Aribam Pishak Sharma v. Aribam Tuleswar Sharma — 1967 DIGILAW 76 (GAU)

ORDER This is an application filed by Aribam Pishak Sarma, Irengbam Yaima Singh Aribam Ningol Ngambi Devi and the legal representatives of Pangamham Doya Singh under Ss. 151 and 114 read with order 47, rule 1. C.P.C. against Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma and 7 others to review the judgement of this Court dated 25-5-1965 in Writ Petition No 9 of 1962 allowing it and issuing a writ of mandamus quashing the orders of the second respondent Chief Commissioner, dated 11-8-1961 and 30-9-1961 and directing him and the other respondents 3 to 8 to discharge their statutory duties in evicting the petitioners herein from portions of road side land lying by the side of Imphal-Kangchup-Tamenglong road. 2. The first respondent herein-Aribam Tuleshwar Sarma filed Writ Petition No 16 of 1961 against the petitioners herein for their eviction from portions of road side lying adjoining Imphal-Kangchup-Tamanglong road 32. 4" x 23 6", 19 x 7", 12. 2" x 19 and 8 x 17 occupied by them respectively But, after the petitioners herein filed their written statements and documents, the first respondent withdrew Writ Petition No. 16 of 1961 on 13-7-1962. Subsequently he filed Writ Petition No. 9 of 1962 on 14-9-1962 for the same relief. His case is that he is the owner of northern portion if certain homestead land covered by joint patta No. 87/27/1. W.T. (Vide Ext. B/12) abutting the Imphal-Kangchup-Tamenglong road. The Government of Manipur declared the said road in its Notification No. PW/CMN/4/53 dated 26-5-1954 as a district road. (Vide Ext. B/13). It maintained the width of the road at 40 ft. and 60 ft. respectively on us approach to urban and industrial areas. It also declared the building and control lines in respect of class of district roads and directed that, as measured from the central line, they should be 50 and 80" respectively. Thus the area upto 80 from the central line on both sides was reserved for the road, The homestead land of the first respondent is within the Municipal area of Imphal. It lies within the urban and industrial area of Manipur. So, the width of the road in question has been maintained at 60 being 30 on either side from the central lint of the road. 3. It lies within the urban and industrial area of Manipur. So, the width of the road in question has been maintained at 60 being 30 on either side from the central lint of the road. 3. The first respondent also alleged that the Manipur Government declared the road as part of the State Highway as published in its Manipur Gazette Extraordinary 71-E-53 dated 28-8-1959. (Ext B/14). By a subsequent Gazette notification dated 4-4-1962 (Vide Ext. B/15) the Government declared the said road as a Highway under the Bombay Highways Act of 1955, which was extended to Manipur Union territory from 11-1-1960. In October, 1960 when the first respondent was constructing a shop on his homestead land, the petitioners encroached on the reserved road side land by constructing shops. The first respondent filed an application before the Settlement Officer, Manipur on 27-10-1960, requesting him to remove the encroachment made by the petitioners. But, he did not take any action even though he sent a reminder on 13-2-1961 Subsequently, the area was surveyed in 1960-61 Cases of encroachment of public road side land were taker up. The Settlement Officer passed an order on 5-1-1961 directing the eviction of the petitioners under Rule 18(2) of the Rules framed by the second respondent on 9-5-1959 (hereinafter called as the Rules of 1959) under Section 157 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation-Regulation 1 of 1886 (hereinafter called as the Regulation) as extended to the territory of Manipur. Vide Exts. B/1 to B/8. But the petitioners did not remove, the buildings from the encroached portions. So, the then Assistant Settlement Officer (E). Manipur, started eviction proceedings against the petitioners on 24-4-1961. The petitioners filed appeal before the second respondent. Chief Commissioner of Manipur against the orders of eviction in C.C. Rev Appeal Nos. 28, 30, 31 and 32 of 1961. He dismissed the appeal of late Pangambam Doya Singh for default on 1-8-1961 (Vide Ext. B/21). On 4-8-1961, he heard the appeals of the petitioners 1 to 3 and ordered that the land encroached by them should be settled on them. (Vide Exts. B/18 to B/20). The second respondent restored the appeal of late Pangambam Doya Singh to file and directed that the land occupied by him also should be settled on him. (Vide Ext, B/22). But, the encroached portions are all situate within 25 ft. (Vide Exts. B/18 to B/20). The second respondent restored the appeal of late Pangambam Doya Singh to file and directed that the land occupied by him also should be settled on him. (Vide Ext, B/22). But, the encroached portions are all situate within 25 ft. from the centre of the road and are thus within the area of the road and the reserved road side land. The encroached portions are also within 35 ft. from the foot of the public road. So the first respondent prayed that the orders of the second respondent dated 11-8-1961 and 30-9-1961 passed in C.C. Revenue Appeal Nos. 28, 30, 32 and 31 of 1961 as per Exts. B/18 to B/20 and B/22 are void and illegal and that the petitioners should of evicted from the sides occupied by them. 4. The petitioners traversed the allegations of the first respondent. The respondents 2 to 8 filed separate counter supporting the allegations of the petitioners herein. 5. My learned predecessor heard arguments and allowed the petition with costs on 25-5-1965. 