( 1 ) THIS is a petition under Section 35 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1. 952, for revising the orders of the Courts below, dismissing the suit of the petitioner for ejectment of the respondent, under Section 13 of that Act. In support of the relief claimed in the suit, two grounds were put forward bringing the same under the requirements of Sections 13 (b) and 13 (e) of that Act. The landlord-plaintiff is a firm said to be consisting of 10 partners, composed of three families, The allegation in the plaint was that the tenant had sublet the premises and therefore, was liable to ejectment under Section 13 (b ). The second ground put forward was that the partners of the firm were under orders of eviction from the premises, which they were occupying, and consequently, they required the premises in question for then occupation. Both the Courts found against the petitioner on both the points and hence this revision under Section 35 of the Act. ( 2 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner strnuously contended that the respondent sublet or assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the premises, thereby rendering himself liable to be evicted under Section 13 (b) of the Act. Both the Courts have gone into the avidence and rejected the case of the petitioner and they have held that the plaintiff had failed to substantiate the allegations about the respondent subletting or assigning or parting with possession of the suit premises. It is a pure question of fact and the finding is based upon evidence and there is neither a misapplication of law nor a misunderstanding of the law applicable to the question when the Courts below arrived at this conclusion, and consequently, there is no ground for interference in this behalf in revision, under Section 35 of the Act ( 3 ) WITH regard to the second ground also, the Courts have very meticulously calculated the members of the family of the 10 partners ot the firm and the accommodation that is available to them. It has been found by the Courts below that 7 flats and 2 garages were available for occupation by the partners of the petitioner-firm and their family members and the finding with reference to this was not challenged before me. It has been found by the Courts below that 7 flats and 2 garages were available for occupation by the partners of the petitioner-firm and their family members and the finding with reference to this was not challenged before me. What is contended is that the number of members of the family is so large and for their requirement, this accommodation was inadequate, and therefore, the Courts below committed an error of law. As a matter of fact the trial Court calculated the total number of the members of the family of all the groups as between 45 and 50, and even for that number, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the 7 flats available constituted sufficient and suitable accommodation for them. The Appellate Court, on the other hand. found that the number of members arrived at by the trial Court was incorrect and after referring to the evidence let in in this behalf arrivsd at the total number of family members at 31. Having arrived at that figure, it agreed with the conclusion of the trial Court that the 7 flats were sufficient for the accommodation of the petitioner s families, and consequently, they were not entitled to an order ejecting the respondent from the premises in question. ( 4 ) IT is vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner before me that in such matters, it is the landlord who is the final arbiter as to what exactly his requirements are and the Courts cannot convert themsevles into the position of the landlord and then say what the requirements of tha landlord are. In support of this contention, the learned counsel invited my attention to an unreported decision of Jindra Lal, J, in P, M. Dhan Singh v. Khanna, Civil Bevn. Case No. 603-D of 1958, D/-22-12-1964 (Punj ). The learned Judge in that case referred to certain earlier decisions of the Court and particularly the decision in Messrs. Sant Ram Des Raj v. Karam Chand, reported in (1962) 64 Pun LR 758: (AIR 1963 Punj 1) (FB) and pointed out that the word requires involves something more than a mere wish and that it has in it an element of need to an extent at least. Another decision to which my attention is drawn is Smt. Vidya Vati v. Hanuman Parshad, reported in (1963) 65 Pun LR 415. Another decision to which my attention is drawn is Smt. Vidya Vati v. Hanuman Parshad, reported in (1963) 65 Pun LR 415. None of these case lays down as an inflexible proposition of law that whenever a landlord comes to the Court with a claim that he requires a particular premises for his occupation, his claim is the last word on the question and the Courts have no jurisdiction to go into the question whether he really needs that particular accommodation or not. On the other hand, the decisions referred to by the learned counsel themselves point out that before an order in favour of the landlord is passed, the Courts must come to the conclusion that not only that the landlord bona fide intends to occupy the premises in question, but he really needs the said premises WITHOUT there being a finding that the landlord needs the premises in question, there cannot be an order in his favour. The acceptance of a contention like the one put forward before will make a mockery of the protection given to a tenant under the provisions of the Act. A rich and wealthy landlord with a small family, may claim that he bona fide wants to occupy a huge mansion of his in the occupation of several tenants, though he is already in occupation of a premises reasonably adequate and suitable for mm and his family. If the contention of the learned counsel is to be accented, the Courts will have no option but to order the eviction of the tenants. I am of the view that such an extravagant claim has only to be stated to be rejected. In the context of scarcity of accommodation, the Act has been passed to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants and at the same time to safeguard and secure the reasonable requirements of the landlord and the provisions of the Act have to be understood ,and applied so as to achieve this object and not to frustrate, defeat or destroy it. Under these circumstances, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Courts have no say in the matter as to whether a landlord in a particular case needs the premises for his requirement. Under these circumstances, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Courts have no say in the matter as to whether a landlord in a particular case needs the premises for his requirement. ( 5 ) OVER and above this, the question I hat has come up for decision in this case is not simply whether the landlord bona fide requires the premises in question or not, but the question is whether he has already suitable accommodation or not. Before a landlord can succeed in a petition under Section 13 (e), two conditions must be satisfied. One is that he bonafide requires the premises in question for his own Occupation and (2) that he has no other suitable accommodation. Unless both these conditions are cumulatively satisfied, there cannot be an order in his favour, under this particular provision. As a matter of fact, his not having any other suitable accommodation will provide the occasion and justification for his requiring the premises in question and will constitute the strongest evidence of the bona fides of his requirement. ALL that the Courts below have done in this case is to come to the conclusion that the second requirement has not been satisfied so as to entitle the landlord to an order in his favour. They have found on the basis of the evidence placed before them that the landlord in this case has other suitable accommodation, and consequently came to tha conclusion that the petitioner is not entitled to the relief prayed for. do not find any improper understanding of law or an incorrect approach on a question of law with reference to the orders of the Courts below and hence, I do not see any Justification for interference with their orders under Section 35 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952 Under these circumstances, the petition, dismissed with costs.