JUDGMENT 1. THIS judgment will govern two writ petitions in Matter No. 467 of 1964 and Matter No. 431 of 1966. Certain bales of cotton belonging to the petitioner were seized upon a search by the excise Authorities, on the ground that they had been secreted and dealt with in contravention of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, and the rules framed thereunder. Upon seizure of the goods after the search the petitioner moved an application challenging the search and seizure of the goods by the excise Authorities. The challenge to the search and seizure is the subject-matter of the petition in Matter No. 467 of 1964. Thereafter an adjudication order was made confiscating 60 bales of cotton fabrics which were seized upon search and other penalties were imposed. The petitioner filed a second application challenging the validity of the adjudication order and this challenge of the petitioner is the subject-matter of the writ petition No. 431 of 1966. 2. I shall now deal with the first application which relates to the search and the seizure of the goods. This application is directed against the search and seizure of certain bales of cotton fabrics, the search and seizure having been executed by the excise Authorities under a letter of authorisation dated November 17, 1964. 3. THE petitioner's business was buying and selling of cotton fabrics, for the purpose of which he was granted a group 'c' licence by the Director of textiles, Government of West Bengal. The petitioner maintains a go-down in the ground floor of premises No. 9, prasanna Kumar Tagore Street, Calcutta. Cotton fabrics were stored in this go-down by the petitioner and were kept in the custody of the petitioner's Bankers, as the goods were hypothecated with the Bankers to secure repayment of loans. 4. The petitioner maintains a go-down in the ground floor of premises No. 9, prasanna Kumar Tagore Street, Calcutta. Cotton fabrics were stored in this go-down by the petitioner and were kept in the custody of the petitioner's Bankers, as the goods were hypothecated with the Bankers to secure repayment of loans. 4. THE petitioner's case is that he stored in the said go-down 33 bales of cotton fabrics which were purchased by him from the Sakti Nagar Textile Industrial co-operative Society Limited, krishnagar, and that this consignment of 33 bales were exempt from payment of excise duty under section 3 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, read with Item No. 19 of the First schedule to the said Act, and Central government Notification of the Ministry of Finance No. 32/60 C. E. dated 1.3.1960 also read with Notification No. 70/60 central Excise dated 30.4.1960 as amended by Notification No. 148/62 C. E. dated 14.7.62 and also other Notifications. By virtue of the provisions in the said Act and also the Notifications cooperative societies registered on or before March 31, 1963, are exempt from paying excise duty on cotton fabrics manufactured on powerlooms owned by them or by their members and the petitioner's contention is that the 33 bales of cotton fabrics kept in the said go-down are not liable to excise duty, as they were manufactured by a co-operative society. On November 21, 1964, the petitioner received a letter from his bankers informing him that 33 bales of cotton cloth stored in the said go-down had been 'frozen' by the officials of the central Excise, under whose direction the goods of the petitioner could not be delivered to him without the permission of the respondent No. 3. 5. THE search and seizure were made by an authorisation issued by the respondent No. 5 dated November 17, 1964, whereby the go-down at the said premises No. 9, Prasanna Kumar Tagore street in the occupation of the parties, mentioned therein, was directed to be searched and goods found therein to be seized by the respondents Nos. 1 and 2. The petitioner's grievance is that 33 bales of cotton fabrics belonging to him were seized upon search, although there was no warrant for search of the petitioner's go-down under the said letter of authorisation. 6. MR. 1 and 2. The petitioner's grievance is that 33 bales of cotton fabrics belonging to him were seized upon search, although there was no warrant for search of the petitioner's go-down under the said letter of authorisation. 6. MR. B. C. Dutt, learned Advocate for the petitioner, submitted that the provisions for search and seizure in section 105 (1) of the Customs Act, 1962, made applicable to the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, and the said order dated November 17, 1964, authorising search of the said go-down and seizure of the goods stored therein were arbitrary, illegal and ultra, vires. Mr. Dutt elaborated this contention firstly by contending that there were no materials before the respondents for any reasonable suspicion that the petitioner's go-down was being used for storage of cotton fabrics manufactured in any power loom unit The second ground of challenge was that the power to search and seize goods under the provisions of the statute was exercised in contravention of such provision. The third ground of challenge was that there was no reason to believe that goods liable to