I. D. Dua, C. J. ( 1 ) THIS is a second appeal under Section 39 of Delhi Rent Control Act of 1958 (hereinafter called the Act) and is directed against the order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated 11/3/1964 affirming the order, of the Rent Controller dated 21/9/1963 directing eviction of the tenant (appellant in this Court ). The Rent Controller gave to the tenant six months period whereafter the order was to be executed. The ground on which the order of eviction was made was bona fide requirement of the landlord within the contemplation of section 14 (l) (e) of the Act. ( 2 ) THE only point which has been canvassed before me on behalf of the appellant is that an application was made on 21/9/1963 before the Rent Controller for permission to adduce evidence in support of the assertion made on that date that Hari Ram, one of the petitioninglandlords had been allotted a quarter by the Railway and that he had falsely deposed before the Rent Controller that he had neither been allotted any quarter by the Government nor had he applied for such allotment. This application was disallowed because the case had been closed by that time and, according to the Rent Controller, no additional evidence could in the circumstances, be allowed. I may point out here that this application was supported by an affidavit affirmed by Shri C. D. Biswas to the following effect:- "that Shri Hari Ram son of Shri Bhagwan Dass was allotted and occupied with effect from 14/3/57, quarter No. C-14/g, Ground Floor, Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi. " ( 3 ) THIS affidavit, I may point out, contains some corrections in ink which do not seem to have been initialled by the Oath Commissioner. The corrections substitute the words "allotted and occupied" in place of the word "allotted" and the year 1957 also seems to have been substituted in place of presumably 1953 or 1959 . At this stage, my attention has been drawn by the learned counsel for the respondents to the fact that in this Court Shri Biswas has filed an affidavit, according to which Shri Hari Ram was residing at C/14-G, Railway Quarters, East Jangpura Extension, New Delhi, and that the said Hari Ram has been living in the said quarter since 14/3/1957, the same having been allotted to him by the Railway Authorities. The discrepancy to which my attention has been drawn by the learned counsel for the respondents, may not be very material, but it does suggest that the dependent has not cared to get precise information before swearing these two affidavits. ( 4 ) CATCHING the thread before diversion, the learned counsel for the appellant has very strongly argued that the learned Rent Controller was in error in declining to admit the evidence on the question of allotment of a railway quarter to Hari Ram, because if Hari Ram had tried to secure an order of eviction by leading false evidence, then it was. virtually a fraud on the Rent Controller and the better exercise of discretion would have been to permit the appellant to lead evidence exposing Hari Ram s falsehood. In this connection, it is necessary to point out that the learned Appellate Tribunal was not impressed by the bona fides of the appellant and it actually went to the length of describing this application to have been intended to delay the decision of the case. The appellate Tribunal in support of its view affirming refusal of the Controller to allow this additional evidence to fill in the lacuna, relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court reported as Arjan Singh Versus Kartar Singh and State of U. P. v. Manbodhan Lal,. Shri Kapur has submitted that Order 41, Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure which must be held applicable to proceedings under the Act by virtue of Rule 23 of the Delhi Rent Control Rules, is intended to enable the parties to adduce further evidence in cases like the present and the learned Rent Control Tribunal has committed a grievous error in not permitting such additional evidence. According to him, this case is directly covered by Rule 27 (1) (a) because the Controller had refused to allow additional evidence which ought to have been admitted. Some attempt has also been made to question the orders of the Controller and of the Tribunal below by presssing into service the provisions of Order 47, Rule I, Code of Civil Procedure, on the argument that this was a fit case for review, and it is submitted that, if a review could be competent it was certainly a good case for permitting additional evidence. ( 5 ) ON behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, it is argued that Order 41, Rule 27, can never be utilised for the purpose of filling lacuna which a party may have left while leading evidence and that it is not shown why the appellant could not have led whatever evidence he wanted to lead on the question of allotment of a railway quarter to Hari Ram at the time when his evidence was actually recorded. He has also taken me through the evidence of the witnesses for the purposeis of showing that the appellant was conscious of Hari Ram s residence and, therefore, if he was residing in a railway quarter, then by due diligence evidence could have been collected and produced on the point of allotment in his favour by the Railway Authorities. Having not adduced the entire relevant evidence at the trial, he could not claim any indulgence either from the Controller or from the Rent Control Tribunal for being permitted to fill in the gap. My attention at the Bar has also been drawn to a later decision of the Supreme Court in The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lala Panchem. It was observed in the reported case that under Order 41, Rule 27, the Appellate Court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined, but the requirement of the Appellate Court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment and the provision does not entitle the Appellate Court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment and it does not entitle the Appellate Court to let in fresh evidence only for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in a particular case. In other words, it is only for removing a lacuna in the evidence that the Appellate Court is empowered to admit additional evidence. ( 6 ) I have devoted serious attention to the case and, in my opinion, the discretion exercised by the Rent Control Tribunal is unexceptionable and the impugned order cannot be questioned on second appeal; more so in face of the provisions of section 39 of the Act. ( 6 ) I have devoted serious attention to the case and, in my opinion, the discretion exercised by the Rent Control Tribunal is unexceptionable and the impugned order cannot be questioned on second appeal; more so in face of the provisions of section 39 of the Act. It may be pointed out that the eviction application was made in August, 1962 and the written statement was filed in January, 1963. According to the statement of the appellant Shri C. D. Biswas, he had been living in this very house since 1/3/1957 and on an earlier occasion also, an apphoation for his eviction has been made, though without success. In these circusmstances, it cannot be said that with due diligence, he could not have obtained information about the alleged allotment of a railway quarter in favour of Hari Ram if he wanted to rely on it as a defence. Question were actually put to Hari Ram who had appeared as A. W. 4, in regard to the premises wherein he lived. It would thus be clear that want of diligence shown by the appellant was obvious and if the Rent Controller or the Rent Control Tribunal did not consider it just and proper to allow him to lead further evidence, it cannot be said that their orders are tainted with any grave legal infirmity so as to raise a substantial question of law calling for interference on second appeal under section 39 of the Act. The Rent Controller had a discretion to disallow evidence sought to be led after the close of the case and the exercise of his discretion has not been shown to be erroneous or contrary to law, and, in my opinion, not even to be improper. It is also noteworthy that the appellant has, so far, not cared to produce any copy of the alleged order of allotment of a railway quarter in favour of Hari Ram and he is apparently anxious only to have a remand order for an opportunity to produce evidence showing such allotment. Nothing has been stated as to how and when the appellant came to know of the alleged allotment and why he could not with due diligence have known about this fact and secured the necessary proof in support thereof. Nothing has been stated as to how and when the appellant came to know of the alleged allotment and why he could not with due diligence have known about this fact and secured the necessary proof in support thereof. The appellant s plea is far from impressive and it is difficult even to feel inclined on the appellant s affidavit that Hari Ram has been living in any railway quarter all through the period since 1957. I am in full agreement with the view of the Tribunal below. But this apart, the fact indisputably remains that there are three landlords and Smt. Lachmi Bai, mother of Hari Ram, is also one of them, who would prima facie seem entitled to claim eviction of the tenant for her bona fide personal requirement for occupying the premises in question. Nothing has been said at the Bar against this aspect and there is nothing on the record to show that she has been allotted any quarter or that she is entitled as of right to stay in any quarter which may have been allotted to Hari Ram, assuming it to be so. The submission that any order obtained on the basis of the false evidence must be held to have been obtained as a result of fraud upon the Court, is in my opinion, somewhat misconceived because the doctrine that fraud vitiates all judicial orders has a different content and an entirely different scope. Merely because some evidence which may later be found to have been untrue or even false, would not necessarily vitiate all judgments based thereon and justify the applicability of the doctrine that fraud vitiates all orders. ( 7 ) FOR the reasons foregoing, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.