JUDGMENT-The two petitioners have filed this Election Petition to challenge the election of the respondent No.1, Krishnarao Gulabrao Deshmukh, to the House of the People from the Amravati Parliamentary Constituency No. 19 in the last General Elections held in February 1967. 2. There is a duly constituted Parliamentary Constituency located in the Amravati district of the State of Maharashtra for electing one representative to the House of the People. This Parliamentary Constituency consists of six Legislative Assembly Constituencies of the Amravati district, including those of Amravati and Chandur Railway. The Parliamentary as well as the Legislative Assembly Constituencies included therein, went to the polls on 15th February 1967 for the purposes of the General Elections ordered by the Election Commission of India. The Collector, Amravati, who was also the Returning Officer of the Amravati Parliamentary Constituency, published a notice of the programme of election. The last date of filing nomination papers was 20th January 1967 till 3 p. m., and the nomination papers were to be scrutinized on 21st January. The date of withdrawal was 23rd January and the date of polling was 15th February. Votes were to be counted on 22nd February and the result was to be declared on 23rd February 1967. 3. The petitioner No.1, Ramkrishna Suryabhan Gavai, the respondent No.1, Krishnarao Gulabrao Deshmukh, the respondent No.2 Devidas Vishwanath Khedkar and five other persons had filed their nomination papers. The nomination paper, Ex. 20, of the respondent No.2 was presented by him to the Returning Officer on 19th January 1967 but it did not bear his signature on that portion of the nomination paper which was to be filled in by the candidate. The respondent No.2 also signed the oath of allegiance, Ex. 21, in the presence of the Returning Officer on 19th January 1967. On the date of scrutiny of nomination papers, all the candidates, except the respondent No.2 or his agent, were present. None of the other candidates raised any objection to the nomination paper of the respondent No.2, but the Returning Officer, on his own motion, rejected that nomination paper on the ground that there was no signature of the respondent No.2 on that part of the nomination paper in which the assent of the candidate and the declaration of age and other particulars have to be mentioned. The Returning Officer also rejected the nomination paper of one Bhagwant Mahadeo Sangitrao on the ground that he had not deposited the sum of us. 500 as required by section 34 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, as a condition precedent for his eligibility to contest the election. After the rejection of the nomination papers of the respondent No.2. Devidas and of Bhagwant Sangitrao, the remaining six candidates went to the polls. As a result of the counting of votes, the respondent No 1, who had secured the largest number of votes, was declared elected. These facts were specifically accepted before me by the parties and represented the common ground between them. 4. The case of the petitioners was as follows: The respondent No.2 believed that he had to sign the nomination paper before the Returning Officer. He personally attended the office of the Returning Officer at about 2.50 p. m. on 19th January 1967, along with his proposer, and personality handed over his nomination paper to the Returning Officer He was personally known to the Returning Officer and the Returning Officer was satisfied, at the time of presenting the nomination paper, as to the identity of the respondent No.2, and also about his assent to his nomination. As soon as the form was received and the Returning Officer was satisfied about the nomination, he proceeded to administer to the respondent, Devidas, the oath of allegiance prescribed by Article 84 of the Constitution. Respondent Devidas took the oath and signed the affirmation which contained the statement that he had been nominated as a candidate for a seat in the House of the People. Section 33 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, enjoins various duties upon Returning Officers when nomination papers are presented to them. Sub-section (4) thereof casts a duty on the Returning Officer to verify the details of the nomination papers and to allow the candidate to remove the irregularities which may have occurred out of technical errors or because of not understanding the provisions of law properly. At the time of accepting the nomination paper and administering the oath of allegiance to the respondent No.2, the Returning Officer must presumably have verified nomination paper and found it to be filled in satisfactorily. At the time of accepting the nomination paper and administering the oath of allegiance to the respondent No.2, the Returning Officer must presumably have verified nomination paper and found it to be filled in satisfactorily. The omission of the signature of the respondent No.2 in the nomination paper was a defect or irregularity which ought to have been cured by the Returning Officer and his failure to get the defect cured was clearly in breach of the provisions of section 33 (4). This omission was a mere technical irregularity and the failure of the Returning Officer to perform his duty of getting the omission supplied has wrongly resulted in penalizing the respondent No.2. In view of the fact that the respondent No.2 had contemporaneously signed the oath of allegiance at the time of presenting the nomination paper, the Returning Officer should have held that there was substantial compliance with the Act and the Rules. He committed a grave illegality and grave irregularity in rejecting the nomination paper under these circumstances. This wrong illegal rejection of the nomination paper has materially prejudiced the election and thereby made it possible for the respondent No.1 to be elected, which would not have otherwise happened. The election of the respondent No.1 was therefore liable to be declared void and set aside, and the entire election for that Constituency should therefore be declared void and illegal because of the improper rejection of the nomination paper of the respondent No.2. 5. The respondent No.2 did not put in appearance and did not file any written statement. After an ex-parte order was passed against him, he appeared through a counsel and applied for setting aside the ex parte order but did not file a proper affidavit in support of the allegation that he was prevented for sufficient cause from appearing on the due date. The ex parte order could not therefore be set aside. The respondent No.2 did not take any part in the proceedings thereafter and did not put in appearance. 6. The ex parte order could not therefore be set aside. The respondent No.2 did not take any part in the proceedings thereafter and did not put in appearance. 6. The respondent No. 1, Krishnarao Gulabrao Deshmukh, denied the allegation of the petitioners that the respondent No.2 did not sign the nomination paper, because of his belief that it had to be signed in the presence of the Returning Officer and also denied that the Returning Officer administered the oath of allegiance to the respondent No 2, because he personally knew that respondent and was satisfied about his identity. It was not the duty of the Returning Officer to get the omission of the signature on the nomination paper supplied and his failure to get the nomination paper signed by the respondent No.2 was not in breach of any duty. The oath of allegiance was not signed contemporaneously with the presentation of the nomination paper by the respondent No.2, and there was no material for the Returning Officer to hold that despite 1he omisl3ion to sign the nomination form, the respondent No.2 had given his assent to the nomination or that there was substantial compliance with the Act and the rules. The nomination paper was not valid. The omission of the signature of the respondent No 2 on the nomination paper was not a mere irregularity and there was no question of condoning it or accepting the nomination paper. The respondent No.2 was merely a dummy candidate with no intention of contesting the election for which Janardan Adasad was the really contesting candidate on behalf of his party. The rejection of the nomination paper had not prejudiced the result of the election and the election of the respondent No. 1 was not liable to be declared void or set aside on account of the rejection of the nomination paper of the respondent No.2. 