confiscation or to any penal proceedings under the statute were secreted in the petitioner's go-down and therefore the search was mala fide, illegal and in excess of the statutory authority of the respondents Nos. 1 and 4, The fourth ground urged by Mr. Dutt was that the search of the petitioner's go-down was made in violation of section 18 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, read with section 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The next ground of attack was that the statutory notice required under section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962, as made applicable to the Central Excise and salt Act, 1944 had not been served upon the petitioner in respect of the said 33 bales of cotton fabrics and that in any event the notice served did not affect 19 bales of cotton fabrics out of 33 bales. There is a further challenge to the said authorisation on the ground of violation of the petitioner' fundamental right guaranteed by article 19 (1) (f) and (g) of this constitution. In support of the contentions mentioned above Mr. Dutt. firstly argued that there was no mention of the petitioner's name in the letter of authorisation. There is a further challenge to the said authorisation on the ground of violation of the petitioner' fundamental right guaranteed by article 19 (1) (f) and (g) of this constitution. In support of the contentions mentioned above Mr. Dutt. firstly argued that there was no mention of the petitioner's name in the letter of authorisation. It was argued that the names of four parties were mentioned in the authorisation letter but the petitioner was not one of such four parties, and therefore the search and seizure were invalid and illegal. The authorisation letter was issued under section 105 (1)of the Customs Act, 1962, and unless the name of the party who was believed to have secreted the goods liable to confiscation, was mentioned in the authorisation letter, there was no warrant either for search of a place or of seizure of any goods seized upon such search. In this case, it was argued, that the names of the parties whose go-down was to be searched, and who were believed to have secreted the goods liable to confiscation, were mentioned in the authorisation letter. But the petitioner's name was not included in the authorisation letter. I shall revert to this contention later in this judgment 7. IN support of his contention reliance was placed by Mr. Dutt on a bench decision of this court reported in (1) 70 CWN 349 (Nathmall Jalan v. Additional Collector of Customs. But this decision to my mind is entirely against the contentions of Mr. Dutt. In that case the goods which were the subject-matter of the application from which the appeal was preferred, were alleged to be smuggled gold. It was held that the question whether the gold was smuggled gold was a matter of subjective satisfaction of the Customs Authorities. It was farther held that if the materials justified a reasonable belief in the customs Authorities that the gold was smuggled gold, the seizure of such gold would be justified. In this case it is plain from the authorisation letter that the Excise Authorities had materials for a belief that the premises at the ground floor of No. 9, Prasanna Kumar Tagore street was used as a place for the storage of cotton fabrics which were cleared there-form in contravention of the central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, and the rules made thereunder. It is also clear that the Excise Authorities had information that the said go-down was used for storing and clearing goods without payment of excise duty and that such excise duty was leviable on such goods, and it was on this information that the authorisation had been issued by the Excise Authorities. In my view, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of section 105 (1) of the customs Act, 1962. 8. MR. Dutt, however, raised another point, namely, that it was not stated in the said authorisation letter that the authority issuing the letter had 'reason to believe' that goods were cleared in violation of the provisions of the statute and all that was stated in the said authorisation letter was that authority issuing the letter had been led to believe' that the ground floor of the go-down was used for storage of cotton fabrics which were liable to excise duty. Mr. Dutt contended that it was not enough to state that the authority was led to believe that certain things have happened, but that it must be clearly stated that the authority had reason to believe that goods were being dealt with in violation of the statute. In my opinion, there is no force in this contention of Mr. Dutt. It is true that the words used in section 105 (1) of the Customs act are 'reason to believe' and these identical words had not been used in the authorisation letter, but in my view this omission is of no consequence at all as what has been stated was that the authority had been led to believe, which must also have been on certain materials or information received by him. The next contention of Mr. Dutt was that section 105 (1) of the customs Act required that the custom Officer should have reason to believe that