Judgement BHARGAVA, J. :- This matter is before us in the following circumstances : The non-petitioner filed an application under S.38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act before the Additional Naib-Tehsildar of Shujalpur for conferring of pucca-tenancy rights on him. The petitioner resisted the claim on various grounds, namely, that the non-petitioner was not a sub-tenant, that he was in possession of the land only as a trespasser and, therefore, was not entitled to become a pucca-tenant; that the applicant was a weak and infirm person incapable of cultivating the land personally within the meaning of the Section 74 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950, and therefore, even if the non-petitioner were held to be a sub-tenant of the land he could only continue in his capacity of a sub-tenant and could not be recognised or declared as a pucca-tenant and that the amount deposited by him was insufficient. The Additional Naib-Tehsildar recorded evidence adduced by the parties in respect of the aforesaid objections and by his order dated 28-2-1958 conferred the rights of pucca-tenant on the non-petitioner over the land in question excepting two Khasra numbers. 2. The applicant succeeded in his appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer. The non-petitioner's further appeal before the Commissioner, Bhopal Division, was allowed and the decision of the Additional Naib-Tehsildar was restored. The revision filed by the applicant before the Board of Revenue remained unsuccessful. 3. The applicant then filed a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in this Court. When the matter was argued before a Division Bench of this Court it considered it fit to refer the question to a larger Bench. It appeared to the referring Bench that there was nothing in Section 38(2) of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act (hereinafter called "the Act") which gave powers to the Tehsildar to determine the disputed status of a person as a sub-tenant or as a tenant of a sub-tenant and that reference to the Tehsildar in that sub-section was merely to nominate the authority with whom the requisite deposit was to be made. The question raised before the referring Bench was whether the Additional Naib-Tehsildar had no jurisdiction to determine the status of the tenant as a pucca-tenant under Section 38 of the Act. It was in that context that this reference has been made. The question raised before the referring Bench was whether the Additional Naib-Tehsildar had no jurisdiction to determine the status of the tenant as a pucca-tenant under Section 38 of the Act. It was in that context that this reference has been made. The referring Bench formulated a question by reference to the contention raised before it in these words : "That the Additional Naib-Tehsildar had no jurisdiction to determine the status of the opponent as a Pucca Krishak under Section 38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act." 4. When the matter was placed before the Full Bench for consideration of the question stated above it referred the said question to a larger Bench. 5. Section 38 provides, in the first place, that all tenants of the proprietor shall become pucca-tenants from the date of vesting (2-10-1951); that the tenants or sub-tenants shall on deposit being made by them of the amount prescribed by Sub-Section (2) of this section before the Tehsildar be deemed to have become the pucca-tenants of the land actually in their possession provided the persons sub-leasing do not suffer from any physical infirmity to cultivate their lands personally as laid down in Section 74 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act (Act No. 66 of 1950); that the deposit is made within the time prescribed in the Section and lastly the Section contemplates a scheme of priority in the conferment of the said rights. In Sub-Section (3) it is provided that if a tenant of a sub-tenant fails to make the deposit within the time specified his right would lapse, and then the sub-tenant would have the right to make the deposit within the time prescribed in Sub-Section (4). 6. Section 38 of the Act or any other section in the Act does not contain any express provision which requires a Tehsildar to make any enquiry after a deposit has been made with his under Section 38(2), or to declare or recognise a person making the deposit as a Pucca-tenant. The practice, however, was that after a deposit was made under S.38(2), the Tehsildar used to hold a judicial enquiry to decide whether the person making the deposit has or has not acquired the rights of a Pucca-tenant. The practice, however, was that after a deposit was made under S.38(2), the Tehsildar used to hold a judicial enquiry to decide whether the person making the deposit has or has not acquired the rights of a Pucca-tenant. Appeals against such orders were taken to normal hierarchy of Revenue Courts until Jagannath v. Gowardhandas, 1958 MPLJ (BR) 824 was decided by the Board of Revenue on 24th September 1958. The Board held that in the absence of any provision to that effect in the Act no appeal or revision lay against an order under Section 38. This led to the introduction of a Bill (see Objects and Reasons M.P. Gazette 10-4-59, page 369) to amend the Act. The Amending Act, namely, the Madhya Pradesh Zamindari Abolition (Second Amendment) Act, 1959 was assented to by the President on the 8th July 1959 and the assent was first published in Madhya Pradesh Gazette on the 24th July 1959. The amendment introduced Section 38-A in the parent Act which confers a right of appeal from every original order passed in respect of any matter provided for in Section 38. The right of appeal by virtue of Section 38-A(2) is conferred retrospectively from the 24th of September 1958 which is the date when Board of Revenue decided 1958 MPLJ (BR) 824 holding that no appeal lay for want of any express provision in the Act to that effect. However, before the Amending Act became the law certain writ petitions were filed in the High Court which led to the ruling in Sujan Singh v. Dwarka Prasad, 1959 MPLJ 738 : MP Nos. 63, 64 of 1958, D/-13-5-1959. A Bench of the High Court in this case held that no judicial order is contemplated under Section 38 of the Act and that the Tehsildar has no power to decide whether the person making the deposit has or has not acquired the rights of a Pucca-tenant. The construction placed by the High Court on Section 38 in this ruling does not take notice of the Amending Act which till then had not become the law. The question that now arises for consideration is whether the construction so placed on Section 38 in 1959 MPLJ 738 : MP Nos. 63 and 64 of 1958, D/-13-5-1959 (supra) is correct even after the Amending Act. 7. The question that now arises for consideration is whether the construction so placed on Section 38 in 1959 MPLJ 738 : MP Nos. 63 and 64 of 1958, D/-13-5-1959 (supra) is correct even after the Amending Act. 7. As already stated, the Act contains no express provision that the Tehsildar has to make any enquiry or to decide about the accrual of Pucca-tenancy rights. It may also be conceded that even after the amendment no express provision to that effect has been introduced in the Act. But 'the intention of the Legislature' is not limited to that what it has chosen to enact in express words but also includes that which has been enacted "by reasonable and necessary implication"; See Saloman v. Saloman and Co. 1897 AC 22 at p.38 and Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales, 1949-2 All ER 755 at pp.769 and 770. It is, therefore, legitimate to consider whether or not the Legislature has made provision by necessary implication empowering the Tehsildar to hold a judicial enquiry and to pass an order deciding that a person has or has not acquired a right of Pucca-tenancy under Section 38. Further, a correct construction of Sec.38 cannot be arrived at by reading that Section alone but all provisions of the Act including Section 38-A introduced by Amending Acts have to be read together. The assistance that is available by reading Section 38-A along with Section 38 cannot be denied. 8. In Shamrao v. District Magistrate, Thana, AIR 1952 SC 324 at p.326, Bose, J. observed : "The rule is that when a subsequent Act amends an earlier one in such a way as to incorporate itself, or a part of itself, into the earlier, then the earlier Act must thereafter be read and construed (except where that would lead to a repugnancy, inconsistency, or absurdity) as if the altered words had been written into the earlier Act with pen and ink and the old words scored out so that thereafter there is no need to refer the amending Act at all." After referring to these observations in Ram Narain v. Simla Banking and Industrial Co. Ltd., AIR 1956 SC 614 at p.621, Jagannadhadas, J. said : "Now there is no question about the correctness of this dictum. Ltd., AIR 1956 SC 614 at p.621, Jagannadhadas, J. said : "Now there is no question about the correctness of this dictum. - It is perfectly true as stated therein that whenever an amended Act has to be applied subsequent to the date of the amendment the various unamended provisions of the Act have to be read along with amended provisions as though they are part of it. This is for the purpose of determining what the meaning of any particular provision of the Act as amended is, whether it is in the unamended part or in the amended part." 9. The question under consideration may be approached from the following view points : (i) What are the matters necessary to be considered under Section 38 which lead to the accrual of a Pucca-tenancy right; (ii) Do these matters necessitate an enquiry and a decision; (iii) Does the Act in S.38 or Section 38-A indicate the authorities who are to hold that enquiry and give the decision. 