6. The petitioners herein, who were the respondents 1 to 4 in Writ Petition No. 9 of 1962, filed the present petition for review of the judgement of this Court on various grounds Under Order 47 Rule 1, C.P.C. a judgement may be reviewed firstly, if the person who applies for review, shows that he discovered new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made secondly when there is some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and thirdly when there is any other sufficient reason The petitioners state that my learned predecessor committed a number of errors and mistakes apparent on the face of the record relying on the affidavit of the first respondent and that, therefore, the judgement has to be reviewed and set aside. My learned predecessor held that the orders of the second respondent granting settlement of the road margin to the petitioners were hit by Rule 20 of the Rules of 1959, under which no person is entitled to obtain a lease in respect of land within 35 ft from the foot of the slope of a public road. My learned predecessor held that the orders of the second respondent granting settlement of the road margin to the petitioners were hit by Rule 20 of the Rules of 1959, under which no person is entitled to obtain a lease in respect of land within 35 ft from the foot of the slope of a public road. The contention of the petitioners counsel is that the said rule does not apply to the petitioners cases but that Rule 69 of the Rules framed under the Regulation and contained in Part II of the Assam Land Revenue Manual Vol. I. 6th edition, under which a periodic lease with the previous sanction of the Chief Commissioner for town land situate within 25 ft. or such other distance as may be laid down by the special order of the Government from the central line of any road maintained by the Public-Works Department or the Local Board, applies and that therefore, the order of my learned predecessor is patently incorrect. I had occasion to deal with the applicability of the Regulation and the Rules framed thereunder to Manipur territory in another case, viz., Thiyam Khomdon Singh v. Chief Commissioner of Manipur, Civil Writ Application Case No. 11 of 1964, disposed of by me on 27-4-1967 (Manipur). Vide paragraphs 13 and 14 of that judgement. As can be seen from page i of the introduction to the Assam Land Revenue Manual - Vol. I, 6th edition of 1940, the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1866, was enacted by the Governor-General in Council in accordance with the provisions of Section 1 of the Government of India Act 1870. As can be seen from page iv the rules were framed from time to time by various notifications by the Assam Government and first issued in a consolidated form under Section 158 of the Regulation in 1894 Those rules were printed in Part II of the Manual. It is seen from page ix that it was at first considered un-necessary to frame separate rules for the assessment of town lands. The assessment continued to be made under the executive orders of the Chief Commissioner until 1897, when the rules were first made. They were revised and included as Section IV of the Settlement Rules in chapter I, Part II of the Manual. The assessment continued to be made under the executive orders of the Chief Commissioner until 1897, when the rules were first made. They were revised and included as Section IV of the Settlement Rules in chapter I, Part II of the Manual. These rules apply to all the lands included in any municipality or any notified area under the Assam Municipal Act. Thus, Part I of the Manual contains the Regulation Part II contains the Rules Part II consists of VIII chapters Chapter I relates to Settlement Rules. There are 5 Sections in Chapter I. Section I refers to the general provision containing Rules 1 to 28. S II contains special provision relating to applications for special cultivation and it includes Rules 29 to 47. Section III relates to re-settlement and contains Rules 48 to 63. Section IV relates to grant of leases and settlement of land revenue in respect of town lands and contains Rules 64 to 77 Section V refers to altered assessment in area not notified as town land and contains Rules 78 to 82-F. It is not necessary to refer to the other chapters m the present case. Rule 66, occurring in Section IV of Chapter I applies to the grant of lease and settlement of land revenue in respect of town lands, under which the second respondent - Chief Commissioner is empowered to grant periodical lease of town lands within 25ft. from the central line of any road maintained by the Public Works Department or Local Board. 7. During the regime of His Highness, the late Maharajah of Manipur, the spirit of the Regulation and the Rules was followed. Clause (f) of the Darbar Resolution No. 18 dated 13-11-1946 directed the then Revenue Member to apply the Assam Land Revenue Manual and to suggest to the Darbar in due course the amendments which were desirable. The Darbar passed another resolution, Resolution No. 5 dated 23-5-1947, directing the Revenue Member to introduce the new system in the Revenue Administration of the Manipur State from 15-6-1947. Thus, the entire Regulation and the Rules framed thereunder in Assam were brought into force in Manipur on 15-6-1947. 8. The Darbar passed another resolution, Resolution No. 5 dated 23-5-1947, directing the Revenue Member to introduce the new system in the Revenue Administration of the Manipur State from 15-6-1947. Thus, the entire Regulation and the Rules framed thereunder in Assam were brought into force in Manipur on 15-6-1947. 