goods were 'secreted' in any place and unless it was alleged in the authorisation letter that any goods were 'secreted' in any place, an order for search and seizure could not be made. Then is no force in this contention of Mr. Dutt also. Then is no force in this contention of Mr. Dutt also. Although it has not been stated that cotton fabrics were secreted at the ground floor of the premises, it has been stated in authorisation letter that the go-downs were used for storage of cotton fabrics which were cleared therefrom in contravention of the central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, and the rules made thereunder. That, in my view, is sufficient indication in the authorisation letter that the goods were secreted in the go-down. 9. THE next contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner was that the search was to be made in compliance with the requirement of section 165 of the Criminal Procedure Code and that section required that the officer conducting the search should record in writing the grounds of his belief that anything necessary for the purpose of the investigation might be found in the place which was to be searched. In this case, it was argued, that no reasons had been recorded for believing that goods liable to excise duty were stored and cleared in the godown in contravention of the Central Excise and salt Act, 1944. Failure to record the reasons for believing that goods were stored and cleared in contravention of the provisions of the said Act, it was argued, made the search unlawful as it was made in contravention of Action 165 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In support of this contention reliance was placed by Mr. Dutt on a decision of the Supreme Court in (2) State of Rajasthan v. Rehman, AIR 1960 SC 210 . In that case a search was made under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, for evasion of excise duly on tobacco. The search was made by the police officer without recording the reasons as required by section 165 of the Criminal Procedure Code. While the search was being made the police officer was resisted and in consequence thereof he fell down and received some injuries. A criminal prosecution was started against the accused for resisting the police officer and this prosecution ended in an order of acquittal which was upheld by the High Court. While the search was being made the police officer was resisted and in consequence thereof he fell down and received some injuries. A criminal prosecution was started against the accused for resisting the police officer and this prosecution ended in an order of acquittal which was upheld by the High Court. There was an appeal to the Supreme Court and it was held that section 165 of the Criminal Procedure Code laid down various steps to be followed in making a search, that the recording of reasons was an important step in the matter of search and if reasons were not recorded it could not be said that the search was carried out in accordance with the provisions of the code of Criminal Procedure and the search should be held to have been made in contravention of the provisions of the Code. The facts in this case, however, are entirely different from the facts in the instant case now before me, inasmuch as the polite officer in conducting the search had omitted to record any reason whatsoever as required by section of the Criminal Procedure code and it was for that reason that it was held that the search was in contravention of the previsions of the code, In this case, on the- other hand, the Custom Authorities had in the after of authorisation stated the grounds for the reason to believe that goods liable to excise duty were being stored and disposed of without payment of such duty and therefore, in my view, it cannot be said that the search was made contrary to or in contravention of the provisions of section 165 of the Criminal procedure Code. 10. MR. Subrata Roy Chowdhury, learned Counsel for the respondents nos. 1 and 4 submitted that this was not a case where reasons were not recorded. On the other hand, there was a clear statement of the reasons in the letter of authorisation. In support of his contention, Mr. Roy Chowdhuri relied upon a Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High court reported in (3) AIR (1965)Andhra Pradesh 294 (Rai Bahadur Seth Sreeram Durgaprasad (P)Limited v. Deputy Collector, Customs department. On the other hand, there was a clear statement of the reasons in the letter of authorisation. In support of his contention, Mr. Roy Chowdhuri relied upon a Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High court reported in (3) AIR (1965)Andhra Pradesh 294 (Rai Bahadur Seth Sreeram Durgaprasad (P)Limited v. Deputy Collector, Customs department. In that case a search warrant issued by the Customs Officer was challenged on he ground of certain alleged defects in the warrant in setting out the particulars of search, and it was held that it was not possible to lay down precisely or exhaustively as to what constituted reason to believe and that the issue of a warrant and the reason to believe for issue of such warrant would involve certain elements