10. Before a person can claim Pucca-tenancy right under S.38(2) he is to be a sub-tenant or tenant of a sub-tenant in actual possession of the land in respect of which the right is claimed, he has to deposit with the Tehsildar a sum of money within a particular time, the deposit is to be of an amount which is a certain multiple of annual income of the land over which right is claimed and the case is not to be of any disability mentioned in Section 74 of the Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act Samvat 2007. In case of a sub-tenant claiming the right, it may further have to be established that the tenant under him, if any, has failed to make the required deposit in time and therefore the right has accrued to him. Now all these matters provided by Section 38 are such that in case of dispute they will require a judicial investigation and decision and the bare fact that a person has made deposit of a certain sum of money with the Tehsildar cannot lead to the conclusion that the depositor has acquired the Pucca-tenancy right conferred by the section. 11. A sub-tenant or a tenant of a sub-tenant who wants to acquire the status of a pucca-tenant has to make a deposit with the Tehsildar. 11. A sub-tenant or a tenant of a sub-tenant who wants to acquire the status of a pucca-tenant has to make a deposit with the Tehsildar. Such a person making the deposit does so for claiming the Pucca-tenancy rights over certain specific lands and the amount that he deposits is for being paid the proprietor, tenant or sub-tenant of the land over which the right is claimed. The words of the Section - "Every sub-tenant or tenant of a sub-tenant who deposits with the Tehsildar - the following amount to be paid to the proprietor or tenant or sub-tenant" read in the light of the purpose of making the deposit necessarily lead to the inference that the person making the deposit will not only inform the Tehsildar of his name and the amount that he is depositing but certain other matters; he will thus inform that he is a sub-tenant or tenant, that the deposit is for acquiring pucca-tenancy rights over specific lands; that the amount deposited is for being paid to named persons who are the proprietor, tenant or sub-tenant of the said lands. This information will have to be in writing for oral information will be meaningless and futile. As the Tehsildar who receives the deposit does not receive it for himself or for the Government but for being paid to others, it is again implicit that he will take steps and inform them that a certain deposit has been made for being paid to them under Section 38 of the Act. The proprietor, tenant or sub-tenant on being informed of the deposit may appear and raise objections that the deposit is ineffective and they are not prepared to accept it for various reasons e.g. it may be said that the person making the deposit is neither a sub-tenant nor a tenant of sub-tenant; that he is not in possession of the land in respect of which the deposit has been made; that the deposit was not made in time; that it is not of the proper amount required to be deposited by the Section; that they or any of them have themselves acquired the pucca-tenancy right. Again, there may arise under the Section a situation where more than one person make deposits in respect of the same land each claiming to acquire pucca-tenancy right. Again, there may arise under the Section a situation where more than one person make deposits in respect of the same land each claiming to acquire pucca-tenancy right. In all these situations where a dispute arises before the Tehsildar what is he to do ? Is he to keep quiet feeling helpless in the matter or is he to proceed to enquire and give a judicial finding on the matters disputed ? Section 38 is no doubt silent on this question but here comes the assistance of Section 38-A which reads, thus : "Appeal against accrual of Pucca-Tenancy right - (i) From every original order other than an interlocutory order in respect of any matter provided for in Section 38, an appeal shall lie - (ii) to the Collector, if such order is passed by the Tehsildar." The Section contemplates an original order of the Tehsildar in respect of matters provided in Section 38 pertaining to accrual of Pucca-Tenancy right which is made appealable to the Collector. The Section can fit in the scheme only if the Tehsildar has powers to enquire and decide matters provided in Section 38 pertaining to accrual of pucca-tenancy right and thus it furnishes the answer that when disputed matters arise before the Tehsildar pertaining to accrual of pucca-tenancy rights he is not to fold his hands but has to proceed to enquire and decide those matters. 12. Section 38-A(1)(ii) which provides for an appeal from an order of the Collector to the Commissioner is related to order of Collector under Section 38(2)(e) where express provision is made empowering the Collector to assess the compensation in case of a well. But in all other matters the dispute will arise before the Tehsildar and unless he has powers to determine them and to pass final orders, Section 38-A(1)(ii) and all other provisions in the Section conferring a retrospective right of appeal will become meaningless and futile. Lord Dunedin observed : "A statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a Court should be to secure that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable"; see Whitney v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 1926 AC 37 at p. 52; Commissioner of Income-tax v. S. Teja Singh, AIR 1959 SC 352 and Gur Sahai v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1062 at p. 1065. Section 38 is no doubt not happily worded but there is no such "crucial omission or clear direction" in it which may prevent the court in holding that the Tehsildar has powers of judicial determination on matters of accrual of pucca-tenancy right, a construction which makes both Sections 38 and 38-A workable, and attains the object of the legislature which it had in the introduction of Section 38-A. 13. The words of Section 38(2) - ''shall be deemed to be a pucca-tenant" do not create any difficulty. They only indicate the point of time from which the status of pucca-tenant accrues. If a person makes a deposit and the Tehsildar after enquiry comes to the finding that such a person has made a valid deposit and has acquired the status of a pucca-tenant this status will enure to him from the date of deposit and not merely from the date of the finding or order. But these words do not contain any direction, direct or indirect, that the Tehsildar has not to make any enquiry and that his function ends after accepting the deposit. 14. It is also true that Madhya Bharat Jagirdari Abolition Act when compared with Zamindari Abolition Act contains clear language on matters under consideration. But that is only because of the slovenly draftsmanship of the latter Act and that does not prevent the Court in arriving at a meaning which can be gathered from the language by a reasonable and necessary implication. 15. The choice before us lies between two interpretations the narrower of which, in our opinion, would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of legislation due to a slight inexactitude in the language of the Section. If we were to adopt this construction we should be construing the provision made in Section 38 to defeat its object rather than with a view to carry its object into effect. We should, therefore, avoid a construction which would reduce the legislative intent to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that the legislature legislates only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. We are fortified in this view by the observations made in Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries, Ltd., 1940-3 All ER 549 at p. 554 and M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa, AIR 1961 SC 1107 at pp.1110 and 1111. We are fortified in this view by the observations made in Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries, Ltd., 1940-3 All ER 549 at p. 554 and M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa, AIR 1961 SC 1107 at pp.1110 and 1111. The observations made by Denning, L.J. in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. V. Asher, 1949-2 All ER 155 at p. 164 may be usefully reproduced as under : "When a defect appears a Judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament………….and then he must supplement the written word so as to give "force and life" to the intention of the legislature………… A Judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out ? He must then do as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases." Having regard to all relevant considerations, we take the view that a judicial order is contemplated under Section 38 of the Act and the Tehsildar has power to decide whether the person making the deposit under Section 38(2) has or has not acquired the rights of a pucca-tenant. For the conferral of the status of a pucca-tenant in our opinion, an order of the Tehsildar is a pre-requisite. 16. We may now proceed to consider the further question whether the Additional Naib-Tehsildar can validly make an enquiry and pass an order under Section 38 of the Act. By a Notification (Hindi matter omitted) of the Revenue Department No. 44/6-D.A. 2 dated 7th May 1956 all the powers of a Tehsildar to decide the question under Section 38 of the Act were delegated to the Naib-Tehsildar. It is not disputed that the said delegation was validly made. The Tehsildar acting under Section 38 is not a persona designata but merely a revenue officer sub-ordinate to the Board of Revenue. He does not exercise a special jurisdiction in the exercise of the powers under Section 38, therefore, the delegation of his powers under Section 38 to a Naib-Tehsildar is valid. The Tehsildar acting under Section 38 is not a persona designata but merely a revenue officer sub-ordinate to the Board of Revenue. He does not exercise a special jurisdiction in the exercise of the powers under Section 38, therefore, the delegation of his powers under Section 38 to a Naib-Tehsildar is valid. In the context of a parallel provision made in Section 21 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act (Act No. 28 of 1951) the same view was taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Bonder v. Ganpat, 1960 MPLJ 1278 . 17. It was, however, urged before us that as the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act (Act No. 66 of 1950) does not contemplate the appointment of an officer designated as Additional Naib-Tehsildar the determination of the application under Section 38 by the Additional Naib-Tehsildar, Shri Dwarka Prasad Mehta, was wholly without jurisdiction. For consideration of this question it would be necessary to refer to the scheme of hierarchy of the revenue Courts under the said Act. Section 6(a) provides for the subordination of revenue officers. Section 7 defines the Chief Revenue Authority. Sections 9 to 15 enumerate the various classes of Revenue Officers. Sections 10, 11 and 12 respectively provide for the appointments of Additional Commissioners, Additional Subas and Additional Tehsildars. It is provided in these Sections that they would exercise those powers which the Government or the other authority specified in the said Sections may direct. The provision with regard to the appointment of Naib-Tehsildars is made in Section 15. It reads thus :- "(1) The Government may appoint to each Pargana as many persons as it thinks fit to be Naib-Tehsildars. (2) The Government shall appoint for each Tappa a Naib-Tehsildar to be in charge of that Tappa." Sub-Section (1) clearly envisages plurality in the number of holders of the office of Naib-Tehsildar in a Pargana at any time. The prefix 'Additional' in the case of Naib-Tehsildar, in our opinion, only shows that the holders of the said post in a Pargana are more than one. The idea conveyed by the said prefix is not different from that which underlies when in the hierarchy of civil Courts an officer is called a Second Additional District Judge or a Second Civil Judge Class I or Class II. The idea conveyed by the said prefix is not different from that which underlies when in the hierarchy of civil Courts an officer is called a Second Additional District Judge or a Second Civil Judge Class I or Class II. Whenever an Additional Naib-Tehsildar is appointed his duties are not required to be carved out and made over to him eo nomine as becomes necessary in the case of an Additional Tehsildar under Section 12(1) of the M.P. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act (Act No. 66 of 1950) or Section 19(2) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. The statute alone is the source of power in the case of Naib-Tehsildar even when more than one Naib-Tehsildar are appointed in a Pargana. The offices of the Naib-Tehsildars and the Additional Naib-Tehsildars appear to us to be "one and the same". Thus, in our opinion, the decision reported in Hiralal v. Board of Revenue of M.P., 1965 MPLJ 325, is clearly distinguishable. We, therefore, hold that after delegation of the authority of Tehsildar to Naib-Tehsildar the enquiry conducted and the order made by an Additional Naib-Tehsildar in a proceeding under Section 38 of the Act, as was done in this case, cannot be said to be vitiated. 18. We would, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the negative and hold that the Additional Naib-Tehsildar had jurisdiction to determine the status of the opponent as a Pucca Krishak under Section 38 of the Madhya Bharat Zarnindari Abolition Act. 19. P.V. DIXIT, C.J. :- I agree. OPINION 20. NEWASKAR, J. :- This reference to the Full Bench was made in this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution as the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench were unable to agree with the view taken by another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Badri Prasad v. Manika, 1962 MP Rev Nirnaya 187, that the Tehsildar alone has jurisdiction to deal with the question as to conferral of the status of a Pucca Tenant upon a person claiming himself to be a sub-tenant under Section 38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act and that neither the Naib-Tehsildar nor an Additional Naib-Tehsildar could deal with a claim of that sort. 21. 21. The question referred to the Full Bench is :- "Whether the Additional Naib-Tehsildar has no jurisdiction to determine the status of a person claiming rights of a Pucca Krishak under Section 38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act on the ground of his being a sub-tenant?" 22. Material facts giving rise to this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution are as follows :- 23. The petitioner Ayyub Khan, prior to the coming into force of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act was a tenant in the Zamindari village in which the disputed land is situated. Opponent Fundilal claiming himself to be a sub-tenant submitted a petition for conferral upon him the status of a Pucca Krishak after making the requisite deposit as provided in that section. This petition was placed for consideration before an Additional Naib-Tehsildar. Ayyub Khan contended that Fundilal was not a sub-tenant. He was merely a trespasser. Consequently he could not become Pucca Krishak in respect of the disputed land. Secondly he contended that even if it were assumed that Fundilal was a sub-tenant still in view of proviso in Section 38(2) of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, he ought to continue to remain as a sub-tenant as he is a person under disability contemplated under Section 74 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. 24. The Naib-Tehsildar rejected both the contentions and held that Fundilal was entitled to the status of a Pucca Krishak. That status was accordingly ordered to be conferred upon him. 25. Against this decision of the Additional-Naib-Tehsildar appeal was preferred to the Sub-Divisional Officer Shujalpur Sub-Division. The finding as to Fundilal being a sub-tenant of Ayyub Khan was upheld. However on the other contention he disagreed with the view of the Additional Naib-Tehsildar and allowed the appeal. 26. Fundilal preferred second appeal before the Divisional Commissioner Bhopal who reversed the decision of the Sub-Divisional Officer and restored that of the Additional Naib-Tehsildar. 27. A revision petition was thereupon preferred by Ayyub Khan. This was rejected on 30-6-1962. 28. Ayyub Khan thereupon filed this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, contending :- (1) That Additional Naib-Tehsildar had no jurisdiction to determine the status of the opponent (Fundilal) as a Pucca Krishak under Section 38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act. 27. A revision petition was thereupon preferred by Ayyub Khan. This was rejected on 30-6-1962. 28. Ayyub Khan thereupon filed this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, contending :- (1) That Additional Naib-Tehsildar had no jurisdiction to determine the status of the opponent (Fundilal) as a Pucca Krishak under Section 38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act. (2) That the petitioner was entitled to claim the status as his was a case covered by Section 74 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act and Section 38(2) proviso of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act. 29. As regards (1) it was held by a Division Bench of this Court in Badriprasad v. Manika, Misc. Petn. No. 29 of 1959, D/-16-7-1960 (MP), that where an application is filed by a person for conferral of rights of a Pucca Krishak it is the Tehsildar who is competent under Section 38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act to pass the order and not the Naib-Tehsildar. As already stated the Division Bench which heard the present case was not disposed to agree with this view and the matter was therefore referred to the Full Bench. 30. Before proceeding to consider the question referred, it is necessary to mention that the Madhya Bharat Government, in exercise of the powers conferred upon it under Section 16(1) of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007, invested the Naib-Tehsildars in the State with the powers of Tehsildars for determining the dispute under Section 38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act by Notification No. 44/6/D.A. 2 dated 7-5-1956. On behalf of the opponent it was contended that it is unnecessary to consider the question referred to the Full Bench because Naib-Tehsildars were duly invested with the powers of Tehsildars for the purpose of deciding disputes under Section 38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act. The decision of the Additional Naib-Tehsildar is therefore not beyond the scope of his authority. 31. Besides the above referred Notification, another thing which was brought to our notice was the amendment effected in the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act by inserting Section 38-A therein whereby provision was made for an appeal against the order passed by Tehsildar. This amendment was effected subsequent to the decision of the Additional Naib-Tehsildar in this case dated 28-2-1958. 31. Besides the above referred Notification, another thing which was brought to our notice was the amendment effected in the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act by inserting Section 38-A therein whereby provision was made for an appeal against the order passed by Tehsildar. This amendment was effected subsequent to the decision of the Additional Naib-Tehsildar in this case dated 28-2-1958. This amendment subsequently introduced in the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act is sought to be interpreted to suggest that it is the Tehsildar who is given power to decide a disputed question arising out of a proceeding under Section 38 and not any other authority including a Naib-Tehsildar. Suggestion was also made at the hearing that even if Naib-Tehsildar is assumed to have powers of Tehsildar by reason of Notification No. 44/6/D.A. 2 dated 7-5-1956 still Additional Naib-Tehsildar cannot have that power. 32. In order to consider the question referred, it will be proper to refer to material provisions in the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act. Chapter I of the Act deals with 'title, extent and definitions'. Chapter II provides for 'vesting of proprietary rights in the State' which till the coming into force of the Act vested in private proprietors called Zamindars and makes consequential and incidental provisions. Chapters III and IV deal with the subjects of assessment of compensation and determination of debts. Chapter V deals with payment of compensation to the ex-proprietors and their creditors. Then comes Chapter VI. This Chapter is headed thus 'Management and Tenure of Land'. First Section in this Chapter is Section 37. It provides for conferral of pucca Tenancy rights on a proprietor in respect of the Khudkasht land in his possession. Sub-Section (2) of this section provides that if there are more persons than one having interest in land held as Khudkasht immediately before the date of vesting any such person may apply for partition of his share in the land to the Tehsildar who shall proceed in accordance with Section 69 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007, and in case of partition shall rateably apportion the assessed rent. Where dispute as to title is raised no partition is to be made until the dispute is decided by a competent Court. 33. Then comes the material provision contained in Section 38. Where dispute as to title is raised no partition is to be made until the dispute is decided by a competent Court. 33. Then comes the material provision contained in Section 38. The section is worded thus :- "(1) Subject to the provisions of this section every tenant of a proprietor shall be deemed to be a Pucca tenant of the land comprised in his holding from the date of vesting. (2) Every sub-tenant or tenant of a sub-tenant who deposits with the Tehsildar within the period specified in Sub-Secs.(3) and (4) the following amount to be paid to the proprietor or tenant or sub-tenant, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be a Pucca tenant of the land comprised in his holding. Till amount is deposited his former status shall continue. The right of becoming a Pucca tenant by depositing money shall firstly be that of the tenant of the sub-tenant, if any and if he fails to deposit money shall be that of the sub-tenant :- (a) In a case of a sub-tenant of Gair-maursi tenant - An amount equal to the double of the net annual income of that land of the Gair Maurasi tenant. (b) In case of a sub-tenant of a Maurasi or Sakitulmilkiat tenant - An amount equal to six times the net annual income of that land of the Maurasi or Sakitulmilkiat tenant. (c) In the case of a sub-tenant of the Khudkasht or Sir of the proprietor - An amount equal to six times the net annual income of that land of the proprietor. (d) In the case of a tenant of a sub-tenant :- (i) If he is a tenant of sub-tenant in the Khudkasht or Sir of the proprietor - An amount equal to six times the net annual income of that land of the proprietor, out of which 85 per cent shall be given to the proprietor and 15 per cent to the sub-tenant. (ii) In case of any other tenant of a sub-tenant - An amount equal to eight times the net annual income of that land of the original tenant out of which 85 per cent shall be given to the original tenant and 15 per cent to the sub-tenant. (ii) In case of any other tenant of a sub-tenant - An amount equal to eight times the net annual income of that land of the original tenant out of which 85 per cent shall be given to the original tenant and 15 per cent to the sub-tenant. (e) In case of a sub-tenant or tenant of a sub-tenant of either description mentioned in (a), (b), (c) and (d) if the well situate on his holding is a private one of the proprietor or tenant or sub-tenant, as the case may be, and no land of the proprietor, tenant or sub-tenant other than the land of that holding is watered from that well - By way of compensation so much of the amount as the Suba may assess after considering the points mentioned in Schedule III. Provided that a sub-tenant or tenant of a sub-tenant shall remain a sub-tenant or tenant of a sub-tenant as before in case of disability mentioned in Section 74 of Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007. He shall have no right to become a Pucca tenant by depositing the amount under this Sub-Section. (3) If the holding be in the possession of a tenant of a sub-tenant, he may deposit the money within eight years of the date of vesting, otherwise his right of becoming a Pucca tenant shall lapse and the sub-tenant may within six months of the expiry of the said eight years deposit in the Tehsil the amount mentioned in clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d), as the case may be, of the preceding sub-section. If he fails to deposit such amount within the said period the proprietor or the original tenant, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be the Pucca tenant of that holding. (4) If the holding be in the possession of a sub-tenant, he may deposit the money within eight years of the date of vesting. On the expiry of eight years, the original tenant or the proprietor, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be the Pucca tenant of that holding. (4) If the holding be in the possession of a sub-tenant, he may deposit the money within eight years of the date of vesting. On the expiry of eight years, the original tenant or the proprietor, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be the Pucca tenant of that holding. (5) If a sub-tenant or a tenant of a sub-tenant fails to deposit the amount within the period specified in Sub-Sections (3) and (4) then, notwithstanding anything contained in his lease or contract, it shall be deemed that all his rights have ceased to exist and that he is a trespasser on that land, and the proprietor, tenant or sub-tenant, as the case may be, get him ejected under Section 90 of the Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007. (6) Rent at the village rate assessed in the current settlement shall be charged from every original tenant, rent-free tenant, concessional tenant, sub-tenant, or tenant of a sub-tenant deemed to be a Pucca tenant under this section. Provided that the rent charged from such of them including the Sikitulmilkiyat tenant, who had been fully assessed in the current settlement shall continue to be the same as assessed in the said settlement, till their re-assessment in the next settlement. Explanation - Current settlement means the settlement in force on the 1st November, 1953. Explanation (1) - The Pucca Tenancy rights under this section shall accrue or be acquired in respect of such land only as may be in the actual possession of the tenant, sub-tenant or tenant of a sub-tenant. (2) In the case of clauses (a), (b) and (d)(ii) of Sub-Section (2), the net annual income shall be the difference between the rent which the Gair Maurusi, Maurusi or Shakitulmilkiyat tenant, as the case may be, receives from his sub-tenant and the rent which he pays to the proprietor and in the case of Khudkasht or Sir land of the proprietor mentioned in clauses (c) and (d)(i), the net annual income shall be the difference between the rent which the proprietor receives from his tenant and the rent determined in accordance with the village rate." Section 39 deals with grant of fresh leases for land given for purposes other than agriculture. Section 40 deals with rights in trees standing in the land belonging to a Pucca-tenant. Section 40 deals with rights in trees standing in the land belonging to a Pucca-tenant. Section 41 provides that every Shakitulmilkiyat, Pucca Maurusi, Namuli Maurusi and Gair Maurusi tenant in a village who was in possession of any holding shall from the date of vesting be deemed to be a tenant of Government. Similarly a proprietor is deemed to be a tenant of Government, in respect of his Khudkashta or Sir. 34. It will be clear from Sections 37, 38 and 41 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, that they mostly contain provisions which are declaratory of the rights acquired by different categories of holders of land on the date of vesting including proprietors, tenant of proprietors, sub-tenants or tenants of sub-tenants. 35. No doubt certain conditions are laid down in these provisions which ought to be fulfilled before the rights mentioned therein are deemed to have been acquired. But there is nothing in these sections to suggest that acquisition of such rights would depend upon determination of any dispute between persons claiming to belong to a particular category and those who might be interested in challenging their status by any named authority. This does not mean that there cannot be any dispute which could arise because of these deeming and declaratory provisions. 36. In the absence of special Courts or tribunals created for such determination, ordinary civil Courts would be quite competent to deal with all kinds of civil disputes including the questions as to for what purposes and between what persons statutory fiction ought to be restored to. 37. It is however contended that the Revenue Court of Tehsildar is by necessary implication created a special Court for determining the above questions including the question whether a claimant satisfies conditions on the fulfilment of which the status of Pucca tenant as indicated in Sections 37, 38 and 41 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act is deemed to have been acquired. 38. The reasons suggested for this view are two although finally reducing themselves into one. 39. 38. The reasons suggested for this view are two although finally reducing themselves into one. 39. Firstly reason, it is said, is that although there is no express language to be found anywhere in the Act particularly in Section 38 of the Act that the Tehsildar has to make an enquiry and decide about the accrual of Pucca-tenancy rights yet the very fact of the requirement for a claimant to make a specified deposit with the Tehsildar involves his informing the Tehsildar that he is a sub-tenant or a tenant of a sub-tenant of a particular land belonging to a particular proprietor, or a tenant or a sub-tenant and that such deposit is meant to be paid to the person to whom the land belongs for acquisition of pucca-tenancy rights. The Tehsildar on being thus informed it is assumed, has to inform the person concerned, for whose benefit the deposit is made, the fact of such deposit. On such information being communicated it may be possible that contentions as to propriety and validity of making such deposit and right of the person making the same might be raised. On such question being raised, it is said, they need judicial determination and Tehsildar consequently has jurisdiction to decide them by necessary implication. 40. The second reason is that Section 38-A of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, Samvat 2008, which has to be read as part of the Act provides for an appeal against every original order of a Tehsildar and that implies his power of Judicial determination of such questions. While putting forward this aspect as to existence of jurisdiction in the Tehsildar to enquire and decide the possible questions which might be raised, it is conceded that express language in the Act does not very much help except the provision subsequently made for an appeal against the order of the Tehsildar under Section 38 by Section 38-A of the Act. 41. This subsequent amendment, it is said, is a clear pointer to the intention of legislature for investing the Tehsildar with power of judicial determination of these questions. That is why I have stated above that the two reasons suggested for existence of power of judicial determination reduce themselves into one and that pertaining to appeal against the order of Tehsildar under Section 38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act. 42. That is why I have stated above that the two reasons suggested for existence of power of judicial determination reduce themselves into one and that pertaining to appeal against the order of Tehsildar under Section 38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act. 42. In thus contending about the existence the jurisdiction in the Tehsildar by necessary implication certain assumptions are made which, to my mind, are not justified. 43. It has to be borne in mind that certain conditions are required to be fulfilled before a sub-tenant or a tenant of a sub-tenant is deemed to have become a Pucca-tenant under Section 38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act. 44. One such condition, as is laid down in the section and particularly in explanation (1), is as below :- "The Pucca-tenancy rights under this section shall accrue or be acquired in respect of such land only as may be in the actual possession of the tenant, sub-tenant or tenant of a sub-tenant." This requirement as to claimant being in possession is sine qua non for becoming a Pucca-tenant. 45. The second condition for a sub-tenant or a tenant of a sub-tenant is that he should make a deposit in accordance with the scheme laid down in the section. 46. When he fulfills these conditions he automatically becomes a Pucca-tenant without any requirement as to determination of any question by Tehsildar. There is a distinction between the position as to the acquisition of Pucca-tenancy rights by a sub-tenant or a tenant of a sub-tenant who is in possession and has gone and made a deposit as provided by Section 38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act and that as to such acquisition as a result of determination and declaration by the Tehsildar. The Act provides for the former and not the latter. Where rights are conferred upon a person by a statute on satisfying certain conditions then, merely because somebody else may choose to raise any contest about it, the vesting of such rights are not suspended until determination is made. Where such disputes are to be determined by tribunals other than ordinary tribunals vested with powers of deciding all disputes of civil nature the legislature has specifically to say so. Where it is not done then such determination has to rest with the ordinary civil Courts. Where such disputes are to be determined by tribunals other than ordinary tribunals vested with powers of deciding all disputes of civil nature the legislature has specifically to say so. Where it is not done then such determination has to rest with the ordinary civil Courts. It is an erroneous assumption that because certain disputes can be raised by persons other than the sub-tenant or tenant of a sub-tenant in possession it is Tehsildar who alone can determine them and not the ordinary civil Courts. 47. Even if we assume that the claimant, when he makes the deposit with the Tehsildar as provided in the Act, has to supply certain details as to the land for which and the person for whose benefit the deposit is being made, still from that it does not necessarily follow that the Tehsildar is required to call upon all and sundry including the beneficiary whether they want to raise any dispute as to the claimant's right and if any disputant comes forward to determine such dispute. The legislature in Section 38 has not said so and it is too much of an assumption to hold that the legislature should be taken to have said so. 48. The second assumption is that although no jurisdiction is expressly conferred upon the Tehsildar still, because an appeal is provided against the order of Tehsildar under Section 38-A of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, we must assume that he can pass some kind of order under Section 38 of the Act and such order can only be regarding determination of disputes aforesaid. This reasoning to my mind needs examination. 49. This provision as to appeal under the amended provision under Section 38-A of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act did not exist in the original Act and was inserted by way of amendment. It is true that if an original order of a particular nature can be conceived under S.38 of the Act then by Section 38-A that order will be appealable. But the reverse is not correct. It is not correct to say that because an appeal is provided an order under S.38 of the Act has to be assumed although the Section does not contemplate passing of any order by the Tehsildar. But the reverse is not correct. It is not correct to say that because an appeal is provided an order under S.38 of the Act has to be assumed although the Section does not contemplate passing of any order by the Tehsildar. But even if you are constrained to assume some kind of order by the Tehsildar under Section 38 of the Act by reason of the provision as to appeal against that order yet it does not follow that the order must be one determining all those disputes which are suggested above. It is possible to think that the Tehsildar may not accept deposit from a sub-tenant or tenant of a sub-tenant in possession and act wrongly. In that case that person can prefer an appeal. Such wrongful refusal to accept a deposit may conceivably be an order 'in respect of any matter provided for in Section 38'. But dispute, as to title, such as existence of relationship of landlord and tenant, as to special conditions under which sub-lease of first or second degree was required to be made, as to two or more persons claiming or disputing the same right of becoming a sub-tenant, do not become matters provided in Section 38 of the Act for judicial determination after an enquiry. 50. One broad ground, which is against the existence of such power of determination in Tehsildar by necessary implication, is that under the scheme of Zamindari Abolition Act unlike that of Abolition of Jagirs Act questions involving disputes as to title are not meant to be determined by the revenue Courts which are Courts of limited jurisdiction. Chapter III of the Act which deals with assessment of compensation provides for cases where question of title is raised during the course of enquiry before the Deputy Compensation Officer, as regards the proprietary right in any property which is divested under S.3 of the Act, the Deputy Compensation Officer, if he finds that such question is not already decided by a Court of competent jurisdiction, has to refer the question to the Claims Officer for only summary enquiry and order. No appeal or revision is provided against such summary order of the Claims Officer on the disputed question of title. In order to avoid undue delay, a period of two months is provided for an aggrieved party to institute a suit in Civil Court for setting aside such order. No appeal or revision is provided against such summary order of the Claims Officer on the disputed question of title. In order to avoid undue delay, a period of two months is provided for an aggrieved party to institute a suit in Civil Court for setting aside such order. The decision of such Civil Court becomes binding. This is clear from S.13 of the Act. 51. Section 37(1) of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act contained in Chapter VI provides that every proprietor, who is divested of his rights shall be a Pucca-tenant of his Khudkasht land in his possession. Sub-Section (2) provides that where there are more persons than one having interest in the land held as Khudkasht immediately before the date of vesting any such person may apply to the Tehsildar, for partition; the Tehsildar is authorized to effect partition in those cases only where no question of title is raised. Where such question is raised no partition could be effected until the question of title is decided by a competent Court (Civil). 52. It is clear from these provisions that where dispute involving title arises, the same can only be decided finally by the Civil Court. On the construction of S.38 and S.38-A of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act suggested on behalf of the petitioner such question is liable to be finally determined by the revenue Court. It also seems from Sections 13, 37 and 38 of the Act that where the legislature intended to confer power upon any authority under the Act to hold an enquiry it has specifically said so. This will be clear from Sections 11, 12, 13(1), 18, 20, 37(1) and 38(1)(e) of the Act. It may be suggested that so far as Sections 13 and 37 are concerned they relate to proprietary title and not as between landlord and tenant. But under either of those sections disputes as to title whether proprietary or as a tenure-holder do arise and ordinarily it is the Civil Court which possesses jurisdiction for determining such disputes. 53. In fact if we look to Section 32 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act which provides for cases in which the jurisdiction of Civil Courts is barred we will find that the case such as the one in question before us is not included in them. 54. 