JUDGMENT : Barman, C.J. - The Petitioner, for self as an operator of the Cuttack-Balikuda route and alii Secretary of the Cuttack Motor Association, challenges the grant of a temporary permit for three months by the Regional Transport Authority, Cuttack, to the Transport Controller, Orissa, for the said route u/s 62(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act., 1938 (Act IV of 1939) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2 In April/May, 1967 the District Transport Manager, Cuttack Zone, made an application to the State Transport Authority, Cuttack for the grant of temporary permits for the period-May 15, 1967 to August] 2, 1907-for the routes Bhubaneswar to Balikuda via Cuttack, Kandarpur and Jagatsinghpur, and Cuttack to Bhubaneswar and back, on the grounds mentioned therein. On May 3, 1967, a representation was made by the Petitioner objecting to the grant of the temporary permits to the District Transport Manager, Cuttack Zone, on the ground that there was no temporary need at all for additional bus services as the need of the traffic is met by the existing services. On May 5, 1967, the Secretary, State Transport Authority, after having heard the learned Advocates for both parties, rejected the application for the temporary permits on the finding that there was no justification for the grant of the temporary permits for the reasons fully discussed in his order: Thereafter, on May 10, 1967, the Transport Controller, Orissa, made an application to the Regional Transport Authority, Cuttack, for a temporary permit on the route Chandnichouk to Balikuda via Kandarpur and Jagatsinghpur for four months for the purpose mentioned in the application, on the same day, the Regional Transport Authority passed an order on the body of the application itself, granting temporary permit for three months; and it is this' order which is being challenged in this writ petition. 3. 3. The main points urged, on behalf of the Petitioner, are, in substance, these: The jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority u/s 62 of the Act, being quasi-judicial, liable to be scrutinised by the proper authorities, the impugned order is liable to be quashed on the ground that the order of the Regional Transport Authority ex facie does not show that he did I at all give any finding that any of the conditions mentioned in Section 62 existed; the very foundation for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Regional Transport Authority u/s 62 is the finding of the existence of any of the special circumstances specified in that section; the impugned grant of the temporary permits without any such finding is an error on the face of the record; the Regional Transport Authority granted: the impugned temporary permit apparently without any basis whatsoever. According to the Petitioner, there is no finding, on record, that there was a temporary need. It was also submitted that the impugned order was against the natural justice inasmuch as it was made without notice to the persons-including the Petitioner-affected or likely to be affected by the issue of the impugned temporary permit. The Petitioner's point is that as he had, already by earlier representation, objected to the grant of the temporary permit by the State Transport Authority, the Petitioner was entitled to notice and that he should have been given an opportunity of being heard by the Regional Transport Authority before granting the temporary permit. It was also argued that the application for inter-region route permit having been already once rejected by the Secretary. State Transport Authority, the subsequent application made before the regional Transport Authority for the same purpose, is not only mala fide, but is also affected by the general principles of res judicata. 4. The question is: Can this Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, interfere with the impugned order of the Regional Transport Authority granting a temporary permit u/s 62 of the Act? 10 my opinion, the answer is: No. The impugned order of the Regional Transport Authority is in these terms: R.T.O. I am satisfied that this is a temporary need. Issue permit as requested for, u/s 62(c) of the M.V. Act for three months. S/d- P. Misra 10-5-67. 10 my opinion, the answer is: No. The impugned order of the Regional Transport Authority is in these terms: R.T.O. I am satisfied that this is a temporary need. Issue permit as requested for, u/s 62(c) of the M.V. Act for three months. S/d- P. Misra 10-5-67. Accepting that the function of the Regional Transport Authority to grant temporary permits u/s 62 of the Act is quasi-judicial, even so, the finding of fact recorded by the Regional Transport Authority in the impugned order that he was "satisfied that this was a temporary need" cannot be challenged in a proceeding for the issue of a writ of certiorari. The adequace or sufficiency of the evidence on which the Regional Transport Authority was satisfied that this was a temporary need and the inference of fact that the drew in support of the said finding, all being within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority, this point cannot be agitated before the writ Court. The purpose for which the temporary permit was required as mentioned in the application for the permit dated-May 10, 1967, on which the temporary permit was granted, is this: On account of Jagatsinghpur being declared a Subdivision and consequently its gaining importance, the traffic on the route applied for thus increased very much and three is a persistent demand from the public not only to ply more buses on this route, but also to provide better amenities to the travelling public by running bigger and more comfortable buses. To meet this particular need of the public, the permit has been applied for. 5. Evidently, the Regional Transport Authority found it to be a temporary need about which he was satisfied, as recorded in his order; it is a pure question of fact, and this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with that finding or seek to correct it by the issue of a writ of certiorari. Though it would have been better if the Regional Transport Authority had given detailed reasons for his finding that it is a temporary need; but his failure to give detailed reasons in that behalf, or to refer specifically to the materials which he had with him in coming to the conclusion that this is a temporary need, would not by itself constitute such an error as to justify the issue of a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution. 6. 