Judgment G.N.Prasad, J. 1. The appellant has been convicted u/s. 193 of the Penal Code. The trial Court sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year, but that has been reduced by the lower appellate court to one month This conviction has been recorded against the petitioner for having intentionally given false evidence in a proceeding under Sec.145. Code of Criminal Procedure, in the Court of a First Class Magistrate at Patna, Sri K. G. Hazari (P. W. 5). The first party to the proceeding was Jagdeo Singh (P. W. 1) and the second party was Ganauri Singh (P. W. 2). The petitioner had sworn an affidavit in that proceeding in support of the case of Jagdeo Singh (P. W. 1). He was also examined as a witness before the Magistrate (P. W. 5). His deposition is recorded in the said proceeding in Ext. 1, and it appears that in course of his cross-examination, the petitioner made the following statement. "I never deposed for F. P. (First Party) in any other case. Besides me there is another man in the village bearing my name, parentage of 22 years. I do not know the name of said Jogendra Singh. His fathers name is Sheo Prasad Singh." He further deposed: "It is not a fact that I have deposed falsely and that I have recently deposed against Kamla Singh on 30-1-1960 in case Kamla Singh V/s. Jagdeo Singh and for said reason I have said falsely that there was another man by name of Jogendra Singh". To demonstrate the falsity of the aforesaid statements of the petitioner, the prosecution has brought on the record Ext. 3, which shows that the petitioner did depose on 30-1-1960 before the same Magistrate (P. W. 5) in a proceeding under Sec.133, Code of Criminal Procedure, to which the parties were Jagdeo Singh (P. W. 1) and Kamla Singh (P. W. 4). 2. Upon a consideration of the evidence on record, the trying Magistrate came to the conclusion that the petitioner had intentionally given false evidence in a Judicial Proceeding, and as such, was guilty under Sec.193 of the Penal Code. The lower appellate Court took the view that the evidence (Ext. 2. Upon a consideration of the evidence on record, the trying Magistrate came to the conclusion that the petitioner had intentionally given false evidence in a Judicial Proceeding, and as such, was guilty under Sec.193 of the Penal Code. The lower appellate Court took the view that the evidence (Ext. 1) of the petitioner to the effect that there was another man in his village bearing the same name and parentage as his was not intentionally false, inasmuch as he had given the name of the father of the other Jogendra Singh as Sheo Prasad. while the father of the petitioner was Ram Prasad Singh. But the lower appellate Court has held that there is no escape from the conclusion that the petitioner had deliberately made a false statement in his deposition (Ext. 1) to the effect that he had never deposed for Jagdeo Singh (P. W. 1) in any other case and that he had not been examined as a witness on his behalf in the proceeding under Sec.133. Code of Criminal Procedure. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the conviction of the petitioner on two grounds. The first contention of the learned counsel is that it has not been proved that the petitioner had made the offending statements contained in Ext. 1 on oath. In this connection it was pointed out that the Bench clerk of the Magistrate (P. W. 5) was not examined to say that oath had been administered to the petitioner before his deposition (Ext. 1) was recorded. In my opinion, there is no merit in this contention. The deposition (Ext. 1) itself shows that the statements contained therein were made by the petitioner on solemn affirmation. No. suggestion to the contrary was made on behalf of the petitioner to the Magistrate (P. W. 5) or to any of the other prosecution witnesses who had been examined with a view to prove that, it was the petitioner who had deposed on behalf of Jagdeo Singh (P. W. 1) in the proceeding under Sec.145. Besides, there is a presumption in law that Court proceedings have been regularly conducted and, therefore, it must be presumed that oath had been duly administered to the petitioner when he had appeared in the witness box for giving his evidence before the Magistrate (P. W. 5). This contention of the learned counsel must, therefore, be overruled. 4. Besides, there is a presumption in law that Court proceedings have been regularly conducted and, therefore, it must be presumed that oath had been duly administered to the petitioner when he had appeared in the witness box for giving his evidence before the Magistrate (P. W. 5). This contention of the learned counsel must, therefore, be overruled. 