JUDGMENT A.B.N. Sinha, J. In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has obtained a rule nisi calling upon the opposite parties to show cause as to why the order of detention dated the 4th July, 1967, passed under Section 3 (i) (a) (iii) and Section 4 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, be not quashed. Cause has been shown by opposite party no. 1, the State of Bihar, urging that the application was fit to be dismissed. 2. The order of detention (Annexure C), purporting to have been passed with a view to prevent the petitioner from indulging in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, has been attacked on the following four grounds: (1) that the facts stated in the grounds of detention were imaginary and non-existent, (2) that the order was mala fide and had been passed in abuse of the powers of the Government and in collusion with certain interested persons, (3) that there has been a violation of the provisions of Section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act in so far as the grounds of detention were served more than five days after the date of the detention, and (4) that the order of detention having been served on the petitioner when the petitioner was lying seriously ill unable to act and look into the affairs of his business for sufficiently long time in the future, the principle of the decision in the case of (I) Rameshwar Shaw V. District Magistrate, Burdwan and another (A.I.R 1964 Supreme Court 334) applied to the facts of this case and on that ground as well the order of detention was bad. 3. The last two grounds may be disposed of first. The facts relevant for appreciating those grounds are as under: According to the petitioner, the order of detention dated the 4th July, 1957 was put into execution even before the order of detention was served on him. His case is that he was taken into custody in the night of the 18th July, 1967, while the order of detention was served on him on the 20th July, 1967. According to the State, the petitioner was put under detention after the service of the detention order on the 20th July, 1967. His case is that he was taken into custody in the night of the 18th July, 1967, while the order of detention was served on him on the 20th July, 1967. According to the State, the petitioner was put under detention after the service of the detention order on the 20th July, 1967. One of the points in controversy, therefore, is whether the petitioner was taken into custody in the night of the 18th July, as alleged by him, or on the 20th July, 1967, as is the case of the State. In regard to the service of the grounds of detention on the petitioner, there is no dispute that the grounds were served on him at 6-15 p. m. on the 25th July, 1967. On the allegations made on behalf of the petitioner, as aforesaid, it has been contended that there has been a violation of the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), because the ground on which the order of detention had been made was served later than five days from the date of detention, and the order of detention was had on this account alone. In my opinion, on the facts of this case, it is not correct to say that the petitioner was detained at any time on the 18th July, 1967, as alleged on his behalf. It appears that the petitioner had been admitted as an indoor patient in the Darbhanga Medical College Hospital on the 11th of July, 1967. While the petitioner was thus absent from his home, the police appears to have gone to his village home to serve the detention order and to take him into custody. Later, as it appears from the station diary entry no.4l0 of the 19th July, 1967 of the Laheriasarai Police Station (Annexure B to the application) that a watch-party comprised of eight constables under a Havildar to keep a watch over the petitioner at the Hospital had been deputed during the night of the 18th July, 1967. It further appears from the said station diary that the deputation of the watch-party continued on the 19th of July, 1967. On the station diary, therefore, it is clear that all that the police did during the night of the 18th July and on the 19th was to keep a watch over the petitioner. It further appears from the said station diary that the deputation of the watch-party continued on the 19th of July, 1967. On the station diary, therefore, it is clear that all that the police did during the night of the 18th July and on the 19th was to keep a watch over the petitioner. Keeping a watch over a person cannot by itself amount to taking the person into custody. It was, however, been urged on behalf of he petitioner that in the circumstances of the present case when the petitioner was lying ill and confined to one of the beds as an indoor patient in a hospital, a watch-party comprised of eight constables could have no other meaning and effect other than taking the person, so confined to bed, into custody. I am unable to accept this contention. It appears from the station diary itself that the officer, who visited the Hospital on the 19th, took no action except explaining to the Havildar incharge of the watch-party the legitimate method in which the work of keeping a watch had to be carried out. If the petitioner was taken into custody, there is no reason why the police officer would have failed to make a note about it in the diary. Reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioner on the contents of the copy of a telegram sent from Laheriasarai on the 19th of July by one Satyanarain to Shree Lal Saraf, a brother of the petitioner, who was at the time staying at the Marwari Hotel, Frazer Road, Patna. This is Annexure 'E' to the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner. It reads as under : “Police came on the night of 18th at 23 HRS. surrounded Jiwach Pd. Saraf in the Hospital and have taken in their custody without serving any cause.” The arrival of the police party at the Hospital must have been followed by the members' of the party taking up positions at different places and that conduct of the party was interpreted by