B. J. DIVAN, P. N. BHAGWATI, J. ( 1 ) THIS Reference arises out of an assessment made for the assessment year 1958 59 the relevant account year being the period 1 July 1956 to 30th June 1957. The assessee was a registered firm consisting of several partners of whom one Dinshaw was a non-resident partner. While assessing the assessee under sec. 23 (5) (a) the Income-tax Officer therefore under the second proviso to that section assessed Dinshaws share of the income on the assessee at the rate which would be applicable if it were assessed on him personally and directed that the sum so determined as payable shall be paid by the assessee. The assessee appealed against the assessment order to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and one of the contentions urged by him in Support of the appeal was that the assessment of Dinshaws share of the income on the assessee under the second proviso to sec. 23 (5) (a) was invalid since the procedure for making such assessment as required by sec. 22 was not followed by the Income-tax Officer. This contention was rejected by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the assessment of Dinshaws share of the income in the hands of the assessee was confirmed. The assessee thereupon carried the matter in appeal to the Tribunal. Before the Tribunal the same contention was repeated on behalf of the assessee. The Tribunal found substance in the contention and held that inasmuch as the assessment of Dinshaws share of the income was to be made on the assessee at the rate which would be applicable if it were assessed on him personally a specific notice ought to have been given to the assessee before proceeding to make such assessment and since no such notice was given the assessment was not properly made. The Tribunal accordingly set aside the assessment in so far as it pertained to the assessment of Dinshaws share of the income in the hands of the assessee and directed the Income-tax Officer to re-assess it after due notice to the assessee as representing Dinshaw. The Tribunal accordingly set aside the assessment in so far as it pertained to the assessment of Dinshaws share of the income in the hands of the assessee and directed the Income-tax Officer to re-assess it after due notice to the assessee as representing Dinshaw. The assessee was of the view that it was not competent to the Tribunal to give a direction to the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh assessment of Dinshaws share of the income in the hands of the assessee after due notice to the assessee as representing Dinshaw and he therefore applied for a reference and on such application the Tribunal referred the following question for the determination of the Court:-WHETHER on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Tribunal having set aside the assessment was justified in directing the Income-tax Officer to reassess the share income of the non-resident after due notice to the assessee firm as representing the non-resident partner. ( 2 ) THE determination of the question depends on the true interpretation of sec. 33 sub-sec. (4) which deals with the power of the Tribunal to make orders on the appeal preferred to it. This sub-section provides that the Appellate Tribunal may after giving both parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit and stall communicate any shall orders to the assessee and to the Commissioner. The power conferred on the Tribunal under this sub-section is in the widest terms for the Tribunal can pass such orders on the appeal as it thinks fit and prima facie we do not see why the Tribunal cannot pass an order setting aside an assessment and directing the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh assessment after giving due notice to the assessee. As a matter of fact sub-sec (5) of sec. 33 clearly postulates that such an order may be passed by the Tribunal on an appeal under sec. 33 sub-sec. (4 ). Sec. 33 sub-sec. (5) says that where as the result of an appeal any charge is made in the assessment of a firm or association of persons or a new assessment of a firm or association of persons is ordered to be made the Appellate Tribunal may authorise the Income-tax Officer to amend accordingly any assessment made on any partner of the firm or any member of the association. This sub-section clearly contemplates a case where the Tribunal may on an appeal before it make an order directing a new assessment of a firm or association of persons to be made after setting aside the assessment impugned in the appeal. The power to set aside the assessment and to direct the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh assessment is therefore clearly comprehended within the width and amplitude of the words pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit and the Tribunal can white setting aside the assessment in appeal direct the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh assessment on the assessee. This view is incontrovertible on a plain reading of sub-secs. (4) and (5) of sec. 33 and it has also received the imprimature of the highest Court in the land in Hukumchand Miles Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax (1967) 63 I. T. R. 232. The Supreme Court in that case held the powers of the Tribunal in dealing N h appeals are expressed in sec. 33 (4) in the widest possible terms and the words pass such orders as the Tribunal thinks fit include all the powers (except possibly the power of enhancement) which are conferred on the Appellate Assistant Commissioner by sec. 31 and consequently the Tribunal has authority under sec. 33 (4) to direct the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Income-tax Officer to hold a further inquiry and dispose of the case on the basis of such inquiry. The Tribunal therefore clearly had power whilst setting aside the assessment of Dinshaws share of the income in the hands of the assessee to direct the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh assessment of Dinshaws share of the income on the assessee after giving due notice to the assessee. ( 3 ) WE must therefore answer the question referred to us in the affirmative. The assessee will pay the costs of the Reference to the Commissioner. Order accordingly. .