ORDER This is a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the issue of a Writ of Certiorari to quash the election of the respondents 1 and 2 as Sarpanch and Sahayak Sarpanch respectively of Mongsangei Nyaya Panchayat under the provisions of the United Provinces Panchayat Raj Act (U. P. Act XXVI of 1947), (hereinafter called as the Act) and the Rules framed thereunder as extended to Manipur Union territory. 2. The petitioners, who were 8 in number at first, and the respondents 1 to 7 were appointed as Panchas of the Mongsangei Nyaya Panchayat by the 11th respondent District Magistrate on 30-5-1964 under Section 43 of the Act as extended to Union Territory of Manipur. Vide Ext. A/4 Manipur Gazette Extraordinary dated 11-8-1964. The 11th respondent District Magistrate, Manipur, fixed 9-00 a. m. of 6-7-1964 to be the time and the date for the meeting of the Panchas to elect their Sarpanch and Sahayak Sarpanch in pursuance of Section 44 of the Act read with Rule 146 (2) of the Rules. The meeting had to be held in the Panchayat Secretarys Office in Mongsangei (vide Ext. B/1 dated 23-6-1964). The District Magistrate nominated the 8th respondent, Assistant Panchayat Officer, Directorate of Panchayats, Imphal, to preside over the meeting under Rule 146 (3) of the Rules, (Vide Ext. B/2). But, the 11th respondent - District Magistrate - postponed the meeting for one week, (Vide Ext. B/3 dated 6-7-1964). Again, he postponed the meeting sine die, (Vide Ext. B/4 dated 9-7-1964). Finally, the 11th respondent appointed 10-00 a. m. of the 16-9-1964 to be the time and the date of the meeting of the Panchas to be held in the Panchayat Secretarys Office in Mongsangei and nominated the 8th respondent, Panchayat Inspector, to preside over the meeting. (Vide Exts. B/5 and B/6 copies of the orders dated 1-9-1964). 3. At the appointed time and place the meeting had to take place. But, while all the petitioners were coming, the petitioners No. 3, 7 and 8 were arrested by the Police Officers of Imphal Police Station on the ground that a report (F. I. R. Case No. 1045 (9) 64 of Imphal Police Station under Section 379 Indian Penal Code) was filed against them by the respondents 1 and 2 that the petitioners 3, 7 and 8 committed theft of some cement pipes. So, at about 10-00 a. m. of 16-9-1964 the remaining petitioners 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, whose party strength was reduced to 5, appeared before the 8th respondent Panchayat Inspector and requested him to postpone the meeting until the three arrested persons were released and joined the meeting for the purpose of election (Vide Ext. B/7 copy of the petition dated 16-9-1964). The said five petitioners immediately left the meeting under protest. But, the 8th respondent proceeded to transact the business of the meeting without the presence of the petitioners. There were only the respondents 1 to 7 in the meeting. At about 11-15 a. m. the name of the first respondent was proposed and seconded for the office of the Sarpanch. At about 11-17 a. m. the name of the second respondent was proposed and seconded for the office of the Sahayak Sarpanch. At 12-00 a. m. the 8th respondent concluded the meeting and submitted a report to the District Magistrate of the proceedings of the meeting on 17-9-1964 (vide Ext. B/8). The petitioners also made a joint representation to the District Magistrate stating that there was no quorum under Rule 146(4) of the Rules and that there was no valid election of the Sarpanch and the Sahayak Sarpanch. After a lapse of about 5 months, the 8th respondent Panchayat Inspector intimated the petitioners by issuing an undated notice that the respondents 1 and 2 were deemed to have been elected as the Sarpanch and Sahayak Sarpanch in the meeting held on 16-9-1964. (Vide Ext. A/1 notice received by the petitioners on 27-2-1965). 4. Thereupon, the petitioners filed the present Writ Petition on 24-3-1965 challenging the election of the respondents 1 and 2 as Sarpanch and Sahayak Sarpanch of Mongsangei Nyaya Panchayat. During the pendency of the Writ Petition, the petitioners 5 and 6 and the 6th respondent died. 5. The first contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the panchas of Mongsangei Nyaya Panchayat were appointed on 30-5-1964, as can be seen from Ext. During the pendency of the Writ Petition, the petitioners 5 and 6 and the 6th respondent died. 5. The first contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the panchas of Mongsangei Nyaya Panchayat were appointed on 30-5-1964, as can be seen from Ext. A/4, that the election of the Sarpanch and Sahayak Sarpanch should have been held within one month thereafter under Rule 146 (1) of the Rules, but that it was held on 16-9-1964 after the expiry of more than one month from the date of the completion of the appointment of the Panchas of the Nyaya Panchayat and that, therefore, the election of the respondents 1 and 2 as Sarpanch and Sahayak Sarpanch is void. The learned Counsel for the respondents raised preliminary objection that this point was not raised by the petitioners in their writ petition, that it is a new point and that, therefore, the petitioners counsel should not be permitted to raise it. But, the petitioners raised this point in their affidavit in rejoinder D/-31-1-1966, copies of which were served on the respondents Advocates on 1-2-1966 and 2-2-1966. So, the respondents were not taken unawares by this objection. The Supreme Court also ruled that an objection, raised in the affidavit-in-rejoinder filed by the petitioners of which respondents had full notice, could be urged. Vide Srila Sri Subramania Desika Gnanasambanda Pandarasannidi v. State of Madras, AIR 1965 SC 1578 and Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board, AIR 1967 SC 295 . So, the preliminary objection of the respondents counsel was overruled. 