7. Upon these pleadings, the following issues were framed and my findings thereon are given opposite each of them: Issues Findings 1.Did respondent No.2 not sign the nomination paper before giving it to the Returning Officer because of his belief that it was to be signed in the presence of that Officer? 7. Upon these pleadings, the following issues were framed and my findings thereon are given opposite each of them: Issues Findings 1.Did respondent No.2 not sign the nomination paper before giving it to the Returning Officer because of his belief that it was to be signed in the presence of that Officer? Not proved 2.Did the Returning Officer accept the nomination paper of respondent No.2 and administer the oath of allegiance to him and obtain his signature thereon because he personally knew that respondent and was satisfied about his identity? Yes 3.Was it the duty of the Returning Officer under section 33 (4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1961, to get the omission of signature supplied and was his failure to get the paper signed by respondent No.2 in breach of that duty? No, that was not his duty and no breach of -duty was committed 4.In view of the contemporaneously sil1:ned declaration of allegiance by respondent No.2 should the Returning Officer have held that despite the omission to sign thereon there was substantial compliance with the Act and the Rules and the nomination paper was valid? No, it was not signed contemporaneously. There was no substantial compliance. 5.Was the want of signature of the candidate on the nomination paper a mere irregularity and should the Returning Officer have condoned it and accepted the nomination paper? It was not a mere irregularity but a defect of a substantial character. 6.Was respondent No.2 merely a dummy candidate with no serious intention of contesting the election for which Janardan Adasat was the really contesting candidate on behalf of that party? It appears that he had no intention to contest. 7.Has the rejection of the nomination paper materially prejudiced the result of the election as alleged by the petitioner? No. 8.Is the election of respondent No. 1 liable to be declared void and set aside on account of the rejection of the nomination paper of respondent No.2? No. 9.Relief and costs. Petition dismissed with costs. 8. Issue No.1: These averments with regard to the reason for the failure of the respondent No.2 to sign the nomination paper could have been within the knowledge of the respondent No.2 only. No. 9.Relief and costs. Petition dismissed with costs. 8. Issue No.1: These averments with regard to the reason for the failure of the respondent No.2 to sign the nomination paper could have been within the knowledge of the respondent No.2 only. However, the petitioners did not examine the respondent No.2 or any other witness to prove this allegation that the respondent No.2 did not sign the nomination paper before giving it to the Returning Officer because of his belief that it was to be signed in the presence of that officer. I find accordingly that this issue was not proved. 9. Issue No.2: The Returning Officer, Mr. Mohani (P W. 1) deposed that the nomination paper, Exh 20, was presented to him personally by the respondent No.2 and he administered the oath of allegiance to him and obtained his signature thereon. Mr. Mohani admitted that he knew the respondent No.2 personally for about two years but he was not asked and did not say that he accepted the nomination paper because he was satisfied about his identity. However, there was no dispute or question about the identity of the respondent No.2 and the evidence of Mr. Mohani clearly showed that he accepted the nomination paper Exh. 20, from the respondent No. 2 because he knew him and was satisfied about his identity. I find accordingly. 10. Issue No.3: Mr. Dharmadhikari, Advocate for the petitioners, was relying on the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 33 in support of the petitioners contention that it was the duty of the Returning Officer to get t~ omission of signature on the nomination paper supplied and the failure to get the nomination paper signed by the respondent No.2 was therefore in breach of that duty. The relevant portions of section 33 of the Representation .of the People Act, 1951, are as follows: "33. The relevant portions of section 33 of the Representation .of the People Act, 1951, are as follows: "33. Presentation of nomination paper and requirements for a valid nomination (1) On or before the date appointed under clause (a) of section 30 each candidate shall, either in person or by his proposer, between the hours of eleven oclock in the forenoon and three oclock in the afternoon deliver to the Returning Officer at the place specified in this behalf in the notice issued under section 31 a nomination paper complied in the prescribed form and signed by the candidate and by an elector of tae constituency as proposer: Provided ******* (2) ******** (3) ******** (4) On the presentation of a nomination paper, the returning officer shall satisfy himself that the names and electoral roll numbers of the candidate and his proposer as entered in the nomination paper are the same as those entered in the electoral rolls: Provided that no misnomer or in accurate description or clerical, technical or printing error in regard to the name of the candidate or his proposer or any other person, or in regard to any place, mentioned in the electoral-roll or the nomination paper and no clerical, technical or printing error in regard to the electoral roll numbers of any such person in the electoral roll or the nomination paper, shall affect the full operation of the electoral roll or the nomination paper with respect to such person or place in any case where the description in regard to the name of the person or place is such as to be commonly understood; and the returning officer shall permit any such misnomer or in. accurate description or clerical, technical or printing error to be corrected and where necessary, direct that any such misnomer, inaccurate description, clerical, technical or printing error in the electoral roll or in the nomination paper shall he overlooked." 