I. D. Dua, J. ( 1 ) ARGUMENTS in this appeal were first heard in November, 1963, when it was adjourned so as to enable the parties to come to some amicable settlement. The respondents learned counsel had, h nay be pointed cut, taken strong objection to the competency of the appeal and had also urged that the decisions Of the Court s below having done substantial justice between the parties this Court should dedine interfeience on revision as well. After some time, I was informed that there was little prospect of an agreed solution. The; appeal, was ,thus directed to be set down for re-hearing. It is in these circumstances that this appeal has now been fully heard. The respondent s counsel his, however, not appeared on this occasion and, therefore, has not addressed any arguments despite the case being on the boaid. ( 2 ) TURNING to the facts, Jai Gopal (respondent in this Court, secured a decree-against Kanwar Gopal for the recovery of Rs. 1,200. 00 with interest at 12 per cent per annum from 19th December, 1957 till payment. This decree was obtained in suit No. 454 of l956. It may be pointed out that this was a decree passed on an arbitration award. It was also provided therein that if the judgment-debtor paid the amount due with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum by 20th February, 1957, the decree would be treated as discharged. It is also observed in the orders of the Courts below that a house belonging to Kanwar Gopal defendant-judgment, debtor had been attached before judgment and the amount recoverable by Jai Gopal was a charge on the said house. Kanwar Gopal having not complied with the terms of this deciee, Jai Gopal decree holder, took out execution thereof and made an application under Order 21, Rule 66, Code of Civil Procedure. In reply to this. . application, S:ham. Mohan Lal (present appellant and), put in his reply denying the charge of the decree-holder on. the property in dispute He also. alleged that this property had been auctioned in court- auction and purchased by him for Rs. 11,500. 00 and that it was specifically mentioned in the sale certificate, issued to, him that there was no lien on the property. The decree holder, according to this reply. could proceed against the personal property of the judgment Debtor. alleged that this property had been auctioned in court- auction and purchased by him for Rs. 11,500. 00 and that it was specifically mentioned in the sale certificate, issued to, him that there was no lien on the property. The decree holder, according to this reply. could proceed against the personal property of the judgment Debtor. It was appareiitly alsoayerred that the decree-holderr had in, his prior application sough", participation in rateable distribution. These pleas gave rise to the solitary issue which was in the following terms- "is the property not liable to be sold in execution of the decree ?"thereafter, Sham Mohan Lal presented another application under section. 151. Code of Civil Procedure, alleging that the property in dispute had been attached under older,of the: Court insuit No. 457 of 1953 (Gauri Shanhar v. Kavaar Gopal On 10th November, 1953 and Kanwar. Gopal judgment-debtor had been served with a prohibitory order restraining him from alienating or creating any lien on this property and that thereafter Gaurishankar. . had moved an application on 14th November, 1956 alleging that Kanwar gopal was trying to sell the property in dispute and, therefore, : he should be restrained from alienating this property. Inpursuance therof,an injunction restraining him from alienating the property in dispute was issued by the Court and ultimately a decree was passed. in. favour, of Gauri Shankar for Rs. . . 8,039. 00 whit costs. Gauri Shankar decree holder, later took out execution of that decree and attached this very house on 22nd January, 1957, with the result that when the award in favour of Jai Gopal, the present decree holder, was given, the property in question was already under attachment under orders of -the Court in execution proceedings of the decree in the suit Gauri Shankar v. Kanuar Gopal. In these circumstarces. the subsequent attachment was void lender section 64, Civil Precedure Code. It has further been alleged by Sham Mohanlal that Jai Gopal had applied in the Court of Shri Dev Raj Saini for rateable distribution in the execution proceedings in Gauri Shankar v. Kanwar Gopal but the same was rejected on 19th November, 1960, with the result that the said order operates as res-judicata. This application was refisted by Jai Gopal according to wh"m Sham Mohan Lal had no right to present this application after closing his evidence in the proceedings initiated by the prior application. This application was refisted by Jai Gopal according to wh"m Sham Mohan Lal had no right to present this application after closing his evidence in the proceedings initiated by the prior application. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed :- 1. Whether the property in dispute was under attachment in suit No. 457 of 1953 ? If so to what effect ? 2. Whether the decree-holder presented any application for rateable distribution in the Court of Shri Ved Parkash, Subordinate Judge ? If so, what was the result of that application and to what effect ? 3. Is the present application under section 151, Civil Procedure Code. not maintainable ?on issue No. 1 Shri P. L. Singia held that after attachment before judgment in Gauri Shankar s suit, a decree was passed for the recovery of Rs. 8. 039. 