namely, articles of search place in which they were secreted, manner in which they were secreted, and the person who was in possession of the articles of search or place where they were secreted. It was further held that it might be that the information in the possession of the warrant officer was not precise or absolutely certain and without any possibility of doubt, but if the information was such as led him to believe that articles of search were secreted in a place, the warrant officer might thereby have a reason to believe as contemplated by section 105 of the Customs Act and that the warrant might be issued even if the officer did not know for certain the name of the person who was in possession of the articles of search or the place where they were secreted. Mr. Roy Chowdhury also relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in (4) Durgaprasad v. H. R. Gomes, air (1966) SC 1209. In that case an authorisation was issued by the Customs authorities for search of a premises and seizure of gold, gold ornaments, etc., which were believed to have been kept in contravention of Gold Control Rules and also of account books and documents. The right to search for documents was challenged on the ground that S. 105 of the Customs act did not authorise a search for documents unless the document was specified. The right to search for documents was challenged on the ground that S. 105 of the Customs act did not authorise a search for documents unless the document was specified. It was held that the object of the grant of the power to search under section 105 was not search of a particular document, but of documents or things which might be useful or necessary for proceedings either pending or contemplated under the customs Act and that at that stage it was not possible for the officer to predict or to know in advance what documents could be found in the search and which of such documents might be useful or necessary for the proceedings. I should note here that sections 105 (1) and 110 and several other sections of the customs Act, 1962 have been made applicable to like matters in respect of duties imposed by section 3 of the central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, by a Notification dated May 4, 1963. Mr. Roy Chowdhury also relied upon another decision of the Supreme court in (5) Radha Kishen v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 822 . in which it was held that where the provisions of section 103 and section 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were contravened in conducting a search, the search could be resisted by the person whose premises were sought to be searched and that because of the illegality of the search the Court might be inclined to examine carefully the evidence regarding the seizure and that beyond these two consequences no further consequence ensued. 11. RELIANCE was also placed by Mr. Roy Chowdhury on a decision of the Kerala High Court reported in (6) AIR (1963) Kerala 241 (United Oil mill v. Collector of Customs. 12. THE next contention of the learned advocate for the petitioner was that the search of the petitioner's go-down was illegal as there was no mention of the petitioner's name in the authorisation letter. It was argued that the letter of authorisation had directed a search relating to particular parties, whose names had been set out therein, but as the petitioner's name was not included in the letter of authorisation, the search of the petitioner's godown was illegal. I am not impressed by this contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner. It was argued that the letter of authorisation had directed a search relating to particular parties, whose names had been set out therein, but as the petitioner's name was not included in the letter of authorisation, the search of the petitioner's godown was illegal. I am not impressed by this contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner. There is nothing in section 105 (1) of the Customs Act which requires the Customs Authorities to specify the name of the individuals whose premises or godowns are to be searched. All that is required is that the Customs Officer should have reason to believe that goods liable to confiscation or documents or things which will be useful are secreted in any place. Section 105 (1) of the Act does not require that the name of the party whose godown or place is to be searched for goods or Mr. Roy Chowdhury on the other hand, contended that the search of the petitioner's godown could not be assailed merely because the petitioner's name was not mentioned in the letter of authorisation. He argued that an authorisation under section 105 (1) of the Customs Act for search of a godown authorised the search of every part of the godown and if goods with regard to which excise duty had been evaded were found in any part of the godown, the Customs Authorities wore entitled to bring such goods within the purview of the search. In support of this contention Mr. Roy Chowdhury relied upon an unreported judgment of Banerjee, J, in Matter No. 18 of 1965 (7) Joychandlal Sethia v. R. Prasad and others, in which case there was no authorisation for search of the second