JUDGMENT : G.L. OZA, J. 1. This second appeal has been preferred by the defendant tenants against the judgment and decree for eviction passed by Civil Judge Class II, Vidisha and on appeal maintained by the Additional District Judge Vidisha. 2. The appellants are the legal representatives of one Shrilal who was originally the tenant in the premises in dispute on rent of Rs. 30 per month. The plaintilf respondents filed the present suit on the allegations that the defendant-tenant had not paid rent from 1-2-1958. The arrears were demanded by notice dated 30-11-1962 but the rent was not paid. By that notice the tenancy was also terminated with effect from 31-12-1962. The respondent filed the present suit for eviction on the ground under section 12 (1) (a) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). The defence of Shrilal was that he was not in arrears of rent at all. According to him the plaintiff-respondents used to purchase things from him on credit and in 1963 the accounts were settled and it was found that there were no arrears left against the defendant. He also denied receipt of the notice. On these facts the trial Court held the defence not proved and decreed the suit of the plaintiff-respondents for eviction as well as for arrears of rent. The appellate Court also maintained the decree and now this second appeal has been preferred by the defendant-appellants. 3. The only question raised in this appeal before me is that there being a dispute about the quantum of arrears the trial Court was bound to pass an order fixing provisionally the quantum of arrears under section 13 (2) of the Act and as that was not done it could not be said that the tenant-appellants were bound to deposit the arrears within one month of the service of the writ of summons and to continue to deposit the rent every month. Learned counsel contended, therefore, that a decree for eviction against the appellants could not be passed. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, contended that the Full Bench decision in Chhagalal vs. Bhagwan Shri Satyanarayan (Idol), 1975 MPLJ 657 only lays down that where there is a dispute as contemplated under section 13 (2) of the Act, it is the duty of the Court to decide the provisional rent of the quantum of arrears of rent. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, contended that the Full Bench decision in Chhagalal vs. Bhagwan Shri Satyanarayan (Idol), 1975 MPLJ 657 only lays down that where there is a dispute as contemplated under section 13 (2) of the Act, it is the duty of the Court to decide the provisional rent of the quantum of arrears of rent. In the present case, the only dispute was regarding the quantum of arrears as according to the defendant he had adjusted the payment of these arrears in certain account of credit for supply of goods to the respondents. But there was no dispute regarding the monthly rent and therefore even if the argument of learned counsel for the appellants is accepted, the appellants could only be saved from the effect of not depositing the arrears of rent within one month from the service of the writ of summons; but there is nothing to justify their non-depositing of rent every month and that itself could be sufficient to maintain the decree for eviction. Learned counsel also contended that in fact it was not a case of dispute about the quantum of arrears but the stand taken by the defendant-appellants was that the amount has been paid; and therefore the provisions of section 13 (2) of the Act will not be attracted. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that if the Court has failed in its duty to fix provisionally the quantum of arrears of rent under section 13 (2) the Full Bench decision lays down that the provisions contained in sub-section. (1) of section 13 are suspended and in that view of the matter the appellants» were not even bound to deposit monthly rent although there was no dispute regarding monthly rent. In support of his contention learned counsel referred to an unreported decision in Jhanmanlal vs. Mahila Mintibai, Second Appeal No. 179 of 1910 decided at Gwalior on 5-5-1976. 5. The plaintiffs in the plaint paragraph 2 alleged that rent from 1-2-1953 was due and therefore by notice dated 30-11-1962 a demand was made. In the written-statement paragraph 2 of the plaint was merely denied. But in the special plea it was alleged that the defendant was running a shop of sweets, milk and tea and it was alleged that it was agreed that the things supplied to the plaintiff respondents would be credited against rent. In the written-statement paragraph 2 of the plaint was merely denied. But in the special plea it was alleged that the defendant was running a shop of sweets, milk and tea and it was alleged that it was agreed that the things supplied to the plaintiff respondents would be credited against rent. It was further alleged that in 1962 the accounts were settled and in fact the appellant-defendants had further to recover something and ultimately in 1963 when the accounts were squared up nothing remained to be paid. A perusal of the plaint and the written-statement goes to show that there was no dispute as regards the monthly rent which was alleged to be Rs. 30 per month. Apparently, the dispute about arrears is not a dispute about the quantum of arrears themselves but is a plea of payment by way of adjustment of certain moneys which fell due in favour of the appellants. And it was on this basis that it was contended that the