Judgment Anwar Ahmad, J. 1. This appeal bv defendants 2 and 3 arises out of a suit for partition. 2. The case of the plaintiff was that Lain Singh had four sons, namely, Chamru Singh, Damar Singh. Lachu Singh and Bandhu Singh. For the purposes of the present appeal, we are concerned only with the branches of Lachu Singh and Bandhu Singh The four sons of Lalji Singh had separated long before the survey operations, Lachu Singh had also four sons, namely, Ramautar Singh, Parmeshwar Sinsh. Beni Singh and Toti Singh. Ramautar had a son Bricha Singh. Bricha Singh. Parmeshwar Sineh and Beni Singh died issueless and Toti Singh died leaving behind his only son Ram Chandar Singh and two daughters, namely, Akhjo Kuer and Gulab-pati Kuer, Jamuna Singh (defendant No. 1) was the son of Akhjo Kuer and the plaintiff was the son of Gulabpati Kuer. According to the case of the plaintifi. Ram Chander was the sole surviving member in the branch of Lachu Singh and succeeded to all the properties of that branch. Ram Chandar also died issueless leaving behind him his widow Mosammat Dewa Kuer (defendant No. 6), who came in possession of those properties. 3. The lands of Khatas Nos. 15 and 16 situate in village Sabbajpur were recorded in the survey Khatian in the names of the three sons of Lachu Singh. namely. Parmeshwar. Beni, Toti and Bricha Singh (son of Ramautar Singh and grandson of Lachu Singh). The lands of Khatas Nos. 339 and 340 situate in village Kalpa were recorded in the survey record-of rights only in the names of Parmeshwar, Beni and Toti. The lands of Khata No. 6 situate in village Adluchak Daulatpur were recorded in the survey record-of-rights in the names of Brijnath Singh (son of Ramphal Singh) and Loknath Singh (son of Tuloo Singh), relations of Toti Singh and his brothers. According to the case of the plaintiff, Brij Nath and Loknath were the farzidars of Toti Singh and his brothers and they never came in possession of the lands of Khata No. 6 which always continued to be in possession of Toti Singh and his brothers. Subsequently, Dewa Kuer (defendant No. 6) came in possession of these lands. According to the case of the plaintiff, Brij Nath and Loknath were the farzidars of Toti Singh and his brothers and they never came in possession of the lands of Khata No. 6 which always continued to be in possession of Toti Singh and his brothers. Subsequently, Dewa Kuer (defendant No. 6) came in possession of these lands. The lands of Khata No. 51 situate in village Sahabaj-pur stood recorded in the survey record-of-rights in the names of Ramruch Singh and Dhani Singh, sons of Bandhu Singh and grandsons of Lalji Singh, in respect of a half-share and the names of Parmeshwar Singh, Beni Singh, Toti Singh and Bricha Singh of the branch of Lachu Singh were recorded in respect of the remaining half. Dewa Kuer (defendant No. 6), widow of Ram Chandar Singh, came in exclusive possession of all the aforesaid lands including the lands of Khata No. 6 and she came in ioint possession of the lands of Khata No. 51 with Ramruch Singh (son of Dhani Singh) to the extent of one half share and remained in joint possession of the sama with Ramruch Singh until she made a gift of all her properties (detailed in schedule A attached to the plaint) by means of a registered deed of gift dated the 7th January 1958 in favour of the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 in equal shares. After tht execution of the deed of gift, the plaintiff came in ioint possession of the lands of Khatas Nos. 6, 15, 16. 339 and 340 with defendant No. 1. The share of the plaintiff therein was to the extent of eight annas. The plaintifi also came in joint possession of the lands of Khata No. 51 with defendants 1 and 2 to 5 and the share of the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 in those lands was to the extent of four annas each and the remaining eight annas belonged to defendants 2 to 5 of the branch of Bandhu Singh. 4. Experiencing great difficulties in continuing to be in joint possession of the lands mentioned above, the plaintiff asked the defendants for partition by metes and bounds: but they refused to do so. Hence the suit. 5. Defendant No. 1 filed a written statement supporting the case of the plaintiff. The suit was contested by defendants 2 and 3. 4. Experiencing great difficulties in continuing to be in joint possession of the lands mentioned above, the plaintiff asked the defendants for partition by metes and bounds: but they refused to do so. Hence the suit. 5. Defendant No. 1 filed a written statement supporting the case of the plaintiff. The suit was contested by defendants 2 and 3. Their defence, in short, was that the last male holder in the branch of Lachu Singh was Beni Singh, the first cousin of Bandhu Singh and, consequently, after the death of Beni Singh. Dhani Singh, son of Bandhu, succeeded to and came in possession of all the properties of the branch of Lachu Singh. Mosammat Dewa Kuer never came in possession of the same and she had no right to make a gift of the properties to the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 Brij Nath and Lok Nath, who were recorded in the khatian in respect of the lands of Khata No. 6, were Phuphera brothers of defendant No. 2. The lands of this khatau which exclusively belonged to the family of Dhani Singh, were recorded in the Khatian in the farzi names of his relations. Dhani and his heirs were in exclusive possession of the lands of Khata No. 6 and they were still continuing in possession of the same. The lands of Khata No. 51 were also in exclusive possession of defendants 2 to 3 and, before them, their ancestors were in possession of the same. The survey authorities wrongly recorded the names of the sons of Lachu Singh in the record-of-rights in respect of the lands of Khata No. 51. 