floor of the premises and yet the second floor was searched and various goods were seized by the customs Authorities. It was held that an order of search might contain so much of the information as already received, but if other restricted and dutiable goods were found on search, it was not beyond the power of the searching officer to bring such goods under the purview of the search and to seize them. I agree with the opinion of Banerjee, J. and I reject the petitioner's contention that the search was invalid because the petitioner's name was not mentioned in the letter of authorisation. I agree with the opinion of Banerjee, J. and I reject the petitioner's contention that the search was invalid because the petitioner's name was not mentioned in the letter of authorisation. For the reasons mentioned above, this application fails and is accordingly dismissed and the Rule is discharged. Each party to pay its own costs. 13. I shall now deal with the second application for appropriate writs 14. THE first point urged by the learned Advocate for the petitioner was that the second order of extension for the seizure and detention of the goods made on August 18, 1965 under the proviso to section 110 (2) of the Customs act was invalid and illegal. It was argued that under the said proviso the customs Authorities had jurisdiction to make one order of extension only for a period not exceeding six months and that they had no jurisdiction or power to make a second order of extension for six months as was done in this case. It was argued that there was nothing in the proviso to justify a second extension order for detention of goods. Mr. Roy Chowdhury, on the other hand, submitted that the second order of extension was validly made by the Customs Authorities. He argued that this very question was raised before this Court and Banerjee, J. in Matter No. 101 of 19 (54 (8) Charandas Malhotra v. The Assistant collector of Customs and others, (unreported)held that the proviso to section 110 (2) did not limit the authority of the Collector of customs to grant only one extension of time up to six months, but that the said proviso authorised the Customs Authorities to grant extensions of time not extending six months at a time. Reliance was placed by Banerjee, J. on the decision of the Supreme Court in (9)Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport corporation v. B. P. Upadhaya, (1955)2 SCA 362. I agree with the views of Banerjee. J. that there was nothing in the proviso to section 110 (2) of the Customs act which limited the power of the Customs Authorities to grant one extension only. The first contention on if of the petitioner, therefore, fails 15. THE next contention of the earned Advocate for the petitioner was that although only 33 bales of cotton fabrics were seized from the petitioner's godown an order for confiscation of 60 bales had been made. The first contention on if of the petitioner, therefore, fails 15. THE next contention of the earned Advocate for the petitioner was that although only 33 bales of cotton fabrics were seized from the petitioner's godown an order for confiscation of 60 bales had been made. It was argued that only 33 bales were seized from the petitioner's godown at 9, Prasanna Kumar Tagore Street and therefore, even assuming that the Customs Authorities had the power to make an order for confiscation, such an order could be made only with regard to these 33 bales. There is, however, hardly any force in this contention, as it appears from the show cause notice dated November 11, 1965, that altogether 60 bales of cotton fabrics were the subject matter of the adjudication proceedings. 16. THE principal contention, however, of the learned Advocate for the petitioner regarding the adjudication order was that the cotton fabrics which were the subject matter of the adjudication proceedings were exempt from payment of any excise duty under notification No. 70/60 dated April 30, 1960 issued by the Ministry of Finance, as the goods were produced on power-looms owned by a co-operative society, namely, Saktinagar Textile Industrial co-operative Society Limited (respondent no. 3. It was argued that the cotton fabrics which were confiscated, were in fact produced in the power-looms of the said co-operative society and therefore no excise duty was payable on such fabrics. In support of this contention reliance was placed by the learned advocate for the petitioner on a bench decision of the Gujarat High court reported in AIR (1965) Guj. 215 (1) [Jamnadas Chhotalal Desai v. C l. Nagla and others]. Mr. Subrata Roy Chowdhury, on the other hand, submitted that the real manufacturer of the cotton fabrics was the petitioner who utilised the power-looms of the respondent No. 3 for the manufacture and therefore no exemption could be claimed by the petitioner under the said Notification. 17. MR. Roy Chowdhury next submitted that the decision of the Gujarat High Court was entirely against the contention of Mr. Dutt. He argued that it was held by Shelat. C. J. in the decision mentioned above that the looms owned by the society could not be exploited by outside agencies. 