ORDER Lakshmi Prasad, J. - Both these petitions are between the same parties and raise identical questions of law and fact. As such they can be conveniently disposed of by a single judgment. 2. The dispute in the cases relates to plots Nos. 102, 104 and 105 of village Anda Ibrahimpur, district Hardoi. These are grove plots. The allegation of the Petitioners is that these constituted their proprietary grove and as such under the provisions of UPZA and LR Act they became the Bhumidhars of the same. It is further alleged in the petition that opposite parties 1 and 2 namely Saktey and Fakirey were employed to look after the trees planted in the disputed plots and were allowed to cultivate the land in lieu of their services but subsequently they dishonestly started putting claim to the disputed plots with the result that the Petitioners instituted a suit for their ejectment u/s 202 of the UPZA and LR Act, in the year 1957. The suit was dismissed on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The Petitioners went in appeal which was also dismissed upholding the view of the trial court. The Petitioners then preferred a second appeal in the High Court. While it was is till pending, the village came to be notified u/s 4 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act with the result that the aforesaid second appeal came to be stayed. Parties filed objections u/s 9 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act. The Petitioners claimed that they were the bhumidhars whereas Saktey opposite party No. 1 claimed that he was the bhumidhar of plots Nos. 102 and 104 and Fakirey opposite party No. 2 claimed that he was the Bhumidhar of plot No. 105. The Consolidation Officer dismissed the objections of the Petitioners but allowed-those of Saktey and Fakirey holding that because of the failure of the Petitioner to bring a suit for their ejectment within limitation, Saktey and Fakirey became 'sirdars' of the respective plots under the provisions of Section 204 of the UPZA and LR. Act. The Petitioners went in appeal which was dismissed. They then preferred a revision which too has been dismissed by a Deputy Director who took a similar view. It is in these circumstances, that these two petitions are filed in so far as there were two objections, one by Fakirey and the other by Saktey. Act. The Petitioners went in appeal which was dismissed. They then preferred a revision which too has been dismissed by a Deputy Director who took a similar view. It is in these circumstances, that these two petitions are filed in so far as there were two objections, one by Fakirey and the other by Saktey. The prayer in each petition is that the impugned order dated 30-7-1965 passed by the Deputy Director Consolidation, be quashed and so also the orders passed by subordinate consolidation authorities. 3. The petitions are opposed by Saktey and Fakirey. 4. I have heard the Learned Counsel for the parties. Having regard to the findings of fact recorded by the consolidation authorities there could perhaps be no dispute on the question that Saktey and Fakirey were asami or to be more precise, Saktey was an asami of plots Nos. 102 and 104 whereas Fakirey was an asami of plot No. 105 under the provisions of UP ZA and LR Act. As such there is no escape from the conclusion that each of them was liable to ejectment by a suit u/s 202 of the Act. As already noted above such a suit was actually filed by the Petitioners in the year 1957. The view taken by the consolidation authorities is that as provided by entry at serial No. 25 in Appendix III to the UP ZA and LR Rules as they existed in the year 1952, suit u/s 202 had to be filed within a year from the date of vesting and since the Petitioners filed no suit till 1957, it must be held that because of their failure to file a suit within the limitation, Saktey and Fakirey became 'sirdars' u/s 204 of the Act. It is this view of the consolidation-authorities which is challenged by the Learned Counsel for the Petitioners. The relevant words occurring in column No. 5 of Appendix III to the aforesaid rules as against entry in serial No. 25 as it then existed, are as below: From the date of vesting where the cause of action arose u/s 202(b) before the date of vesting and in all other cases, from the date on which the cause of action arose. 5. It is nobody's case that the Petitioners were furnished with a cause of action at any time prior to the date of vesting. 5. It is nobody's case that the Petitioners were furnished with a cause of action at any time prior to the date of vesting. As such in order to find as to whether or not the Petitioners' suit u/s 202 to eject opposite parties 1 and 2, filed in 1957, was barred by limitation, the starting point for the computation of limitation, as provided in the latter clause of the entry at serial No. 25 has to be fixed, that is with reference to the words "from the date on which the cause of action arose". It is nobody's case that opposite parties 1 and 2 were "asamis for any fixed terms". As such it cannot be taken that the cause of action would accrue to the land-holder on the expiry of that term. If Section 175 of the UP Tenancy Act furnishes any clue to the nature of the tenure of a non-occupancy tenant who became an 'asami' under the provisions of the UP ZA and LR Act, it can safely be inferred that an asami who does not hold the land for any fixed term, holds it on year to year basis. Such being the position, it is impossible to conclude that cause of action accrued on the expiry of any particular year because of mere inaction on the part of the land-holder. A tenure which is held from year to year must first be determined by the land-holder in order to be furnished with a cause of action for a suit for ejectment. By mere inaction, i.e. by not entering into a fresh agreement of tenancy on the expire of any particular year, it cannot be said that the land-holder gets cause of action as soon as the year expires. Such may be the result in a case where the tenancy is for a fixed term because in that case, unless there be a fresh agreement for renewing the tenancy, the right of the tenant to retain possesion ceases and the right of the landholder to eject him comes into existence. This would net, in my opinion, be the position where the tenancy is from year to year. In that case unless there is a determination of tenancy by the landholder, there can arise no occasion for the landlord to get cause of action to eject the tenant. This would net, in my opinion, be the position where the tenancy is from year to year. In that case unless there is a determination of tenancy by the landholder, there can arise no occasion for the landlord to get cause of action to eject the tenant. On the facts found by the consolidation authorities in the case in hand, it appears that no cause of action accrued to the Petitioners, till, as they alleged in the plaint in their suit u/s 202 of the Act, it accrued to them in Asadh 1957, vide paragraph 9 of the certified copy of the plaint annexure 'A' to the counter affidavit filed by opposite parties 1 and 2. In that view of the matter, the decision of the consolidation authorities that opposite parties 1 and 2 acquired 'sirdari' rights u/s 204 of the Act, is manifestly erroneous and deserves to be struck down. 6. In the end, both the petitions are allowed with costs and the impugned order dated 30-7-1965 passed by the Deputy Director Consolidation, is quashed with the direction that he shall proceed to dispose of the revisions afresh in the light of the legal position explained in the body of the judgment.