JUDGMENT_ This is a Petition by the plaintiffs-landlords whose suit for eviction against their tenant. defendant No.1 (opponent No.1) and alleged sub-tenant-defendant No.2 (opponent No.2) was decreed by the trial Court but in an appeal filed by the defendants that decree was set aside and the suit was dismissed by the appeal Court. 2. The facts of the case, in so far as they are relevant, may be briefly stated as follows: The premises in dispute are a flat and a garage in a building known ail Belha Court in the City of Bombay and are governed by the provisions of the Rent Act (Bombay Act LVJI of 1947). The building belonged to one Nawab Sardar Haji Meer Musud Alamkhan Bahadur and his wife. By a settlement deed dated February 21, 1938, which is at Exh. A in the proceedings, the Nawab and his wife created a trust in respect of this property for the benefit of themselves (during their life. time) and their son and three daughters ami constituted themselves and their son. as the first trustees. The Nawab died in 1942 and in 1952 the surviving trustees appointed two of the daughters as additional trustees. The total Dumber of trustees thus became four. By a deed dated February 2, 1954, the widow of the Nawab relinquished her beneficial interest in favour of her son and daughter and thereafter remained only as a trustee. 3. Defendant No. 1 has been a tenant of the premises in dispute since 1938 and a part of the premises is now occupied by defendant No.2. 4. The suit leading the present petition was filed by the four trustees as plaintiffs-landlords-Eviction was sought on several grounds but in this petition we are concerned with only one out of them, viz. that the plaintiffs require the premises reasonably and bona fide for occupation by plaintiff No.3, who is also a beneficiary under the trust. It may be mentioned here that pending the proceedings the widow of the Nawab who was plaintiff No.1 died and the plaint was amended by renumbering plaintiffs Nos.1 to 4 as plaintiff A Nos. 1 to 3 respectively. Plaintiff No.1 is the son and plaintiff Nos. 2 and a are the daughters of the settlers, and the plaintiffs are trustees as well as beneficiaries under the Trust. 5. 1 to 3 respectively. Plaintiff No.1 is the son and plaintiff Nos. 2 and a are the daughters of the settlers, and the plaintiffs are trustees as well as beneficiaries under the Trust. 5. The trial Court held that the premises were required reasonably and bona fide by plaintiff No.3 for occupation by herself and that greater hardship would be caused to her, if a decree for possession was refused to her. The claim for possession was accordingly decreed. 6. On appeal by the defendants, the Appeal Court Confirmed the findings of the trial Court but held that plaintiff No.3 was not a person for whose benefit the premises were held and the plaintiffs were, therefore, not entitled to recever possession On the ground of her requirement. There is no reference to this point in the judgment of the trial Court. The counsel for the defendants, however, stated before the Appeal Court that the point had been argued before the trial Court and the appeal Court allowed it to be argued as it went to that root of the matter viz. the plaintiffs right to recover possession of the 8uit premises on the ground of personal requirement. Although in the petitioner a ground had been taken that the plaintiffs were prejudiced on account of the defendants being allowed to urge this new point, no grievance was made before me by Mr. Adik, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, on that 800re. The short question that falls for determination in this petition, therefore, is whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recover possession of the suit premiseaon the ground that the same are required reasonably and bona fide for occupation by plaintiff No.3. 7. The only provision of the Rent Act on which the plaintiffs can rely and have relied, is section 13 (1) (g), which reads: Section 13. (I) lays that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the land. lord for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust that the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the trust; .. " 8. There is no dispute that plaintiff No.3 is a beneficiary under the trust created by the trust deed, Exh. A. What is contended is that that i8 not enough to bring her within the expression,. " 8. There is no dispute that plaintiff No.3 is a beneficiary under the trust created by the trust deed, Exh. A. What is contended is that that i8 not enough to bring her within the expression,. person for whose benefit the premises are held". In order to make her a person for whose benefit the premises are held she must further have right as such beneficiary to occupy the premises, which she could enforce if denied Apart frem authority, the contention appears to be sound. The object of the Rent Act evidently is to afford protection to the tenants against