8. The Central Government however, extended the Regulation to Manipur on 4-2-1952 under Section 2 of the Union Territories (Laws) Act 1950 (Act XXX of 1950) The second respondent issued a notification dated 9-5-1959 framing the Rules of 1959 under Section 157 of the Regulation. The Manipur Government published Part I of the Regulation in 1956. But, it did not publish the Rules. The Rules of 1959 were published in Manipur Gazette Extraordinary No. 28-E-20 dated 2-6-1959 The said rules are similar to the rules contained in Part II of the Assam Land Revenue Manual mentioned above Chapter I contains Section I relating to general provisions in Rules 1 to 25. Section II contains rules relating to resettlement - assessment of land and record of rights (Rules 26 to 42-F) Chapter II contains rules for the allotment of grazing grounds. (Rules 43 to 56). Chapter III contains the rules under Sections 26, 27, 152 and 155 of the Regulation regarding survey and demarcation of land (Rules 57 to 67) Chapter IV relates to registration rules under Chapter IV of the Regulation (Rules 68 to 89). Chapter V refers to rules under Chapter V of the Regulation, relating to arrears and mode of recovering them (Rules 90 to 108). Chapter VI relates to the rules under Sections 114 121 and 155 relating to the partition and union of estates. (Rules 109 to 119) Chapter VII relates to the rules under Sections 129 152 and 155(B)(C) relating to procedure, the mode of serving processes and process-fees, (Rules 120 to 127). 9. Subsequently, the Parliament passed the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act (Act XXXIII of 1960) consolidating and amending the law relating to the land revenue in the Union Territory of Manipur and to provide for certain measures of land reform. The second respondent framed Rules under the said Act on 31-5-1961 which were published in Manipur Gazette Extraordinary No. 22-E-14 dated 31-5-1961 and the Rules are called Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Rules of 1961. The second respondent framed Rules under the said Act on 31-5-1961 which were published in Manipur Gazette Extraordinary No. 22-E-14 dated 31-5-1961 and the Rules are called Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Rules of 1961. There are also separate Rules for allotment of land framed in 1962 called as The Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms (Allotment of Land) Rules, 1962. 10. The first contention of the petitioners counsel is that Chapter I of Part II of the Manual is headed by Settlement Rules", that Section I thereof is headed by "general provisions", that Section IV thereof is headed by "grant of leases and settlement of land revenue in respect of town lands," that according to R. 66, waste lands in towns shall be settled in accordance with Rr. 67 to 71, but that though the Manipur Government published the Land and Revenue Regulation as Part I in 1956, it did not separately publish the Rules in Part IT of the Manual, that the Rules of 1959 do not mention that they were framed in supersession of the Rules in Part II of the Manual, that no separate Rules for the settlement of town land were framed that the Rules in Section IV of Chapter I of Part II of the Manual must be deemed to be still in force under Section 24 of the General Clauses Act and that, therefore, Rule 69 would apply to these cases of settlement of the road side land made by the 2nd respondent to the petitioners. His second contention is that after the enforcement of Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960 only the Regulation was repealed, that the Rules contained in Part II of the Assam Land Revenue Manual were not repealed, that only the Rules of 1959 were repealed, that under Section 24 of the General Clauses Act. the Rules in Part II of the Manual must he deemed to be still in force and that hence Rule 69 would apphr. the Rules in Part II of the Manual must he deemed to be still in force and that hence Rule 69 would apphr. His third contention is that my learned predecessor overlooked Rule 69 of Section IV - Chapter I. Part II of the Assam Land Revenue Manual and applied incorrectly Rule 20 of the Rules of 1959, that this Court now can examine the application of Section IV suo motu at the time of the disposal of this present review petition as can be seen from Dan Sing Bist v. Additional Collector Bijnor AIR 1960 All 152 , or may consider the affidavit filed along with the review petition as sufficient basis for the petitioners to set up an additional ground for review as can be seen from Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius. AIR 1954 SC 526 . 11. There are fallacies in his arguments covered by the contentions Nos. 1 and 2. The sections of a statute constitute the principal or enacting part of it. Every section is a substantive enactment itself. Each section depends on its own language, context and setting for its true meaning and effect. The headings prefixed to the sections or set of sections are like preambles to them. One of the principles of construction of a statute is that the probable intention of the Legislature must be also found out. The statutory rules framed by the Executive have the same effect as though they are enacted in the Act itself. Every effort must be made to reconcile different parts of a statute Vide in this connection the passages at pages 36, 41, 230 and 371 of Interpretation of Statutes and General Clauses Act by N.S. Bindra - 1965 edition. Vide Deonandan Singh v. Ramlakhan Singh, AIR 1948 Pat 225, Nanalal Zaver v. Bombay Life Assurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1949 Bom 56, and Babulal Bhuramal v. Nandram AIR 1958 SC 677 . The rules in part II of the Regulation were framed in pursuance of Sections 155, 156, 157 and 158 of the Regulation. The Government of Manipur published the Land and Revenue Regulation comprising of the Act as Part 1 in 1956. But, the rules were not separately published and my attention was not drawn to any such Rules published in 1956. But, they were published in 1959. The Government of Manipur published the Land and Revenue Regulation comprising of the Act as Part 1 in 1956. But, the rules were not separately published and my attention was not drawn to any such Rules published in 1956. But, they were published in 1959. In the notification in Manipur Gazette Extraordinary dated 2-6-1959, it was mentioned that the second respondent framed Rules under Section 157 of the Regulation. Though it was not mentioned in the publication that the Rules were framed in supersession of the Rules contained in Part II of the Regulation, they must be deemed to be impliedly repealed. For, the Rules in Part II of the Regulation were also framed under the same section, namely, Section 157 of the Regulation. So, the intention of the second respondent was to frame fresh rules applicable to Manipur territory. Most of the Rules of 1959 are quite similar to the Rules in Part II of the Regulation, but for the fact that the Rules of 1959 omitted some of the Rules contained in Part II of the Manual. The Court has to suppose that the Government has a consistent design in the policy and intend nothing that is inconsistent or incongruous. An order of a later date annuls all inconsistent orders of former dates. The provisions of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act are not confined to the cases of express repeals. All that is contemplated by this section is that there must be a repeal of an existing Act by a subsequent Act. Such repeal may be by express words or it may be by necessary implication. If the Acts are repugnant and inconsistent with each other, the Courts will have no alternative but to declare the prior general enactment as repealed by the subsequent general Act. If the intention is found to be to sweep away all the previous orders and to establish one rule, it is sufficient to get rid of any previous special order Vide the passages at page 888 of Interpretation of Statutes and General Clauses Act by N.S. Bindra - 1965 edition. Vide also Ayyaswami Nadar v. Joseph, AIR 1952 Trav Co 371 and Ramji Rupchand v. District Superintendent. Western Railway, Ratlam. AIR 1957 Madh Bh 155. Vide also Ayyaswami Nadar v. Joseph, AIR 1952 Trav Co 371 and Ramji Rupchand v. District Superintendent. Western Railway, Ratlam. AIR 1957 Madh Bh 155. In the present case Rule 20 of the Rules of 1959 specially relates to lease of road side land, Rule 25 of the said Rules specially relates to settlement of town lands. It lays down that, unless otherwise directed by the Chief Commissioner, nothing in the Rules of 1959 shall apply to the land included in a military cantonment, that the Chief Commissioner may, from time to time, prescribe special rules for the settlement of land within two miles of a military cantonment or municipality or within half a mile of an area notified under the Act governing Municipal bodies as may be in force and that unless and until such rules have been prescribed the settlement of such land shall be effected under the rules. Rules 1 to 24, provided that no periodic lease can be issued for such land (except where it has or is likely to have no non-agricultural value). So, the Rules in Section I of Chapter I of the Rules of 1959 are self-contained general provisions, which are also applicable to leaser and settlement of road side lands and town lands. If no such rules are framed with regard to the town land then the said Rules will have to apply. As such the old Rules in Part II of the Manual including the Rules in Section IV Chapter I of Part II relating to the grant of lease and settlement of land revenue in respect of town lands must be deemed to have been repealed. So, the first contention of the petitioners counsel fails. 12. The second contention of the petitioners counsel that the Rules in Part II of the Regulation still continue to be in force, even after the enactment of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act of 1960 (hereinafter called as the M.L.R. and L.R. Act) is also incorrect. Section 170(1) of the said Act lays down that the enactments mentioned in the schedule or so much thereof as relate to the matters covered by the provisions of the M.L.R. and L.R. Act, brought into force shall stand repealed in such area of the Union Territory of Manipur, where the Act is brought into force. Section 170(1) of the said Act lays down that the enactments mentioned in the schedule or so much thereof as relate to the matters covered by the provisions of the M.L.R. and L.R. Act, brought into force shall stand repealed in such area of the Union Territory of Manipur, where the Act is brought into force. The schedule contains the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886 (Assam Act I of 1886) as extended to the Union Territory of Manipur by notification under Section 2 of the Union Territories (Laws) Act, 950 (Act XXX of 1950) as one of the repealed Acts. So, the said Regulation was repealed. When the Regulation, which is the parent Act, was repealed, the Rules framed thereunder would also stand repealed automatically. The notification in the Gazette publishing the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Rules, 1961 (Which were framed under the said M.L.R. and L.R. Act) specifically mentions that the Rules were framed in supersession of the previous rules, except rules 5 to 17 of Rules of 1959. So, after the framing of the Rules under the M.L.R. and L.R. Act in 1961, the Rules in Part II of the Assam Manual and all the Rules except the Rules 5 to 17 of the Rules of 1959 were repealed. 