6. Rule 146 (1) of the Rules contains a mandatory provision that the period, within which the Panchas of a Nyaya Panchayat shall elect from amongst themselves two persons as the Sarpanch and the Sahayak Sarpanch, shall be one month from the date on which the appointment of Panchas of the Nyaya Panchayat under Section 43 was completed. It runs as follows : "The period within which the Panchas of a Nyaya Panchayat shall elect from amongst themselves two persons as the Sarpanch and the Sahayak Sarpanch shall be one month from the date on which the appointment of Panchas of the Nyaya Panchayat under Section 43 is completed." The word used is "shall" (underlined (here in ) by me) and in the context it means "must". So, the election of the respondents 1 and 2, which was held beyond the period of one month from 30-5-1964 the date of the appointment of the Panchas contravenes the provisions of Rule 146 (1) of the Rules. The learned Counsel for the respondents, however, urged that the word "shall" does not always mean "must" but that it must be understood as "may" and that, therefore, it was not compulsory that the election of the Sarpanch and Sahayak Sarpanch should be held within one month from the date of the completion of the appointment of the Panchas. They relied on the passage at page 376 of Maxwells Interpretation of Statutes (10th edition) and also State of Madhya Pradesh v. M/s. Azad Bharat Finance Co., AIR 1967 SC 276 . The Supreme Court held that it is well settled that the use of the word "shall" does not always mean that the enactment is obligatory or mandatory but that it depends upon the context in which the word "shall" occurs and the other circumstances. In that case the construction of Section 11 of the Opium Act (Act 1 of 1878) as amended by Madhya Bharat Opium Act of 1955 was in question. In the present case, that the word "shall" is mandatory and means "must" is clear from Section 44 of the Act, under which the Sarpanch and Sahayak Sarpanch have to be elected. It runs thus : "44. Election of Sarpanch, Sahayak Sarpanch - The panchas appointed under Sec. 43 shall in the manner and within the period to be prescribed, elect from amongst them two persons who are able to record proceedings; one as the Sarpanch and the other as the Sahayak Sarpanch : Provided that if the panchas fail to elect the Sarpanch or the Sahayak Sarpanch as aforesaid the prescribed authority may appoint the Sarpanch or the Sahayak Sarpanch." In S. 44 also the word used is "shall" (underlined (herein ) by me). The proviso to Sec. 44 lays down the penal consequences if the Sarpanch and Sahayak Sarpanch are not elected within the prescribed period, in which case the prescribed authority "may" appoint the Sarpanch or the Sahayak Sarpanch. In the proviso the word used is "may" (underlined by me (here in " ")) as contradistinguishing from the word "shall" used in the section. In the proviso the word used is "may" (underlined by me (here in " ")) as contradistinguishing from the word "shall" used in the section. So, in the context of S. 44 of the Act read with Rule 146 (1) of the Rules, it is abundantly clear that the Sarpanch and the Sahayak Sarpanch "must" be elected within one month from the date of the completion of appointment of the panchas. But, the election was postponed as can be seen from Exts. B/1 to B/6 from 6-7-1964 to 16-9-1964. As such, the election is illegal and is contrary to the provisions of Section 44 of the Act and Rule 146 (1) of the Rules. 7. The second contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the alleged election of the respondents 1 and 2 on 26-9-1964 was held under fraudulent circumstances. The strength of the petitioners party was "8" while that of the party of the respondents 1 to 7 was "7". The petitioners case is that if all the 15 members were present, then the petitioners group would have elected some of the petitioners as Sarpanch and Sahayak Sarpanch and that they would have succeeded in the election, because the strength of their group was "8" as against "7" the strength of the group of the respondents 1 to 7. But, at about 10-00 a.m. on 16-9-1964 when the petitioners were entering into the meeting hall, the petitioners 3, 7 and 8 were arrested by the Police of Imphal Police Station at the gate of the meeting hall and were taken away. The petitioners allege that they requested the Police Officers to release them so that they might attend the meeting and might be re-arrested after the election was over, but that the Police Officers did not need their request and that they took away the