6. Defendant No. 6, at first filed a written statement supporting the case of Defendants 2 and 3; but, subsequently, she filed another written statement supporting thecase of the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 along with a petition with a prayer for the cancellation of her first written statement. She also examined herself in Court and supported the case of the plaintiff and defendant No. 1. 7. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge, on a consideration of the evidence on record, has cnme to the following conclusions: (i) that Ram Chandar Singh was the last male holder in the family of Lachu Singh and, after his death, Dewa Kuer came in possession of all his properties and, after the execution of the registered deed of gift (Ex. 7. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge, on a consideration of the evidence on record, has cnme to the following conclusions: (i) that Ram Chandar Singh was the last male holder in the family of Lachu Singh and, after his death, Dewa Kuer came in possession of all his properties and, after the execution of the registered deed of gift (Ex. 2) dated the 7th January 1958, the plaintiff and defendant No 1 are in possession of the properties: (ii) that defendants 2 and 3 have one half share in the lands of Khata No. 51 and the remaining half belongs to Dewa Kuer which she has transferred to the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 by means of the deed of gift (Ext 2); and (iii) that the lands o± Khata No. 6 never belonged to the branch of Lachu Singh and. therefore. Dewa Kuer (defendant No. 6) or the plaintiff and defendant No 1 never came in possession of the same. On these findings the learned Additional Subordinate Judge has decreed the suit of the plaintiff to the extent of eight annas in the lands of khatab Nos, 15,16, 339 and 340 and four annas in the lands of Khata No. 51. He has held that the remaining eight annas share in the lands of Khatas Nos. 15. 16. 339 and 340 belongs to defendant No. 1, that four annat share in the lands oi Khata No. 51 belongs to defendant No. 1 and the remaining eight annas share therein belongs to defendants 2 to 5. The suit of the plaintiff has been dismissed so far as the lands of Khata No. 6 are concerned and it was held that the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 have no share in these lands. 8. Mr. Lakshman Sharan Sinha, learned counsel for the appellants, has raised only two points; (1) that Ram Chandar Singh was, not the last male holder of the branch of Lachu Singh and (2) that the lands of Khata No 51 always belonged to Bandhu branch and the plaintiff rind defendant No. 1 have no interest in these lands. 9. It may be stated at the very outset that, although a large number of wit- nesses were examined on behalf of the parties, namely, the plaintiff, defendant No. 1 and defendants 2 and 3, the learned Subordinate Judge has not placed reliance upon the oral evidence. 9. It may be stated at the very outset that, although a large number of wit- nesses were examined on behalf of the parties, namely, the plaintiff, defendant No. 1 and defendants 2 and 3, the learned Subordinate Judge has not placed reliance upon the oral evidence. He has held that the witnesses of both the parties have stated only a part of the truth and, therefore. he has placed reliance on the oral evidence so far as it is supported by the documentary evidence. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants has placed the entire evidence before us, and, having heard learned counsel for the parties we are of the opinion that the view taken by the learned Additional Subordinate Judge is perfectly -justified and it is not possible to take any other view of the oral evidence on record. 11. So far as the documentary evidence is concerned, it has to be stated that there is no document to show as to who died later. Ram Chandar or Beni. As already stated, the case of the plaintiff is that Ram Chandar died last of all among the male members of the branch of Lachu Singh and, therefore, his widow (defendant No. 6) came in possession of all the properties of that branch. In coming to the finding that Ram Chandar was the last male holder in the branch of Lachu Singh, the Court below has relied on certain documents which go to show that Dewa Kuer (defendant No. 6) was in possession of all the properties of the branch of Lachu Singh after the death of the last male holder. They also go to show that she was dealing with the properties of this branch from 1954 onwards. Exhibit H-2 is a certified copy of Register D which goes to show that the name of Dewa Kuer was recorded in place of Beni Singh, Parmeshwar Singh. Toti Singh and Bricha Singh sometime in 1937. Defendant No. 6 (D. W 1) has stated in her evidence that, four months after the death of her husband, she got her name mutated in Register D. Exhibit 6 is a certified copy of the rent reduction schedule. It describer Dewa Kuer as the exclusive tenant with respect to the lands of Khata No. 51. Defendant No. 6 (D. W 1) has stated in her evidence that, four months after the death of her husband, she got her name mutated in Register D. Exhibit 6 is a certified copy of the rent reduction schedule. It describer Dewa Kuer as the exclusive tenant with respect to the lands of Khata No. 51. Exhibit 4 is a rehan deed dated the 24th June 1954 executed by Dewa Kuer in favour of one Ramyad Singh in respect of the lands of Khata No. 340. Exhibit. 