11. Sub-section (4) and the proviso thereto obviously refer to what Mr. Mohani (P. W. 1) called a preliminary scrutiny at the time when a nomination paper is presented to the Returning Officer. A plain reading of sub. Sub-section (4) and the proviso thereto obviously refer to what Mr. Mohani (P. W. 1) called a preliminary scrutiny at the time when a nomination paper is presented to the Returning Officer. A plain reading of sub. section (4) would show that at the time of this preliminary scrutiny the Returning Officer has to satisfy himself that the names and the electoral roll numbers of the candidate and his proposer as entered in the nomination paper are the same as those entered in the electoral rolls. That means that he has to satisfy himself about the identity of the candidate and the proposer as mentioned in the nomination paper by comparing them with the names and numbers as given in the authorised electoral roll. There is nothing in this sub-section which requires him to scrutinise the remaining contents of the nomination for satisfying himself that they have been properly or fully entered into. The scheme of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, would show that this task of scrutinising the correctness of the other recitals in the nomination paper for the purpose of deciding upon the validity thereof has to be postpone ed till the time of the scrutiny of the nomination paper, under sub-section (2) of section 36. The proviso to the section which I have quoted above in ex-tenso also shows that clerical, technical or printing errors in regard to the name of the candidate or his proposer or in regard to any place mentioned in the electoral roll or the nomination paper or in regard to the roll numbers of these persons has only to be looked into and technical errors with regard to these matters, namely, the names, places and electoral roll numbers of the candidate and the proposer have to be ignored and an opportunity has to be given to the candidate and the proposer to correct any mistakes with regard to the names, places or roll numbers as mentioned in the nomination papers, so as to bring them in conformity with those as given in the electoral rolls. 12. Mr. Dharmadhikari was strenuously contending that despite the clear wordings of sub. section (4), it should be understood as authorizing and requiring the Returning Officer even to scrutinise the remaining recitals in the document and to give an opportunity to the candidate and the proposer to make corrections therein. 12. Mr. Dharmadhikari was strenuously contending that despite the clear wordings of sub. section (4), it should be understood as authorizing and requiring the Returning Officer even to scrutinise the remaining recitals in the document and to give an opportunity to the candidate and the proposer to make corrections therein. However, he showed no authority for supporting this contention which is not only not warranted by the wordings of sub-section (4) and the proviso thereto but would stand ruled out by them. Accepting the contention of Mr. Dharmadhikari would require much more to be read in the sub-section than what was mentioned therein. The rules of interpretation of statutes would not permit me to add to the wordings of the sub-section and the proviso thereto by leading much more in the sub-section than what was contained therein. In fact, the authorities would appear to be to the contrary. A similar question had arisen before the Supreme Court in British India General Insurance Company v. Itbar Singh (1). That was a suit for damages filed against the owners of motor cars for recovery of damages suffered by the plaintiffs as a result of the negligent driving of the cars. The owners of the cars were insured against third party risks and the insurers were subsequently added as defendants to the suits under sub-section (2) of section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. That subsection provided that an insurer added as a party to an action under it was entitled to defend on the grounds enumerated in it. The insurers however sought to take defences other than those mentioned in that sub-section. A question thereupon arose as to what defences were available to the insurers. While not disputing that under the section as it stood, these other defences could not be raised the learned Solicitor-General, who appeared for the insurers, contended that sub-section (2) did not contain a prohibition to raise other defences. For supporting the contention that subsection (2) should be interpreted in the way he desired, the Solicitor-General suggested that the Court should add only one word to the section, so as to permit the insurers to raise these additional and further defences. That contention was overruled by the Supreme Court by making the following observations: "In order that sub-section (2) tray be interpreted in the way the learned Solicitor. General suggests we have to add words to it. That contention was overruled by the Supreme Court by making the following observations: "In order that sub-section (2) tray be interpreted in the way the learned Solicitor. General suggests we have to add words to it. The learned Solicitor General concedes this and says that the only word that bas to be added is the word "also" after the word grounds. But even this the rules of interpretation do not permit us to do, unless the section as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning, neither of which we think it is. The addition suggested will, in our view, make the language used unhappy and further effect a complete change in the meaning of the words used in the sub-section." 13. A similar question with regard to the construction of section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act had arisen in Jumma Masjid v. Kodimaniandra Daviah (2). A similar argument was advanced that certain more words should be imported into that section. That argument was overruled on making the following observations: "In effect, this argument involves importing into the section a new exception to the following effect: Nothing in this section shall operate to confer on the transferee any title, if the transferor had at the date of the transfer an interest of the kind mentioned in section 6 (a). If we accede to this contention, we will not be construing section 43, but rewriting it. We are not entitled, observed Lord Loreburn L. C. in Vickers Sons and Haxim Ltd. v. Evans (3) to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself." 14. Even Mr. Dharmadhikari does not say that sub-section (4) of section 33, as it stands, is meaningless or of doubtful meaning or that any clear reasons could be found within the four corners of the Act itself to add words as suggested by him. Respectfully following the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid two decisions, I would overrule the contention of Mr. Dharmadhikari that anything more should be read in the section than what was contained therein 15. When the submission of Mr. Respectfully following the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid two decisions, I would overrule the contention of Mr. Dharmadhikari that anything more should be read in the section than what was contained therein 15. When the submission of Mr. Dharmadhikari for importing additional clauses in sub-section (4) is rejected, there is nothing in the section which would require the Returning Officer either to scrutinise the remaining portions in the nomination paper at that preliminary stage or to allow or to call upon the person concerned to supply the omissions or to correct the errors. The examination of the nomination papers with respect to the other recitals therein had to be postponed, as was done by the returning Officer, till the stage of scrutiny, under sub-section (2) of section 36 fixed for 21st January. The petitioners were therefore not right in saying that any duty was cast on the Returning Officer to get the omission of the signature on the nomination paper supplied at the time of its presentation, and therefore there was no question of his committing a breach of a duty which was never cast upon him. I accordingly find that it was not the duty of the Returning Officer to get the omission supplied and he had not committed any breach of the duties imposed upon him. 16. Issue No.5: In order to decide the question whether the want of signature of the candidate on the nomination paper was a mere irregularity or not" I think it useful to quote the relevant provisions governing this matter. I have already quoted section 33 which makes provision for presentation of nomination paper and the requirements of a valid nomination paper. That section refers to the prescribed form of nominations. According to section 2 (g) of the Act, "prescribed" means prescribed by rules made under that Act. The relevant rule is rule 4: of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961, at pp. 370 and an of the Manual of Election Law, 5th Edition. That rule is in the following words: "4. That section refers to the prescribed form of nominations. According to section 2 (g) of the Act, "prescribed" means prescribed by rules made under that Act. The relevant rule is rule 4: of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961, at pp. 370 and an of the Manual of Election Law, 5th Edition. That rule is in the following words: "4. Nomination paper.