Per Gajendra Singh, Member—This is a reference from the learned Member Shri G.B.K. Hooja, to this larger Bench for rectification of the mistake of this larger Bench alleged to have been committed in disposing of the point of law referred to that Bench, by its order dated 15-3-1966. It was held by that Bench that the revision petitions in sales tax matters should continue to be heared by a Member sitting singly in those cases in which the lis started prior to the amendment of the Sales Tax Act, conferring jurisdiction of hearing revision cases in Division Bench. It was further held that revision was a vested right and thus the legislation snatching away that right and could not be given a retrospective effect in the absence of express provision or by necessary intendment in the amending Act itself. The learned Member now desire that in recording that opinion the larger Bench committed an error apparent on the face of the record. The contention raised by the Govt. Advocate was that the two judgments of the Supreme Court were not brought to their notice namely Peer Mohd. Meer Lebabhi vs. Thirumalaya Gounder Ramaswamy Gounder dated 23-8-1965 in Civil Appeal No. 383/1963 reported in A.I.R. 1964 page 907 and the other Eta. B. Krithnal vs. Bar Kebar. The learned Member therefore desires that the Larger Bench may exercise the power of rectification of mistake presumably u/s. 17 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act. The case was heard by us in the presence of the counsel for the parties. There is no power of review under the Sales Tax Act. There is however a power to rectify the mistakes under sec. 17 of the same Act. This power could be exercised by the Board of Revenue or any authority who passed that order on his own motion or when such a mistake has been brought to its notice by a dealer or by the authority concerned excluding the Board under sec. 17 sub-section 2(b)(2). There the Commissioner or the assessing authority moved the Board in this connection. In the first instance the application seems to have been put up through by the assessing authority. This was obviously wrong. The assessing authority was not at all aggrieved by the order of the Board. 17 sub-section 2(b)(2). There the Commissioner or the assessing authority moved the Board in this connection. In the first instance the application seems to have been put up through by the assessing authority. This was obviously wrong. The assessing authority was not at all aggrieved by the order of the Board. The Board did not pass in the larger Bench, the final order, but only recorded the opinion and the final order was passed on a matter of jurisdiction by the Division Bench concerned. Further the larger Bench recorded its opinion on a question of law whether the single member should hear the revision petition or the Division Bench should hear them after the amendment of the Sales Tax Act. The correction of any mistake being apparent from the record does not arise. In the record itself the two rulings were not referred to at the time the larger Bench came to pass that order. In order to find a jurisdiction u/s. 17 it must be shown that the mistake is apparent from the record. Merely because some rulings were not brought to the notice of the Larger Bench does not mean that the Larger Bench committed a mistake apparent from the face of the record. Thus on this count this reference to our mind is bad in law. Secondly, u/s.17 application for rectification have to be disposed of within a period of 120 days from the date of the receipt thereof. By the time this application came up for consideration, 120 days were already passed and thus on that count also no order of rectification can be made. For the reason stated above we feel that this reference to this Larger Bench was not properly conceived nor was the application made in accordance with the provision of the law. We pass no order and return this reference back to the Bench concerned who may proceed to dispose of the case in accordance with the view already taken by the Larger Bench as far as the jurisdiction of the case is concerned. We pass no order and return this reference back to the Bench concerned who may proceed to dispose of the case in accordance with the view already taken by the Larger Bench as far as the jurisdiction of the case is concerned. Per Shri G.B. K. Hooja—The circumstances in this rectification application has come up before this Larger Bench may be stated as follows— When the above revision petition came up for hearing before me an objection was raised by the learned Government Advocate that the single bench was not competent to hear this revision petition and that it should be placed for hearing before a D. B. inspite of the fact that a Larger Bench of this Board had held by its order dated 15.3 1966 that the revision petitions in sales tax matters should continue to be heard by a Member sitting singly in those cases in which the lis had started prior to the amendment of the Sales Tax Act, conferring jurisdiction of hearing of revision petitions upon a D.B. It was observed by the majority of the Members constituting the Larger Bench that the right of special appeal which was available to the litigants in case the matter was decided by a single Bench was a vested right and thus the legislation snatching that right could not be given a retrospective effect unless it was done by express enactment or by necessary implication by the Legislature in the Amending Act. It was, however, argued by the learned Government Advocate that when the above reference was heard by the Larger Bench, the following two judgments of the Supreme Court could not be brought to their notice— 1. Ittavira Mathai vs. Varkey (A.I.R. 1964 SCR Page 495) 2. M/s. P. Mohammed Meera Lebbai vs. Thriumalaya Gounder Ramaswamy Gounder (decided by Supreme Court on 23-8-65) It was urged that in view of these judgments the revision petition should be heard by a D.B. and not by the S.B. I felt that the decision of Larger Bench was binding on me. However since it was a procedural matter, it was considered desirable that the two Supreme Court rulings should be brought to the notice of the same Larger Bench along with a rectification application by the Government Advocate for further consideration. However since it was a procedural matter, it was considered desirable that the two Supreme Court rulings should be brought to the notice of the same Larger Bench along with a rectification application by the Government Advocate for further consideration. Since disposal of sales tax cases was being delayed for want of clarification of the procedure, it was proposed by me that the matter may be submitted to the learned Chairman immediately for placing