JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS second appeal by the defendant arises out of a suit filed by the respondent for the eviction of the appellant from an accommodation consisting of two Chasmas taken on rent by the appellant for non-residential purposes from the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought the ejectment of the appellant on the ground that he needed the accommodation for the purpose of his own business. The learned Ist Additional Civil Judge, Class II, Indore, who tried the suit found the need of the plaintiff in respect of the accommodation established. He also held that the plaintiff was not in possession of any other suitable accommodation for his own business. Accordingly, he decreed the plaintiffs claim for ejectment. ( 2. ) THE defendant preferred an appeal before the 1st Additional District judge, Indore. The learned Additional District Judge, however, came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs bona fide requirement was proved only in regard to one Chasma, but that as there was no provision in the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, for ejectment of a tenant from a part of the tenanted premises and as tenancy could not be split up, the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for the ejectment of the appellant from both the Chasmas. It is against this decision that the tenant has now preferred this appeal. ( 3. ) SHRI Bhalerao, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that the plaintiff-respondent was not entitled to a decree for the ejectment of the appellant from both the chasmas when the learned Additional District Judge found the plaintiffs bona fide requirement established only in regard to one Chasma. It was said that the plaintiff should have been given a decree for the ejectment of the appellant only in regard to one chasma. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on an unreported decision of the late Sharma J. , in Jiwandas v. Guljarilal (Second Appeal No. 138 of 1962, decided on 15th December 1962.) (Gwalior Bench ). It was also submitted that in fact the plaintiff was not entitled to any decree for ejectment when he had succeeded in establishing his bona fide requirement only in respect of a part of the accommodation. ( 4. ) I am unable to accede to the contentions advanced on behalf of the appellant. It was also submitted that in fact the plaintiff was not entitled to any decree for ejectment when he had succeeded in establishing his bona fide requirement only in respect of a part of the accommodation. ( 4. ) I am unable to accede to the contentions advanced on behalf of the appellant. The settled rule is that a lease-hold estate or a tenancy in respect of a property cannot be divided or split up without the landlords consent. It is because of this rule that it has been held by the Privy Council in Harihar banerji v. Ramshashi Roy (AIR 1918 P. C. 102=45 IA 221.) that a notice calling upon the tenant to quit a portion of a holding is absolutely bad. Such a notice would be invalid. Therefore, the ejectment of a tenant can only be from the entire rented out premises and not from a part of it, unless a special statute regulating tenancies contains provision permitting the ejectment of a tenant from a part only of the tenanted premises. Such a provision existed in the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949. Under that Order the Rent Controller was empowered to. assess the need of the landlord in respect of the whole premises or any portion thereof; and if the Controller was satisfied that the need of the landlord could be met by only a portion of the premises, then he had the power under clause 13 (8) of the Order to grant permission to the landlord to terminate the tenancy in respect of a portion of the rented out premises. It was with reference to this provision of the Central Provinces and berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, that it was observed by sharma J. , in Jiwandas v. Guljarilal (supra) that a tenant could be evicted from a part of the rented out premises. Sharma J. , placed reliance on the Full bench decision of this Court in Nathulal v. Ratrtsi (1957 M P L J 805.) But that again was a decision with reference to the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and rent Control Order, 1949. The learned Judge applied the ratio in Nathulals case to the case before him which was governed by the M. P. Accommodation control Act, 1955. The learned Judge applied the ratio in Nathulals case to the case before him which was governed by the M. P. Accommodation control Act, 1955. But the application of the principle laid down in Nathulals case to the cases governed by the M. P. Accommodation Control Acts would not be justified when the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, whether of 1955 or of 1961, does not contain any provision permitting the ejectment of a tenant from a part only of the premises. Indeed, in the absence of such express provision under which a tenant can be evicted from a part only of the premises, to hold that a tenancy can be split up and a tenant can be ejected from a part of the rented out premises would be utterly contrary to the settled rule of indivisibility of tenancy or leasehold estate and the decision of the Privy Council in harihar Banerjis case. It may be mentioned that section 13 (4) of the West bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, expressly provides that when the Court is of opinion that the landlords requirement may be substantially met by ejecting a tenant or a sub-tenant from a part only of the premises and allowing the tenant or the sub-tenant to continue in occupation of the rest, then, if the tenant or a sub-tenant agrees to such occupation, the Court shall pass a decree accordingly. The M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, does not contain any such provision. ( 5. ) LEARNED counsel referred to the decision in Krishnachandra v. Hiralal (1972 MPLJ Note 6=1962 J L J 450.)and candidly said that it did not support his contention. That Was a case where certain premises were used both for residential and non-residential purposes. The landlord seeking ejectment in that case established his requirement of the accommodation for residential purposes only. Sen J. therefore, held that as the landlord had established his need only in respect of part of the premises, he was not entitled to eject the tenant both from residential and non-residential portions of the premises and that the M. P. Accommodation control Act 1955, did not contain provision for ejectment of a tenant from a part of the premises. ( 6. ( 6. ) THE further argument of learned counsel is that if, as held by the learned Additional District Judge, the respondent was able to establish his requirement only in respect of one chasma, then it could not be said that the landlords need in respect of the entire accommodation had been established and consequently no decree for ejectment could at all be passed on the ground of the landlords requirement in respect of the accommodation. This contention only begs the question. When the tenancy is indivisible and cannot be split up and the tenant cannot be evicted from a portion of the rented out premises, it necessarily follows that when the landlord proves his requirement in respect of a part of the accommodation, then for the purposes of eviction his requirement for the entire premises must be held to be established. If a part which is needed cannot be had without the whole, then the whole thing must be given. It must be stated here that the observation of Sen J. in Krishnachandra v. Hiralal that "when the need has been established of only part of the premises the landlord is not entitled to ejectment of the whole", must be read in the context of the facts in Krishnachandras case. That was a case where the ejectment of the tenant was sought from residential as well as non-residential portions and the landlord was able to establish only his residential requirement. It was in these circumstances that the learned Judge made the above observation. That observation cannot be read as meaning that for the purposes of section 12 (1) (e) or (f), the landlord must establish his bona fide requirement in respect of each and every inch of the accommodation from which the tenant is sought to be evicted. ( 7. ) FOR the foregoing reasons, my conclusion is that the learned Additional District Judge rightly affirmed the decree for eviction of the appellant from the accommodation in question passed by the Ist Additional Civil Judge, glass II, Indore. The result is that this appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.