eviction and against certain mal practices by landlords. The protection against eviction is embodied in section 12, sub-section (1) of which reads: "12. (1) A landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays is ready and willing to pay, the amount of the standard rent and permitted increases, if any, and observes and performs the other conditions of the tenancy, in so far as they are consistent with the provisions of this Act." Section 13 (I) lays down certain exceptional circumstances in which the protection is either totally lost or is subordinated to the need for the protection of the interest of the landlord. The various clauses of sub-section (I) of section 13 can be broadly classified into two classes, viz. those which take away the protection totally and those which subordinate it to the requirements of the landlord. Clauses la) to (f), (k) and (1) fall in the first 01as8. These clauses provide for oases where the tenant is either guilty of some illegal act or default or is placed in such a position that he no longer needs the protection of the Rent Act. Thus, for instance, clause (a) takes away the protection given to the tenant by section 12, if he has committed any act contrary to the provisions of clause (0) of section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. Similarly, clause (b) provides for a O8.se where the tenant has without the landlords consent given in writing, erected on the, premises any permanent structure. These are instances of cases where the tenant is guilty of an illegal act or default. Similarly, clause (b) provides for a O8.se where the tenant has without the landlords consent given in writing, erected on the, premises any permanent structure. These are instances of cases where the tenant is guilty of an illegal act or default. Clerks provides for a case where the premises have not been used without reasonable cause for the purposes for which they were let for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit, while clause (1) provides for a case where the tenant after coming into operation of the Rent Act has built, acquired vacant pOll8ession of or been allotted a suitable residence., These are instances of cases where the tenant is no longer in need of the protection afforded by the Rent Act. 9, Clauses (g), (h), (hh), (hhh), (i), (ii) and (iii) fall into the section. These clauses contemplate cases where the need to provide for the landlords requirements outweighs the tenants need for protection, though the tenant ill Dot guilty of any illegal act or default. In cases governed by these clauses the protection is not absolutely lost. Enough care has been taken by sub-section(3) to see that a decree is not passed unless the landlord satisfied certain conditions which would ensure that his need requires to be attended to first. Care has also been taken by enacting sections 17 to 17C to provide for cases in which from the subsequent conduct of the landlord it becomes apparent that the representations made by him for obtaining the decree must not have been true. 10. Turning to the clause which is in point, viz. clause (g) of 8ub-section (1) of section 13, the Legislature thought fit to subordinate the tenants Deed to the requirements of the landlord because greater hardship would be caused to the landlord if effect was given to the protection afforded to the tenant. A landlord is ordinarily the full owner having the legal as well as the beneficial interest combined in him. Cases will, however, arise where the legal and beneficial interests in the premises vest in different persons. In such a case, it would be reasonable to suppose that the Legislature intended to protect the interests of the person in whom the beneficial interest vests. Clause (g) is really in three parts. Cases will, however, arise where the legal and beneficial interests in the premises vest in different persons. In such a case, it would be reasonable to suppose that the Legislature intended to protect the interests of the person in whom the beneficial interest vests. Clause (g) is really in three parts. First part applies to a landlord who is the full owner, second part applies to a case where the landlord is something like a trustee of a private trust and the third part provides for a ease where the landlord is a trustee of a public trust. No difficulty ari8es in the application of the :tint part because if the landlord who is the full owner of the premises needs them and would be put to greater hardship if a decree as refused to him, his interships will certainly have to be preferred to those of the tenant. Th. position is, however, different in the other two cases. In those cases the landlord comes to Court to espouse the cause of one who is the beneficiary under the trust. The question that arilles is whether the Legislature could have thought of providing for the beneficiary in such cases irrespective of the nature of his beneficial interest under the trust. It is possible, as I will presently point out, that the beneficiary may have merely a right to share in the income and not a right to the occupation of the premises or a right in the premises themselves. Surely the Legislature could not have intended to deprive the tenant of the protection available to him under the Rent Act for giving to such a beneficiary what he is not entitled to under the trust. That this is so can be seen from the explanation to section 13 (2) also. Surely the Legislature could not have intended to deprive the tenant of the protection available to him under the Rent Act for giving to such a beneficiary what he is not entitled to under the trust. That this is so can be seen from the explanation to section 13 (2) also. Section 5 (3) of the Rent Act defines landlord as follows: " landlord mean any person who ill for the time being, receiving, or entitled to receive, rent in respect of any premises whether on his own account or on account, or on behalf, or for the benefit of any other person or as a trustee, guardian, or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent if the premis811 were let to a tenant; and includes any person not being a tenant who free time to time derive title under a landlord; and further includes in respect of hill sub-tenant a tenant who hill sub-let any premises;" It has been held that even a Rent Collector falls within this definition of landlord. It would be surprising if the Legislature had provided for recovery of possession by a Rent Collector because he falls within the definition of that term under the Rent Act, but the Legislature was conscious of this position and has, therefore, enacted the Explanation to section 13 (2) which reads: "Explanation -For the purpose of clause (g) sub-section (1)- (b) the expression landlord shall not include a rent-farmer or rent-collector or estate-manager. " Evidently the reason for excluding these persons from the definition of land lord for the purposes of clause (g) is that they have no right to occupy the premises. This would suggest this in enacting clause (g) to sub-section (1) of !lection 13 the Legislature wanted to provide and was providing for the cases of persons who are entitled to occupy the premises and who satisfy the other conditions laid down therein. 11. The point involved in this case does not appear to be covered by authority. Mr. Chitale, learned counsel for the defendants, has however, invited my attention to certain English decisions which may be of some assistance in arriving at the correct conclusion. The oases relied on by him are: Sharpe v. Nicholl8 (1), Parker v. R08enberg (2) and Fri8h Ld. v. Barclays Bank La, (3). 12. Mr. Chitale, learned counsel for the defendants, has however, invited my attention to certain English decisions which may be of some assistance in arriving at the correct conclusion. The oases relied on by him are: Sharpe v. Nicholl8 (1), Parker v. R08enberg (2) and Fri8h Ld. v. Barclays Bank La, (3). 12. In Sharpe v. Nicholl8 (1) the widow and nephew of the deceased landlord filed a suit as his personal representatives for eviction on the ground that the widow wanted the house which was in the occupation of a tenant, for her personal occupation. In the trial Court the case proceeded as if the widow alone was the plaintiff and the Judge of the county Court awarded her a decree on certain conditions. The tenant having appealed, the Appeal Court held that personal representatives were not landlords within the meaning of Para. (h) of Schedule I to the Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) (Amentiment) Act, 1933, and could not claim possession under that paragraph on behalf of one of their number who required possession for her own occupation without proof of her beneficial interest. There is no discussion in the case as to what the nature of the beneficial interest should be; but it appears evident that the beneficial interest that the plaintiff was expected to have in order to succeed was such all would entitle him or her to occupy the premises. The point had not been taken in the trial Court by the defendant but the Court of Appeal held that the decree passed by the county Court being illegal in other respects the case should be remanded and the defendant should be allowed to raise that point. The case was accordingly remanded. 