3 is a sale deed dated the 21st June 1956 executed by Dewa Kuer in favour of Mosammat Jhakuri Kuer and others which relates to the lands of Khata No. 16 situate in village Sahabaipur. It is significant to note that defendant No. 3 figures as an identifier and also as an attesting witness on the sale deed (Ext. 3). Exhibit 3(a) is another sale deed dated the 5th November 1957 executed by Dewa Kuer in favour of Ram Pravesh Singh with respect to the lands of Khata No. 340 of village Kalpa. The plaintiff has also filed a large number of rent receipts Exhibits 1 (a) to 1 (t). They extend over a period of ten years. 1947 to 1956. The rent receipts, however, do not mention the plot and khata numbers. But this much is clear from the rent receipts that she was mutated in the landlords Sherista and was paying rents for the lands hereinbefore held by Lachus branch. As opposed to this, the documentary evidence produced by the defendant does not go to show that they were dealing with the properties of Lachus branch. The name of Dewa Kuer was entered in Register D in the year 1937-38 in place of all the male members of Lachus branch; but no step was taken to correct the same. If she was not really entitled to the properties of that branch as the widow of Ram Chandar. the last male holder, the defendants must have taken, steps to get the entry corrected. It must, therefore, be held in agreement with the Court below that Ram Chandar Singh was the last male holder in Lachus branch and that Dewa Kuer came in possession of all the properties of that branch on the death of Ram Chandar. her husband, and was dealing with the same. 12. It must, therefore, be held in agreement with the Court below that Ram Chandar Singh was the last male holder in Lachus branch and that Dewa Kuer came in possession of all the properties of that branch on the death of Ram Chandar. her husband, and was dealing with the same. 12. The next point for determination is as to whether the lands of Khata No 51 jointly belong to the branches of Lachu Singh and Bandhu Singh as recorded in the survey record-of-rights or they exclusively belong to the branch of Bandhu Singh and the survey entry is incorrect. The lands of Khata No. 51 are the ancestral property belonging to the branches of Lachu Singh and Bandhu Singh. The defendants do not dispute this position but simply allege that the survey entry is wrong. Sec.103 of the Bihar Tenancy Act lavs down that such an entry must be deemed to be correct unless the contrary is shown. The Court below has very rightly held that no evidence has been led by the defendants to the effect that the survey entry is wrong. The witnesses examined by them simply sav thai the defendants were in possession of the lands of Khata No. 51 but mere possession of the defendants, even for a lone period. is not sufficient to rebut the presumption attached to the entry in the record-of-rights There is a further presumption under the Hindu law that the property is joint Mr R. S. Chatteriee. learned counsel for the respondents, has verv rightly contended that the defendants nowhere say that the lands of Khata No. 51 were their self-acquired property or fell to their share exclusively on partition or that they had perfected their title by adverse possession. Therefore, even if thev were in pos-session for a large number of vears. their possession would enure to the benefit of the entire ioint family. In support of their case, the defendants relied upon Exhibit J-2/1, a rent reduction schedule which does not bear any certificate of its being true copy, and hence the court below was right in not placing my reliance on the same. The defendants also produced a certified copv of one laggit of 1361 Fasli. As has been rightly held by the Court below, there is nothing on the record to show under what circumstances this laggit came into existence. The defendants also produced a certified copv of one laggit of 1361 Fasli. As has been rightly held by the Court below, there is nothing on the record to show under what circumstances this laggit came into existence. They also produced some rent receipts; but these rent receipts do not bear khata and plot numbers. Even if the same be held to relate to Khata No. 51, they, by themselves, would not go to show that the defendants were the exclusive owners of these lands and that the presumption that all the members of the family were jointly interested in the lands has been rebutted. It may be that Dewa Kuer, who is also entitled to the lands oi Khata No. 51, being a widow, had the rent paid through defendants 2 and 3 for her share in those lands and, as such, they came in possession of the rent receipts. It has, therefore, to be held that the defendants have failed to prove that the survey entrv is wrong and, as such, tht learned Additional Subordinate Judge has rightly decreed the suit of the plaintiff so far as the lands of Khata No. 51 are concerned. 13. For the reasons stated above, there is no substance in either of the points raised by learned counsel for the appellants. 