13. My learned predecessor stated in his judgement that, as at the time of the survey and initiation of the proceedings for eviction in 1960-1961, the Rules of 1959 were in force Rule 20 of the said Rules would apply and that the second respondent had no authority to settle the road side land on the petitioners in 1961 as evidenced by Exts. B/18 to B/20 and B/22. So, his reasoning is perfectly correct. 14. However, he forgot to refer to a very important aspect of the case evidenced by Exts. A/1 and A/3, which were filed by the petitioners and which were already on record both in W.P. 16/1961 and W.P. 9/1962. He did not refer to them in his judgement at all. Ext. A/1 is a certified copy of a Jamabandi of the year 1947-48 which shows that a patta was issued in the name of the first petitioner by the then Government of Manipur being Patta No. 87/4-1.W. (Ext. B/30) for the construction of a shop. Ext. He did not refer to them in his judgement at all. Ext. A/1 is a certified copy of a Jamabandi of the year 1947-48 which shows that a patta was issued in the name of the first petitioner by the then Government of Manipur being Patta No. 87/4-1.W. (Ext. B/30) for the construction of a shop. Ext. A1 shows that the first petitioner was permitted to construct a shop on an area of 26 x 14 of the road side land for which an annual tax of Rs. 5.62 P.W. as payable. Ext A/3 is a certified copy of an order dated 17-9-1949 passed by the then Chairman of the Local Self Government, Manipur on an application dated 27-R-1949 filed by Irengbam Ongbi Mani Devi, the mother of the second petitioner, under which the Chairman. Local Self Government Manipur, settled temporarily an area of 20 x 30 for the construction of a shop at a distance of 25 from the centre of the road and 5 from the border of a lane with effect from 1-10-1949. According to the petitioners, the husband of the third petitioner also filed an application an per Ext. A/2 dated 27-12-1949 to the Chairman Local Self Government. Manipur to grant to him a plot about 14 in length on the road side to the east of the shop of the first petitioner. But, no order was produced and the petitioners allege that the husband of the third petitioner was verbally permitted to construct a shop. Ext. A/2 has to be ignored for the present as it, was not filed in the previous Writ Petition No. 9 of 1962. But, Exts. A/1 and A/3 were in the record. They show that the present sites occupied by the petitioners 1 and 2 were settled on them in 1948 and 1949 A. D. when the old Rules under Part II of the Assam Land Revenue Manual were in force. They should be deemed to be periodic leases (within the meaning of Rule 1(d) of the Rules under the Regulation inasmuch as they were granted for an indefinite period being more than 3 years and a right to enjoy them subject to the due payment of the land revenue and local taxes etc., must be held to have been conferred upon them. So these two leases were saved by Rule 69 of the then existing Rules contained in Part II of the Assam Manual. According to the petitioners they constructed their shops in 1948-49 at heavy expense. This fact is proved by the statement of the first respondent himself. (Vide Ext. A/4 dated 13-2-1961 wherein he admitted before the Settlement Officer that the petitioners made construction about 10 years prior to the date of his statement). This Ext. A/4 was not filed by the petitioners in the Writ Petition and. therefore, for the present this is also not considered. But Exts. A/1 and A/3 prove beyond any shadow of doubt that the lites, in the possession of the petitioners 1 and 3 were granted to them in the year 1948-49. The 1st respondent relied on Exts. B/10 and B/11 to show that the grants covered by Exts. A/1 and A/3 are legal. Ext. B/10 is a copy of the Darbar resolution dated 28-2-1947, which shows that no building should be built within 50 from the edge of the State maintained roads except with the consent of the Bazar Committee. Ext. B/11 is a copy of Darbar Resolution No. 3 of d-l-1928 under which the State reserved the right of enjoying the user of earth within 50 from either side of the road. But, Exts. A/1 mid A/2 prevail over Exts. B/10 and B/11, inasmuch as the grants, covered by Exts. A/1 and A/2, were valid under Rule 69 of the Rules framed under the Assam Land Revenue Manual. At any rate, until the grants covered by them are also set aside, the petitioners 1 and 3 cannot be evicted. As such, my learned predecessor committed a grave mistake in relying on the affidavit of the first respondent in thinking that the sites were for the first time settled on them by the second respondent in 1961 and by holding that the settlement was contrary to Rule 20 of the Rules of 1959. This is a very grave error apparent on the face of the record. 15. Again, the first respondent committed a patent illegality in filing a single Writ Petition questioning the various settlements made in favour of the various petitioners separately. My learned predecessor committed an error in allowing the 1st respondent to file a Joint Writ Petition against the petitioners, whose cases are quite different. 