13. In Parker v. R08enberg (2) the suit had been filed by three plaintiffs, two of whom were trustees under the will of one Emma Jessie Marsh and the third plaintiff was the sister of the testatrix as well as a beneficiary under the will. Following the decision in Sharpe v. Nicholls (1) it was held that the trustee’s being personal representatives having no beneficial interest in the house, could not avail themselves of the provisions of the Act of 1933, which entitled a landlord to recover possession of a dwelling house if it was reasonably required by him for occupation as a residence for himself. It was also held that the hird plaintiff, who was the beneficiary, not being party to the tenancy agreement nor entitled to the reversion of the property was not the landlord within the meaning of section 12 (1) (g) of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920, which defines the term landlord as follows: "The expression landlord also includes in relation to any dwelling-house any person, other than the tenant, who is or would but for this Act be entitled to possession of the dwelling-house, ....” She was, therefore, not entitled to sue for ejectment. This again, though not in very express terms, indicates that a person who is neither the full owner nor entitled to occupy the premises cannot recover possession from a tenant protected under the Rent Act. 14. In Frisk Ld. v. Barolays Bank La. (I), Frish Ld. who were the tenant of a house wherein they were carrying on a fried-fish business, were holding the premises on lease granted to them first in 1932. The lease was renewed from time to time and, after its last renewal, was to expire in September 1953. They had obtained an order under Part II of the Lease-hold Properties (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1951, for the grant of a new tenancy for one year from September 29, 1963. In the meantime the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954:, having come into force they again applied on October 11, 1954, for the grant to them of a new tenancy under the provisions of that Act. The premises in the occupation of the tenant had been settled on trust by the owner, one Nathan Parnes, by a trust for sale and to hold the proceeds of sale upon the tru8ts of a settlement of even date. By that settlement the landlords, i. e. the trustees, were directed to hold the income of the net proceeds of the sale upon discretionary trusts for Mr. Parnes, his children and issue. Under the provi8ions of the Landlord and Tenant Ac, 1954, the landlords could object to the grant of new tenancy under certain circumstances. The grounds on which they could object were that on the termination of the current tenancy of the tenant, the landlord intended to occupy the holding for the purposes partly for the purposes, of a business to be carried on by him therein. The grounds on which they could object were that on the termination of the current tenancy of the tenant, the landlord intended to occupy the holding for the purposes partly for the purposes, of a business to be carried on by him therein. That was the provision of section 30 (I), clause (g) of that Act. By section 41 (2) it was provided that where the landlords interest was held on trust the references in Para. (g) of sub-section (1) of section 30 of that Act were to be tlon8trued as including references to the beneficiaries under the trust or an,. of them. On receiving notice of the application made by the tenants the trustees objected to the granting of new tenancy on the ground that Mr. Parnes, and beneficiary under the trusts affecting the premises, intended on the determination of the tenants tenancy to occupy the premises himself for the purpose of a business to be carried on by him. Prior to the launching of the objection Mr. Parnes had made a proposal to the trustees for taking the premises on lease at a much higher rate of rent than the tenants were paying. He had also undertaken to compensate the trustees for such compensation as they may have to pay to the tenants. On these facts it was held that the expreseion benefioiaries under the trust or any of them in the context of the provisions of the Act must be limited to persons entitled to occupy by virtue of their interest as beneficiaries. It was further held that only those beneficiaries whose interest is such as to give them the right as against the trustees, to occupy the property, or is such that the trustees may properly within the terms of their trust let them &8 beneficiaries into possession, come within that expression. 15. These decisions and particularly the last one wherein practically similar provisions had to be interpreted do support the view which I am taking in the case. 16. Mr. Adik, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, invited my attention to an unreported judgment of this High Court in K. V. Sketty v. Surendra Gajamin JOB"" (1). That was a case under the Bombay Rent Restriction Act, 1939, and the provision corresponding to section 13 of the present Rent Act was section 11 of the former Act. 16. Mr. Adik, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, invited my attention to an unreported judgment of this High Court in K. V. Sketty v. Surendra Gajamin JOB"" (1). That was a case under the Bombay Rent Restriction Act, 1939, and the provision corresponding to section 13 of the present Rent Act was section 11 of the former Act. Even under that Act a landlord was entitled to recover p088ession if the premises were reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises were held. The relevant provision was thus quite similar to clause (g) of section 13 (1) of the present Act. The plaintiff in that case had filed the suit for possession on the ground that the premises were required for occupation by his mother. The facts are not fully stated in the judgment but it appears that there was a partition between the plaintiff and his brother and in that partition no provision had been made for the maintenance of their mother, although admittedly she was entitled to maintenance. The plaintiff had succeeded in the Courts below and the Revision Application was tiled by the tenant. The contention urged on his behalf seems to have been that the mother was not a person for whose benefit the premises were held. That was negatived on the ground that the widowed mother was entitled to maintenance under the Hindu Law and maintenance necessarily included a right of residence. This case cannot, therefore, be of any help to Mr. Adik, it being held that the mother was entitled to residence and hence entitled to occupy the suit premises. 17. In my view on a correct reading of the expression person for whose benefit the premises are held the only meaning that can be assigned to it would be that the person in question must have a right to occupy the suit premises, which right the person can enforce if denied. It will, therefore, have to be seen whether plaintiff No.3 in the present case has under the trust deed, Exh. A, a right to occupy the suit premises. 18. The deed, Exh. A, is styled as Wakf-alal-Aulad. The whole tenor of it, however, shows that it is a deed of trust and purports to convey the property to the trustees. It will, therefore, have to be seen whether plaintiff No.3 in the present case has under the trust deed, Exh. A, a right to occupy the suit premises. 18. The deed, Exh. A, is styled as Wakf-alal-Aulad. The whole tenor of it, however, shows that it is a deed of trust and purports to convey the property to the trustees. It is not necessary to go into the validity of the deed because that question has not been raised by the defendants. The substance of the provisions of this trust deed is that the trustees are to hold the property and let it out to tenants. Out of the income 17 percent. is to be carried to a sort of reserve fund for the maintenance and repairs of the building and the balance of the income is to be paid to the Settlcors during their life time. After the death of the Settlers, 3 percent of the balance of the income is to be used for the maintenance and upkeep of the Surat Islam Yatimkhana so long as that institution exists and on its ceasing to exist it is to be used for the other charities mentioned in the deed. The remaining balance of the income is to be divided into five equal parts, two of which are to be given to the 80n and one to each of the three daughters. (We are not concerned III this case with the provisions which are to come into operation after the life time of the son and the daughters). Then there is an important provision to the effect that one out of the flats along with the garage attached to it could be used by the Managing Trustee free of rent for the better management of the true. This provision cannot, however, be of any help to the plaintiffs because admittedly flat No. 10 in the building has been already occupied by plaintiff No. I, who ill the Managing Trustee at present. 19. It is not the case of Mr. Adik that Exh. A expressly conference the right of occupation on plaintiff No.3. What he contends is that there is no prohibition against occupation by any of the plaintiffs and, therefore, impliedly it must be assumed that plaintiff No.3 or for the matter of that any of the beneficially, had such a right. In support of this contention of his, Mr. A expressly conference the right of occupation on plaintiff No.3. What he contends is that there is no prohibition against occupation by any of the plaintiffs and, therefore, impliedly it must be assumed that plaintiff No.3 or for the matter of that any of the beneficially, had such a right. In support of this contention of his, Mr. Adik relied on an unreported judgment of this High Court in Babua K. Shah v. Panachand Kasturchand Zaveri (1). In that case the trustees had filed a suit against the tenant for recovery of possession of the premises in his occupation on the ground that the son of the author of the trust, who was the beneficiary under the trust, wanted them for his own personal residence. The suit had been decreed by the Courts below and the tenant had, therefore, come in revieion to this High Court. The revision application came to be dismissed for the reason that in that case it was clearly the duty of the executors to provide a residence for the beneficiary. The full facts of the case are not stated in the judgment and it is not clear what the provisions of the trust were. The conclusion, however, indicates that in all probability the son of the author of