petitioners 3, 7 and 8. It seems, they were released on bail at about 3 p. m. after the election was over. Ext. A/3 shows that ultimately the investigating officer filed a report on 19-6-1965 stating that in the course of the investigation it transpired that there was a mistake of fact against the accused persons under Section 379, Indian Penal Code and that, therefore, they might be discharged. Ext. A/2 shows that the Judicial Magistrate (I), Imphal, discharged them on 19-6-1965 on the basis of the report of the Police. Ext. A/2 shows that the Judicial Magistrate (I), Imphal, discharged them on 19-6-1965 on the basis of the report of the Police. So, ultimately it is proved beyond doubt that the petitioners 3, 7 and 8 were arrested on 16-9-1964 just before the commencement of the meeting for the election of the Sarpanch and Sahayak Sarpanch to prevent them from taking part in the election and vote. It is therefore evident that they were got arrested on false and flimsy grounds, and that, the respondents 1, 2 and others, at whose instance they were arrested, played fraud and made the election a simple farce and mockery. In as much as they succeeded in getting rid of the petitioners 3, 7 and 8 by getting them arrested by the Police, the respondents 1 to 7 were in a majority in the meeting and could elect their own candidates as Sarpanch and Sahayak Sarpanch. This is nothing but an abuse of the democracy and the democratic set up of the Nyaya Panchayat. The so-called election was a sham and a colourable election. For this reason also the election is liable to be set aside. 8. The third contention of the petitioners counsel is that there was no quorum as required by Rule 146 (4) of the Rules at the actual time of election of Sarpanch and Sahayak Sarpanch and that, therefore, their election is void. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 146 lays down that half the number of members of a Nyaya Panchayat, fixed under Rule 9, shall form the quorum for the meeting. The remaining petitioners 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 presented a petition as per Ext. B/7 before the 8th respondent, bringing to his notice the fact of illegal arrest of the petitioners 3, 7 and 8 and requested him to adjourn the meeting. They immediately left the meeting without signing the list of voters present. Ext. B/8, report sent by the 8th respondent to the 11th respondent, shows that he subsequently conducted the election, that at about 11-15 a. m. the first respondent was unanimously elected by the respondents 1 to 7 as Sarpanch, that at about 11-17 a.m. the second respondent was unanimously elected as the Sahayak Sarpanch and that he dissolved the meeting at 12-00 a. m. As the strength of the Nyaya Panchayat was 15, the quorum required for the meeting was "8". But, there were only 7 members, namely, the respondents 1 to 7 when the election was held. So, the election contravened the provisions of sub-rule (4) of Rule 146 of the Rules. 9. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents is that there was quorum in the beginning at about 10-00 a. m. when the meeting commenced with 12 members and that though the 5 petitioners - 1, 2 and 4 to 6 subsequently left the meeting without signing the list of voters present, before the actual election was held, the election was not liable to be set aside. But, the petitioners 1, 2 and 4 to 6 left the meeting at 10-00 a. m. and were not present when the election was actually held. It would have been quite a different matter, if they continued to stay in the meeting at 11-15 a. m. and 11-17 a. m. and refrained from voting. Then, their physical presence in the meeting could be taken as their actual attendance for the purpose of the meeting and it could be said that there was quorum. But, even though they were present when the meeting commenced, by no stress of imagination could it be said that there was requisite quorum of the members for the meeting at the time of the actual election of the Sarpanch and the Sahayak Sarpanch as they left the meeting and did not sign the rolls even. Almost a similar question cropped up in Dwarka Nath Dutta v. Chandra Mohan Roy, Mainamati Union Board Case No. 115, reported at page 61, Doabias Election Cases, 1864-1935 Vol. 2, 1955 edition. In that case 6 voters were present as against 5 for a quorum in a meeting to elect the President of the Union. But 3 voters, who were present, did not vote. It was held that the fact that they did not vote at the meeting would not make them any the less persons present at the meeting. It was pointed out further that if, after joining the meeting, they did not want to be members of the Union, the easiest and usual course for them was to leave the place and that their conduct in simply taking no active part in the meeting did not make them absent from the meeting when as a matter of fact they were present. In the present case there was no quorum at the time when the actual election took place. The petitioners 1, 2 and 4 to 6 had already left the meeting. The election of the respondents 1 and 2 is thus contrary to the provisions of sub-rule (4) of Rule 146 of the Rules and is void. It is liable to be set aside for this reason also. 10. The 