53. In fact if we look to Section 32 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act which provides for cases in which the jurisdiction of Civil Courts is barred we will find that the case such as the one in question before us is not included in them. 54. The only three cases in which Civil Court's jurisdiction is intended to be excluded are regarding (1) any matter pending before a Claims Officer (2) the claim or any secured debt or claim which has been discharged or deemed to have been discharged under Section 21 of the Act, and (3) the recovery of any secured debt or claim determined under Section 23 of the Act. 55. Section 38 (1) of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act provides that every tenant of a proprietor shall be deemed to be Pucca-tenant. In the course of argument before us it was not suggested that any enquiry is contemplated under this sub-section although disputed questions similar to those under Section 38(2) of the Act are conceivable. 56. It is consequently not correct to contend that that power of making an enquiry under Section 38(2) of the Act ought to be read by necessary implication in that provision. It is well established that it is not permissible for the Court to travel outside the words used in a statute to discover a secret intention which is not expressed therein vide Sehat Ali v. Abdul Qavi Khan, AIR 1956 All 273 (282) (FB) and Central Brokers v. N.K. Murthy, AIR 1954 Mad 699 . 57. The function of the Court in fact is not to say what the legislature meant or ought to have meant but what it has said it meant, Vide Edward H.M. v. Attorney General, AIR 1930 PC 120 (126). 58. The Supreme Court in Shiv Bhadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 394 (397), has observed that it is not permissible for the Court to supply even an obvious lacuna in a statute. In another case reported in Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder, AIR 1953 SC 148 , the Supreme Court held that even where there is Casus Omissus it is for the legislature to remedy the defect and not for the Court to do so. In another case reported in Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder, AIR 1953 SC 148 , the Supreme Court held that even where there is Casus Omissus it is for the legislature to remedy the defect and not for the Court to do so. It is undeniable that the provisions conferring jurisdiction upon special bodies, persons or Courts should be strictly construed vide Brindaban Biharilal v. Badri Prasad, AIR 1949 Pat 335 (337), Koyal v. Bhondlal, AIR 1931 Nagpur 48 and A.R. Sarin v. B.C. Patil, AIR 1951 Bom 423 . 59. Having regard to these principles we cannot read in Section 38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, a provision conferring power to determine any dispute between a person seeking to make the deposit on the basis of his alleged status and another questioning his right to do so. For answering the question which Court or Tribunal should determine such a dispute we ought to travel outside the provisions of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act. 60. The relationship between the tenant of a Zamindar and his sub-tenant or that between a sub-tenant and his tenant can be determined incidentally in a proceeding under Qanoon Mal either for possession or for ejectment within a specified period. But no provision has been brought to our notice whereby the disputed status of either a sub-tenant or a tenant of a sub-tenant can be declared as in a case under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, so as to bind the parties. For securing that kind of relief therefore it is the Civil Court which has to be approached. Another dispute which can be conceived is where the sub-tenant or the tenant of a sub-tenant was in actual possession of the land on the date of vesting. If the determination of this dispute is needed for deciding the right of a person to make the deposit then the relief as to who was in possession on such a date can also be determined by the Civil Court. 61. It is thus clear that neither the Tehsildar nor the Naib-Tehsildar have jurisdiction under the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act to decide the disputes of the above nature. 62. The disputes such as these are of civil nature and in the absence of specific exclusion Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code confers sufficient jurisdiction upon ordinary Civil Courts to determine the same. 62. The disputes such as these are of civil nature and in the absence of specific exclusion Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code confers sufficient jurisdiction upon ordinary Civil Courts to determine the same. Relief to be claimed in such a case is of course one under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act of declaration. 63. This appears to have been partly realised by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as will appear from the letter of Avar Sachiv to the Divisional Commissioner No. 4741-6-D.A./1, dated 22-12-1956, wherein it was directed, after reference to the Law Department, that no appeal had been provided under S.38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act within the four corners of that Act and that consequently such appeals ought not to be entertained and if entertained should be treated as incompetent. 64. However, later, without realising the exact scope of the statutory provision contained in Section 38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, a provision was added by way of amendment whereby appeals were provided against the order passed by Tehsildar under Section 38. As already stated earlier, from this provision as to appeal inserted on 24-7-1959, we ought not to read into it the mind of the legislature that the Tehsildar should enquire into all disputed questions raised by parties with reference to a right contemplated under Section 38(2) of the Zamindari Abolition Act. Moreover it is possible to conceive of an appeal against the Tehsildar's erroneous refusal to allow deposit to be made. 65. In that view an appeal may be said to have been properly provided for that limited purpose. Moreover in the present case the order of the Additional Naib-Tehsildar in this case was passed on 28-2-1958 and no appeal can be said to have been provided even under Section 38-A of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, against that order that provision having come into force on 24-7-1959. We, therefore, ought not to take into account that provision as to appeal in this case at least. 66. For these reasons we cannot regard the later amendment providing for an appeal against the orders of Tehsildar as indicating that Tehsildar was invested with jurisdiction by the terms of Section 38(2) of the Zamindari Abolition Act to decide disputes between a person seeking to make the deposit and another disputing his right to do so. 67. 66. For these reasons we cannot regard the later amendment providing for an appeal against the orders of Tehsildar as indicating that Tehsildar was invested with jurisdiction by the terms of Section 38(2) of the Zamindari Abolition Act to decide disputes between a person seeking to make the deposit and another disputing his right to do so. 67. As regards the Notification No. 44/6/D.A. 2 dated 7-5-1956 by the Government in exercise of its power under Section 16(1) of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, conferring powers of a Tehsildar upon Naib-Tehsildars for determining disputes under S.38, such conferral of powers upon Naib-Tehsildar cannot have the effect of conferring jurisdiction upon the Naib-Tehsildars to determine such disputes when even Tehsildars themselves have not been conferred jurisdiction to do so by the terms of Section 38 or any other provision in the statute. 68. As regards the contention that the order is passed by an Additional Naib-Tehsildar and consequently the same is by an authority not contemplated under the Act, it is clear to me that the Government has, under Section 15 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, power to appoint to each Paragana as many persons as it thinks fit to be Naib-Tehsildars. Where more than one such Naib-Tehsildar are appointed it is open to call one subsequently appointed as Additional Naib-Tehsildar. But his powers and functions remain the same and where Naib-Tehsildars are authorised to exercise certain powers of Tehsildars they can legitimately be exercised by Additional Naib-Tehsildar. 69. It thus seems clear to me that no enquiry by the Tehsildar is contemplated under Section 38(2) of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act and the provision contained in it requiring a sub-tenant or tenant of a sub-tenant in possession of any holding to make a deposit with the Tehsildar as laid down in that section does not imply any such enquiry and judicial determination. This view was taken earlier by the Division Bench consisting of Khan and Krishnan, JJ., in a case reported in 1959 MPLJ 738 . Each of the learned Judges gave his own reasons separately for taking that view. 70. This view was taken earlier by the Division Bench consisting of Khan and Krishnan, JJ., in a case reported in 1959 MPLJ 738 . Each of the learned Judges gave his own reasons separately for taking that view. 70. My answer therefore to the question referred is as below : "Neither the Tehsildar, nor the Naib-Tehsildar (which includes Additional Naib-Tehsildar) has jurisdiction to determine the status of a person claiming rights of a Pucca-tenant under Section 38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act on the ground of his being a sub-tenant or a tenant of a sub-tenant in possession. The acquisition of the status of a Pucca-tenant by a sub-tenant or tenant of a sub-tenant is, under the terms of Section 38, automatic on fulfilment by him of the condition as to deposit in the manner and to the extent provided in that section. 70. P. K. TARE, J. :- I agree. 71. PANDEY, J. :- I have had the advantage of reading the opinions of my brothers Newasker, J. and Bhargava, J. I agree with the conclusion reached by Newasker, J. I had at first not desired to record a separate opinion but, since the main question is of some importance. I feel upon further reflection that I should express my opinion. 