Judgment H.Mahapatra, J. 1. Defendant No. 2, who is a judgment-debtor, is the appellant. A suit for recovery of money based on two promissory notes dated the 23rd August, 1949 and 11th February, 1953, executed by defendant No. 1 who is the father of defendant No. 2 was instituted on the 13th July, 1955. Among the pleas raised in defence, one was that the suit was barred by limitation. The plaintiff depended upon an acknowledgment made by the executant of the handnote for saving limitation. The first handnote dated the 23rd August, 1949 was for Rs. 6900. On that Rs. 2500 was paid by defendant No. 1, the executant of the hand-note on the 26th September, 1951 and he had made an endorsement to that effect on the body of the promissory note. There was another payment in respect of the same hand-note on the 6th October, 1954. It was Rs. 200 and an endorsement to that effect was made by defendant no 1, the executant. It was contended by the defendants that the suit based on that hand-note was barred by limitation inasmuch as payment or an acknowledgment on the 6th October, 1954 (marked as Ext. 6A) did not save the limitation because it was made after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation for bringing a suit baaed on that note. The courts below did not accept this contention and decreed the plaintiffs suit. Defendant No. 2 carried the matter in appeal to the first appellate court but without success. Hence, this second appeal. 2. Learned Counsel, appearing for the appellant, very strenuously contended that the view taken by the courts below in regard to payment or an acknowledgment dated the 6th October, 1954 (Ext. 6A) is not tenable in law, because by the time that endorsement and payment was made, the prescribed period of limitation in regard to the suit based upon the hand-note (Ext. 5) dated the 23rd August, 1949, had already expired. 6A) is not tenable in law, because by the time that endorsement and payment was made, the prescribed period of limitation in regard to the suit based upon the hand-note (Ext. 5) dated the 23rd August, 1949, had already expired. As I have stated above, the view taken by the courts below in this respect was that if the acknowledgment of liability is made during a period before the date when the suit in that respect could have been filed, taking into account the provisions of Sec. 4 of the Limitation Act, that would save limitation and a fresh period of limitation will be computed from such date of payment or acknowledgment and endorsement. I am clearly of the view that the courts below were wrong in their interpretation of sections 19 and 20 of the old Limitation Act. Sec.19(1) states: "Where, before the expiration of the period prescribed for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by some person through whom he derives title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed." Sec.20(1) is as follows: "Where payment on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy is made before the expiration of the prescribed period by the person liable to pay the debt or legacy, or by his duly authorised agent, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed, from the time when the payment was made " In the aforesaid provisions, the relevant words which are necessary for us to consider are "the period prescribed for a suit in respect of any right" and "before the expiration of the prescribed period." What is really meant by the words "period prescribed" or "prescribed period" in the above two sections has to be determined, Sec.3 of the Limitation Act says: "Subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 25 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made, after the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the first schedule shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence". It is absolutely clear that the word prescribed which is used in this Enactment for the first time in Sec.2 is in relation to the first schedule of the Act Having said like that, the Enactment lays down in Sec. 4 as follows: "Where the period of limitation pre-scribed for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day that the court re-opens." Again, the word prescribed as used in this section cannot but be in relation to Schedule I. Under Sec. 4, a privilege is given to the suitor to institute a suit and exercise his right to sue on the re-opening day of a court, if the prescribed period of limitation expires on a day when the court is closed, and he is prevented thereby from instituting his suit on that day. This provision does not enlarge the period prescribed for a suit as given in the first schedule, although it bestows a privilege upon the suitor. If Sec. 4 will be taken to mean otherwise, that is, the prescribed period of limitation is extended, then in every case which can be covered by Sec. 4 will give a prescribed period separate from another, that would be hardly consistent either with the scheme of the Act or with the specific provisions of the Enactment. It has, therefore, to be held that the prescribed period or the period prescribed with reference to the limitation for a suit has to be interpret-ed as the period mentioned in the schedule of the Act. 3. Coming to sections 19 and 20 of the Act and interpreting the words "period prescribed" and "prescribed period", the words shall be taken to mean the period mentioned in the schedule of the Act. In that view of the matter, if an acknowledgment is made beyond such prescribed period as given in the schedule or if any payment is made beyond, such period that would not attract a fresh period of limitation, as contemplated in those two sections. In that view