-Every nomination paper presented under sub-section 1) of section 33 shall be completed in such one of the Forms 2A to 2E as may be appropriate: Provided that a failure to complete, or defect in completing the declaration as to symbols in a nomination paper in form 2A or form 2B shall not be deemed to be a defect of a substantial character within the meaning of sub-section (4) of section 36." Admittedly, From 2A printed on page 431 of the Manual of Election Law was applicable to the facts of this case. It is not necessary to quote the first part thereof which is to be filled in and signed by the proposer. Its second part is in the following words: "I. the above-mentioned candidate, assent to this nomination and hereby declare (a) that I have completed ……years of age; *(b) that I am sponsored at this election by the party; (c) that the symbols I have chosen are, in order of preference (i) .... (ii) ..... and (iii)……. *I further declare that I am a member of the ...... **Caste/tribe which is a scheduled caste/tribe of the State of ..... in relation to .. . . . (area) in that State. Date (Signature of candidate) *Score out this paragraph, if not applicable. "Score out the word not applicable. (To be filled in by the Returning Officer) Serial No. of nomination paper---- This nomination was delivered to me at my office at……….(hour) on .. (date) by the *candidate/proposer. Date Returning Officer. in relation to .. . . . (area) in that State. Date (Signature of candidate) *Score out this paragraph, if not applicable. "Score out the word not applicable. (To be filled in by the Returning Officer) Serial No. of nomination paper---- This nomination was delivered to me at my office at……….(hour) on .. (date) by the *candidate/proposer. Date Returning Officer. *Score out the word not applicable." A perusal of sub-section (1) of section 33, rule 4 and the portion of the Form 2A to be filled in by the candidate will show that the essential requirements of a valid nomination paper are: (i) The nomination paper has to be presented at the appointed time; (ii) It must be presented either by the candidate in person or by his proposer; (iii) It has to be delivered to the Returning Officer within the prescribed hours; (iv) It has to be completed in the prescribed form; and (v) It has to be signed by the candidate. According to the proviso to rule 4 quoted above, only a failure to complete, or defect in completing, the declaration as to symbols shall not be deemed to be a. defect of a substantial character within the meaning of sub-section (4) of section 36. It would be seen from the form that after the proposer had completed and signed the portion relating to him, the candidate has to sign his part of the form for the purposes of- (i) recording his assent to his nomination, and (ii) declaring (a) his age, (b) the party which has sponsored his candidature and (c) his order of preference for the symbols to be allotted. In case the election is for a reserved seat for scheduled castes or tribes, the declaration has further to state the scheduled caste or tribe for which he is seeking election. That clause however is not relevant for the purposes of the present case. On a proper construction of these provisions, it would be obvious that the form has to be completed by the candidate for recording and communicating his assent to the nomination and for giving his declaration with regard to the age, his party and the symbols to be allotted to him, and after that declaration is filled in, he has also to sign that form before presenting it to the Returning Officer. A perusal of these provisions would leave no manner of doubt that signing the form by the candidate is an essential and mandatory condition for submitting the form to the Returning Officer. There is nothing in these provisions which gives an option to the candidate whether to sign that form or not. It would be useful to note in this connection that section 33 uses the expression "the candidate shall" with regard to the requirements therein, and the only exception which seems to have been made is that the presentation of the nomination paper may be done either by the candidate or by his proposer, presumably at the option of the candidate. There seems to be no scope for any other option either with regard to the time at, the date on, or the time during which it was to be given or the authority to whom it was to be given, or the filling in the details in the form or signing the form. 17. While not disputing that the wordings of section 33 purport to indicate that the requirements therein are mandatory, Mr. Dharmadhikari was submitting that the requirement of signing the form by the candidate was mandatory only when the nomination paper was not presented by the candidate himself but was presented by the proposer on his behalf. If that was the intention of the Parliament, there was nothing to prevent them from saying so in so many words. With the language of the section as it stands, I do not think that it would be permissible to accept this interpretation without doing violence to the language thereof. The requirement of signing the form appears to be as much necessary when the nomination paper is presented in person by the candidate as when it is presented through the proposer. There was no warrant in this section for the assumption of Mr. Dharmadhikari that the requirement of signing the form was not necessary when the form was presented by the candidate himself. 18. While not disputing that the section itself gives no indication for putting that interpretation, Mr. Dharmadhikari was contending that the signature was meant only for satisfying the Returning Officer that the candidate had assented to his nomination, and therefore such a signature was not necessary when the candidate himself presents his nomination paper and thereby indicates that he has assented to the nomination. Dharmadhikari was contending that the signature was meant only for satisfying the Returning Officer that the candidate had assented to his nomination, and therefore such a signature was not necessary when the candidate himself presents his nomination paper and thereby indicates that he has assented to the nomination. The argument was that a candidate who had not accepted the nomination would not present the nomination paper mentioning him as the candidate. The assumption of Mr. Dharmadhikari that this signature on the nomination paper by way of expressing the assent of the candidate was only for the Returning Officer does not appear to be correct. If that were the position, and if only the Returning Officer was required to be satisfied about the acceptance of the nomination by the candidate because of the presentation of the form by the candidate himself, the other candidates would be precluded from raising an objection to the acceptance of the nomination paper when the scrutiny under sub-section (2) of section 36 is started. A perusal of that sub-section would however show that it was open to the other candidates or their agents to raise objection to the acceptance of the nomination paper and their objections were not restricted to any particular grounds. Therefore, it was implicit in sub-section (2) of section 36 that the other candidates had also a right to challenge the acceptance of the nomination paper on the ground that the assent of the candidate was not recorded on the nomination paper. If only the Returning Officer had to be satisfied on the point of assent, the Parliament could not have required the form of nomination bearing the signature of the candidate to state that he was assenting to his nomination. Obviously, therefore, the assent was not only for the Returning Officer but for the other candidates, as also for the electors in the Constituency who could have a right to challenge the election on the basis that the Returning Officer had failed to reject the nomination paper though it did not bear the signature of the candidate in token of his assent. 