JUDGMENT 1. The plaintiff instituted this suit against four defendants. The first defendant is the firm. The second and the third defendants are two partners. The fourth defendant is also impleaded as a partner of the firm. 2. The plaintiff's cause of action is in respect of goods sold and delivered. The plaintiff's case is that there was a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 for supply of a Single Speed Drum Pikrose Electric Hoist. The plaintiff dispatched the goods to the colliery of the defendant firm. The defendant No. 4 is alleged to have represented himself as a partner and also to have requested the plaintiff to release the documents relating to the said goods without payment in full on an undertaking to pay the plaintiff's dues by 7 June 1961. The contract was on 20 April 1961. It may be slated here that the contract stipulated that the railway receipt and the bill would be sent to the defendant firm through the United Commercial Bank and payment was to be made in full against the railway receipt. The plaintiff alleges that pursuant to the request of the defendant No. 4 the plaintiff instructed the bankers to deliver the documents on receipt of a cheque for Rs. 7,250/- which represented one-half of the price. The plaintiff claims the balance sum of Rs. 7,185. 82 paise after giving credit for Rs. 7,250/-against the total price of Rs. 14,435. 82 paise. 3. The plaintiff alleges that by letters dated 11 January 1962 and 2 February 1962 the defendant No. 3 acknowledged liability on her behalf and on behalf of the defendant No. 1. It is also alleged that the defendant No. 3 had authority to make acknowledgment on behalf of defendant No. 1. Acknowledgment of liability of defendant No. 1 is also alleged to have been made by its agent by letters dated 19 February 1962 and 27 March 1962. 4. Written statement was filed by the defendant No. 2. The defendant firm, namely, defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 3, a partner of defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 4, husband of defendant No. 3 did not file any written statement and did not appear at the trial. On behalf of defendant No. 2 issues were raised so to whether the defendant no. 4 was a partner of defendant no. On behalf of defendant No. 2 issues were raised so to whether the defendant no. 4 was a partner of defendant no. 1 and secondly, whether the plaintiff's alleged claim is barred by limitation. 5. Oral evidence was adduced by a witness on behalf of the plaintiff. On behalf of the defendant oral evidence was adduced by a witness who was the agent of the defendant firm as also of another colliery in which the defendant no. 2 had a share. 6. The oral evidence on behalf of the plaintiff was that the defendant No. 4 represented himself to be a partner. It appears that in the letter dated 20 April 1961 the defendant No. 4 was described as the representative of the defendant No. 4 was described as the representative of the defendant firm. Though the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant firm was that the railway receipt would be given on payment of the full price, the defendant No. 4 wrote a letter on 7 May 1961 asking for credit with regard to the payment of the full price. The letter dated 7 May 1961 was signed by the defendant No. 4 as a partner though the printed stationery of the defendant firm showed that the two partners were defendants Nos. 2 and 3. By two letters dated 2 May 1961 and 15 May 1961 addressed by the plaintiff to the United Commercial bank the plaintiff asked the bank in the first instance to deliver the railway receipt against the payment of Rs. 14,435. 82 and by the second letter the plaintiff authorised the bearer of the letter S. B. Ganeriwalla of Pure Searsole Collieries to take delivery of the documents against payment of Rs. 7,250/- The oral evidence on behalf of the plaintiff is that the letter dated 7 May 1961 was written by the defendant No. 4 as a partner and therefore the plaintiff was under the impression that the defendant No. 4 was a partner. The plaintiff never addressed a letter to the defendant No. 4 as a partner. Though the letter dated 7 May 1961 was written by defendant No. 4 as a partner and the letter was written on the printed stationery which showed the names of defendants nos. The plaintiff never addressed a letter to the defendant No. 4 as a partner. Though the letter dated 7 May 1961 was written by defendant No. 4 as a partner and the letter was written on the printed stationery which showed the names of defendants nos. 2 and 3 as the partners and the plaintiff's witness said that he was surprised thereby, the plaintiff did not pursue the matter with the defendants as to how the defendant No. 4 could describe himself as a partner. On the entire evidence I am of opinion that the plaintiff is unable to prove that the defendant No. 4 was a partner of the defendant No. 1, 7. There does not appear to be any dispute that the contract was made between the plaintiff on the one hand and the defendant firm on the other. Goods were delivered by the plaintiff and the defendant No. 4 took delivery. The defendant No. 4 was authorised to take delivery. The defendant No. 1 and its partners ought therefore to be liable to pay the price of the goods. That is why the contesting defendant raised the plea of limitation. 