before the same Larger Bench. The learned Chairman ordered the matter to be placed before the same Larger Bench on 23-4-66, but as the Learned Advocate General could not appear before the Larger Bench, the case was adjourned for a number of times. In the meanwhile two of the members constituting the Larger Bench ceased to be attached to the Board. Under these circumstances, the rectification application filed by the learned Government Advocate came up for hearing before our Larger Bench on 15 9-1968. Now, coming to the merits of the application, with due respect I find myself unable to agree with the view which my learned colleague Shri Gajendra Singh proposes to take in this matter. My learned colleague proposes to reject this rectification application on two grounds. Firstly that the two rulings referred to therein were not brought to the notice of the Larger Bench when it came to pass the relevant order. It is argued that the Larger Bench cannot be said to have committed a mistake apparent on the face of the record merely because some rulings were not brought to its notice. In this connection with due deference I would like to refer to the observations of Wadsworth J. in (28) A.I.R. 1941 Madras 918 (Natese Naicker vs. Samanda Chettier Examining the scope of 0.47, R. 1 it was observed therein that when there is a legal position clearly established by a well known authority and by some unfortunate oversight the Judge has gone palpably wrong by the omission of those concerned to draw his attention to the authority, it may in a proper case be a ground coming within the category of an error apparent on the face of the record. Of course, it was further observed in the same case , by the learned Judge that a court has no power to rely upon a decision pronounced subsequent to the original for purposes of review. Of course, it was further observed in the same case , by the learned Judge that a court has no power to rely upon a decision pronounced subsequent to the original for purposes of review. This is not the position in the present case. The rule relied upon by the learned Government Advocate in preferring the rectification application was laid down by the Supreme Court of . India on the 23rd August, 1965 i.e. much before the order of the Larger Bench dated 15-3-1966 came to be passed and must, therefore, be held to be binding on this court on 15-3-1966 The only question which needs to be examined is whether or not rule is relevant to the issue pending before this court. The appeal before the Supreme Court arose from a judgment of a single Judge of the Kerala High Court dismissing the appellants suit for recovery of possession of certain property and mesne profits. The question of law which arose in this appeal could be heard and disposed of by a single Judge of the High Court. The original suit was instituted on 10-2-50 and was substantially decreed in the appellants favour on 30-7-58. Three appeals were preferred against it. They were heard together and disposed of by a common judgment dated 10-8-60 At the time the suit was instituted the Travancore—Cochin High Court Act 5 of 1925 M,E. (corresponding to 1949 A.D.) was in force. U/s. 20 of that Act read with S. 21 all appeals to the High Court valued at an amount in excess of Rs.1000/- had to be heard by a Division Bench consisting of two judges of the High Court. The appellants suit and the appeals taken by the respondent from the District Court and the Subordinate Judge were both valued at Rs.3000/- and, therefore, they would have been heard by a Division Bench of two Judges. Secs. 20 & 21 of the Act were in force on the date on which the appeals were instituted but the aforesaid Act was subsequently repealed by the Kerala High Court Act, 1959 which came into force on 3-3-59. The appeals were, therefore, placed for hearing before a Single Judge overruling the appellants plea that they should be only heard by a Division Bench. The appeals were, therefore, placed for hearing before a Single Judge overruling the appellants plea that they should be only heard by a Division Bench. The reason why an appeal was heard by a single Judge was that u/s. 6 of the Kerala High Court Act 5 of the 1959, the jurisdication of a single Judge to hear and dispose of appeal from an original decree was extended to appeals in which the value of the subject matter did not exceed Rs. 10,000/-. According to the learned counsel, the right to have the appeal heard by a Division Bench conferred by the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act which was in force not only when the suit but also when the appeals were filed, was not taken away by Kerala Act 5 of 1959 and could not be taken away by implication. In support of his contention, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Garikapati Veerava vs. N. Subbaiah Choudhry ( 1957 S.C.R. page 488 ) in which the following propositions were laid down— (1) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. (2) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. (3) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. (4) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of the filing of the appeal. (5) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. The learned counsel particularly laid stress on the third proposition. (5) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. The learned counsel particularly laid stress on the third proposition. While agreeing with the above approach, the learned Judge of the Supreme Court felt that the appellant could not obtain any benefit from what had been laid down in the above case. For in their opinion this was not a case where right of appeal conferred by law on the appellant had been taken away. It was observed by them that the right to prefer an appeal from the judgment of the court of first instance is derived from the provisions of sec. 