8th respondent himself felt doubt over the legality and validity of the proceedings held by him. He did not declare the result of the election on 16-9-1964. On the other hand, he submitted a report to the 11th respondent District Magistrate, as can be seen from Ext. B/8, copy of the report dated 17-9-1964. Therein the 8th respondent did not declare that the respondents 1 and 2 were duly elected. But, he left the matter to the 11th respondent for his decision. The petitioners also challenged the proceedings by applying to the 11th respondent. But, the 8th respondent finally sent notices to the petitioners (which were not dated) stating that he was directed to declare the result of the election of the Sarpanch and Sahayak Sarpanch held on 16-9-1964 and that the respondents 1 and 2 were elected to the Offices. In the copy addressed to the 9th respondent-Assistant-Panchayat Officer, there is a reference to the latters letter dated 25-2-1965. So, evidently this declaration was made after 25-2-1965. The parties received the notices on 27-2-1965. Thus, the results were not declared until at least 27-2-1965. Their election is vitiated, as there was no quorum in the meeting when the election was held. 11. The next question, which is of some general importance, is whether the present writ petition lies. Rule 147 of the Rules lays down that any dispute relating to the election of a person as Sarpanch or Sahayak Sarpanch shall be decided in the manner provided by Rule 79 for decision of disputes relating to election of Upa-Pradhan. Rule 79 lays down that any person desiring to dispute the election of an Upa-Pradhan shall, within 30 days after the date of election present an application to the Sub-Divisional Officer of the division, in which the Sabha concerned is situated, setting forth the grounds on which he disputes the election. Rule 79 lays down that any person desiring to dispute the election of an Upa-Pradhan shall, within 30 days after the date of election present an application to the Sub-Divisional Officer of the division, in which the Sabha concerned is situated, setting forth the grounds on which he disputes the election. The S. D. O. should dispose of the election petition according to the provisions of Rules 77 and 78 in so far as they are applicable. But, the petitioners did not seek their remedy under Rule 147 read with Rule 79. The contention of the respondents counsel is, therefore, that the writ petition does not lie 12. Article 226 (1) of the Constitution of India, under which the present writ petition was filed, empowers the High Court to issue to any person or authority, orders or writ including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any rights conferred by part III and for any other purpose. Clause (2) lays down that the power conferred on a High Court by Clause (1) or Clause (1A) shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by Clause (2) of Article 32. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be invoked only for enforcement of any of the personal rights conferred by part III or other rights akin to the said rights but not for the enforcement of franchise rights and relied on Orissa Mineral Development Co. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Orissa, AIR 1960 On 79, Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1044 and Ram Chandra Malpani v. State of Assam, AIR 1963 Assam 168. The first case recognised the fact that the existence of an alternative remedy may not always be a sufficient ground for the High Court to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 and held that cases may arise where the unconstitutionality or the illegality of the order under challenge is so apparent that notwithstanding the existence of the alternative remedy the High Court may interfere under that Article. But, it was further ruled that at the same time a party should not be permitted to escape the rigorous effects of the law of limitation by applying to the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution, after the expiry of the period prescribed by law, to get relief from the appropriate revisional or appellate authorities. That case arose under Orissa Sales Tax Act (Act XIV of 1947) as amended by Act XXVI of 1958. In the second case the constitutional validity of the Oriental Gas Company Act, 1960 (West Bengal Act XV of 1960) was in question. It was held by the Supreme Court that Article 226 in terms does not describe the classes of persons entitled to apply thereunder, but that it is implicit in the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief asked for must be one to enforce a legal right, that the existence of the light is the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court and that the legal right must ordinarily be the right of the petitioner himself who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief. It was further held that the right, which can be enforced under Article 226, must be ordinarily the personal or individual right of the petitioner himself, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule may have to be relaxed or modified. The Supreme Court held in that case that the legal personal right of the petitioner was infringed by the