00 execution of which was sued out on 14th January 1957 and the Court issued warrants for attachment of both movable and immovable property. Ultimately as a result of compromise, the execution application was dismissed on 27th March, 1958 but attachment was reserved. Thereafter Gauri Shankar again took out execution on 28th January, 1959 when the decree was partly satisfied and the execution application dismissed on 19th November, i960 as partly dismissed. Jai Gopal had also applied for rateable distribution in those proceedings but he was not paid anything. The learned Subordinate Judge on these facts observed that though the property was under attachment in suit 457 of 1953, the order of reserving the attachment was illegal in law, with the result that the house should again have been attached. The existing attachment was, therefore, of no effect and the present decree- holder was entitled to get the house in dispute sold in execution of his decree Under issue No. 2, the Court proceeded to observe that the application for rateable distribution by the decree holder did not estop him from now praying that the property in dispute be sold because there could be no estoppel against statute. On issue No 3, the Court has observed that the proper remedy for Shri Sham Mohan Lal was to apply under Order VI, Rule 17, Code of Civil Procedure, and not under section 151 with the result that the present application could not be maintained. On issue No 3, the Court has observed that the proper remedy for Shri Sham Mohan Lal was to apply under Order VI, Rule 17, Code of Civil Procedure, and not under section 151 with the result that the present application could not be maintained. On this basis, the property was held liable to attachment in execution of the decree of the present decree-holder and the objections were dismissed. 3 On appeal by Sham Mohan Lal, the learned Additional District Judge affirmed the order of Shri P L. Singia and observed in the end that the appellant Sham Mohan Lal had sought to amend his application after six years and his game appeared to be to prolong the proceedings as much as possible so that Jai Gopal who had only a petty amount to recover gets fed up with the litigation and relinquishes his claim. Sham Mohan Lal, according to the learned Additional District Judge, is real brother-in -law of Kanwar Gopal and the two appear to be in league to defeat Jai Gopal. The application for amendment was considered to be mala fide and disallowed. ( 4 ) ON second appeal, Shri G. S. Vohra. learned Counsel for Sham Mohan Lal, has very strongly argued that the two Courts below have seriously erred in law in disallowing his objections. According to the learned counsel, the attachment was in subsistence and the appellant was entitled to resist Jai Gopal s claim to proceed against the property in question. According to him, the Courts below have assumed certain facts which arc incorrect and are not founded on any evidence on the record. When confronted with the objection to the comp tency of the appeal, the appellants counsel has relied on section 47, Code of Civil Procedure, and has submitted that the appellant, as an auction purchaser, is a representative of the judgment-debtor. In support of this sub mission, he has relied on the following decisions :- ( 5 ) KAILASH Chandra v. Gopal Chandra, in which it v. as h?ld that the term "representatives" in section 47 must include persons who by assignment from a party or by operation of law have succeeded to the interest of that party in the decree, and quoad that interest are bound by the decree. I may point out that in that case, the auction-purchaser was also the decree holder who had applied for delivery of possession under Order 21, Rule 95, Civil Procedure Code, and the question arose whether against the older of the executing Court he was entitled to prefer an appeal. Obviously, that decision does not directly cover the present case. Chanan Singh v. Waryam Sing in which a single Judge of the Lahore High Court observed that the word "representative" in section 47 has been used in a much wider sense then the expression "legal representative" and it includes all persons on whom the interest of a defendant has devolved and who, to the extent of that interest, is bound by the decree. The transferee of the defendant s interest pendente hiw was held to be included in this definition. The facts of that case are also materially different hem those which concern us. Abaul Chaffer Khan v. Ishlia Ali, where again it was observed that the word "representative" in section 47 has a much wider meaning and it includes not only a If gal representative but any representative-in interest who is bound by the decree. Even the facts of this case are from similar to these which confront me in the present case. Gauri v, Ude, is a Full Bench decision which was called upon to answer the following question :- "if property is attached in execution proceedings and if the judgment-debtor has objection to raise on the ground that the property is not liable to attachment or sale, is he entitled to wait until sale has taken place and then have the sale set aside on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction to sell the property ?"obviously, the decision of the Full Bench would have little to do with the question which I am called upon to decide on the preliminary objection in this case. If is undoubtedly true that Bhide J. did record the following observations in the course of his judgment :- "the question whether an order for sale under 0. 21, R. 66 (read with R. 64) is or is not appealable would seam to depend upon whether it determines any rights or liabilities as between the decree- holder and the judgment-debtor. If is undoubtedly true that Bhide J. did record the following observations in the course of his judgment :- "the question whether an order for sale under 0. 