19. On a perusal and construction of these relevant provisions, I am clear that the want of signature of the candidate on the nomination paper was not a mere irregularity but it was a defect arising out of non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of section 33. I find accordingly. 20. 19. On a perusal and construction of these relevant provisions, I am clear that the want of signature of the candidate on the nomination paper was not a mere irregularity but it was a defect arising out of non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of section 33. I find accordingly. 20. Issue No.4: It was next contended by Mr. Dharmadhikari that even if there was a defect in the nomination paper because of the absence of the signature of the candidate, this respondent No.2 had contemporaneously signed the oath of allegiance as required by Article 84 of the Constitution as now amended, and the presentation of the nomination paper by the respondent No 2 in person, coupled with this contemporaneous signing of the oath of allegiance, established that there was substantial compliance with the requirement of the Act that the candidate should assent to his nomination and therefore the defect ought to have been condoned by the Returning Officer and the nomination paper should not have been rejected. It was further urged by Mr. Dharmadhikari that the form of the oath of allegiance, Exh. 21, clearly recited that the respondent No. 2 had been nominated as a candidate for the election and when the Returning Officer attested the signature of the respondent No.2 on that oath, he was obviously satisfied that the respondent No.2 had accepted his nomination and that satisfaction of the Returning Officer would also be binding on the other candidates even if they were to challenge the acceptance of the nomination paper of the respondent No.2 on this ground. Mr. Dharmadhikari drew my attention to the statement of Mr. Mohani that while receiving the nomination paper, he had noticed that the form was completed. He urged that that statement also established the satisfaction of the Returning Officer that the respondent No.2 had assented to his nomination by presenting in person the nomination paper which was completed. Mr. Chandurkar, Advocate for the respondent No.1, disputed the claim of the petitioners that the oath of allegiance was contemporaneously signed by the respondent No.2 at the time of presenting the nomination paper. According to him, the evidence of Mr. Mohani showed that the signature on that form was not contemporaneous but had been taken after a lapse of time. He also pointed out that Mr. According to him, the evidence of Mr. Mohani showed that the signature on that form was not contemporaneous but had been taken after a lapse of time. He also pointed out that Mr. Mohani was not asked and did not say that he had actually administered the oath as required by Article 84 of the Constitution, and his evidence only showed that the candidate had signed that oath. According to him, making and subscribing an oath was necessary and merely signing the form did not comply with that requirement. Adverting to the statement of the Returning Officer that the form had been completed, Mr. Chandurkar urged on the basis of section 33 that completing the form was a prelude to the signing thereof and was not equivalent to signing as required by that section. He also urged that making and subscribing the oath under Article 84 only created a qualification in favour of the candidate and that had nothing to do with the legal requisites of the acceptance of the candidature. 21. As adumbrated, the respondent No.2 Devidas was not examined and there is no material on record to show at what time and under what circumstances he signed the form of oath. The contention that the signing of the oath of allegiance was contemporaneous with the presentation of the nomination form is not borne out by the evidence of Mr. Mohani. He stated that after Exh. 20 and other nomination papers were received by him, he made a preliminary scrutiny of the nomination papers, presumably under sub-section (4) of section 33, and thereafter asked the candidates to subscribe to the oath of allegiance. That must necessarily mean that there was a time-lag between the presentation of the nomination paper and the signature on the oath of allegiance by the respondent No.2. What that time-lag was has unfortunately not been made clear. The fact however remains that because of the time-lag, the presentation of the nomination paper cannot be said to be contemporaneous with the making and signing of the oath, Exh. 21, as was erroneously assumed on behalf of the petitioners. I accordingly find that the presentation of the nomination paper and the making and signing of the oath, Exh. 21, were not contemporaneous. 22. Coming to the question of making and signing the oath, the only evidence on the point was of Mr. Mohani (P. W. I). 21, as was erroneously assumed on behalf of the petitioners. I accordingly find that the presentation of the nomination paper and the making and signing of the oath, Exh. 21, were not contemporaneous. 22. Coming to the question of making and signing the oath, the only evidence on the point was of Mr. Mohani (P. W. I). He deposed: " .... I made a preliminary scrutiny of the nomination papers in the presence of the candidates and asked them to subscribe to oaths of allegiance. That was on the same day." The form of oath, Exh. 21, was then shown to him and he added: "This was signed by the said Devidas Khedkar in my presence and I have countersigned by way of attestation of his signature." He was however not asked, and he did not say, that he administered the oath to Devidas or that Devidas read out and took the oath in his presence before signing it. When this and similar oaths are administered, the person administering the oath has to read it out clause by clause, and the person making the oath has to repeat each of these clauses and take the oath, and thereafter, he signs the form in the presence of the person administering the oath and that person attests the signature of the person taking the oath. That procedure was not proved to have been followed, and with the evidence as it stands, it is clear that Devidas did not read out or make the oath but only subscribed to the oath by signing it as he was asked to do by Mr. Mohani. A perusal of Article 84 of the Constitution would show that the person concerned has to make and subscribe before some person authorised in that behalf by the Election Commission, an oath or affirmation according to the form set out in the Third Schedule. Merely signing the oath by way of subscribing to the form is not the same thing as making and subscribing the oath as required by this Article. Consequently, it cannot be said that the respondent No.2 had made or subscribed to the oath as required by that Article, and there will be no question of inferring from the fact of merely signing the form of oath at a later hour that it amounted to an expression of his assent to his nomination. 