72. The history of the case has been given in the opinion recorded by Newasker, J., who has also set out the provisions of Section 38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act. It is not, therefore, necessary to re-state them here. 73. The view taken by Newasker, J., is grounded upon the principle that the Courts cannot, under the disguise of construction, usurp a legislative function. On the other hand, Bhargava, J. proceeds on the principle that any enacting provision in a statute must be so construed as to make it operative and workable : Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Both these principles are limited in their application and cannot be carried too far in disregard of the consequences. The precise question for consideration here is which of the two principles of construction should govern the present case. 74. In the erstwhile State of Madhya Bharat, two Acts, Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 (13 of 1951) and Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, 1951 (28 of 1951), were placed on the Statute Book on 5th June 1951 and 27th November 1951 respectively. 74. In the erstwhile State of Madhya Bharat, two Acts, Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 (13 of 1951) and Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, 1951 (28 of 1951), were placed on the Statute Book on 5th June 1951 and 27th November 1951 respectively. Admittedly both the Statutes were in pari materia as dealing with similar subject matters of forming parts of the same system. In the earlier Act shortly called Zamindari Abolition Act, with which we are immediately concerned in this case, the only provisions relevant to the matter under consideration were : "(38)(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, every tenant of a proprietor shall be deemed to be a pucca-tenant of the land comprised in his holding from the date of vesting. (2) Every sub-tenant or tenant of a sub-tenant who deposits with the Tahsildar within the period specified in Sub-Sections (3) and (4) the following amount to be paid to the proprietor, or tenant or sub-tenant, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be a pucca-tenant of the land comprised in his holding………………………………….". Against this, express provisions were made in the later Act (28 of 1951) for a sub-tenant or a tenant of sub-tenant desiring to acquire the rights of a Pucca-tenant in his holding to make an application in the prescribed form to the Tahsildar and also to deposit with him the specified amount [Sections 21 and 22]. The Tahsildar was required to make an enquiry and passed orders on the application (Section 23). A right of appeal was also given to any person aggrieved by an order passed under Section 23 (Section 28). It is obvious from the language employed in Section 38(1) and (2) of the Zamindari Abolition Act reproduced above as well as from the provisions of the later Act being on the point that no enquiry by the Tahsildar under Section 38 ibid, as originally enacted, was contemplated. 75. It appears, however, that Tahsildar used to entertain applications and pass orders under Section 38 of the Zamindari Abolition Act and, in the usual course, such orders were challenged in appeal and revision until the Board of Revenue decided in 1958 MPLJ (BR) 824 that no appeal or revision lay against any order passed under that section. Thereupon Madhya Pradesh Bill No. 15 of 1959 was introduced to amend the Zamindari Abolition Act. Thereupon Madhya Pradesh Bill No. 15 of 1959 was introduced to amend the Zamindari Abolition Act. The objects and reasons were these : "Section 38 provides for accrual of pucca-tenancy rights in certain circumstances and lays down the order of preference in which such rights shall accrue to a tenant. The accrual of Pucca-tenancy rights has since been a subject of much litigation and different judicial pronouncements have been made by different Revenue authorities in the matter, the latest being a decision of the Board of Revenue in Revenue Revision No. 99 of 1958 - Jagannath v. Gowardhan Das, 1958 Revenue Niranaya at p. 390 wherein the Board has held that no appeal or revision lies against an order under Section 38 in absence of any provision to that effect in the Act. It is therefore proposed that an appeal be provided against an order in respect of any matter provided for in Section 38. The Bill is designed to achieve this object". When the Bill was on the anvil of the Legislative Assembly, this Court decided in 1959 MPLJ 738 that the Tahsildar had no jurisdiction to make any enquiry under Section 38 of the Zamindari Abolition Act. Even so, unheedful of the view taken in 1959 MPLJ 738 (supra), the Legislative Assembly enacted and inserted in that Act Section 38A which reads : "38-A (A) (1) From every original order other than an interlocutory order in respect of any matter provided for in Section 38, an appeal shall lie - (i) to the Collector, if such order is passed by the Tahsildar; (ii) to the Commissioner, if such order is passed by the Collector; and the decision in the appeal by the Collector or the Commissioner, as the case may be, shall be final. (2) An appeal under Sub-Section (1) shall be preferred within 60 days - (a) from the commencement of the Madhya Pradesh Zamindari Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1959 (9 of 1959) (hereinafter in this section referred to as the said Act) where the original order was passed on or after the twenty-fourth day of September 1958, and before the commencement of the said Act; (b) from the date of the order, where the order is passed after the commencement of the said Act. (3) Where before the commencement of the said Act, an appeal or revision against an order of a Tahsildar or Collector, as the case may be, in respect of any matter provided for in Section 38 in pending before any Revenue Officer or the Board of Revenue, such appeal or revision shall, on such commencement, stand transferred to the Revenue Officer who would have been competent to entertain an appeal against such order under Sub-Section (1) if an appeal had been filed after such commencement and be disposed of by such officer. (4) While an appeal or revision of the nature referred to in Sub-Section (3) has, before the commencement of the said Act, been rejected by any Revenue Officer or the Board of Revenue on the ground that such Revenue Officer or the Board has no jurisdiction to entertain the same, such appeal or revision shall, on an application made within 60 days of such commencement, be readmitted and disposed of by the Collector or the Commissioner, as the case may be, as if it were an appeal preferred in accordance with the provisions of Sub-Section (4). (5) Nothing contained in the foregoing sub-section shall have the effect of conferring a right of appeal where an appeal or revision preferred in respect of any matter provided for in Section 38 has, before the commencement of the said Act, been decided on merits. (6) The Court-fee payable on a memorandum of appeal shall be two rupees". The question is whether, in view of these provisions for an appeal, the language of Section 38 of the Act can be regarded as contemplating, by necessary implication, a judicial order following an enquiry. 76. It is plain that the language of Section 38(2) of the Zamindari Abolition Act is quite incapable of bearing the meaning sought to be spelled out of it and it is, to my mind, not correct to say that the purpose of the Legislature will be defeated only on account of a slight inexactitude of the language of section. 76. It is plain that the language of Section 38(2) of the Zamindari Abolition Act is quite incapable of bearing the meaning sought to be spelled out of it and it is, to my mind, not correct to say that the purpose of the Legislature will be defeated only on account of a slight inexactitude of the language of section. It is more appropriate to say that the section will have to be redrafted afresh in order to reconcile it with the new Section 38-A. The following observations of Viscount Simon, L.C. made in 1940-3 All ER 549 at p. 554 were quoted as an authority for that course : "Judges are not called upon to apply their opinions of sound policy so as to modify the plain meaning of statutory words, but, where, in construing general words the meaning of which is not entirely plain, there are adequate reasons for doubting whether the legislature could have been intending so wide an interpretation as would disregard fundamental principles, then we may be justified in adopting a narrower construction. At the same time, if the choice is between two interpretations the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility, and should rather accept the bolder construction, based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result." In regard to these observations, it is sufficient to say that, in that case, the question for consideration was whether the word "property" occurring in Section 154 of the Companies Act, 1929, included the right to the service of an employee and Viscount Simon, adopting a narrower construction of the general word "property'', negatived it. 77. Reliance was placed upon the following observations of Subba Rao, J. also in AIR 1961 SC 1107 at pp. 1110-1111 : ''Before we consider this argument in some detail, it will be convenient at this stage to notice some of the well established rules of construction which would help us to steer clear of the complications created by the Act. Maxwell "On the Interpretation of Statutes", 10th Edn. 1110-1111 : ''Before we consider this argument in some detail, it will be convenient at this stage to notice some of the well established rules of construction which would help us to steer clear of the complications created by the Act. Maxwell "On the Interpretation of Statutes", 10th Edn. says at page 7 thus : '...............if the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we shall avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result.' It is said in Craies on Statute Law, 5th edn. at page 82 : "Manifest absurdity