21, R. 66 (read with R. 64) is or is not appealable would seam to depend upon whether it determines any rights or liabilities as between the decree- holder and the judgment-debtor. It it does, it would obviously fall under section 47 and be appealable as a decree (of 45 Mad L. J. 478) If the order determines, e. g. a question as regards the saleability of certain property. I do not see why it should not be appealable under section 47 C. P. C. merely because it is passed in the course of the proceeding under 0. 21, R. 66 relating to the proclamation of the sale. "this, in my view, merely paraphrases the provisions of section 47 without laying down anything helpful to the appellant before me. 1 he last decision cited is Ramalingaswami v. Venkiiaswaini It was observed therein that if in settling the terms of the sale prcelamation, the rights of the Judgment-debtors inter seaie affected by the order, then it would be a matter relating to the execution discharge or satisfaction of the decree and the decision of the Court would be open to appeal at the instance of the aggrieved party. Whether or not this observation lays down a correct rule of law, it certainly does not help the appellant, assuming the law so laid being correct, a question on which I express no opinion on the present occasion. The appellant s submission is, in my view, difficult to sustain. It is desirable to read section 4 of the Code which is in the following terms :- "47 Question to be determined by the Court executing decree- (1) All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which. the. decree was passed, or their representative, and relating to tl,e execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. (2) The Court may, subject to any objection as to limitation or jurisdiction, treat a proceeding under this section as a suit or a suit as a proceeding and may, if necessary, order payment of any necessrary, order payment of any additional Court-frees. (2) The Court may, subject to any objection as to limitation or jurisdiction, treat a proceeding under this section as a suit or a suit as a proceeding and may, if necessary, order payment of any necessrary, order payment of any additional Court-frees. (3) Whether a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the representative of a-party such question shall, for the purpose of this section, be determined by the Court. Explanafion.- For the purposes of this section, a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed, a defendant against whom a suit has been dismissed and a purchaser at a sale in execution of the decree are parties to the suit. "the question is, can it be said that the parties to the present. controversy were parties to the suit in which the decree ROW sought to be executed was passed? The Explanation in its present form was substituted for the old Explanation by the Amendment Act 66 of 1956 which came into force with effect from 2nd December, 1956. The earlier decisions, therefore, dealing with the question whether an auction-purchaser is or is not a party to the suit, have lost much of their importance. The question-, however, arises whetherthis Explanation would treat as parties to the suit auction-purchasers in a prior litigation between the common judgment-debtor arid third parties. The Explanation in terror does not seem to apply to such a case and at the bar no arguments have been addressed on that part of the case. As at present advised, therefore I am inclined to hold that the present controversy is not covered by section 47, Civil Procedure Code, and, therefore, second appeal would not be competent. It may be pointed out in this connection that no attempt has been made on behalf of the appellant to make out a. case of his being represented by the judgment-debtor during the course of the suit procedings in which respondent Jai Gopal obtained the decree which he is now seeking to execute. ( 6 ) A request has been made by Shri Vohra that the present appeal may be treated as a revision. It is true that this Court has full power to treat an appeal as a revision and a revision as an appeal when there is 5. A. I. R. 1960 Mad. 296. no statutory or other impeliment in, the way and when this. It is true that this Court has full power to treat an appeal as a revision and a revision as an appeal when there is 5. A. I. R. 1960 Mad. 296. no statutory or other impeliment in, the way and when this. interests of Justice demand it. It, hawever, must not be forgotten that interference on revision has an element of. discretion and even. though,. there may be some legal infirmity in the order of the Court balow, this Court may appropriately decline interference if it comes to the conclusion that the impugned order is substantially just and the exercise of the. revisional power is. not called for in the largar interests of substantial justice. It- may be recalled that in the Court of first instance. an application was made under section 151, Civil Procedure Code, seeking to amend the objection in response to notice under order 21, Rule66,ofthecode. Both the Courts have held that the application for amendment under section 151 of the Code is not maintainable. The learned Additional District Judge has gone to the length of observing that Shri Sham Moban Lal s game seems to be to prolong the proceedings as. much as possible so that Jai Gopal, who has only a petty: amouiit to recover, gets fed Up with the litigation and relinquishes his claim. This observation seems prima face to be. Justified and indeed it finds some support from the attitude adopted by the appellant in this Court as well. ( 7 ) FOR the reasons foregoing, I do not find any cogent ground being made out for interference on revision. In the final result, this appeal, treated as a revision, fails and is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs in this Court.