4. The second contention oi the learned counsel is somewhat substantial. It has been found by both the Courts below that the deposition (Ext. 1) did not bear the requisite endorsement to the effect that after it had been recorded, it was read over and explained to the petitioner at the time when his thumb impression was taken thereon. In this connection the evidence of the Magistrate (P. W. 5) was that usually his Bench Clerk used to read over the deposition to the witness who used to sign it or put his thumb mark in token of its correctness, but at the relevant time, the Bench Clerk did not use to give any certificate to this effect. Relying upon this circumstance, learned counsel has urged that no conviction for perjury can be recorded against the petitioner In support of his contention, learned counsel relied upon Nalluri Chenchiah V/s. King Emperor ILR 42 Mad 561=(AIR 1919 Mad 45 (2) ), which was followed by the Punjab High Court in Kesar Singh V/s. Sultan-Ul-Mulk (1927)28 Cri LJ 651 (1) (Lah). In ILR 42 Mad 561 = (AIR 1919 Mad 45 (2)). it was held by a Division Bench that -- Where the deposition of a witness is not read over and interpreted to him before it is signed by him, he cannot be prosecuted for perjury on such deposition under Sec.193 of the Penal Code. Dealing with the matter. Sadashiva Ayyar. it was held by a Division Bench that -- Where the deposition of a witness is not read over and interpreted to him before it is signed by him, he cannot be prosecuted for perjury on such deposition under Sec.193 of the Penal Code. Dealing with the matter. Sadashiva Ayyar. J. made the following observation: "Where a deposition after it has been completed has been interpreted and read over to a witness and acknowledged by him to be correct, any irregularity due to the omission of the observances of further formalities, such as the presence of the judge and his listening to the reading during the time when the deposition is interpreted and read over to the witness, may not affect the admissibility of the record as evidence of the witnesss statements -- see Bogra V/s. Emperor, (1911) ILR 34 Mad 141; but the omission to interpret and read over the deposition to the witness after the deposition is completed cannot in my opinion be put on the same footing, because the guarantee provided by the law for the accuracy of the deposition has been substantially ignored, and it is dangerous and against public policy to make a witness liable on such a wholly unsafe record." My attention was also drawn to Emperor V/s. Jogendra Nath, ILR 42 Cal 240 = (AIR 1914 Cal 789) where a Bench of the Calcutta High Court took the view that Sec.360(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires the evidence of a witness to be read over to him in the hearing of the accused or his pleader in order that the accused should have an opportunity of correcting any mistake in it, and that the reading of the deposition by the witness himself is not a compliance with the Section and renders the deposition inadmissible in a subsequent trial against him under Sec.193 of the Penal Code. In support of this proposition reliance was placed upon two earlier decisions of the same Court; one in Mohendra Nath Misser V/s. Emperor (1908) 12 Cal WN 845 and the other in Jyotish Chandra Mukerjee V/s. Emperor, (1909) ILR 36 Cal 955. 5. It will be noticed, however, that a contrary view has been taken by the Allahabad High Court in Mohammad Farooq V/s. Rex, AIR 1950 All 501 . 5. It will be noticed, however, that a contrary view has been taken by the Allahabad High Court in Mohammad Farooq V/s. Rex, AIR 1950 All 501 . There it was observed: "I find it difficult to accept the proposition that if a deposition is not read over it can not be found to be false. Whether it is false or not does not depend upon whether it was read over to the witness or not. It depends upon whether the facts alleged to exist or to have existed in the deposition existed or not. If they did not exist the deposition is false and remains false, notwithstanding its not being read over to the witness. The provisions of the Penal Code relating to punishment for perjury do not pay any regard to the question whether the deposition was read over or not." 6. The question for consideration, therefore, is which of these two conflicting views should be accepted as correct. In my opinion, the answer to this question must be given in the light of the decision of the Privy Council in Abdul Rahman V/s. King Emperor 54 Ind. App 96 = (AIR 1927 PC 44), which was approved by the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Singh V/s. State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 214 . In Abdul Rahmans case, it was pointed out that the object of reading over the deposition is to obtain an accurate record from the witness of what he really means to say, and to give him an opportunity of correcting the words which the Magistrate or his clerk has taken down. It was further held that the provision of Sec.360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not complied with in terms by giving the witness an opportunity of reading the deposition over to himself, but such irregularity or omission does not have the effect of rendering the deposition inadmissible and it would not by itself be ground for quashing a conviction. In Bhagwan Singhs case AIR 1952 SC 214 , it was observed; "The object of the reading over prescribed by Sec.360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not to enable the witness to change his story but to ensure that the record faithfully and accurately embodies the gist of what the witness has actually said. In Bhagwan Singhs case AIR 1952 SC 214 , it was observed; "The object of the reading over prescribed by Sec.360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not to enable the witness to change his story but to ensure that the record faithfully and accurately embodies the gist of what the witness has actually said. Therefore, before prejudice can be substantiated on this score, it must be disclosed by affidavit exactly where the inaccuracy lies." In view of the decisions of the Privy Council and of the Supreme Court, just referred to, I am inclined to think that the views expressed in the earlier decisions of the Madras and the Calcutta High Courts, upon which learned counsel for the petitioner relies, cannot be accepted as correct; and as pointed out by the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1950 All 501 , those earlier decisions must be taken as having been overruled by Lord Phillimores observation in Abdul Rahmans case, 54 Ind App. 96=(AIR 1927 PC 44) and I should add, by the observations of the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Singss case AIR 1952 SC 214 . 6A. The whole question for consideration, therefore, is was the petitioners deposition (Ext. 1) correctly recorded? Ext. 1 does show that the petitioner did make the statement in the proceeding under Sec.145 that he had not deposed for Jagdeo Singh (P. W. 1) in any other case, and it has been proved from Ext. 3 that the petitioner did depose for Jagdeo Singh (P. W. 1) about 18 months earlier in the proceeding under Sec.133, Code of Criminal Procedure, between him and Kamla Singh (P. W. 4). Both the depositions were recorded by the same Magistrate (P. W. 5), whom the petitioner had the opportunity of cross-examining. But throughout the cross-examination of P, W. 5, no suggestion was made on behalf of the petitioner that his deposition (Ext. 1) had not been correctly recorded or that it was incorrect with regard to any matter. It was nowhere suggested on behalf of the petitioner that while he had deposed to something, the Magistrate (P.W. 5) had recorded in Ext. 1 something else. There can also be no justification for thinking that the deposition (Ext, 1) was not correctly recorded by the Magistrate (P. W. 5). Therefore, the authenticity of the record of the statement of the petitioner contained in Ext. 1 something else. There can also be no justification for thinking that the deposition (Ext, 1) was not correctly recorded by the Magistrate (P. W. 5). Therefore, the authenticity of the record of the statement of the petitioner contained in Ext. 1 can admit of no doubt whatsoever, and once it is established that the record of the deposition (Ext. 1) is correct, the falsity of the relevant statement therein must be held to have been established, and the petitioner cannot escape the consequences of the law of perjury merely on the ground that the procedure contained in Sec.360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as to the reading over and interpreting the deposition to the witness had not been complied with. I respectfully agree with the view taken in Mohammad Farooqs case, AIR 1950 All 501 that the provisions of the Penal Code relating to punishment for perjury do not pay any regard to the question whether the deposition was read over or not. I must, therefore, overrule the second contention of the learned counsel. 7. I must, however, refer to a Bench decision of this Court in Bansi Pandey V/s. Emperor, AIR 1917 Pat 639, which was relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The ratio of this decision has been correctly summarised in the head note which reads: "Where the statements relied upon in a prosecution for perjury are not absolutely irreconcilable and there is no evidence that they were read over to the witness in the presence of the accused or his pleader, as required by Sec.360 Criminal P.C. a conviction under Sec.193. Criminal P. C. is bad." That, however, was a case where the charge was defective, inasmuch as it did not set forth the contradictory statements which the accused was alleged to have made. The charge merely mentioned that the accused had. "contradicted yourself in evidence before the Honorary Magistrate". It was, therefore, held that the charge was insufficient. The record of the deposition was also characterised as inadmissible in evidence on the ground that it was not read over to the witness in the presence of the accused or his pleader, and this was sought to be supported on the authority of the earlier decision of the Calcutta High Court in (1908) 12 Cal WN 845. The record of the deposition was also characterised as inadmissible in evidence on the ground that it was not read over to the witness in the presence of the accused or his pleader, and this was sought to be supported on the authority of the earlier decision of the Calcutta High Court in (1908) 12 Cal WN 845. But such a view is no longer tenable and must be deemed to have been overruled by the decisions of the Privy Council in Abdul Rahmans case 54 Ind App 96 = (AIR 1927 PC 44) and of the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Singhs case AIR 1952 SC 214 , to which I have already referred. Bansi Pandeys case, AIR 1917 Pat 639 is, therefore, of no avail to the petitioner. 8 For the foregoing reasons, the conviction of the petitioner must be upheld. The sentence has already been substantially reduced by the lower appellate Court and it can not be said to be excessive The application is, accordingly, dismissed.