23. According to Mr. Consequently, it cannot be said that the respondent No.2 had made or subscribed to the oath as required by that Article, and there will be no question of inferring from the fact of merely signing the form of oath at a later hour that it amounted to an expression of his assent to his nomination. 23. According to Mr. Dharmadhikari, the question whether the respondent No.2 had made the oath or not was academia in view of his signature on the form of oath, Exh. 21, which clearly recited that he had been duly nominated as a candidate. This argument equates the mere signing of the form of oath with making and subscribing to the oath, but that was obviously not warranted by the wording of Article 84. The question was not at all academic but was substantial and material and the result of merely signing the form of oath was that Devidas cannot be said to have made the oath. True, the form of oath, Exh. 21, signed by the respondent No.2 contains a recital that he had been duly nominated as a candidate. However, Mr. Mohani did not say that the said Devidas had read out or had read to himself the oath before signing it and Devidas himself did not enter the witness box to say that he had read the form of oath before signing it. Consequently, the bare recital in that form that he had been duly nominated as a candidate without proof that he had read, understood, and sub-scribed to that recital by signing it cannot amount to an admission that he had accepted his nomination, so as to dispense with the signature on the nomination form to indicate his assent to the nomination &8 required by that form. 24. It was submitted by Mr. Dharmadhikari that making and signing the oath or affirmation was subsequent to giving the nomination paper and therefore the fact of mere signing the form without making the oath must result in attributing assent of the nomination to the respondent No.2. Mr. 24. It was submitted by Mr. Dharmadhikari that making and signing the oath or affirmation was subsequent to giving the nomination paper and therefore the fact of mere signing the form without making the oath must result in attributing assent of the nomination to the respondent No.2. Mr. Chandurkar referred to the apparent conflict in the provisions of section 32 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and Articles 84 and 173 of the Commutation and contended that making and signing the oath was only for establishing the qualification of the candidate to file a nomination paper and cannot therefore be treated as an expression of his assent to the nomination already made by the proposer. I do not think that any useful purpose will be served by going into this academic discussion in view of the fact that the petitioners have not brought before the Court the evidence of the respondent No.2 who could have stated what his intention was in signing the form which recited that he was duly nominated and whether had really accepted the nomination or not. As I have already pointed out, the circumstances appearing from the evidence as discussed above cannot lead to the conclusion that merely signing the form of the oath of allegiance was a substantial compliance with the requirement of the Act that the nomination paper should be signed by the candidate. I find accordingly. 25. Issue No.6: The respondent No.1 did not adduce any evidence in support of his contention that the respondent No.2 was only the dummy candidate and never intended to contest the election, and therefore he had not accepted the nomination. However, the Returning Officer, Mr. Mohani, stated in his evidence that the respondent No.2 did not attend the scrutiny of nomination papers and an official letter was received by him from the Jan Sangh Party to intimate that Janardan Adasat was their official candidate and the symbol of lamp should be allotted to him. Mr. Mohani further stated by referring to the records of the Returning Officer which were produced in Court, that the respondent No.2 had in actual fact contested the election for the Amravati Legislative Assembly Constituency which was held on the same day on which the election for the present Parliamentary Constituency was held. Mr. Mohani further stated by referring to the records of the Returning Officer which were produced in Court, that the respondent No.2 had in actual fact contested the election for the Amravati Legislative Assembly Constituency which was held on the same day on which the election for the present Parliamentary Constituency was held. The respondent No. 2 did not attend the scrutiny of nomination papers and did not appear in this case to support the contentions of the petitioner. Considering all these circumstances, it clearly appears that whether the respondent No.2 was a dummy candidate or not, he never intended to contest this Parliamentary Election because another candidate was nominated by his party for that election and that is why he did not accept the nomination and did not sign the nomination form in token of giving his assent to the nomination. I find accordingly. 26. Issue No.8-Mr. Dharmadhikari, Advocate for the petitioners, can tended that the Returning Officer had misconstrued the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (4) of section 36 and had committed a legal error in treating the omission of the signature on the nomination form as a defect of a substantial character. His argument briefly was that the defect was not substantial and amounted only to a mere irregularity. The Returning Officer should have got the defect rectified either at the time of receiving the nomination paper or at the time of scrutiny. The identity of the candidate was not in question and therefore the nomination paper could not have been rejected because of the mere omission to sign it. The Returning Officer had committed an error in adopting a technical attitude in dealing with the question of the validity of the nomination paper. Mr. Chandurkar, Advocate for the respondent No 1, contended, on the other hand, that there was no question of the Returning Officer getting this defect cured at any stage of the proceeding and the defect could not be treated as a mere irregularity or as being unsubstantial. Mr. Chandurkar, Advocate for the respondent No 1, contended, on the other hand, that there was no question of the Returning Officer getting this defect cured at any stage of the proceeding and the defect could not be treated as a mere irregularity or as being unsubstantial. He referred to the proviso to rule 4 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, which prescribed that it was only the failure to complete, or defect in completing, the declaration as to symbols in the nomination paper, which was not to be deemed to be a defect of a substantial character, but that proviso could not be extended to the omission to sign the nomination paper. In his opinion the statutory requirements of the election law have to be strictly observed and the Returning Officer was justified in strictly applying clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 36 and in refusing to apply sub-section (4) of that section. 