15. Again, the first respondent committed a patent illegality in filing a single Writ Petition questioning the various settlements made in favour of the various petitioners separately. My learned predecessor committed an error in allowing the 1st respondent to file a Joint Writ Petition against the petitioners, whose cases are quite different. This is also an error apparent on the face of the record. Vide Mandir Thakar Dawara Drum v. State of Pepsu. AIR 1955 Pepsu 159, Shanmuga Rajeswara Sethupathi v. State of Madras, AIB 1957 Mad 570, Bankim Chandra Chakravarty v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, AIR 1958 Pat 314 and Bishwaranjan Bose v. Honorary Secretary. Ram Krishna Mission, Vivekanand Society, Jamshedpur. AIR 1958 Pat 653 . 16. There are also several other errors in the judgement of my learned predecessor - evidently committed by him by salving on the allegations made by the first respondent in his affidavit. Firstly the first respondent alleged in his writ petition that his homestead land is covered by patta No. 87/ 274-1. W. Later on, he filed a petition for the amendment of the number of the patta by deleting 4n from 274 He alleged that it was a mistake committed by the typist in typing the Writ Petition. My learned predecessor allowed the amendment. So, his patta is 87/27 (Vide Ext. B/12). But, my learned predecessor found that his patta was 87/27/4-1. W.T. which is not at all the case of the first respondent. It may be noted that according to Ext. A/1, the patta granted to the first respondent herein, it was covered by 87/4, which is said to be a joint patta belonging to the first petitioner as well as the first respondent (Vide Ext. B/30). My learned predecessor evidently mistook one patta for another and mentioned in the judgement that the land of the first respondent is covered by Patta No. 87/27/4. 17. Secondly, the first respondent relied on Ext. B/13 Manipur Gazette Notification dated 26-5-1954, to show that the second respondent prescribed certain limits from the centre of the road in question, on which no construction should be made. My learned predecessor relied on the affidavit of the first respondent to show that the second respondent declared Kangchup-Imphal-Tamenglong road as a district road and that he prescribed certain limits. But, on actual perusal of Ext. My learned predecessor relied on the affidavit of the first respondent to show that the second respondent declared Kangchup-Imphal-Tamenglong road as a district road and that he prescribed certain limits. But, on actual perusal of Ext. B/13, it is found that it was mentioned therein that the second respondent was "pleased to classify" the road and "to fix the standards" mentioned therein. It is not correct to state that the second respondent made any "declaration" about the road as mentioned in the affidavit of the first respondent or in the judgement. Further, it has to be seen that the said notification does not show under what provision of law the second respondent either "classified the road" or "fixed the standards". But, what really happened was that the Bombay Highways Act of 1955 was extended to Manipur on 11-1-1960. The second respondent declared the road in question as Highway and classified it on 12-2-1962 (vide Ext. A/6) as a Highway. In continuation of it, the second respondent issued another notification as per Ext. B/15 dated 4-4-1962, classifying the roads. He fixed the Highway Authorities under Ext. A/7 Gazette notification dated 28-12-1962 long after the Writ Petition was filed. Vide Ext/ A/7. Ext. A/9 Gazette Notification, dated 24-2-1967, which was filed by the petitioner with a separate petition (C. Misc. Appln. 42/1967) for admission shows that the 2nd respondent proposed to fix the Highway boundaries of the State Highways. But, even that does not include the road in question. Thus, the second respondent appointed the Highways Authorities only on 28-124962 under Section 4 of the said Act, after the Writ Petition was filed. The 7th respondent Principal Engineer. Territorial Council was not at all in existence when the Writ Petition was filed. So, my learned predecessor went wrong in issuing a writ of mandamus to a non-existing authority. It is a futile writ. The High Court will not issue a writ which is futile and in favour of a person having no subsisting legal rights. Vide In re, Dr. John Matthai, AIR 1952 Trav-Co. So, my learned predecessor went wrong in issuing a writ of mandamus to a non-existing authority. It is a futile writ. The High Court will not issue a writ which is futile and in favour of a person having no subsisting legal rights. Vide In re, Dr. John Matthai, AIR 1952 Trav-Co. 1, Debendra Bandhu v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1952 Cal 808 , Mahesh Chandra v. Tara Chand, AIR 1958 All 374 (FB), Karnal Kaithal Co-operative Transport Society Ltd., Karnal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1959 Punj 75, Kalyan Singh v. State of Utter Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1183 , State of Punjab v. Suraj Parkash, AIR 1963 SC 507 and Venkata Subbayya v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1965 Andh Pra 425. 