JUDGMENT B. D. Gupta, J. - This is a plaintiff's second appeal. The trial court had decreed the suit after recording finding on all the questions in controversy in plaintiff's favour. On appeal by the defendants the appellate court, whilst agreeing with all the findings recorded by the trial court in plaintiff's favour, took the view that plaintiff's claim was barred by limitation with the result that the decree of the trial court was set aside and plaintiff's suit was dismissed. The only question which, in these circumstances, has arisen for my consideration in this second appeal is as to whether the learned appellate Judge was right in his view that plaintiff's claim was barred by limitation. After hearing learned counsel for the parties it appears to me manifest that the view taken by the learned Judge is erroneous and that plaintiff's claim was not barred by limitation. The facts relevant for considering this question of limitation may now be briefly stated. 2. The plaintiff-appellant had advanced a loan to the second defendant who executed a pronote in respect thereof in plaintiff's favour on the 12th of November, 1939. In 1940 the plaintiff filed a suit on the basis of that pronote and obtained a decree. The first defendant was a real brother of the second defendant and they were joint owners of certain plots of land. On the 14th of October, 1940, the second defendant had executed in favour of his brother, the first defendant, a sale deed purporting thereby to transfer to the first defendant his share in those plot of land. The plaintiff put his decree in execution and purchased the share of the second defendant in the plots at an auction sale in March, 1943 and the plaintiff was granted a sale certificate. On account, however, of the sale deed dated the 14th of October, 1940, the plaintiff was unable to obtain possession of the share of the second defendant by reason of objection raised by the first defendant on the basis of the sale deed of the 14th of October, 1940. The plaintiff then brought the suit, which has given rise to this appeal, in 1952. The plaintiff then brought the suit, which has given rise to this appeal, in 1952. The plaintiff alleged that the document of transfer dated the 14th of October, 1940, was fraudulent and fictitious and was not binding on the plaintiff because the only purpose for which the aforesaid document was executed was to defraud creditors. It was alleged in the plaint that notwithstanding the aforesaid document the second defendant was still, in fact, in possession of the property and the document of transfer had not been acted upon The relief claimed may be fairly translated as follow:- 3. On a declaration that the sale deed executed by the second defendant in favour of the first defendant dated the 14th of October, 1940, was void and of no effect as against the plaintiff, a decree for joint possession, along with the first defendant, over the plots of land, be granted in favour of the plaintiff. 4. The suit was contested on a member of pleas, including the plea of limitations. The courts below are agreed that the plaintiff was a genuine creditor of the second defendant at the time of the execution of the document of the 14th of October, 1940, that the aforesaid document had been executed by the second defendant in favour of the first defendant fraudulently in order to defeat and delay the claim of the plaintiff and was not a bona fide transfer for consideration, but was a fictitious transaction. The courts below are also agreed that the sale deed had never been acted upon. These findings have not been challenged before me by either party and the question which has arisen is as to whether, in the light of the pleadings and the aforesaid findings, the relief claimed by the plaintiff was barred by limitation. The learned Judge has taken the view that Article 120 of the Limitation Act was applicable and learned counsel for the appellant has not questioned before me that view of the learned Judge that, in case Article 120 was applicable, plaintiff's claim was barred by time. Learned counsel has, however urged that the article applicable to the present case was Article 138 of the Limitation Act as it was in force at the relevant time. Learned counsel has, however urged that the article applicable to the present case was Article 138 of the Limitation Act as it was in force at the relevant time. This article ran as follow:- "Like suit by a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree, when the judgment-debtor was in possession at the date of the sale." 5. There is no controversy that the expression "like suit", in the background of the preceding articles, meant suit for possession of immovable property. Article 138 provided a period of 12 years beginning from the date when the sale became absolute, for a suit for possession of immoveable property by a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree when the judgment-debtor was in possession on the date of sale. There is no controversy that if Article 138 was applicable to the suit, it was well within limitation when it was filed in 1952. The question, therefore, is as to whether Article 138 is applicable because, if that be so, there would be no justification for applying the residuary Article 120 which the Learned Judge has done. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on a number of cases but it does not appear necessary to refer to more than two of the decisions cited by him. The first is the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ikram Singh v. Intizam Ali, I.L.R. 6 Alld. 260, and the second is the decision of another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Banwari Lal v. Bhagwan Din, 1884 Allahabad Weekly Notes, 88. 7. In the case of Ikarm Singh (Supra) the plaintiffs had sued for the setting aside of a usufructuary mortgage by the judgment-debtor which had been made by the judgment-debtor before the sale of the property in favour of plaintiff's father and also for possession of the village alleging, inter alia, that the mortgage was fraudulent and collusive. The courts below had taken the view that the period of limitation applicable was three year and not twelve years but, on appeal by the plaintiff, the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench of this Court took the view that 12 year rule of limitation was applicable and decided the appeal accordingly. The courts below had taken the view that the period of limitation applicable was three year and not twelve years but, on appeal by the plaintiff, the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench of this Court took the view that 12 year rule of limitation was applicable and decided the appeal accordingly. It appears to be un-necessary to refer to the numerous cases which find mention in the judgment of the Division Bench. 8. In the case of Banwari Lal (supra) the plaintiff was a purchaser of immoveable property at an auction in execution of a decree, but was resisted in obtaining possession thereof by virtue of a claim under a lease from the judgment-debtor. On the allegation that the lease was collusive and invalid the relief claimed was the setting aside of the lease and possession of the property. The plea of limitation was negatived by the learned Judge of this Court with the following observation:- "The direct and main object of the plaintiff's suit was to obtain possession of the property purchased by him at the auction-sales of 1877 and 1878, and the avoidance of the alleged lease, which both Courts have found to be a collusive and fictitious documents, was merely incidental thereto. 9. The limitation of three years was therefore inapplicable............ 10. The aforesaid decisions, to my mind, make it clear that quite irrespective of the fact that the plaintiff may, in the course of the relief set forward in the plaint, seek avoidance of the document of transfer, the claim for possession must be treated as the substantial claim and that being so Article 138 would clearly apply to such a suit. The learned appellate Judge seems to have taken guidance from the decision in the case of Prakash Narain v. Raja Birendra Bikram Singh, A.I.R. 1931 Oudh, 333 in which the question which was considered centered round a choice between Article 91 and Article 120 of the Limitation Act. We are not concerned with any suit seeking to cancel or set aside any instrument, and no question of a choice between Article 91 and Article 120 arises. We are not concerned with any suit seeking to cancel or set aside any instrument, and no question of a choice between Article 91 and Article 120 arises. The learned Judge's judgment is conspicuous by the absence of any reference to Article 138 of the Limitation Act, but some of the cases mentioned by the learned Judge in his judgment as having been relied upon by plaintiff's counsel, including the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ikram singh (supra) make it clear that the 12 year rule of limitation was invoked in the course of arguments at the hearing of the appeal. Referring to the aforesaid case, as also to another case, the learned Judge merely observed that those case had "been filed by the plaintiff for possession of the property without seeking the relief of cancellation of the sale deed, whereas in the present case the plaintiff has specifically sought a declaration that the sale deed executed by the defendant No. 2 in favour of the defendant No. 1 on 14.10.40 was void and not binding on the plaintiff". The distinction drawn by the learned judge seems to be a distinction without any difference inasmuch as, even though in the cases decided by this Court, which have been referred to earlier, distinct relief for cancellation of the document of transfer itself had been claimed, the present case stands on a much stronger footing inasmuch as in this case the only relief claimed was for possession on a declaration that the plaintiff was not bound by the transfer which was collusive, fictitious and void. I have no hesitation in holding that Article 138 of the Limitation Act, as it was at the relevant time, applied to the present case, and plaintiff's suit was well within limitation, and there is no controversy that, on this view of the matter, the plaintiff was entitled to a decree affirming the decree of the trial court. 11. I accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the decree under appeal and restore that of the trial court, with costs throughout.