the trust was entitled to occupy the premises under hose provisions. That decision cannot, therefore, be of any help to the plaintiffs in the present case. 20. The decision in Atmaram v. Narayan (2) is more in point. In that case the suit was for recovery of premises belonging to a community and let out to a tenant. The suit had been brought by the President of the community who was authorised by the resolution of the community to file it and the ground urged for ejectment was that the premises were required for letting out to the members of the community who were beneficially interested therein. The case was governed by the Bombay Rent (War Restrictions) Act, 1918 (Bombay Act II of 19l8). Section 9 (2) of that Act contained a provision in practically the same terms as clause (g) of 8ub-section (1) of section 13 of the present Rent Act. The suit was decreed by the trial Court. The case was governed by the Bombay Rent (War Restrictions) Act, 1918 (Bombay Act II of 19l8). Section 9 (2) of that Act contained a provision in practically the same terms as clause (g) of 8ub-section (1) of section 13 of the present Rent Act. The suit was decreed by the trial Court. When the matter came to the High Court, two objectione were urged on behalf of the tenant; one related to the frame of the suit with which we are not concerned but the other was that the members of the community to whom the plaintiff proposed to let out the premises were not persons for whose benefit the premiees were held. This objection was upheld by a Division Bench of this Court and while diemi88ing the application it was observed: "But the fact, remains that it cannot be said that the community, a Slumina the property belongs to them, required the premises in suit for their own purposes reasonably and bona fide when the intention was to turn uut. the existing tenant and put in one of the community . It is not, therefore, possible to accept the contention of Mr. Adik that because there is no prohibition it must be assumed that plaintiff No.3 has a right to occupy the suit premises as a beneficiary under the trust. 21. Mr. Adik faintly argued that even as a trustee plaintiff No.3 would be entitled to occupy the suit premises. No such argument was urged before the Courts below and the same i. prima facie untenable. It was never the case of the plaintiffs that plaintiff No.3 wanted to occupy the premises in her capacity as a trustee. In the notice given to the tenant for the termination of his tenancy it was stated at the end: "Please further note that the premisel are required for one of the beneficiary for personal use and occupation bona fide and reasonably." Again in the plaint in Para. 5 it was stated: "The plaintiff No.4 (who sub sequently became plaintff No.3) is a beneficiary under the said Trust-Deed dated the 21st January 1938. 5 it was stated: "The plaintiff No.4 (who sub sequently became plaintff No.3) is a beneficiary under the said Trust-Deed dated the 21st January 1938. The plaintiffs say that the said premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the plaintiffs for occupation of the plaintiff No 4 and her family members and for purpose of their residence." As already pointed out the trust deed permits only the Managing Trustee to occupy one of the flats for better management of the trust and one such flat has already been occupied by the present Managing Trustee, viz. plaintiff No.1. Again in her deposition before the trial Court, plaintiff No.3 stated in cross examination: "If I occupy the fiat in suit, I will have to pay the rent." That clearly shows that the plaintiffs wanted the premises for being let out to plaintiff No.3. That would not be occupation by plaintiff No.3 either in her capacity as a truetee or as a beneficiary. Even otherwise, it would be illegal for a trustee unless authorised by the trust deed to use the trust property for his or her own purpose. No claim for recovery of possession and therefore, be founded on the plea that one of the trustees in his or her capacity as Ii. trustee wants to occupy the suit premises. 22 In view of the conclusion I have arrived at on the merits of the eal8, it is not necessary for me to deal with the other points argued by Mr Chitale, viz. that there is no error apparent on the face of the record and the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is, therefore, not maintainable; that the trustees are merely estate managers and, therefore, excluded from the definition of the term landlord for the purposes of clause (g) of sub- section (I) of section 13, by the explanation to section 13 (2), and lastly that the findings recorded by the Courts below regarding reasonable and bona fide requirement of plaintiff No.3 and regarding comparative hardship are vitiated because the Courts below have not applied their minds to the evidence on record. 23. The result of the above disoull8ion is, that the petition fails and the rule is discharged with costs.