18. Thirdly, the first respondent suppressed not only the fact that he had filed Writ Petition No. 16 of 1961 and withdrew it, but also the further important fact that the petitioners constructed their shops in or about 1948 and 1949. He alleged in his writ petition that they constructed the shops in 1961 for the first time. But, he himself have a statement before the A.S., and S.O.E., in Petition No. 99 of 1950 dated 13-2-1961 as per Ext. A/4, wherein he stated that the petitioners constructed shops on the western road side of Kangchup road to the north of his patta land about 10 years prior to his statement. He further stated that if any settlement was to be granted, the land in question might be settled in his favour. His statement was recorded on 26-3-1961. So, he admitted before the A.S. and S.O. Circle E that the petitioners constructed their shops in or about 1951. But, he suppressed this fact and alleged in his Writ Petition that the petitioners constructed their shops in or about 1961. The contention of the first respondents counsel is that Ext. A/4 does not show the name of the A.S. and S.O. before whom the first respondent was alleged to have given his statement on oath, mat it does not further show that any oath was administered to the first respondent, that the mode of recording deposition in a Civil Court under Order 18. Rules 5 and 6, Civil P.C. was not observed, that it is not admissible under Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act and that it cannot be looked into. Rules 5 and 6, Civil P.C. was not observed, that it is not admissible under Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act and that it cannot be looked into. In this petition it can be looked into as containing an admission made by the first respondent in a statement of his recorded even without any oath. It can be considered as a statement under which the first respondent previously admitted that the petitioners constructed their shops in or about 1951 and not in 1961 as alleged by him in his Writ Petition. 19. Fourthly, he is guilty of laches in keeping quiet from 1948-1949 and in acquiescing in the conduct of the petitioners in constructing their shops in 1948-49. As such he is not entitled to invoke the extraordinary Writ Jurisdiction of the High Court. Vide Messrs, Pannalal v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 397 and Mirza v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1959 Andh Pra 444. 20. Fifthly, my learned predecessor held that under Rule 5 of the Rules of 1959, it is only the Deputy Commissioner and not the Chief Commissioner who was empowered to grant a settlement, that even then Rule 5 requires that an application should have been filed by the petitioners, but that no application was filed and that the second respondent went wrong in settling the disputed portions of the road sides in favour of the petitioners without their petitions. The petitioners, however, filed Ext. A/5, certified copy of an application filed by the deceased 4th petitioner before the second respondent requesting him to grant settlement of the site in his favour. So, to this extent the order of my learned predecessor that no application was filed before the second respondent is not correct. 21. Sixthly, as the first respondent suppressed several facts, he was not entitled to obtain a writ, Vide Sabani Ram v. State of Assam, AIR 1953 Assam 137, Mangilal Sharma v. Appellate Tribunal of State Transport Authority, Rajasthan, AIR 1937 Raj 167, Ram Saran Sharma v. State of Bihar. 21. Sixthly, as the first respondent suppressed several facts, he was not entitled to obtain a writ, Vide Sabani Ram v. State of Assam, AIR 1953 Assam 137, Mangilal Sharma v. Appellate Tribunal of State Transport Authority, Rajasthan, AIR 1937 Raj 167, Ram Saran Sharma v. State of Bihar. AIR 1958 Pat 181 , Roop Kishore v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Moradabad, AIR 1959 All 433 , Deptylal v. Collector of Nilgiris, AIR 1959 Mad 460 , Haji Abdul Shakoor v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kanpur, AIR 1959 All 440 , Wasim Ahmed Khan v. Secretary, Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P. Allahabad, AIR 1961 AH 290 and Mrs. Chang Meiyu v. Union of India, AIR 1961 Manipur 37 . 22. Out of the above six errors, some of them are found to be mistakes on account of the fact that the petitioners filed Exts. A/2 and A/4 to A/9, after the disposal of the writ petition. The petitioners allege that Ext. A/2 was discovered from the Court of die second respondent, because the original petition was filed by the third petitioners husband in 1949 and that the third petitioner had no knowledge of its existence until she obtained certified copy of it. They further allege that they discovered the statement (the original of Ext A/4) made by the first respondent before A.S. and S. 6, in connection with his Petition No. 99 of 1960 made on 13-2-1962 after they received summonses on 4-4-1961 and 18-4-1961 as evidenced by Exts. B/1 to B/8. They further allege that they discovered the original statement (the original of Ext. A/5) on 18-6-1965, because its existence was not within the knowledge of the legal representatives of the deceased 4th respondent in the writ petition who had filed it. They further contend that the other exhibits were subsequently discovered by them. Their counsel relied on Seeramma v. Seshamma, AIR 1933 Mad 217, to support of his contention that the affidavits filed by the petitioners were sufficient proof of the discovery of the documents. But, a bare assertion in the affidavit that they could not produce the documents early would not do. There must be strict proof that, after the exercise of due diligence, they could not discover the documents in question. Vide Ganga Ram v. Mt. But, a bare assertion in the affidavit that they could not produce the documents early would not do. There must be strict proof that, after the exercise of due diligence, they could not discover the documents in question. Vide Ganga Ram v. Mt. Saradhu, AIR 1955 Him Pra 25, Basanta Kumar Das v. Yumnam Dinamani Singh, AIR 1955 Manipur 