6. In dealing with applications for issue of a writ of certiorari under Article 226 in cases of this type, it is necessary to bear in mind that this Court is not exercising the jurisdiction of an appellate Court. In granting or refusing to grant permits to applicants, the appropriate transport authorities are discharging a very important and a very onerous quasi-judicial function. Large stakes are generally involved in these applications and so it is of utmost importance that the appropriate authority should consider all the relevant facts carefully and in its order set out concisely and clearly the reasons in support of its conclusions. It is hardly necessary to emphasise that applicants for permits whose applications are rejected should be satisfied that all points urged in support, of their respective claims have been duly considered before the matter was decided. Even so, it would, we think, be inappropriate for this Court to issue a writ of certiorari mainly or solely on the ground that all reasons have not been set out in the judgment or order of the appropriate authority. In entertaining writ petitions, this Court must not lose sight of the fact that decisions on questions of fact under the Act have been left to the appropriate authorities which have been constituted into quasi-judicial tribunals in their behalf and so the decisions rendered by them on questions of fact should not be interfered with under the special jurisdiction conferred on this Court under Article 226, unless the well-recognised tests in that behalf are satisfied. These views are contained in two decisions of the Supreme Court laying down the principles by which High Courts are to be guided in dealing with such cases in their writ jurisdiction: Syed Yakoob Vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and Others and Sri Rama Vilas Service (P) Ltd. Vs. C. Chandrasekaran and Others, . 7. In support of his contention, the Petitioner relied on a decision of the Patna High Court in B.K. Mukerjee Vs. Chairman, East Bihar Regional Transport Authority and Another, where the Court quashed the order of the Regional Transport Authority as ultra vires on the ground that the order did not show, on the face of the order itself, that the conditions of Section 62 had been complied with. The Patna case, however, is distinguishable from the facts of the present case. The Patna case, however, is distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In the Patna case, the impugned order of the Regional Transport Authority read as follows: Discussed with D.C.T.P. may issue Shri S.N. Agarwala for four months-Dumka to Maheshkhala. Sd. R. Prasad. 25-7-60. It was submitted on behalf of the Petitioner in the Patna case that the above order of the Transport Authority is ultra vires and illegal because the order did not ex facie show that the temporary permit had been given for one of the reasons specified in Section 62 of the Act; this contention was accepted by the Patna High Court and the order of the Transport Authority was quashed. There is nothing in the Patna case to show that any of the conditions specified in Section 62 was in fact satisfied, the impugned order in the Patna case only shows that the Regional Transport Authority had merely "discussed with D.C." without giving any finding whether the case came within any of the conditions laid down in Section 62. In the present case before us, however, the' Regional Transport Authority has recorded in his order that he was "satisfied that this is a temporary need" thus clearly showing in the order itself that the case before him came within the am bit of Sub-clause (c) of Section 62 of the Act. Therefore the Patna decision does not help the Petitioner in the present case. 8. There is also no substance in the point taken on behalf of the Petitioner that the Regional Transport Authority granted the temporary permit without notice and without giving him an opportunity of being heard even though he had objected, by representation, to the earlier application for temporary permit made by the District Transport Manager, Cuttack Zone, to the State Transport Authority who rejected the application. In our opinion, the Petitioner is not entitled to any notice of application for temporary permit, as of right. In our opinion, the Petitioner is not entitled to any notice of application for temporary permit, as of right. u/s 62 of the Act, the Regional Transport Authority, while exercising his power of granting a temporary permit, that is to say, while authorising the use of a transport vehicle temporarily, namely, for conveyance of passengers on special occasions, such as, fairs, funerals, or for the purpose of seasonal business, or to meet a temporary need, is not required to follow the long drawn out procedure laid down in Section 47 or Section 57 of the Act. That certainly could not have been the intention of the Legislature. Indeed, if the Regional Transport Authority was to go through the entire procedure laid down in Section 47 or Section 57, then the very purpose of making provision for grant of temporary permit u/s 62 to meet immediate temporary need-like funerals-would be frustrated. In our opinion, therefore, this contention of the petition is untenable. 9. A part from merits, there was also an alternative remedy open to the Petitioner by way of an appeal u/s 64 of the Act. It was open to the Petitioner to avail of this provision for appeal to the prescribed authority who would have given him an opportunity of being heard. Remedies for the redress of grievances or the correction of errors are found in the Act itself; and it is to these remedies that resort must generally be had in the first instance. In this context, what the Supreme Court has laid down has to be kept in view-indeed has to be reminded of-namely that the Motor Vehicles Act is a statute which creates new rights and .liabilities and prescribes an elaborate procedure for their regulation. No one is entitled to a permit as of right even if he satisfies all the prescribed conditions. The grant of a permit is entirely within the discretion of the transport authorities and depends on several circumstances which have to be taken into account. There is a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permits, providing what matters are to be taken into consideration as relevant and prescribing appeals and revisions from subordinate bodies higher authorities. Veerappa Pillai Vs. Raman and Raman Ltd. and Others, . 10. There is a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permits, providing what matters are to be taken into consideration as relevant and prescribing appeals and revisions from subordinate bodies higher authorities. Veerappa Pillai Vs. Raman and Raman Ltd. and Others, . 10. In the view we have taken of the case against the Petitioner both on merits and on the availability of an alternative remedy under the Act itself, as discussed above, it is unnecessary to deal with the other points raised on behalf of the Petitioner. 11. The Petitioner is not entitled to any relief prayed for. The writ petition must accordingly fail and is dismissed. Each party will bear his own costs. A. Misra, J. - I agree. Final Result : Dismissed