appellant-defendants are not in arrears at all. Admittedly, there is no dispute about the quantum of monthly rent. 6. The Full Bench decision to which reference was made by learned counsel for the appellants arose out of a reference to the Division Bench by a Single Judge. The question referred to the Division Bench was: “Whether the operation of section 13 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 is arrested so far as the deposit of rent according to it is concerned and it remains in suspense until the Court fixes a provisional rent since when the dispute is raised by the defendant-tenant in his written statement, or it would be so since when the defendant-tenant makes an application inviting the attention of the Court to the specific dispute and asks the Court to fix the provisional rent?” The Division Bench in turn felt that as it requires reconsideration of two Division Bench decisions of this Court, it should be referred to a larger Bench. Consequently, the matter was referred to the Full Bench and the Full Bench answered the question in these terms: “The operation of sub-section (1) of section 13 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, is arrested when a dispute as is referred to in sub-section (2) is raised by the defendant-tenant in his written statement and it is not necessary that he should make an application inviting the attention of the Court to the specific dispute and asking the Court to fix provisional rent.” The learned Judges of the Full Bench felt that the real question which went before them for decision was that when the tenant raises a dispute as contemplated under sub-section (2) of section 13, whether it is necessary for him to make a further application to invite the Court to pass a provisional order or it is the duty-of the Court to pass 1a provisional order. Their Lordships in this decision observed: “The question referred to us thus rightly assumes that the operation of sub-section (1) of section 13 is arrested and this provision remains in suspense when a dispute is raised by the tenant under sub-section (2) and that the obligation to deposit rent remains so suspended until the Court fixes the provisional rent and the tenant is not in default if no provisional rent is fixed by the Court. The point that we are required to decide is whether it is sufficient for the tenant to raise the dispute in his written-statement or whether he must make an application inviting the attention of the Court to the specific dispute and ask the Court to fix the provisional rent.” It is therefore apparent that although the question which was referred to the Full Bench quoted above talks of suspension of the operation of sub-section (1) in absence of an order under sub-section (2) of section 13, but the real question which was before the Full Bench was as to whether it is the duty of the Court to pass an order under section 13 (2) or it is necessary for the tenant defendant to snake an application inviting the Court to pass an order.” 7. Section 13 of the Act reads: “13. Section 13 of the Act reads: “13. When tenant can get benefit of protection against eviction: (1) On a suit proceeding being instituted by the landlord on any of the grounds referred to in section 12, the tenant shall, within one month of the service of the writ of summons on him or within such further time as the Court may, on an application made to it, allow in this behalf, deposit in the Court or pay to the landlord an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was paid, for the period for which the tenant may have made the default including the period subsequent thereto upto the end of the month previous to that in which deposit or payment is made ad shall thereafter continue to deposit or pay, month by month, by the 15th of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate. (2) If in any suit or proceeding referred Ito in sub-section (1), there is ?any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant, the Court shall fix a reasonable provisional rent in relation to the accommodation to be deposited or paid in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (i) till the decision of the suit or appeal. (3) If, in any proceeding referred to in sub-section (ii) there is any dispute, as to the person or persons to whom the rent is payable, the Court may direct the tenant to deposit with the Court the amount payable by him under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) and in such a case, on person shall be entitled to withdraw the amount in deposit until the Court decides the dispute and makes an order for payment of the same. (4) If the Court is satisfied that any dispute referred to in sub-section (3) has been raised by a tenant for reasons which are false or frivolous, the Court may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and proceed with the hearing of the suit. (4) If the Court is satisfied that any dispute referred to in sub-section (3) has been raised by a tenant for reasons which are false or frivolous, the Court may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and proceed with the hearing of the suit. (5) If a tenant makes deposit or payment as required by sub-section (1), or sub-section (2) no decree or order shall be made by the Court for the recovery of possession of the accommodation on the ground of default in the payment of rent by the tenant, but the Court may allow such costs as it may deem fit to the landlord. (6) If a tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount as required by this section, the Court may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit. Sub-Clause (1) of this section contemplates two things from the tenant when a suit is filed under section 12 of the Act: (i) he shall deposit the arrears of rent within one month of the service of the writ of summons. (ii) he shall there- after continue to deposit month by month by the 15th of each succeeding month the rent during the pendency of the suit; and sub-clause (5) of this section saves the tenant from a decree on the ground of default of payment of rent if he has made deposits as required under sub-sections (1) and (2). Admittedly, therefore, for a tenant to save himself from a decree for eviction on the ground of default it is necessary that he complies with both the parts of sub clause (1) of section 13. And that is what has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in Smt. Rampiyari vs. Shri Ramautar, AIR 1968 MP 87 : “We are unable to accede to this contention. The main part of sub-section (3) of section 12 lays down that if a tenant makes payment or deposit of rent as required by section 13, then no order for his eviction shall be made on the ground of default in the payment of rent, this is, on the ground specified in section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. The main part of sub-section (3) of section 12 lays down that if a tenant makes payment or deposit of rent as required by section 13, then no order for his eviction shall be made on the ground of default in the payment of rent, this is, on the ground specified in section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. In order to avoid a decree for eviction on the aforesaid ground, the tenant has to make not only the initial deposit as required by sub-section (1), or sub-section (2), but has also to continue to deposit rent during the pendency of the suit as enjoined by sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 13 of the Act. The same provision has been repeated in sub-section (5) of section 13 albeit with the addition “but the Court may allow such costs as it may deem fit to the landlord.” Neither the main part of sub-section (3) of section 12, nor section 13 (5) admit of any qualification on account of a default in the making of any payment or deposit as required by section 13. Indeed, it is the compliance of section 13 that gives to the tenant the benefit of avoiding a decree on the ground stated in section 12 (1) (a) of the Act.” 8. Sub-Section (2) of section 13 talks of any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant. And it is now not in dispute that such a dispute could be: (i) a dispute about the amount of arrears payable, or (ii) a dispute about the quantum of monthly rent. It cannot be disputed that if there is a dispute about the quantum of monthly rent, the dispute about the quantum of arrears payable would be related to the amount of monthly rent. But there may be cases where is no dispute about the monthly rent, but still the tenant may dispute that he is not in arrears or by saying that he has paid off the arrears, as in the present case. The question, therefore, that arises in the present appeal is that if the quantum of monthly rent is not in dispute, could it be held that even if there is a dispute about the quantum of arrears, still the operation of the second part of section 13 (1) also remains suspended about which there is no dispute at all. The question, therefore, that arises in the present appeal is that if the quantum of monthly rent is not in dispute, could it be held that even if there is a dispute about the quantum of arrears, still the operation of the second part of section 13 (1) also remains suspended about which there is no dispute at all. It appears that the decision to which learned counsel for the appellants has made a reference Jhammalal vs. Mahila Mintibai (supra) has not gone in detail in this aspect of the matter. It appears that the Full Bench Judgment has been understood to mean that if there is any dispute under sub-section (2) of section 13, then the operation of section 13 (1) automatically is suspended. 9. As discussed earlier, this aspect of the matter, that section 13 (1) itself is in two parts and the dispute referable under section 13 (2) may be referable to either of the parts of section 13 (1) and whether in all cases the operation of section 13 (1) will be suspended, was not before the Full Bench. As pointed out earlier, what the Full Bench laid down was that it was incumbent on the Court itself to pass an order under section 13 (2) and it was not necessary for the tenant - defendant to make an application inviting a decision on that question. In this view of the matter, therefore, in my opinion, the Full Bench decision does not come to the rescue of the appellants as admittedly, there was no dispute about the monthly rent and therefore the only dispute which was raised was that the tenant had paid all the arrears. The dispute, if at all, could be said to be a dispute about the quantum of arrears payable and even if the Court below did not pass an order as contemplated under section 13 (2) of the Act, still the appellants could not be absolved of the responsibility of depositing rent every month about which there was no dispute. 10. Consequently, in my opinion, there is no substance in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed. The respondents shall be entitled to costs of this appeal. Counsel fee as per schedule if certified.