14. During the pendency of this appeal, an application was filed on behalf of the appellants under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure to call for entrv No. 3151 in the register of pension payment aiders of Gaya Treasury from the Treasury Officer, Gaya. in order to show that Ram Chandar predeceased Beni Singh. It was stated in that application that the appellants, applied for a certified COPY of the aforesaid entry but their prayer was refused. Thit, application came up for hearing before Untwalia and Ramratna Singh, JJ., who by their order dated the 22nd September 1965, directed that the prayer of the appellants would be considered by the Bench which would hear the first appeal. A second application under Order XLI Rule 27 was filed by the appellants on the 3rd August 1967 enclosing a certified copy of the aforesaid entry with a praver that it should be admitted in evidence in this case. A second application under Order XLI Rule 27 was filed by the appellants on the 3rd August 1967 enclosing a certified copy of the aforesaid entry with a praver that it should be admitted in evidence in this case. It is stated by the appellants that thev tried their best to procure some reliable documentary evidence with regard te the factum of death of Beni Singh and Ram Chandar Singh during the pendency of the suit in the Court below but they could not do so. They have now filed a certified copy of the aforesaid entrv along with the second application which goes to show that Beni Singh died on the 11th September 1936 and that the pension due to him on the date of his death was received by Deva Kuer. Their submission is that if Ram Chandar had been alive at the time of Benis death, he would have himself and not hip widow Dewa Kuer. received the amount of pension due to Beni The case made out in the application is to the affect that the admission of this entry as additional evidencf is verv essential for the decision as to who was the last male holder in the branch of Lachu Singh. that the appellants had no knowledge about the existence of this entry during the pendency of the suit in the Court below and that they have come to know about it very recently. In these circumstances, it has been submitted that the aforesaid entry be admitted as additional evidence. 15. in order to decide the point as to whether the aforesaid entry should be admitted as additional evidence, it will be useful to quote the relevant provisions under Order XLI Rule 27 (1) of the Code. Clauses (b) and (c) of this rule after amendment by this Court read thus: "The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. Clauses (b) and (c) of this rule after amendment by this Court read thus: "The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if- (a) x x x x x (b) the party seeking to adduce additional evidence satisfies the Appellate Court that such evidence, notwithstanding exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree or order under appeal was passed or made, or- (c) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced or witness to be examined". In the first instance, it has been contended that Clause (c) should be applied to the facts of the present case. In the submission of learned counsel, unless the aforesaid entry be admitted in evidence this Court will not be able to come to its judgment on the point or at least, it should be admitted in evidence "for any other substantial cause." Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, while considering Clause (b) now Clause (c) by the amendment of this Court in Parsottim Thakur V/s. Lal Mohar Thakur, AIR 1931 PC. 143. have observed as follows: "Under Clause (1) (b) it is only where the appellate Court requires it, (i.e. finds it needful) that additional evidence can be admitted. It may be required to enable the Court to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause, but In either case it must be the Court that requires it. This is the plain grammatical reading of the sub-clause. The legitimate occasion for the exercise of this discretion is not whenever before the appeal is heard a party applies to adduce fresh evidence, but when on examining the evidence as it stands some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent." We have heard learned counsel for the parties at great length and gone through the evidence on record. Our considered opinion is that the iudgment can be pronounced even without admitting the entry as additional evidence nor is there any other substantial cause for admitting the same. Our considered opinion is that the iudgment can be pronounced even without admitting the entry as additional evidence nor is there any other substantial cause for admitting the same. 16 So far as the application of Clause (b) concerned, the Court must be satisfied that the appellants notwithstanding exercise of due diligence, had no knowledge of the existence of the document or the same could not be produced by them at the time when the decree under appeal was passed by the Court below. The affidavits in both the applications were not sworn to by defendant No. 2 who ia the elder of the two appellants before us and is expected to know more about the affairs of the family than defendant No. 3 (who is very young), who has sworn to the affidavits. The applications do not disclose as to how the appellants came to know about the existence of the aforesaid entry. There is no mention therein that the appellants could not have the knowledge about the existence of this document, in spite of due diligence, before the decree under appeal was passed and, as such, the affidavits filed on behalf of the appellants do not satisfy the requirements of Order XLI Rule 27 (1) (b). Moreover. Beni Singh was so nearly related to the appellants that, in the natural course of human conduct, they must have been aware that Beni Singh was in Government service and the payment of his pension ceased on his death. Therefore, the entry cannot be admitted as additional evidence under Clause (b) as well. 17. In the result, the iudgment and decree of the Court below are affirmed and the appeal is dismissed with costs. R.J.Bahadur, J. 18 I agree.