ORDER R. J. Bhave, J. This revision is by the plaintiff. The plaintiff had filed a suit claiming to be the adopted son of Puhupsingh against the daughter of Puhupsingh for declaration, partition and separate possession of certain property described in the schedule attached to the plaint. The property in suit is assessed to land revenue. The prayer clause in the plaint was to the following effect: It is prayed, therefore, that the Court be pleased to:- (i) Declare that the plaintiff is the adopted son of late Puhupsingh. (ii) Order partition of the Bhumiswami holding detailed in the schedule attached with the plaint. (iii) Put the plaintiff in separate possession of his own share of the land. (iv) Award costs of the suit; and (v) Award such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper. Realising that the prayer clause was not in consonance with the provisions of the law. the plaintiff applied for amendment of the prayer clause to the following effect: To add the following at the end of clause (i):- and holds 2/3rd interest in the land detailed in schedule (A) of the plaint'. (ii) To add at the end of clause (ii):- .....in accordance with the provisions of section 54 of the Civil Procedure Code. If the amendment is allowed, the prayer clause would read thus: (i) Declare that the plaintiff is the adopted son of late Puhupsingh and holds 2/3rd interest in the land detailed in schedule (A) of the plaint. (ii) Order partition of the Bhumiswami holding detailed in Schedule attached with the plaint in accordance with the provisions of section 54 of the Civil Procedure Code. The trial Court, by its order dated 19-10-1966, allowed the amendment of the first clause only. The amendment of the second clause was refused on the ground that u/s 178 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code the jurisdiction for partitioning the land revenue paying properties was conferred exclusively on the revenue Courts and that u/s 257 of the Code the jurisdiction of the civil Courts was barred in that matter and hence no direction could be issued to the revenue Courts to partition the property by the civil Court. The plaintiff has challenged in this revision the above said order. The plaintiff has challenged in this revision the above said order. Shri Dharmadhikari, learned counsel for the applicant, urged that the provisions of section 178 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code are only enabling. Evsn the proviso to section 178 makes it clear that where the question of title is raised, until such question has been decided by a civil suit, the revenue authorities cannot proceed to partition the property. He, therefore, urged that u/s 178 itself the jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain a suit to decide the title of the parties and even to partition the property is implicit. Shri Pandey, learned counsel for the non-applicant, on the other hand, urged that though in section 178 the expression 'may' is used, it means 'shall' and that it is wrong to interpret section 178 as an enabling section. He conceded that in various clauses u/s 257 there is no reference to section 178; but he urged that even in the absence of such reference, the case is covered by the general provision to be found in the first part of section 257 wherein it is stated that 'except as otherwise provided in this Code, or in any other enactment for the time being in force, no civil Court shall entertain any suit instituted or application made to obtain a decision or order on any matter which the State Government, the Board or any Revenue Officer, is by this Code, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of...... Section 178 of the Code is in the following terms: Partition of holding.-(1) If in any holding which has been assessed for the purpose of agriculture u/s 59, there are more than one Bhumiswami, any such Bhumiswami may apply to a Tahsildar for a partition of his share in the holding: Provided that no such partition shall be made, if any question of title is raised, until such question has been decided by a civil suit. (2) The Tahsildar, may, after hearing the co-tenure-holder, divide the holding and apportion the assessment of the holding in accordance with the rules made under this Code. (3) Omitted. (4) (.5) Explanation 1 -For purposes of this section any co-sharer of the holding of a Bhumiswami who has obtained a declaration of his title in such holding from a competent civil Court shall be deemed to be a co-tenure-holder of such holding. Explanation 2 --Omitted. (3) Omitted. (4) (.5) Explanation 1 -For purposes of this section any co-sharer of the holding of a Bhumiswami who has obtained a declaration of his title in such holding from a competent civil Court shall be deemed to be a co-tenure-holder of such holding. Explanation 2 --Omitted. It is a well recognised principle that ordinarily the word 'May' is not a word of compulsion. It is an enabling word and it only confers capacity, power or authority and implies discretion. [See Madanlal v. Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd. A 1 R 1962 S C 1543 at p. 1557]. It is also well recognised that where a power is deposited with a public officer for the purpose of being used for the benefit of persons, that power ought to be exercised and the Court will require it to be exercised, and in that sense the word 'may' will have to be interpreted not as an enabling provision but as a mandatory provision. [See Ramji Missir and Another Vs. The State of Bihar, at p." 1092]. Keeping those principles in view, we must analyse the provisions of section 178 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code. In clause (1) of section 178 it is provided that in case of holdings, which are assessed to land revenue, and there are more than one person who are entitled to hold the land in Bhumiswami rights, then any such Bhumiswami may apply to the Tahsildar for partition of his share in the holding. Clause (2) then says that the Tahsildar may, after hearing the co-tenure-holders, divide the holding. So far as clause (2) is concerned, the expression 'may' used in that clause will have to be interpreted as mandatory, inasmuch as that imposes a duty on the Tahsildar to partition the property it' an application to that effect is made. But the same thing cannot be asserted with respect to clause (1). A Bhumiswami may go to the revenue Courts if there is no dispute regarding the rights of the other co-sharers for getting the property partitioned. But where there is a dispute as to