it has been held to be a declaration made by defendant No. 1 that the disputed property had always belonged to the plaintiff. It has further been held that after this declaration, or relinquishment, or disclaimer, made in May 1958, possession of the shop had been given to the plaintiff, although the plaintiffs evidence has been characterised as not very satisfactory. Nevertheless, it has been held that defendant No. 1 ceased to have any interest in the shop after the 30th, May, 1958 and the plaintiff came in possession of the shop and all the papers relating thereto. Nevertheless, it has been held that defendant No. 1 ceased to have any interest in the shop after the 30th, May, 1958 and the plaintiff came in possession of the shop and all the papers relating thereto. The learned Judge has also come to the conclusion that defendant No. 2 was running the shop on behalf of the plaintiff and not on behalf of defendant No. 1 that he had continued in possession even after executing the document dated the 30th, May, 1958 has been negatived. On these findings the decree of the first court has been upheld. 4. The learned Advocate-General appearing for the defendants has urged that when the court of appeal below was not accepting the plaintiffs case of facts antecedent to 30th May 1958, it had erred in law in decreeing the suit on the basis of a deed of disclaimer. It is contended that a deed of disclaimer or relinquishment could not have transferred title to the disputed property to the plaintiff According to learned Counsel, a mere declaration made by defendant No. 1 by a document dated the 30th May, 1958, could not have been held to be the basis of the plaintiffs title, when the court of appeal below had itself held that no transfer of property had been made by that deed. According to the learned Advocate-General, the court of appeal below has held that there was no consideration for the transaction evidenced by the deed of May 1958 and, therefore, no transfer had been effected on the 30th May, 1958, even if the document was a registered one. Reliance is placed on the case of Keshri Mull V/s. Sukhan Ram, AIR 1933 Pat 264 and the case of Hutchi Gowder V/s. Bheema Gowder, AIR 1960 Mad 33 . The decision of this had involved consideration of a document which was apparently an unregistered one, whereas the decision of the Madras High Court had dealt with a document which was a registered one. Sri K.D. Chatterji appearing for the plaintiff-respondent has, on the other hand, contended that the question of consideration for the document dated the 30th May, 1958 has been erronously approached by the court of appeal below and that the transaction should be interpreted as one of conveyance, when it was accompanied by delivery of possession. Sri K.D. Chatterji appearing for the plaintiff-respondent has, on the other hand, contended that the question of consideration for the document dated the 30th May, 1958 has been erronously approached by the court of appeal below and that the transaction should be interpreted as one of conveyance, when it was accompanied by delivery of possession. Sri Chatterji has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Thayyil Mammo V/s. K. Ramunni AIR 1966 S.C. 337 . Having heard learned counsel for parties and having gone through Exhibit 1, dated the 30th, May, 1958, 1 am of the opinion that this document should be considered as a conveyance, in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above. Upon the question of consideration it may be mentioned that the document states that the value was about Rupees 500. According to the case of defendant No. 1, made out in paragraph 11 of the written statement, he had executed this document in lieu of consideration of Rs. 500 to be paid by the plaintiff to defendant No. 1". As a matter of fact, in evidence this defendant had made out a case that the plaintiff was to pay Rupees 5000; but, nevertheless, defendant No. 1s case was that there was promise to pay. In the circumstances, it is not possible to hold, as the learned Subordinate Judge has stated, that the document was not for consideration when it was executed. Then, the recital of the document, no doubt, convey an impression that defendant No. 1 had stated that the property involved was really the property of the plaintiff, but there are other expressions in the document which may very wall be taken to be words of conveyance. In this document defendant No. 1 had also stated that he was giving up all his rights. I do not see why such an expression cannot be taken to be a conveyance of the right of defendant No. 1, if any, although the paramount impression is that defendant No. 1 was holding the property banami. In this document defendant No. 1 had also stated that he was giving up all his rights. I do not see why such an expression cannot be taken to be a conveyance of the right of defendant No. 1, if any, although the paramount impression is that defendant No. 1 was holding the property banami. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Thayyil Mammos case, AIR 1966 SC 337 held that a registered instrument styled as a release deed, relasing right, title and interest of the executant in any property in favour of the releasee for valuable consideration may operate as a conveyance, if the document clearly discloses an intention to effect a transfer. The learned Advocate-General has distinguished this case on the ground that the document involved had stated that it had been executed on receipt of consideration. But I have stated above that even according to the case of defendant No. 1. consideration was involved in this case and there was promise to pay and as a result of this transaction (Exhibit 1), possession had been delivered to the plaintiff. On the findings arrived at by the court of appeal below, defendant No. 2 was in possession on behalf of the plaintiff. The documents with respect to the business held in the shop have been produced by the plaintiff and the certificate under the Shops and Establishments Act (Exhibit 6) was in the name of the plaintiff, although it was issued during the pendency of the suit. The learned Subordinate Judge has mentioned that defendant No. 1 had alleged in his written statement that his papers regarding the shop had been stolen away, but nothing about this had been said in the evidence. Therefore, it appears to me that the transaction dated the 30th May, 1958 (Exhibit 1) can very well be looked upon as a conveyance, effected by a registered deed, by which title to the disputed property had passed from defendant No. 1 to the plaintiff. In my opinion, the decree passed by the courts below must be affirmed on this ground alone. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has also urged that the transaction dated the 30th May, 1958 had amounted to an assignment of the tenancy created in favour of defendant No. 1 by a Company and, therefore, the plaintiffs title has been established Sri. In my opinion, the decree passed by the courts below must be affirmed on this ground alone. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has also urged that the transaction dated the 30th May, 1958 had amounted to an assignment of the tenancy created in favour of defendant No. 1 by a Company and, therefore, the plaintiffs title has been established Sri. Chatterji has also urged that the decree passed in the plaintiffs favour should be maintained upon possessory title on the very findings of the courts below These contentions had not been raised at any earlier stage in these particular forms and I do not think that it Is necessary to consider these points at this stage. But, on the footing that title had passed to the plaintiff by Exhibit 1, I would dismiss the appeal with costs.