17. MR. Roy Chowdhury next submitted that the decision of the Gujarat High Court was entirely against the contention of Mr. Dutt. He argued that it was held by Shelat. C. J. in the decision mentioned above that the looms owned by the society could not be exploited by outside agencies. In this case, it was argued, it was plain that the petitioner had exploited the power-looms of the respondent No. 3 for the manufacture of cotton fabrics. It was found that the petitioner supplied the working capital to the respondent No. 3 and engaged or hired the services of the respondent No. 3 for turning out manufacture fabrics. It was further found that the respondent no. 2 organised purchase of yarn (on credit from the market)required to run the looms of the respondent No. 3 on account and on behalf of the petitioner. It was on these facts that it was held that the petitioner was the real manufacturer of 6,29,346 sq. meters fabrics which were seized from two premises, namely, 1/4c, Gun foundry Road, Calcutta and 9, Prasanna Kumar Tagore Street, Calcutta. 18. IT seems to me that the contentions of Mr. Roy Chowdhury are well founded. On the materials collected the Excise Authorities came to the conclusion that the petitioner was the real manufacturer of cotton fabrics and had exploited the power-looms of the respondent No. 3 for the purpose of manufacture. As the petitioner was found to be the real manufacturer, the Excise Authorities came to the conclusion that no exemption could be claimed on the ground that the power-looms of the respondent No. 3 were utilised by the petitioner for the purpose of the manufacture. The last contention of Mr. Dutt was that rules of natural justice had been violated as there was no evidence to support the adjudication order in so far as it was held that the petitioner was the real manufacturer of the cotton fabrics and the power-looms of the respondent No. 3 had been exploited by the petitioner for the purpose of the manufacture. In my opinion, there is no merit in this contention of the petitioner either. There undoubtedly was evidence before the Excise Authorities to come to the conclusion that the petitioner was the real manufacturer. The adequacy of such evidence is not a matter for this Court to consider in a writ petition. In my opinion, there is no merit in this contention of the petitioner either. There undoubtedly was evidence before the Excise Authorities to come to the conclusion that the petitioner was the real manufacturer. The adequacy of such evidence is not a matter for this Court to consider in a writ petition. The entire evidence on which the impugned order is based has been discussed at some length in the order. 19. IN repelling this contention on behalf of the petitioner reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the respondents Nos. 1 and 4 on the decision of the Supreme Court in (11) Issardas daulatram and others v. The Union of India and others, (1962) 1 SCR (suppl)358, in which it was held that although there was no direct evidence to show that gold had been imported in contravention of the regulations, the evidence relied on by the Collector of customs that the gold was smuggled gold could justify the findings. Relying upon this decision, it was submitted that in this case there was direct evidence that yarn was purchased by and on behalf of the petitioner and was supplied to the respondent No. 3 by the petitioner for manufacture of cotton fabrics. Various other items of evidence discussed in the order also would amply justify the conclusion at which the Customs Authorities had arrived. The evidence on which reliance was placed by the Excise Authorities in making the impugned order, it was argued, was disclosed in the show cause notice dated November 11, 1965, and therefore the petitioner had ample opportunity of repelling the contentions of the Excise authorities and also of producing evidence and materials in support of his own contention. In support of this contention reliance was placed by Mr. Roy Chowdhury upon a decision of this court reported in 69 CWN 864 [ (12)Kishanlal Agarwalla v. The Collector of land Customs and ors.] In my opinion this contention on behalf of the respondents nos. 1 and 4 is also well-founded. In this case the evidence on which the Excise authorities relied were disclosed in the show cause notice and the annexure thereto and the petitioner was given the opportunity of producing, at the time of showing cause, all the evidence upon which ho relied in support of his defence. 1 and 4 is also well-founded. In this case the evidence on which the Excise authorities relied were disclosed in the show cause notice and the annexure thereto and the petitioner was given the opportunity of producing, at the time of showing cause, all the evidence upon which ho relied in support of his defence. This is not a case where there was no evidence at all nor a case where material evidence had been shut out by the Excise Authorities. The petitioner had ample opportunity to answer the charges against him and also to produce evidence and materials in support of his answer. For the reasons mentioned above, this application must fail and is accordingly dismissed. The rule is discharged. Each party to pay its own costs.