title, there is nothing to indicate in clause (2) that he must go to the civil Court for the purposes of settling the question of title and then must necessarily come to the revenue Courts for the further relief of partition. But where there is a dispute as to title, there is nothing to indicate in clause (2) that he must go to the civil Court for the purposes of settling the question of title and then must necessarily come to the revenue Courts for the further relief of partition. To my mind, the provision u/s 178 has been made for the reason that the revenue authorities are better suited to partition the property and the actual division of the land revenue paying property can be more conveniently effected by those authorities. This is the reason why I am of the opinion that section 178 is only an enabling provision. In support of his contention that the civil Court's jurisdiction in the matter of partition with respect to revenue paying land was barred, Shrt Pandey relied on Vinayak v. Jairam AIR 1932 Nag. 31 : 27 NLR 341 and AIR 1933 121 (Nagpur) . In my view, both these decisions do not support Shri Pandey. Section 93 of the C. P. Tenancy Act, 1920, provided thus: If in any holding there are more persons than one having tenancy rights, any such person may apply to revenue officer for a partition of his share in the holding and the revenue officer may, subject to Rules made u/s 109, divide the holding and apportion the rent. While interpreting this provision, it was observed in Vinayak v. Jairam thus: With regard to the second point I remark that section 105 (o) of the Tenancy Act prohibits a civil Court from exercising jurisdiction over the partition of holdings u/s 93 ibid, and section 93 only refers to the breaking up of a holding. The lower appellate Court then should vary the preliminary decree, so as to give effect to its main intent that the holdings should be divided, and should endeavour to effect partition by allotting holdings to the various co-sharers. It is not clear from the record how the fields are divided into holdings: it may be that a particular partition cannot be effected without breaking up one or more holdings. If this is the case the plaintiff should be directed to apply for partition of some holdings in a manner allowed by the rules: I see no reason why a satisfactory partition cannot be reached without the formation of a holding of less than 10 acres. If this is the case the plaintiff should be directed to apply for partition of some holdings in a manner allowed by the rules: I see no reason why a satisfactory partition cannot be reached without the formation of a holding of less than 10 acres. The plaintiff should receive a full one-third of the land if this is reasonably possible: otherwise, he will have to be content with land of value less than one-third of the whole as his share together with a sum of money. In Rajpal v. Parwatrao the facts were that two holdings, one an occupancy field and the other an absolute occupancy field, belonged to three persons. In partition proceedings the Tahsildar allotted one holding to two claimants and the other to the third. That action was challenged by way of a civil suit. In that case, Grille A. J. C. (as he then was) observed: But the partition of a holding is a very different matter from the partitioning of land held by parties in a village by holdings, and is not a matter which a revenue officer u/s 93 of the Tenancy Act is concerned with at all. His business is to divide the holding physically and apportion the rent on the parts so divided. This has not been done in the present case and as there was no partition of a holding, there was no apportionment of the rent of the holding. There is nothing in the Tenancy Act which empowered the Naib-Tahsiidar to consolidate the holdings which, if it is claimed that he did actually divide them individually, was the next step taken. As has been held in Vinayak v. Jairam section 93 of the Tenancy Act refers only to the breaking up of a holding, and has no applicability to the redistribution of holdings without any breaking up. I am satisfied that the action of the revenue authorities in this instance was ultra vires of the Tenancy Act. The observations in the two decisions clearly indicate that the jurisdiction of the revenue authorities is confined to physical division of the tenancy holding and apportionment of rent. The civil Court has a right to partition the property in such a way as not to involve actual division of a holding and only where such an eventuality may occur the revenue Court may be approached. The civil Court has a right to partition the property in such a way as not to involve actual division of a holding and only where such an eventuality may occur the revenue Court may be approached. Section 54 of the CPC itself provides that when a decree for partition of the property assessed to land revenue is passed, the partition of the property shall be made by the Collector or any gazetted subordinate of the Collector deputed by him in this behalf in accordance with the law (if any) for the time being in force relating to the partition or the separate possession. Similar is the provision in Order 20, rule 18, which prescribes the form in which the decree should be drawn. In my view, the purpose of section 178 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code is to indicate the authority that may partition the property on application of the parties or on the direction of the civil Court. There is nothing in section 178 to indicate that the Legislature desired to confer exclusive jurisdiction in the matter on the Tahsildar. It would thus appear that u/s 178 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code the Tahsildar can divide the holdings physically and apportion the land revenue; but he has no right to allot the holding to one party and direct payment of compensation to the other. That function is that of the civil Court. From this point of view also the proper interpretation of section 178 is that it is an enabling provision and has not the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of the civil Court. For the aforesaid reasons, my conclusion is that the lower Court was in error in disallowing the amendment as prayed for. The order dated 19-10-1966 is set aside. The trial Court shall now allow the plaintiff to amend the plaint as prayed for and shall proceed with the trial. The revision is accordingly allowed. The applicant shall get costs of these proceedings. Hearing fee Rs. 50. Final Result : Allowed