27. The submission of Mr. Dharmadhikari that the Returning Officer should have examined the nomination paper at the time of the preliminary scrutiny under sub-section (4) of section 33 and should have got the defect rectified in accordance with the proviso there under, must stand rejected for the reasons stated by us while considering issue No.3. As I have pointed out there, that preliminary scrutiny under sub-section (4) of section 33 has to be restricted only to verifying the correctness of the names and electoral roll numbers of the candidate and his proposer by verifying them from the electoral rolls. There is nothing in section 36 which could have permitted or authorised the Returning Officer to get the defect removed or to allow an amendment by making additions or alterations in the nomination paper at the time of the initial scrutiny under sub-section (2) of section 33. It is only a clerical or printing error with regard to name, number in the electoral roll or place which can be allowed to be corrected under sub• section (4) of section 33, and obviously an error of the kind with which we are concerned in this case would not fall in that category and could not have been allowed to be corrected. Mr. Mr. Dharmadhikari also did not show any provision in section 36 which would have supported his contention that the Returning Officer should have got the error rectified by allowing the respondent No. 2 to sign the nomination form at least at the time of the scrutiny under sub-section (2) of section 36. I may further mention that no such question could possibly have arisen because the respondent No.2 had neither appeared nor asked for permission to rectify the defect at the time of the scrutiny of the nomination paper. Therefore, the matter will have to be decided on the basis of the nomination paper as it stands and not on the basis of what it should have been after an amendment to be made to it. 28. Sub-section (2) of section 36 relates to scrutiny of nomination papers. It provides that on examining the nomination papers and deciding objections if any, or on his own motion, after such summary inquiry as may be necessary, the Returning Officer shall reject any nomination paper on the following three grounds: (a) That on the date of scrutiny, the candidate is either not qualified or is disqualified for being chosen to fill the Beat under Articles 84, 102, 173 and 191 of the Constitution; or (b) That there has been a failure to comply with any of the provisions of section 33 or 34; or (c) That the signature of the candidate or the proposer on the nomination paper is not genuine. Sub-section (4) prohibits the Returning Officer from rejecting a nomination paper on the ground of any defect which is not of a substantial character. The proviso to rule 4 with regard to the nomination paper lays down that a failure to complete or defect in completing, the declaration as to symbols in a nomination paper in Form 2A would not be deemed to be a defect of a substantial character within the meaning of sub-section (4) of section 36. The matter in question would have to be decided in the light of these provisions. 29 I have already reproduced section 33 which mandatorily requires that the nomination paper should be completed in the prescribed form and should be signed by the candidate and by his proposer. I have already indicated that this requirement is mandatory and not only directory as submitted by Mr. Dharmadhikari. 29 I have already reproduced section 33 which mandatorily requires that the nomination paper should be completed in the prescribed form and should be signed by the candidate and by his proposer. I have already indicated that this requirement is mandatory and not only directory as submitted by Mr. Dharmadhikari. Therefore, the failure of the respondent No.2 to sign the nomination paper would clearly fall within clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 36 and consequently, the Returning Officer would have no option but to reject the nomination paper as per instruction No. 12 (j) (viii) on page 26 of the Hand-book for Returning Officers, 1967, issued by the Election Commission, unless he was to come to the conclusion that this defect was not of a substantial character. The correctness of this position was not disputed or questioned by Mr. Dharmadhikari. 30. Mr. Dharmadhikari was however submitting that such a defect ought not to have been treated as a defect of a substantial character. The principal ground in support of this contention was that the respondent No.1 had indicated his assent to the nomination by presenting the nomination paper and by contemporaneously subscribing the oath. I have already dealt with that factual aspect of the matter and I have pointed out that subscribing the oath was not contemporaneous but was subsequent. I have also pointed out that the conduct of the respondent No.2 is not even appearing on the date of scrutiny and in contesting the election to the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly from the Amravati Constituency, coupled with his failure to challenge the election of the respondent No. 1, would negative the claim of Mr. Dharmadhikari that the respondent No.2 must be deemed to have assented to his nomination. This conduct would be contra-indicative of such an assent. It could be possible that he may have assented to his name being proposed, but he deliberately omitted to sign the nomination paper because he did not mean to assent to the nomination, presumably on the ground that his Party had nominated some other person as their authorised candidate. It must be remembered in this context that the respondent No.2 is an educated man, as admitted by Mr. Mohani in his evidence. It must be remembered in this context that the respondent No.2 is an educated man, as admitted by Mr. Mohani in his evidence. Sub-section (4) of section 33 requires the nomination to be in the form prescribed by the rules and the Form 2A as prescribed requires the candidate to sign it for indicating his assent to the nomination and for giving a declaration with regard to his age, the party sponsoring him and the symbol that he was adopting. Now, the declaration with regard to age was material for determining the candidates eligibility to contest. The rules also require him to state which party he belongs to. Unless that form were to be signed as prescribed by sub-section (4), it could not be said that he had subscribed to the assent and the declaration about those material points. Mere presentation of the nomination paper without signature on the declaration would not amount to compliance with the requirements of sub-section (4). These material requirements of this section having been disregarded, I am not prepared to accede to the argument that the omission to sign the nomination paper was a mere irregularity or that it was not a defect of a substantial character. 31. This question of signing the nomination paper had arisen before the Supreme Court in Rattan Anmol Singh v. Oh. Atma Ram (1) There the candidate was illiterate and could not sign and therefore had put his thumb mark but it was not authenticated as required by rule 2 (2) of the Representation of the People (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951. His nomination paper was rejected by the Returning Officer. While upholding the rejection of the nomination paper as correct, the Supreme Court made the following observations in paragraph 15: "The next question is whether the attestation can be compelled by the persons concerned at the scrutiny stage. It must be accepted that no attempt was made at the presentation stage to satisfy the Returning Officer about the identity of these persons but evidence was led to show that this was attempted at the scrutiny stage. It must be accepted that no attempt was made at the presentation stage to satisfy the Returning Officer about the identity of these persons but evidence was led to show that this was attempted at the scrutiny stage. The Returning Officer denies this, but even if the identities could have been proved to his satisfaction at that, stage it would have been too late because the attestation and the satisfaction must exist at the presentation stage and a total omission of such an essential feature cannot be subsequently validated any more than the omission of a candidate to sing at all could been. Section 36 is mandatory and enjoins the Returning Officer to refuse any nomination when there has been any failure to comply with any of the provisions of section 33… He cannot at that stage remedy essential defects or permit them to be remedied. It is true he is not to reject any nomination paper on the ground of any technical defect which is not of a substantial character but ho cannot remedy the defect. He must leave it as it is. If it is technical and unsubstantial it will not matter. If it is not, it cannot be set right." (the underlining is mine) It will be clear from these observations, and particularly the portion underlined by me that this defect of the omission to sign is not such as could have been cured and must lead to the rejection of the nomination. This decision will completely answer the contentious of the petitioner. 