provisions of the impugned Act. But the third case of AIR 1963 Assam 168 has some bearing on this case. Rule 11 of the Rules framed under the Assam Municipal Act (Act XV of 1957) for election of Commissioners of the Municipal Board was not complied with. The Assam High Court held that the right of franchise is a creature of a statute, that if that right is infracted the remedy of the person is to challenge the election by the procedure provided by the special statute, that in that case the election could be challenged before the District Judge under Section 18 (1) (c) of the said Act and that, therefore, no writ petition would lie. It was also held that it is the infraction of an individual and a personal right which gives a person a right to approach the High Court under Article 226 and that the petitioner in that case could not file a writ petition, as no personal legal right of his was infringed. 13. There is large volume of case law, which has laid down that even if there is an alternative remedy it does not bar the jurisdiction of the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, if the alternative remedy is not adequate and is not equally convenient, beneficial or effective. Vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233 , Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 153 , Virendra Singh v. Returning Officer, Gaon Panchayat Elections, AIR 1957 All 213 , Bhagwati Prasad v. J. K. Tandon, AIR 1957 All 354 , Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer, Companies District 1, Calcutta, AIR 1961 SC 372 . Parmatma Ram v. Siri Chand, AIR 1962 Him Pra 19, Municipal Council, Khurai v. Kamal Kumar, AIR 1965 SC 1321 , M. G. Abrol, Additional Collector of Customs, Bombay v. Shantilal Chhotelal and Co., AIR 1966 SC 197 , Laisram Thanil Singh v. District Magistrate, Manipur, W.P. No. 12/1966 : 1966 Mani LJ 49, Dr. (Mrs.) Shabbir Fatima v. Chancellor, University of Allahabad, AIR 1966 All 45 , Hira v. Chetu, AIR 1967 All 452 , Atma Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 Raj 239 (FB) and First Income-tax Officer, Salem v. Short Brothers (P.) Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 81 . 14. Article 329 of the Constitution of India bars the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writs in respect of an election to either House of Parliament or either House of the Legislature of a State. But, there is no such constitutional bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction in respect of elections to local bodies such as Municipalities, District Boards and the like. Vide also pages 639 and 640 of Constitutional Law of India, by H. M. Seervai, 1967 edition. In the following cases, relating to disputes for elections to Local bodies, the High Courts exercised their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, though no election petitions were filed under the provisions of the relevant Acts. Vide also pages 639 and 640 of Constitutional Law of India, by H. M. Seervai, 1967 edition. In the following cases, relating to disputes for elections to Local bodies, the High Courts exercised their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, though no election petitions were filed under the provisions of the relevant Acts. AIR 1957 All 213 was under the same U. P. P. R. Act applicable to the present case in question. After the declaration of an election to a municipality the District Magistrate passed without jurisdiction an order declaring the election void and also fixed a date by which reelection was to be completed. It was held that the order was passed without jurisdiction and that there was no bar to the High Court for issuing direction quashing the order and consequential mandamus. In AIR 1957 All 354 , the nomination papers of two candidates for election to the office of Pradhan of Gaon Sabha were accepted by the Assistant Returning Officer after scrutiny. He declared one of the candidates as having been duly elected to the office of Pradhan. But, the Director of Elections held that the Assistant Returning Officer had no jurisdiction to pass the order and quashed it and directed re-election. It was held that the Director of Elections acted wholly without jurisdiction since he was not given any authority to adjudicate whether the Returning Officer had acted without jurisdiction or not and that the result of the election could be challenged only by an election petition and not before the Director of Elections. A writ was issued quashing the orders of the Director of Elections. In Parmatma Ram v. Siri Chand, AIR 1962 Him Pra 19 it was held that the existence of an alternative remedy under the Punjab Municipal Act (Punjab Act III of 1911) and the Municipal Election Rules of 1957 framed thereunder was not a bar to the exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and that in the circumstances of the case the non-filing of a petition challenging the election of the successful candidate in accordance with Rules 54 and 55 of the Municipal Election Rules, 1957, did not operate as a bar to the maintainability of the petition praying for writ of quo-warranto. In Civil Writ Petn. In Civil Writ Petn. No. 12 of 1966 : 1966 Mani LJ 49 this Court held that a writ would lie