or futility, palpable injustice, or absurd inconvenience or anomaly to be avoided". Lord Davey in Canada Suggar Refining Co. v. R. 1898 AC 735 provides another useful guide of correct perspective to such a provision in the following words : 'Every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and the other clauses of the Act, so as, so far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the subject-matter'." Subba Rao, J. made those observations in connection with the narrow question of interpretation of the meaning of the word "said" in Section 320(1) of the Hyderabad District Municipalities Act, 1956. He, however, stated as follows : "If this interpretation be accepted, the Act would become a dead letter and the obvious intention of the Legislature would be defeated. Such a construction cannot be accepted except in cases of absolute intractability of the language." (Page 1111) As shown, the language of Section 38(2) of the Zamindari Abolition Act is inflexible and wholly incapable of bearing the meaning sought to be ascribed to it. 78. The counsel pressed into service the following oft-quoted observations of Denning, L.J. in 1949-2 All ER 155 at p. 164 "When a defect appears a Judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament ..................and then he must supplement the written word so as to give "force and life". He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament ..................and then he must supplement the written word so as to give "force and life". A Judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out ? He must then do as they would have done. A Judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases". In Magor Rural District Council v. Newport Corporation, 1950-2 All ER 1226 at p. 1236 Denning, L.J., repeated what he had said earlier and stated : "I would repeat what I had said in 1949-2 All ER 155. We do not sit here to pull the language of Parliament and of Ministers to pieces and make nonsense of it. That is an easy thing to do, and it is a thing to which lawyers are too often prone. We sit here to find out the intention of Parliament and of Ministers and carry it out, and we do this better by filling in the gaps and making sense of the enactment than by opening it up to destructive analysis". These observations were however criticised and disapproved by the House of Lords in Magor and St. Mellins Rural District Council v. Newport Corporation, 1951-2 All ER 839, Lord Simonds stated : "The Court, having discovered the intention of Parliament and of Ministers too, must proceed to fill in the gaps. What the legislature has not written, the Court must write. The proposition which re-stated in a new form the view expressed by the Lord Justice in the earlier case of 1949-2 All ER 155 at p. 164 (to which the Lord Justice himself refers) cannot be supported. It appears to me to be a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of interpretation, and it is less justifiable when it is guess-work with what material the legislature would if it had discovered the gap, have filled it. If a gap is disclosed, the remedy lies in an amending Act". It appears to me to be a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of interpretation, and it is less justifiable when it is guess-work with what material the legislature would if it had discovered the gap, have filled it. If a gap is disclosed, the remedy lies in an amending Act". (Page 841) Lord Radcliffe stated : "In so far as the intention of Parliament or of Ministers is revealed in the Acts of Parliament or orders, either by the language used or by necessary implications, the Courts should, of course, carry those intentions out, but it is not the function of any judge to fill in what he considers to be the gaps in an Act of Parliament. If he does so, he is usurping the function of the legislature''. (Page 847) Lord Tucker stated : I think it is clear that the situation which has arisen in the present case was never present to the minds of those responsible for the Local Government Act, 1933, and that the language is quite inappropriate to meet it. In these circumstances, your Lordships would be acting in a legislative rather than a judicial capacity if the view put forward by Denning, L.J. in his dissenting judgment were to prevail". (Page 850) The view taken by the House of Lord in regard to the observations of Denning, L.J. finds further support from Gladstone v. Bower, 1960-3 All ER 353 in which Devlin, L.J. observed : "I think, therefore, that this is simply casus omissus and the Act is defective. If it were ever permissible for the court to repair a defective Act of Parliament, I should be very glad that the Court should do so in this case so far as the Court could. The court will always allow the intention of a statute to override the defects of wording but the court's ability to do so is limited by the recognised canons of interpretation. The court may, for example, prefer an alternative construction which is less well fitted to the words but better fitted to the intention of the Act. But here for the reasons given by the learned Judge there is no alternative construction; it is simply a case of something being overlooked. We cannot legislate for casus omissus. The court may, for example, prefer an alternative construction which is less well fitted to the words but better fitted to the intention of the Act. But here for the reasons given by the learned Judge there is no alternative construction; it is simply a case of something being overlooked. We cannot legislate for casus omissus. I may be sure in this case that I know exactly what Parliament would do if perceived a gap. But, if the rule were to be relaxed sooner or later the court would be saying what Parliament meant and might get it wrong and thus usurp the law-making function. It is a matter of keeping within the recognised canons and they do not permit the court to supply words if the only (and I emphasise only) ground for their admission is to give legislative efficacy to a statute." 79. It is well established that where there is casus omissus, it is for others, and not for the courts, to remedy the defect : Hansraj v. Dehra Dun M.E.T. Co., AIR 1933 PC 63, Hira Devi v. District Board, Shahjahanpur, AIR 1952 SC 362 and AIR 1953 SC 148 . Hira Devi's Case, AIR 1952 SC 362 (supra) is instructive in that, there too, when one section of the U.P. District Boards Act was subsequently amended, another related section remained unamended with the consequence that an action taken under the latter had to be declared to be ultra vires the power of the Board. Bhagwati, J., who spoke for the Court, observed : "It was unfortunate that when the Legislature came to amend the old Sec.71 of the Act, it forgot to amend Sec.90 in conformity with the amendment of Sec.71. But this lacuna cannot be supplied by any such liberal construction as the High Court sought to put upon the expression ''orders of any authority whose sanction is necessary". No doubt it is the duty of the Court to try and harmonise the various provisions of an Act passed by the Legislature. But it is certainly not the duty of the Court to stretch the words used by the legislature to fill in gaps or omissions in the provisions of an Act". No doubt it is the duty of the Court to try and harmonise the various provisions of an Act passed by the Legislature. But it is certainly not the duty of the Court to stretch the words used by the legislature to fill in gaps or omissions in the provisions of an Act". (Page 365) In the present case, it is not even suggested that there are in Section 38(2) of the Zamindari Abolition Act any words susceptible of such a liberal construction for the purpose of carrying the object of the Act into effect. As I indicated earlier, the whole section has to be recasted to bring it in conformity with the new Section 38-A of the Zamindari Abolition Act. 80. In my opinion, Section 38(2) of the Zamindari Abolition Act, as it stands, cannot be read as implying that the Tahsildar has authority to enquire and decide whether any person making a deposit thereunder has or has not acquired the rights of a pucca-tenant. There are several reasons for taking that view. In the first place, the situation which has arisen as a consequence of insertion of Section 38-A in the Zamindari Abolition Act was never present to the minds of those who were responsible for enacting Section 38(2) of the Act. Secondly, the language employed in Section 38(2) ibid is inappropriate to the situation so arising. Thirdly, here there is no case of alternative construction. It is a case of something forgotten or overlooked. Fourthly, the construction contended for cannot be effectuated without recasting Section 38(2) to harmonise it with the provisions of the new Section 38-A. Fifthly, the process of removing a defect of this nature is essentially, a function of the legislature which cannot be usurped by the Courts. Finally, to remove this defect, the appropriate remedy is an amendment of the Act. 81. In regard to the further question whether the Additional Naib-Tahsildar could exercise the powers of a Tahsildar under Section 38 of the Zamindari Abolition Act, I agree with my brothers Newasker, J. and Bhargava, J. for the reasons given by them that he could do so. BY THE COURT 82. 81. In regard to the further question whether the Additional Naib-Tahsildar could exercise the powers of a Tahsildar under Section 38 of the Zamindari Abolition Act, I agree with my brothers Newasker, J. and Bhargava, J. for the reasons given by them that he could do so. BY THE COURT 82. ORDER :- In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the reference is answered by saying that the acquisition of the status of a pucca-tenant by a tenant or a sub-tenant of a tenant under Section 38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951, is automatic on the fulfilment by the tenant or a sub-tenant of a tenant, as the case may be, of the conditions as to deposit in the manner and to the extent provided in Section 38 and that an Additional Naib-Tahsildar can exercise the powers of a Tahsildar under that provision. 83. There will be no order as to costs of this reference.