17 . The Writ Petition No. 9 of 1962 was filed on 14-9-1962. It was pending till 25-5-1965. So, the petitioners had ample time and opportunity to exercise due diligence and to produce the above mentioned documents (except Ext. A/9 which was published recently on 24-2-1967) into the Court. It cannot, therefore, be stated that the petitioners exercised due diligence when this Writ Petition was pending. However, it has to be noted that the errors 1 to 6 pointed out above are not errors on the face of the record. They relate to matters which could have been properly raised by the petitioners in an appeal and not in a petition for re view. The grounds, which can be urged in a petition for review, are quite different from the grounds which can be argued in an appeal. Discovery of new point is also no ground for review Vide Ebadullah Khan v. Municipal Board, Allahabad, AIR 1950 All 450 , Dharma Das v. Mool Sajiwan, AIR 1953 Vindh Pra 44 (2) and Gangaram, Nathuram v. Beharilal Brijlal, AIR 1952 Bhopal 39. The fact that the decision is wrong on law is no ground for review. Vide Puyam Liklai Singh v. Moiranthem Maipak Singh. AIR L956 Manipur 18, J.N. Sahni v. State, AIR 1956 Madh Bha 174 (FB) and Iftikhar Ahmad v. Bharat Kumar, AIR 1957 Raj 165 . The fact that a decision is wrong on merits is also no ground for review. Vide Bal Chand v. Bheron Dan, AIR 1951 Raj 857 Jana v. Ghulam Nabi, AIR 1952 J and K 12, Lachhmi Narain Bain v. Ghisa Bihari. AIR 1960 Punj 43 and F.G. Davidson v Mohanlal Sindhi, AIR 1964 All 342 . The purpose of the provisions of Order 47, R. 1. Civil P.C. is not to make the Court re-write a second judgement reversing its findings in the earlier judgement and the same question cannot be permitted to be re-argued in a different perspective. AIR 1960 Punj 43 and F.G. Davidson v Mohanlal Sindhi, AIR 1964 All 342 . The purpose of the provisions of Order 47, R. 1. Civil P.C. is not to make the Court re-write a second judgement reversing its findings in the earlier judgement and the same question cannot be permitted to be re-argued in a different perspective. Vide Krishna Aiyar v. Narayanan, AIR 1951 Mad 660 , Kunverji Shamji v. Jivandas Hirji, AIR 1953 Kutch 30. Kalika Prasad v. Additional Commissioner, Agra Division, AIR 1956 All 103 , Debi Prasad v. Khelavan, AIR 3957 All 67 and S.P. Awate v. C.P. Fernandes. AIR 1959 Bom 466 . 23. But, as already stated there are two important grounds for review, which show that there are errors apparent on the lace of the record. Exts. A/1 and A/3 were filed by the petitioners in the earlier Writ Petition No. 16 of 1961 as well as in the subsequent Writ Petition No. 9 of 1962. But, my learned predecessor did not refer to them at all in hit judgement. They go to the very root of the case. No purpose is served by this Court in setting aside the orders of the second respondent passed in 1961 as per Exts. B/18 to B/20 and B/22 in granting settlement of the sites in favour of the petitioners. The petitioners 1 and 3 cannot be evicted unless the earlier periodic leases granted to them as evidenced by Exts. A/1 and A/3 are also set aside. It is not a case of mere failure of my learned predecessor to refer to Exts. A/1 and A/3. Failure to refer to a certain document in a judgement may not be a ground for review as laid down in Hari Ram v. Mt. Nathi, AIR 1952 Raj 39 . But, this is a case where important documents, which were in the record and which affect the very jurisdiction of this Court to issue a writ, were not considered by this Court. Further, my learned predecessor erred in entertaining the Writ Petition against all the petitioners, though they were concerned with different sites, causes of action and orders. In the same petition different writs would have to be granted, if the 1st respondent succeeds. Further, my learned predecessor erred in entertaining the Writ Petition against all the petitioners, though they were concerned with different sites, causes of action and orders. In the same petition different writs would have to be granted, if the 1st respondent succeeds. Failure to consider the most important point and issues, where the case is an exceptional one, is an error apparent on the face of the record Vide Note 16-a at page 4477 of AIR Commentaries on Civil P.C. Vol. IV 7th Edition and also Debi Sahai Gulzari Mal v. Basheshar Lal Bansi Dhar, AIR 1928 Lah 919 Ram Baksh v. Mt. Rajeswari, AIR 1948 All 213, Hari Sankar Pal v. Anath Nath Mitter, AIR 1949 FC 106, Narayanan v. Raman, AIR 1953 Trav-Co. 306 (FB), Chenchanna Naidu v. Praja Seva Transport Ltd., Cuddappah, AIR 1953 Mad 39 and AIR 195 SC 526. The High Court possesses the power to recall and correct a manifestly erroneous order passed by it under Article 228 of the Constitution of India. Vide In re, A.K. Gopalan AIR 1953 Mad 41 , AIR. 1960 All 152 and Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909 . The question as to how the error occurred and who was responsible for the error is also immaterial. Vide Mt. Jamna Kuer v. Lal Bahadur, AIR 1950 FC 131 and AIR 1953 Mad 39 . The errors have, to be corrected. The successor-in-office can also review the order made by his predecessor and rectify the errors. Vide AIR 1948 All 213. 24. In the result, Civil Misc. Application No. 42 of 1967 is allowed, Civil Review Petition No. 2 of 1965 is allowed and the judgement of this Court dated 25-5-1965 is reviewed and set aside. The Writ Petition No. 9 of 1962 is dismissed. Under the circumstances of the cases, I direct both the parties to bear their respective costs in the Writ Petition as well as the Review Petition. Order accordingly.