8. In order to appreciate the rival contentions on the aspect of limitation it is necessary to refer to the correspondence on which reliance was placed by the plaintiff to escape from the mischief of limitation. Reliance is placed on letters dated 11 January 1962, 2 February 1962, 19 February 1962 and 27 March 1962. The letter dated 11 January 1962 is written by defendant No. 3 as a partner of Pure Sear-sole Collieries B to the plaintiff. In that letter it is stated that there is no dispute whatsoever that the plaintiff's outstanding dues against Pure Sear-sole Collieries B amount to Rs. 7,185. 82 and the said amount must be paid by the above partnership. In the letter dated 2 February 1962 which is written and signed by the defendant No. 3 as a partner of Pure Sear-sole Collieries B and written to the plaintiff it is stated that necessary action will be taken by the author of the letter in due time for payment of the plaintiffs lawful and legitimate dues for which the plaintiff could rest assured, the letters dated 19 February 1962 and 27 march 1962 are written by agent of Pure Sear-sole Collieries to the plaintiff. The agent is the witness who gave evidence on behalf of the defendant No. 2. In the letters dated 19 February 1962 and 27 March 1962 the author of the letter wrote to the plaintiff that enquiries would have to be made from the plaintiff whether the plaintiff intended Pure Sear-sole Collieries to go to the law court for the embezzlement made by S. B. Ganeriwalla, meaning thereby defendant No. 4, with the help of his wife Sm. Gita Ganeriwalla, meaning thereby defendant No. 3. In the letter dated 19 February 1962 it is also written that they (meaning the two Generiwallas) took out the money from the partnership business and never paid to the plaintiff. In the letter dated 27 March 1962 the author of the letter asked the plaintiff to send copies of letters dated 30 April 1961 and 7 May 1961 addressed to the plaintiff by Pure Searsole Collieries B and concluded by stating that the letters were urgently required for realizing the plaintiff's dues from the defendants S. B. Ganeriwalla and his wife Gita Ganeriwalla. Relying on these letters counsel for the plaintiff contended that the letters would have to be read in the surrounding circumstances in which the plaintiff demanded money of the defendant firm and the partners. The plaintiff's letters dated 3 January 1962 stated that the plaintiff received copy of a letter written by the defendant Gita Ganeriwalla to the defendant Rani harpiari Devi from which it would appear that there existed some controversy between the partners in regard to payment to the plaintiff. In that letter the plaintiff stated that the plaintiff did not like to prove controversies among the partners. The plaintiff concluded by stating that it would be appreciated if Pure Searsole Collieries B were pleased to arrange to send Rs. 7,185. 82 paise failing which the plaintiff would be compelled to petition the High Court as proposed in the letter dated 4 December 1961. The plaintiff demanded of Pure Searsole Collieries B the amount of Rs. 7,185 and stated that if payment was not made, the plaintiff would apply to this Court to wind up the company under section 433 of the Indian Companies Act. By letter dated 30 January 1962 addressed by the plaintiff to Sm. The plaintiff demanded of Pure Searsole Collieries B the amount of Rs. 7,185 and stated that if payment was not made, the plaintiff would apply to this Court to wind up the company under section 433 of the Indian Companies Act. By letter dated 30 January 1962 addressed by the plaintiff to Sm. Gita Ganeriwalla the plaintiff reiterated that the plaintiff did not want to go into the controversies among the partners and demanded immediate payment of Rs. 7,185. 82 paise. 9. The contention on behalf of the plaintiff was that the letters dated 19 February, 1962 and 27 March, 1962 written by the agent on behalf of Pure Searsole Collieries would indicate that information was being asked for by Pure Searsole Colliery of the Plaintiff with regard to the amounts payable to the plaintiff and therefore, the letters established first jural relationship of debtor and creditor between the plaintiff on the one hand and defendants Nos. 2 and 3 on the other and secondly, the letters in the contex of surrounding circumstances would be acknowledgment of liability to pay. Reliance was placed by counsel for the plaintiff on the Full Bench decision in (1) Pandiri Veerans. v. Grandi veerah-bhcdra Swami. reported in I. L. R. 41 Madi. 427 in support of the contention that a partner would have authority to acknowledge liability as against his co-partner and it was not necessary to have direct evidence of authority, but such authority could be inferred from surrounding circumstances. It was submitted by counsel for the plaintiff that no direct evidence was given by the defendant No. 2 that defendant No. 3 was not authorised to make any acknowledgment and secondly, it appeared on the evidence that at the time when the letters were written the partnership business was continuing and therefore, these two factors would establish that there was implied authority of a partner to admit liability on behalf of a co-partner. In the Madras case it was said that the direct evidence of specific authority to make acknowledgment was quite unnecessary and that authority might be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. In the Madras case it was said that the direct evidence of specific authority to make acknowledgment was quite unnecessary and that authority might be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. It was illustrated by saying that where one partner signed, an acknowledgment in respect of a gambling debt of his own proof of the acknowledgment would be sufficient to fix the other partner with liability but the exception in section 21 (2) of the old Limitation Act which stated that nothing in sections 19 and 20 would render one of joint directors, partners or mortgagees chargeable by reason only of written acknowledgment signed or payment by the agent or any other or others of them. It is manifest that sub-section (2) of section 21 of the old Limitation Act is intended to apply to transactions conducted in the ordinary course of partnership business. The general principle of law is that partners are the agents of one another and the acts done by them in the ordinary course of business would bind the partnership. The question in the present case is whether it can be said that the surrounding circumstances and the evidence in the present case indicate that the acknowledgment alleged by the plaintiff was made by a partner as to bind the firm or the other partner and was also made in the course of ordinary partnership business. 10. Counsel for the contesting defendant relied on the Bench decision in (2) Azizur Rahman v. Upendra Nath Samanta, reported in 42 C.W.N. 18. In that Bench decision B. K. Mukherjee, J., said that sub-section (2) of section 21 of the old Limitation Act explained that a contractor partner, etcetera would not be implied agent of his co-contractors or co-partners for purposes of sections 19 and 20 of the Limitation, Act and if it was sought to bind the latter by any act of acknowledgment or payment by the former, authorization must be proved. In other words, liability would not arise by reason only of a written acknowledgment. The acknowledgment is to be made by a partner who is authorised to do so. In other words, liability would not arise by reason only of a written acknowledgment. The acknowledgment is to be made by a partner who is authorised to do so. As to who is a person authorized will appear not merely from the provisions of the Partnership Act or the provisions contained in the Limitation Act in regard to making of acknowledgment but from the facts and circumstances of the case as to whether the person acknowledging the liability was really authorised to do s. o. In the present case the documentary evidence establishes that there were disputes between the partners. It was said by counsel for the plaintiff that the authority of the defendant No. 3. was not impeached in cross-examination of the plaintiff's witness. Counsel for the contesting defendant challenged the authority of the defendant No. 3 write the letters and invited special attention of the plaintiff's witness to the disputes and differences between the partners and that one of the partners was denying her liability. The letters written by the defendant No. 3 dilated 11 January. 1962 and 2 February, 1962 would also indicate that disputes and controversies were in existence between the partners and the writer of the letter was trying to induce the partner to agree to pay up the dues. A copy of the letter dated 11 January 1962 was sent to defendant No. 2 for information and for taking immediate step. There is no evidence to show that the letter dated 11 January 1962 was written by the defendant No. 3 with the authority of the defendant No. 2. The normal authority in a continuing partnership business cannot be read into the letters in the present case by reason of disputes and differences to which I have referred. Further, there is intrinsic evidence in the letter dated 11 January 1961 that the letter was being sent to the other partner for information and that evidence shows that information was being sent to keep the other partner posted with the fact that a letter was being written. A. letter which is written for the purpose of giving information to the other co-partner does net derive its authority from, the other co-partner because it is a letter sent to the co-partner for information. A. letter which is written for the purpose of giving information to the other co-partner does net derive its authority from, the other co-partner because it is a letter sent to the co-partner for information. Unless the two partners agree either in fact or from the course of conduct one does not have the express or implied authority of the other to deal with the matters. An authority cannot be implied from the facts and circumstances of the present case because of disputes and also the character of the letter which is indicative of the existence of such disputes. 11. The letter dated 2 February 1962 shows in no uncertain terms that the defendant No. 3 who wrote the letter as a partner sent a copy to the other partner for information and with a request to arrange necessary payment. This letter dated 2 February 1962 rests on the same footing that an authority cannot be implied on behalf of the other partner to admit any liability because of disputes and differences between partners. The letter dated 11 January, if it were an authorised letter, would in my opinion have amounted to admission if there were no disputes between the parties as well. The letter dated 2 February 1962 irrespective of the contention as to lack of authority and the disputes between the parties does not in my opinion amount to any unqualified and unequivocal acknowledgment of liability. The words "accounts will be taken for payment of lawful and legitimate dues" do not show an unqualified and unequivocal acknowledgment of liability. It is true there need not be any amount mentioned. It is also true that there need not be promise to pay and there must be an unequivocal admission of liability. The words "accounts will be taken for payment of lawful and legitimate dues" repel any reading of unconditional acknowledgment into the letter dated 2 February 1962. 12. It is true there need not be any amount mentioned. It is also true that there need not be promise to pay and there must be an unequivocal admission of liability. The words "accounts will be taken for payment of lawful and legitimate dues" repel any reading of unconditional acknowledgment into the letter dated 2 February 1962. 12. The letters dated 19 February 1962 and 27 March 1962 which were contended by counsel for the plaintiff to establish the jural relationship between debtor and creditor between the plaintiff on the one hand and the defendant on the other hand show that information which was being asked for by the agent of Searsole Collieries would go into' the law court for embezzlement made by the Generiwallas, The jural relationship that is contemplated on the authority of the decision of the Supreme Court in (3) S. F. Mazda v. Durga prasad Chamaria, reported in AIR 1961 SC 13261 is existence of jural relationship between parties such as debtor and creditor. These two letters dated 19 February 1962 and 27 March 1962 far from establishing any jural relationship of debtor and creditor between the plaintiff on the one hand and the defendant on the other show that information was being asked for to start proceedings of embezzlement against the Generiwallas. As will appear from the Bench decision in (4) Shaik Mohideen Saheb v. The Official Assignee, reported in ILR 35 Mad. 142, the mere fact that one of the partners of a going concern is in charge of a branch of such concern cannot lead to the inference that such partner has authority to bind the firm on an acknowledgment when pressed for payment. It has to be found from the facts of the case as to what were the respective position and authority of the partners. In the present case the partners were at loggerheads and they were raising disputes between them and they went to the extent of charging a partner and her husband with embezzlement of moneys belonging to the firm. For all these reasons I am of opinion that as far as the defendant No. 2 is concerned, she is not bound by any acknowledgment because it is not the authorised act of copartner. A fortiori such acknowledgment cannot bind the firm because it is not the authorised act of a partner of the firm. For all these reasons I am of opinion that as far as the defendant No. 2 is concerned, she is not bound by any acknowledgment because it is not the authorised act of copartner. A fortiori such acknowledgment cannot bind the firm because it is not the authorised act of a partner of the firm. It, therefore, follows that as far as the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are concerned, the suit must fail. As far as the defendants Nos. 3 and 4 are concerned they did not contest at the trial the defendant No. 3 acknowledged liability to pay for herself. The defendant No. 4 made the plaintiff part with the goods by representation. The plaintiff is entitled to recover the sum against the defendants Nos. 3 and 4. There will, therefore, be a decree against the defendants Nos. 3 and 4 for the sum of Rs. 7,185. 82 paise with interest on judgment at 6 per cent and costs. The suit as against defendants Nos. 1 and 2 is dismissed with costs assessed at 30 gold mohurs.