32. In Brijendralal v. Jwalaprasad (2), the candidate had omitted to specify his age in the declaration on the nomination paper. Following the earlier decision in Rattan anmol Singh v. Atma Ram (1). it was held that this was a defect of a substantial character and the nomination paper was rightly rejected. 33. Mr. Dharmadhikari was wanting to rely on some decisions of the Supreme Court in which the technical attitude with regard to deciding the question of validity of nomination papers was deplored. Those were oases of defects which were not material or substantial but were only formal or technical. The observations were justified by the facts of those cases. 33. Mr. Dharmadhikari was wanting to rely on some decisions of the Supreme Court in which the technical attitude with regard to deciding the question of validity of nomination papers was deplored. Those were oases of defects which were not material or substantial but were only formal or technical. The observations were justified by the facts of those cases. How ever, in Baru Ram v. Smt. Prasanni (3) the decision in Pratan Singh v Shri Krishna Gupta (4) was explained and it was observed: "Where, however, the statute requires specific facts to be proved in a specific way and it also provides for the consequence of non-compliance with the said requirement it would be difficult to resist the application of the penalty clause on the ground that such an application is based on a technical approach. Indeed it was precisely this approach which was adopted by this Court in the case of Rattan Anmol Singh v. Alma Ram (1). 34. In Brijendralal v. Jwalaprasad (2), a reference was made to the oases in which it was observed that Courts should not adopt a technical attitude in dealing with election matters and then it was pointed out that those remarks were necessitated by the facts of those cases. A distinction was made between the cases in which the defect was only formal or technical and cases where th9 defect was material and substantial. In submitting that the omission of a signature was not a material defect, Mr. Dharmadhikari was not giving due importance to clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 36. According to that clause, a nomination paper was liable to be rejected if the signature of the candidate or the proposer on the nomination paper is not genuine. That postulated the necessity of the existence of the signature, and unless such 3. signature was there, the question whether it was forged or genuine would not arise. Mr. Dharmadhikari was also overlooking the proviso to rule 4 of the Conduct of Election Rules, which says that the failure to complete, or defect in completing, the declaration as to symbols in a nomination paper in Form 2-A or Form 2-B shall not be deemed to be a defect of a substantial character within the meaning of sub-section (4) of section 36. This proviso excepting this particular omission from the category of defects of substantial character, would lead to the conclusion that the failure to complete, or defect in completing, the rest of the nomination form by the candidate would necessarily have to be treated as a defect of a substantial character. Mr. Dharmadhikari has not been able to satisfy me that this omission to sign the nomination paper was only a formal defect and not a substantial one. 35. Relying on certain observations in Namdeo Chimnaji v. Govinddas Batanlal (1), Mr. Dharmadhikari was contending that only the defects in the nomination paper with regard to the identity of the candidate could be material and substantial and all other defects were formal and technical. That was a case in which the nomination papers of three respondents were rejected on the ground that their surnames as given in the nomination forms do not conform to the surnames given in the electoral rolls. The election held after the rejection of those nomination papers was challenged in the election petition. The Election Tribunal upheld the order of the Returning Officer and the matter was brought before this Court by way of an appeal. The Division Bench of this Court pointed out that the surname was not an essential requirement of a nomination paper and the mistake, if any, was caused by the printer of the voters list and the rejection of the nomination papers was bad. A reference was made to some decisions in which the defects in the nomination papers were held to be formal. After quoting the observations of Mahajan C. J. in the case of Karnail Singh v. Election Tribunal, Hisar (2) the Division Bench proceeded to observe: "These weighty observations emphasised the crucial point to be considered on the 80rutiny of the nomination form, namely, that it is to be filled in, in order to identify the candidate and therefore if the identity of the candidate is once established, any other defects not affecting the identity would be clerical or technical defects and not substantial. In this case, as we have already said, there is no doubt as to the identity of the respondent No. 8 or his proposer." These observations were made by the Division Bench in the context of the facts of that case where the identity of the candidate was questioned on the ground of the difference in the surnames. The aforesaid observations cannot be taken as an exposition of the entire law on the question of scrutiny of nomination papers with regard to all the defects which are substantial and material and their rejection for grounds other than those with regard to identity. This argument of Mr. Dharmadhikari would stand repelled by the observations of Earl of Halsbury, L. C., in Quinn v. Leathem (1): "Now, before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood (2) and what was decided there in, there "are two observations of a general character which I wish to make and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the oaS6 in which such expression are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may B6em to follow logically from it." The observations of the Division Bench would not provide any guide for deciding the facts of the present case, which are entirely different. 36. It will be clear from the foregoing discussion that the nomination paper of the respondent No.2 suffered from the substantial defect of want of signature of the candidate as mandatorily required by sub-section (1) of section 33, and therefore, sub-section (4) of section 36 could not come into operation, and the Returning Officer rightly rejected the nomination paper under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 36. When the nomination paper was thus rightly and properly rejected, it cannot be said that it has been improperly rejected within the meaning of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 100, and consequently, it must be held that the election of the respondent No. 1 is not liable to be declared void or set aside on the ground of the rejection of nomination paper of the respondent No.2. I find accordingly. 37. Issue No.9: In the result, this petition is dismissed with costs. The petitioners shall pay Rs. 2,400 as pleaders fees to the respondent No. 1 at Rs. 400 per day for the six effective hearings. Petition dismissed