to quash the election of the Municipal Commissioners, which contravened Sections 14 and 16 of Assam Municipal Act and Rules 19 and 22 of the Rules of Election of Commissioners of Municipal Board Manipur, though there was an alternative remedy. In AIR 1966 All 45 it was held that though an alternative remedy under Section 42 of the Allahabad University Act (Act III of 1921) of challenging the election lay before the Chancellor, the alternative remedy was neither adequate nor equally appropriate and that, therefore, writ petition lay. In AIR 1967 All 452 it was held that the power of the Court conferred by Article 226 cannot be restricted by a provision contained in an Act of Parliament or of State Legislature, that consequently, even though as a practice and in order to respect the Legislative direction the election shall not be challenged except by means of an election petition, there is no insurmountable hurdle in the way of the Court in granting relief in a suitable and hard case. In AIR 1967 Raj 239 (FB) there are very pertinent observations at page 247. In para 20 Bhandari, J. stated as follows : "20. No doubt, jurisdiction of the High Court in exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be taken away by any provision made by the Legislature for ousting the jurisdiction of the civil Court. But, when this Court is passing an order for setting aside an election for any infirmity in pre-election matters, it will no doubt keep in view that the Legislature has laid down certain conditions which must be satisfied before an election could be set aside, and those, who come to this Court for seeking relief under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be permitted to get such relief by evading that provision of law, except when, on strictest scrutiny of the case, the Court finds that there has been such breaches of the provisions of law that the State or the authority concerned should not have proceeded at all to hold the election, or when the holding of an election was merely a farce. Except for such cases, generally speaking election of a person as a member of the Board should not be set aside for defects in pre-election matters." 14A. In the present case there are the following circumstances which warrant this Court exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, though the petitioners had the alternative remedy of challenging the election before the Sub-Divisional Officer, under Rule 147 read with Rule 79 of the Rules. Firstly, Section 12 (c) of the Act, which bars jurisdiction of a Civil Court, applies to disputes regarding election to the Office of Pradhan of a Gram Sabha or member of it including the election of a person who may be appointed as Appellant Panch of a Nyaya Panchayat under Section 43 of the Act. In such a case the election can be called into question by an application presented to the authority concerned within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner. But, it does not apply to disputes regarding the election to office of Sarpanch or Sahayak Sarpanch. Secondly, the election was held in total disregard of the provisions of sub-Rules (1) and (4) of Rule 146 of the Rules read with section 44 of the Act. Thirdly the respondents 1 to 7 played fraud in getting the petitioners 3, 7 and 8 arrested just before the election was to be held on false allegations of theft and manipulated to have a majority of their party at the time of the election. The election was simply a mockery and a farce. It was a colourable one which cannot be allowed to stand. 15. The learned counsel for the respondents stated that the petitioners circumvented the law of limitation by filing the writ petition, that under Rule 147 read with section 79 of the Rules, the election petition should have been filed within one month from the date of election of the respondents 1 and 2, but that the petitioners filed the writ petition on 24-3-1965. They relied on AIR 1960 Orissa 79 where it was held that the law of limitation cannot be allowed to be circumvented by a person by filing a writ petition, where his ordinary remedy is otherwise barred by limitation. They relied on AIR 1960 Orissa 79 where it was held that the law of limitation cannot be allowed to be circumvented by a person by filing a writ petition, where his ordinary remedy is otherwise barred by limitation. But, in the present case the respondents 8 to 11 declared the election or the respondents 1 and 2 only after 25-2-1965 and the present writ petition was filed by the petitioners within one month, namely, on 24-3-1965. So, they cannot be said to have circumvented the law of limitation. 16. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the election of the respondents 1 and 2 as Sarpanch and Sahayak Sarpanch is set aside. The District Magistrate should fill up according to law the vacancies of the Panchas caused by the death of the petitioners 5 arid 6 and the 6th respondent under Sections 48 and 50 of the Act. Later on, he should get the election of Sarpanch and Sahayak Sarpanch held within one month from the date of the completion of the appointment of the panchas. The petitioners are entitled to their costs. Advocates fee Rs. 50. One set. Petition allowed.