of the matter, if an acknowledgment is made beyond such prescribed period as given in the schedule or if any payment is made beyond, such period that would not attract a fresh period of limitation, as contemplated in those two sections. This view gains support from the decision in Bai Hemkore V/s. Masamalli, (1902) ILR 26 Bom 782, where a distinction between the right to sue and the prescribed period of limitation for a suit was brought out very clearly and it was held that an acknowledgment beyond the period of three years, which is the prescribed period in the schedule, did not save the limitation. This view also was followed in Debendra Nath V/s. Kartic Prasad, AIR 1929 Cal 68, and in Laxman Krishnaji V/s. Yadao Raghoba, AIR 1940 Nag 401. There are some other cases also to the same effect which were cited by learned counsel, but it is not necessary to add to the number of cases for the same purposes. In Maqbul Ahmad V/s. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh, AIR 1935 PC 85, it was laid down by their Lordships that Sec. 4 of the Limitation Act did not prescribe the period of limitation, us stated in the schedule of the Act. Therefore, it has to be concluded that Ext. 6A in the present case, that is the payment and endorsement made by the executant of the hand-note, defendant No. 1, on the 6th October, 1954, did not entitle the plaintiff to compute a fresh period of limitation from that day, as, before that date, the prescribed period of limitation read with Sec.19 and 20 of the Limitation Act (in respect of payment and endorsement made on the hand-note on the 26th September. 1951) had already expired. 4. The above view taken by me does not, however, help substantially the appellant in this case. Defendant No. 1, as I stated earlier, had executed another hand-note dated the 11th February, 1953 for RS. 200 (marked as Ext. 5A). In that hand-note, he stated that he owed money to the plaintiff on another letter, meaning the hand-note. According to the concurrent findings of the courts below and the admitted case of the defendants, no other money was due to the plaintiff from defendant No. 1 and his family before the 11th February, 1953 except on the previous hand-note dated the 23rd August, 1949 (Ext. 5). According to the concurrent findings of the courts below and the admitted case of the defendants, no other money was due to the plaintiff from defendant No. 1 and his family before the 11th February, 1953 except on the previous hand-note dated the 23rd August, 1949 (Ext. 5). Therefore, the statement owning previous liability in Ext. 5A the second hand-note, cannot but mean an acknowledgment of the debt due under Ext. 5 and that will come clearly within the provisions of Sec.19 of the Limitation Act (old). Learned counsel for the appellant, however, urged that since there was no reference in Ext. 5A either to the sum or to the date of the first hand-note dated the 23rd August, 1949, that cannot be taken the statement in Ext. 5A as relative to the first hand-note. But in view of the admission of the defendants and in view of the concurrent findings of the courts below that there was no other debt due from defendant No. 1 except under Ext. 5 before that date, the statement in Ext. 5A cannot but be taken in relation to that alone. In that view of the matter, Ext. 5A will be an acknowledgment and come under Sec.19 of the Act. That alone will save limitation because the suit was instituted by the plaintiff on the 13th July, 1955 within the prescribed period of limitation computed from llth February, 1953. The courts below were justified in decreeing the plaintiffs suit on that account. 5. There was a partition suit between defendant No. 1 (father) and defendant No. 2 (son), in which a written statement was filed by the father defendant No. 1 on the 16th September 1954 in which he stated that about Rs. 14000 was due from his Hindu undivided family to Kishun Prasad (Plaintiff) and other persons named therein. The courts below have taken this to be an acknowledgment of liability to the plaintiff by defendant No. 1 and held that that also saved limitation for the plaintiffs suit within the meaning of Sec.19 of the Act. The argument against this, on behalf of the appellant is that by that time, that is, the 16th September, 1954, there were two debts due from defendant No. 1 to the plaintiff under two hand-notes and it could not be clear from what was stated in the written statement (Ext. The argument against this, on behalf of the appellant is that by that time, that is, the 16th September, 1954, there were two debts due from defendant No. 1 to the plaintiff under two hand-notes and it could not be clear from what was stated in the written statement (Ext. 1), whether that related to the first hand-note or the second hand-note or both. Since a figure of indebtedness of the joint family of which defendant No. 1 was the karta was stated not in respect of the plaintiff alone but in regard to other per-sons named therein, the acknowledgment could not be definitely ascertained as relating to one or the other or both of the hand-notes executed in favour of the plaintiff by defendant No. 1 on the 23rd August, 1949 and 11th February. 1953. There is some force in this contention. But even if this statement in Ext. 1 is not taken as an acknowledgment of liability in respect of the hand-note dated the 23rd August, 1949, the- plaintiffs suit based on that hand-note will still be within time, on the basis of the acknowledgment in Ext. 5A as already pointed out. In view of that the decree obtained by the plaintiff cannot be assailed. 6. The second appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs.