JUDGMENT : G.K. Misra, J. - The member of the first party (opposite party) approached the police on 10-2-1965 alleging that the members of the second party forcibly dispossessed him on 8-2-1965 from the disputed land consisting of plot 524/1 with an area of 2.33 acres in village Tumilia in the district, of Sundergarh. After making an inquiry police submitted report to the Magistrate for taking action u/s 145, Criminal Procedure Code, on receipt of the police report the Sub-divisional Officer passed an order on 23-3-1965 transferring the case to the file of Sri R.C. Patnaik, Magistrate, First Class, for disposal according to law. On the same day Sri R.C. Patnaik passed the following order-Case received on transfer to my file. Start proceeding u/s 145 Criminal Procedure Code. The next order was passed on 7-5-1965 which runs thus: Report from the Officer-in-Charge, Hemgir P.S. received. I am satisfied from the said report that both the parties are advancing their claims over the disputed land and there is apprehension of breach of peace. The land under dispute is plot No. 524/1, 204 cubits X 168 cubits area A 2-33 Decimals bounded by East, West, North land of Purusottam, South village road in village Tumilia, P.S. Talsara, Dist. Sundergarh within the local limits of my jurisdiction. Therefore both the parties are hereby directed to appear before this Court either in person or by pleader on 27-5-1965 and put written statements of their respective claims in regard to the facts of actual possession of the disputed land and further put in such documents to adduce by putting in affidavits the evidence of such persons they rely upon in support of such claim. The land is attached till the disposal of the proceeding, Ask the C I.C. Hemgir P.S. to attach the land and appoint a receiver who will look into cultivation etc. and keep prop and' account, of income and expenditure thereof until further order. Thereafter parties filed their affidavits and documents. After going through the case, the learned Magistrate declared possession of the first party on 27-10-1965. Against this order the criminal revision is filed. 2. The case of the first party is that he is a landless Harijan. The disputed land was a piece of Anabadi Goda land. The first party made reclamation of the same. The second party members are influential persons and encroached upon the disputed land. Against this order the criminal revision is filed. 2. The case of the first party is that he is a landless Harijan. The disputed land was a piece of Anabadi Goda land. The first party made reclamation of the same. The second party members are influential persons and encroached upon the disputed land. The first party member had put ridges around the disputed land and was growing paddy therein for the last three years. In the month of Falgun the members of the second party armed with dangerous weapons cut the eastern portion of the ridge, forcibly dispossessed him and threatened to kill him. So he approached the police for action. The members of the second party claimed that they were in possession of the disputed land for the last 13 years and that they did not dispossess the first party member. 3. Mr. Murty advanced two contentions: (i) On the materials on record, possession of the members of the second party should have been found; and (ii) The preliminary order having been passed on 7-5-1965 and the dispossession being admitted to have taken place on 8-2-1965, the possession of the second party should have been declared on the date of the preliminary order. 4. The judgment of the learned Magistrate is somewhat unsatisfactory. He did not examine the affidavits critically and gave no cogent reasons in support of his finding that the dispossession was on 8-2-19155. On scrutiny of the affidavits we ate satisfied that the finding of the learned Magistrate is well founded though it is not based on discussion. The first party member filed affidavits of Khemsil Biswal and Bali Singh in support of his version. Both of them have got lands near the disputed land and they support the case of his possession for three years and dispossession in the month of Falgun. 8-2-1965 fall within that month. The second party members filed affidavits of Gurudeb Biswal, Purandar Biswal, Kulamani Petel and Srikar Singh. None of them has land in the vicinity. They speak of the entire plot 524 and not specifically of plot 524/1. There is no dispute that plots 524/2 and 524/3 are in possession of the members of the second party. The first party member does not claim interest therein. Thus the affidavits of the witnesses on behalf of the second party are vague. They speak of the entire plot 524 and not specifically of plot 524/1. There is no dispute that plots 524/2 and 524/3 are in possession of the members of the second party. The first party member does not claim interest therein. Thus the affidavits of the witnesses on behalf of the second party are vague. The affidavits of the first party are to be preferred to those of the second party in view of the fact that the witnesses have lands in contiguity. We accordingly confirm the finding of the learned Magistrate that the first party member was in possession of the disputed land until he was dispossessed on 8-2-1965. 5. The next question for consideration is whether the preliminary order was passed on 23-3-1965 or on 7-5-1965. If the preliminary order was passed on the latter date, then the first party member is not entitled to the benefit of the second proviso to Section 145(4), Criminal Procedure Code. The proviso runs thus: Provided further that, if it appears to the Magistrate that any party has within two months next before the date of such order been forcibly and wrong- fully dispossessed, he may treat the party so dispossessed as if he had been in at such date. If 7-5-1965 is the date of the preliminary order, then the dispossession on 8-2-1965 would be beyond two months from that date and the possession of the second party members 'on that date must be declared. 6. Mr. Das contends that the preliminary order was passed on 23-3-1905. He placed emphasis on the order of the learned Magistrate passed on that date to the effect "Start proceeding u/s 145, Criminal Procedure Code". According to him, by then the police report recommending that action should be taken u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure to prevent breach of the 'Peace was already before the Magistrate. After perusal of the same, the Magistrate was satisfied that there was apprehension of breach of the peace relating to the disputed land, and, as such he assumed jurisdiction by directing a proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure to be started though the formal order was not drawn up until 7-5-1965. This contention necessitated assumed jurisdiction u/s 145, Criminal Procedure Code. 7. This contention necessitated assumed jurisdiction u/s 145, Criminal Procedure Code. 7. Section 145(1) runs thus: Whenever a District Magistrate, Sub-divisional Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class is satisfied from a police report or other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, within the 1000.1 limits of his jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader, within a time to be fixed by cash Magistrate and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute and further requiring them to put in such documents, or to adduce, by putting in affidavits, the evidence of such persons, as they rely upon in support of such claims. The Sub-section is in two parts. The first part directs that the Magistrate must be satisfied that a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace exists concerning any land. Then he shall make an order in writing stating the grounds of his being 80 satisfied. The second part insists that if he is so satisfied, he would require the parties concerned in the dispute to take steps in respect of matters mentioned in the Sub-section. The Magistrate is thus seized of jurisdiction only if he is satisfied that a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace exists. In respect of dispute relating to land, ordinarily the Civil Court has jurisdiction. But if there is an apprehension of breach of the peace relating to land, the Criminal Court gets jurisdiction under this section. The jurisdiction of the Magistrate does not depend upon how he proceeds. Satisfaction regarding existence of a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace confers the authority on the Magistrate to act under the section. The other matters relate to procedure stating how he is to act. If he has jurisdiction, he is not deprived of it, merely because the procedure followed by him was erroneous or defective. An omission on his part to state the grounds of his satisfaction, or to follow certain directions contained in the Code cannot deprive him of the jurisdiction which is derived from the satisfaction itself. If he has jurisdiction, he is not deprived of it, merely because the procedure followed by him was erroneous or defective. An omission on his part to state the grounds of his satisfaction, or to follow certain directions contained in the Code cannot deprive him of the jurisdiction which is derived from the satisfaction itself. If the materials on record establish that the Magistrate had the satisfaction and accordingly assumed jurisdiction, the order passed is the preliminary order u/s 145(1) even though there is omission of the grounds or of the drawal of the formal order. A clear analysis of this view is to be found in Kapoor Chand and Another Vs. Suraj Prasad . In Murali v. Purusottam 31 C.L.T. 251, after review of several authorities, the position of law was summed up thus: It is the duty of the Magistrate to record in writing in clear and unambigous terms that a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace exists and the grounds of his being so satisfied. If, however, due to inadvertence I the Magistrate does not state the grounds for his satisfaction, the proceeding cannot be quashed as being without jurisdiction if it otherwise appears from the record that there were materials for the satisfaction when the order u/s 145(1), Code of Criminal Procedure was passed. No hard and fast rule can be laid down. Each case must" however, be governed by its own facts. We endorse the aforesaid view. 8. The question for consideration in this case is whether the Magistrate seized jurisdiction on 23.3.1965 and whether his order "start proceeding u/s 145, Criminal Procedure Code" indicates that he had the satisfaction that there was dispute likely to cause breach of the peace relating to the disputed land. In some cases it has been held that if the police report or the complaint filed by any of the parties sets out the ground sufficiently and is expressly referred to by the Magistrate in the preliminary order then there is sufficient compliance with the provisions of Sub-section (1) and the Magistrate assumed jurisdiction-Khos Md. v. Nazir Md. ILR Cal. 353. In this case, the police report was received on 23-3-1965. It gives a complete picture of the dispute between the parties .and the existence of apprehension of breach of peace relating to the disputed land. v. Nazir Md. ILR Cal. 353. In this case, the police report was received on 23-3-1965. It gives a complete picture of the dispute between the parties .and the existence of apprehension of breach of peace relating to the disputed land. There is a reference to it in the order of the Sub-divisional Officer on 23-3-1905. Sri Patnaik received the police report and passed an order to start a proceeding u/s 145, Criminal Procedure Code. Apparently Sri Patnaik was satisfied that there was apprehension of breach of the peace relating to the disputed land. Though the order is cryptic ;and did not state the grounds, it could not have been passed "Unless the Magistrate had the satisfaction. Thereby the Magistrate assumed jurisdiction. The omission 'to state the grounds or to give a direction to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute or documents and affidavits, does not deprive him of the jurisdiction which he assumed by directing a proceeding u/s 145, Criminal Procedure Code. Doubtless, the subsequent order passed on 7-5-1965 is in terms of Section 145(1) wherein the Magistrate says that he was satisfied from the police report of the existence of a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace. It can be plausibly argued that the Magistrate did not apply his mind to the police report earlier and had no prior satisfaction and, as such be did not assume .jurisdiction before 7-5-1965. Though on facts such an argument cannot he said to be preposterous, taken area whole, the better construction would be that the Magistrate had the satisfaction on 23-3-1905, assumed jurisdiction on that date and accordingly directed a proceeding u/s 145. On 7 -5-1965, he was perhaps apprehensive that the order Bated 23-3-1965 might be defective unless he passed it in terms of Section 145(1), and accordingly he passed the order in terms thereof. We are of opinion that the preliminary order was passed on 23-3-1905 and not on 7-5-1965. The learned Magistrate in the final order construed 23-3-1965 as the date of the preliminary order. 9. On the aforesaid view, the first party member is entitled to the benefit of Section 145, Sub-section (4), second proviso. We are of opinion that the preliminary order was passed on 23-3-1905 and not on 7-5-1965. The learned Magistrate in the final order construed 23-3-1965 as the date of the preliminary order. 9. On the aforesaid view, the first party member is entitled to the benefit of Section 145, Sub-section (4), second proviso. In this view of the matter it is unnecessary to consider whether the first party member would Buffer due to the delay made by the Magistrate in drawing up the formal order on 7-5-1965. 10. We find no merit in the revision. It is accordingly dismissed. Revision dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed