ORDER This is a petition filed by one Phenjinang of Khongjarong village under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to quash the order of the S.D.O., Tamenglong (the third respondent herein) demarcating Goikachakan stream as the southern boundary of Tamenglong Headquarters. 2. The brief facts of the case are that Tamenglong Khongjarong and Dailong are three contiguous villages adjacent to Tamenglong Headquarters. Mr. William Shaw, the then S.D.O., demarcated the boundary of Tamenglong Headquarters in 1924 after due enquiry. He passed Standing Order No. 1 of 1924, as per Ext. B/1 fixing the southern boundary. He described the southern boundary as "Khebuching range ridge down the stream forming the boundary between Khongjarong and Tamenglong villages upto the point where it crossed the Tamenglong Imphal bridle path". Though he thereby demarcated the boundary between Khongjarong and Tamenglong as the stream arising from Khebuching range, he did not mention the name of the stream. It appears that there are two separate streams, called Goikachakan and Jouji, both crossing Tamenglong Imphal bridle path. Goikachakan stream arises from Khebuching range, while Jouji takes its rise from Gadai range. 3. There was a dispute regarding possession of certain land between Jouji and Goikachakan, among the villagers of Khongjarong and Tamenglong. Shri. W. Shaw decided that the disputed land belonged to the villagers of Khongjarong as per his order Ext. A/2 dated 30-3-1926 in Mist. Case No. 44 of 1924-25 acting upon the swearing of the parties based upon peculiar local tribal customs. But, he did not modify the description of the southern boundary of Tamenglong Headquarters Ext. A/3 shows that Shri. T.C. Tiankham, the then S.D.O. of Tamenglong passed an order on 8-11-1950 in Misc. Case No. 1 of 1949-50 in a similar dispute between the villagers of Tamenglong and Khongjarong, stating that the order of Shri. W. Shaw in Misc. Case No 44 of 1924-25 would stand Ext. A/4 shows that Shri. K. Kipgen, the then S.D.O. Tamenglong, passed an order dated 7-8-1951 in Misc. Case No. 107 of 1951 on his file, that the plaintiff in that case wanted him to point out the boundary demarcated by Shri. W. Shaw and Shri. T.C. Tiankham, between the plaintiffs land and the defendants land and that Shri. K. Kipgen, ordered that the Jouji stream was the boundary between Tamenglong and Khongjarong according to the order of Shri. T.C. Tiankham. The order of Shri. Kipgen was upheld by the Deputy Commissioner in Manipur in Hill Appeal Case No. 109 of 1951 on 30-11-1951 (vide Ext. A/5). The Chief Commissioner also upheld it in further second appeal to him in C.C. (Hill) Civil Appeal No. 7 of 1952, as can be seen from Ext. A/6 dated 19-5-1962. He held that the boundary as fixed by Shri. Shaw was correct and that it had to be acted upon. He dismissed the appeal. 4. The Government considered it necessary to prepare an authentic map showing the clear southern boundary of Tamenglong Headquarters area for the purpose of declaration of the Headquarters area as notified area under Section 334(1) of Assam Municipality Act of 1956, as extended to Manipur territory. Accordingly, Shri. H.M. Ray (Sub-Divisional Officer) took up the matter and after due notices to the villagers of Khongjarong and Tamenglong (including the petitioner who is in possession of the land to the south of the stream Jouji) passed an order as per Ext. A/7 D/- 24-11-1964 in Misc. Case No. 1 of 1964 on his file that the southern boundary of Tamenglong Headquarters is Khebuching range ridge down the stream of Goikachakan upto the point where it crossed the area Tamenglong Imphal bridle path. He pointed out in his order that he fixed the boundary in conformity with the boundary described by Shri. W. Shaw on 16-1-1924 as per Ext. B/1. The petitioner and two others challenged the order before the Chief Commissioner. Manipur, by filing C.C. Petition Case No. 261 of 1964. The Chief Commissioner held that the matter was to be disposed of as an executive matter, that the S.D.O. should be informed that Tamenglong Headquarters boundary should be demarcated as pointed by Shri. Ray and rejected the petition on 24-5-1965 Vide Ex. A/8. The petitioner challenges the order of the Chief Commissioner dated 24-5-1965 in the present writ petition filed on 8-9-1965. 5. A/8. The petitioner challenges the order of the Chief Commissioner dated 24-5-1965 in the present writ petition filed on 8-9-1965. 5. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that alter the enactment of Manipur (Courts) Act, 1955, disputes regarding the boundaries between the villages and disputes relating to ownership of land are matters of civil nature which can be dealt with only by Civil Courts, established under the said Act, that administrative orders cannot be passed by the S.D.Os., S.D.Cs or the Deputy Commissioner in respect of such civil matters, that the southern boundary as fixed under the orders evidenced by Exts. A/2 to A/6 as the Jouji stream could not be altered into Goikachakan stream and that the orders as per Exts. A/7 and A/8 are liable to be set aside. In support of his contention, he relied on the previous judgements of this Court which were all considered and followed by this Court in Chapu Kuki v. Ngouni Naga. Writ Appln. No. 12 of 1960 D/-8-9-1961 (Manipur). Though Exts. A/2 to A/6 lend support to the contention of the petitioner that previously Jouji stream was demarcated as the southern boundary of Tamenglong" Headquarters and the order of Shri. H.M. Ray, S.D.O. as per Ext. A/7 fixing Goikarhakan as the southern boundary appears to be contrary to the same, still. Ext A/7 shows that Shri. H.M. Ray S.D.O., actually clarified and demarcated the southern boundary of Tamenglong Headquarters as defined by Shri. W. Shaw in his earlier order as per Ext. B/1 The facts of the case show that Shri. H.M. Ray, S.D.O., simply clarified the position of the boundary line on the land and that he did not pass any fresh order demarcating the southern boundary. His order shows that he wanted to fix the boundary in conformity with the boundary described by Shri. Shaw on 16-1-1924 as per Ext. B/1. So, his order is an executive order. It is neither a judicial nor a quasi-judicial one and he did not exceed his jurisdiction. His order shows that he wanted to fix the boundary in conformity with the boundary described by Shri. Shaw on 16-1-1924 as per Ext. B/1. So, his order is an executive order. It is neither a judicial nor a quasi-judicial one and he did not exceed his jurisdiction. That the High Court does not issue any prerogative writ like a writ of certiorari to quash executive or administrative orders and that a writ of certiorari lies only when the impugned decision is that of a judicial or quasi judicial authority and when the said authority acts without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction is clear from a number of rulings. Vide Bidhu Bhusan Bagchi v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1952 Cal 901 ; Kishen Rao v. Mahbood Ali, AIR 1953 Hyd 235; Basan Singh v. Janak Singh, AIR 1954 All 447; A.K. Moitra v. Ministry of Defence Union of India. AIR 1955 All 512 ; Subalal Hodhrai Sharma v. Govt. of Madhya Bharat, AIR 1955 Madh B 173; Ganesh Ram Sharma v Secy, to the Govt. of Assam. Supply Dept. AIR 1956 Assam 158 and. Engineer-in-Chief Army Head Quarters (Union of India) v. C.A. Gupta Ram, AIR 1957 Punj 42. So, the present writ petition is misconceived. If Shri H.M. Ray made a wrong clarification of the southern boundary then the petitioner has to seek his remedy elsewhere and not by a petition for a writ. 6. As rightly urged by the learned Assistant Government Advocate, the petitioner is also guilty of laches. The learned Chief Commissioner passed the order as evidenced by Ext. A/8 on 24-5-1965. But, the petitioner filed the present writ petition on 8-9-1965 more than 3 months after the Chief Commissioner passed the order No doubt, no period of limitation has been described for the institution of a petition for a writ. But, it must be filed within a reasonable period. This is based on the principle of equity that delay defeats equity. The contention of the learned Assistant Government Advocate that unexplained delay of 3 months is fatal to a writ petition is supported by a number of decisions relied on by him. They relate to cases where there was delay of 3 months and more. Vide Muthiah Chettiar v. Commr., of Income-tax, Madras. The contention of the learned Assistant Government Advocate that unexplained delay of 3 months is fatal to a writ petition is supported by a number of decisions relied on by him. They relate to cases where there was delay of 3 months and more. Vide Muthiah Chettiar v. Commr., of Income-tax, Madras. AIR 1951 Mad 204 ; Mohandas Issardas v. A.N. Sattanathan, AIR 1955 Bom 113 ; Lairsram Bokul Singh Kondolei Singh v. State of Manipur, AIR 1956 Manipur 11 , Vishnuprasad Kalidas v. Inspector General of Police Saurashtra AIR 1956 Sau 39; Devassy Lonappan v. Nattika Firka Rural Co-Operative Bank Ltd., AIR 1957 Ker 14 ; Nanda Kumar Banerjee v. Board of Trustees for the Improvement of Calcutta. AIR 1957 Cal 578 and R.M. Devre v. Honble Home Minister. AIR 1957 Hyd 14. The contention of the petitioners learned counsel is that the petitioner is a hill-man and that some time was taken to get copies of the prior orders etc. But, Exts. A/1 to A/7 show that the copies are all old and that they were taken before 1965. Ext. A/8 was taken in June 1965. So there is no explanation for the subsequent delay. The writ petition is liable to be dismissed for the laches of the petitioner. 7. It was urged by the petitioners counsel that the petitioner was not given any notice by the Chief Commissioner before he passed his order as per Ext. A/8 dated 24-5-1965. The contention of the Assistant Government Advocate is that there is no provision of law under which notice must have been given to the petitioner by the Chief Commissioner before he passed the order in question and that, therefore, his failure to give notice is not a ground to set aside his order. He relied on Commr. of Income-tax, United and Central Provinces v. Badridas. AIR 1937 PC 133. But, this decision has no application to the facts of this case. Natural justice requires that the Chief Commissioner should have given notice to the petitioner before he disposed of the petition. But, in view of my order that the present writ petition is misconceived and that, it is belated, failure on the part of the Chief Commissioner to give notice is no ground for allowing the writ petition. 8. In the result, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. But, in view of my order that the present writ petition is misconceived and that, it is belated, failure on the part of the Chief Commissioner to give notice is no ground for allowing the writ petition. 8. In the result, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. But, under the circumstances, I direct the parties to bear their respective costs. Petition dismissed.