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention of the learned counsel was that in that case the right of appeal was traceable to the provisions of Travancore-Cochin High Court Act of 1949. It was observed by the learned Judges of the Supreme Court that that Act was enacted for making provision regulating the business of the High Court of Travancore-Cochin for fixing the jurisdiction of single Judges, Division Benches and Full Benches and for certain other matters connected with the functions of the High Court. It did not purport to confer a right of appeal on the parties but merely dealt with procedural matters viz. matters which are dealt with by several High Courts under the Letters Patent. While dealing with this objection the learned Judges quoted with approval the view taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Ittavira Mathai vs. Karkey Varkey and another which is as follows: That reason is that an appeal lay to High Court and whether it is to be heard by one, two or larger number of judges is merely a matter of procedure. No party has a vested right to have his appeal heard by a specified number of judges. An appeal lay to the High Court and the appeal in question was in fact heard and disposed by the High Court and, therefore no right of the party has been infringed merely because it was heard by two judges and not by three judges. An appeal lay to the High Court and the appeal in question was in fact heard and disposed by the High Court and, therefore no right of the party has been infringed merely because it was heard by two judges and not by three judges. No doubt in certain classes of cases as for instance, cases which involve an interpretation as to any provision of the Constitution, the Constitution provides that the Bench of the Supreme Court hearing the matter must be composed of judges who will not be less than five in number. But it does not follow from this that the legal requirements in this regard cannot be altered by a competent body. We, therefore, overrule the contention of the learned counsel and hold that the appeal was rightly heard and decided by a Bench of two Judges." In the circumstances, the objection of the appellant was rejected. The learned Judges also took into consideration the contention of the learned counsel that by depriving the appellant of the right to have his appeal heard by a Division Bench his further right of appeal to the Supreme Court was affected and that since that right also vested in him when he instituted the suit it could not be taken away retrospectively except by an express provision. In repelling this contention the learned Judges observed that as no party had a vested right to have his appeal to be heard by more than one Judge of the High Court, no right to prefer an appeal under Art. 133 can be said to vest in him, the right under which being unavailable in case heard and disposed of by a single judge of the High Court. To my mind, this rule laid down by the Supreme Court is fully applicable to the present case. The right to special appeal is given u/s 10 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act which lays down the manner in which the jurisdiction of the Board has to be exercised. It lays down that except as otherwise provided by or under this Act or by any other law or enactment for the time being in force in the whole or any part of Rajasthan and subject to any rules made in that behalf, the jurisdiction of the Board may be exercised : (a) by the Chairman or any other member of the Board, sitting singly or. (b) by a Bench of the Board, consisting of two or more members. Provided that a party aggrieved by a decision of a single member shall have the right to make a special appeal to a bench consisting of two or more members of the Board within one month from the date of the decision of the single member. It is obvious that the question whether an appeal is to be heard by one, two or a particular number of members is merely a matter of procedure. No party has a vested right to have his appeal heard by a specified number of members. Prior to the issue of the Amending Act the revision applications in Sales Tax cases were heard by single Members. After the passing of the Amending Act, this jurisdiction was conferred upon a Division Bench consisting of two Members. Following the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of P. Moha-mmaed Meera Lebbai vs. Thrumalaya Gounder Ramaswamy Gounder and others, it may be observed that no right of the party has been infringed because the cases have now to be heard by two Members. The right of special appeal follows only if a case is heard by single member. If a case is initially heard by a D.B. no such right accrues to a party and, therefore, it cannot be said that there has been an infringement of its right. I would, therefore, with respect, follow the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of P. Mohammed Meera Lebbai vs. Thirumalaya Gounder Ramaswamy Gounder and others. The second ground on which my learned colleague proposes to dismiss the rectification petition is that u/s 17 an application for rectification has to be disposed of within a period of 120 days from the date of receipt thereof and as 120 days had elapsed by the time this application came for consideration it is his view that no order for rectification could be made. This question was examined by a D. B. of this Board consisting of the learned Chairman and myself in State vs. M/s Churu Ghani Oil Utpadak Sahkari Samiti Ltd. ( R.R.D. 1966 page 222 ).. Having examined the case law on the subject, we came to the conclusion that the period laid down in sec. 17 was of the nature of directory provision. Having examined the case law on the subject, we came to the conclusion that the period laid down in sec. 17 was of the nature of directory provision. It was observed by us that if it were deemed to be essential and imperative, it would subject the parties, who have no control over the authorities to suffer the consequences of the lapses arising from the decisions of such authorities. We therefore hold that to interpret the provisions of sec. 17 as mandatory would be tantamount to imposing a clog on the judicial discretion of a court and that to deny a court the right to rectify its mistakes after the lapse of the prescribed period would amount to a travesty of justice. It was observed by us that while the prescription of time limit on an individual might be mandatory, so far as a Court or a tribunal was concerned it must be deemed to be directory. In this view of the law, I have not been able to pursuade myself to accept this argument of my learned colleage. For the reasons given above, I would accept this rectification application and hold that all revisions pending at the time of the coming into force of the amending Act will be heard and disposed of by a Division Bench of this Board. However, as in the meantime, severelcases have been disposed of by single benches, following the rule laid down by the Larger Bench, I would invoke the aid of the doctrine of prospective overruling and hold that the cases which have been decided earlier should not be disturbed and the parties should be allowed to seek the benefit of the proviso to sec. 10 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act if they so feel called upon to do but the cases to be heard hereafter should be heard by a a Division Bench. Per Shri R.K. Chaturvedy—I endorse the views expressed by my learned colleague Shri G.B.K. Hooja and am of the opinion that the rectification application should be accepted.