the sender of the telegram as tantamount to taking the petitioner into custody. That is, however, not the legal position. Section 3 A of Act lays down that “a detention order may be executed at any place in India in the manner provided for the execution of warrants of arrest under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898”. That is, however, not the legal position. Section 3 A of Act lays down that “a detention order may be executed at any place in India in the manner provided for the execution of warrants of arrest under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898”. The manner of execution of warrant of arrest is governed by Section 46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; and it provides that “in making an arrest the police-officer or other person making the same shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested, unless there be a submission to the custody by word or action.” There is no averment in the petition or in the telegram referred to above that either the Havildar incharge of the watch-party or any other person actually touched or confined the body of the petitioner. It may not have been necessary for the person executing the detention order to notify to the petitioner the substance of the detention order or to serve the detention order on him for actually taking the petitioner into custody, but in absence of any material to suggest that an arrest was effected of the petitioner in the manner laid down in Section 46 of the Criminal Procedure Code. I am constrained to hold that there is no merit in the petitioner's case that he was taken into custody on the night of the 18th July, 1967. It has been, however, urged on behalf of the petitioner that even if the detention of the petitioner was taken to have commenced in the forenoon of the 20th July, 1967, the grounds for detention having been served on the petitioner at 6.15 p. m. on the 25th July, 1967, there was a violation of Section 7 (1) of 1 he Act. There is no substance in this contention as well. The provision of Section 7 (1) requires that the grounds on which the order of detention has been made shall be communicated to the detenu as soon as may be, but not later than five days from the date of detention. Counting five days from the date of detention, that is, from the 20th July, 1967, the service of the grounds of detention at 6.15 p. m. on the 25th July, 1967 was within five days. Counting five days from the date of detention, that is, from the 20th July, 1967, the service of the grounds of detention at 6.15 p. m. on the 25th July, 1967 was within five days. The expression ‘five days from the date of detention’ means full five days from the expiry of the date of detention. In the instant case, five days will be calculated from the mid-night of the 20th till the mid-night of the 25th. It is obvious that on the provisions of Subsection (1) of Section 7, the detaining authority was entitled to full five days from the date of detention. In order, therefore, to give the detaining authority the aforesaid period of five days, the whole of the day on which the person concerned was detained must be excluded and the period of five days should be calculated from the end of that date. In my opinion, it is not permissible to break the date of detention into fraction and calculate the period of five days from the end of one or other fraction of the said date. It follows that the grounds of detention in the instant case were served not later than five days from the date of detention, the date of detention being the whole of the 20th of July, 1967, and, thus, there has been no contravention of Sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act, and the order of detention cannot be attacked on this ground. 4. The fourth grounds, urged on behalf of the petitioner, is also untenable. It is true that the petitioner was hospitalised at the time when the order of detention was served on him; but it has not been suggested, nor it could be suggested in the circumstances of this case that the petitioner's illness was such that he was unable to direct his business activities and hold consultations with his family members or partners in regard to those activities. The petitioner was suffering from hypertension and it could not be said that his mental faculties were in any manner affected or impaired. The present case, therefore, cannot be at par with the case of a person, who is already in jail custody when the order of detention is served on him. The petitioner was suffering from hypertension and it could not be said that his mental faculties were in any manner affected or impaired. The present case, therefore, cannot be at par with the case of a person, who is already in jail custody when the order of detention is served on him. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of (I) Rameshwar Shaw (A.I.R 1964 Supreme Court 334) at page 339 that “at the point of time when an order of detention is going to be served on a person, it must be patent that the said person would act prejudicially if he is not detained and that is a consideration which would be absent when the authority is dealing with a person already in detention”, because in the case of such a person it could not be rationally postulated that if he is not detained, he would act in a prejudicial manner. The present case is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the case of Rameshwar Shaw, and the detaining authority cannot be said to have acted irrationally in coming to the conclusion that it was necessary to detain the petitioner so as to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial manner to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. The nature of the illness of the petitioner, as is evident from the copies of the certificate of the Doctor and medical reports (Annexure A series to the application), was not such which can be said to have disabled the petitioner from directing his activities, he being free to move about, though not normally and always free (Sic) to meet anyone he liked as the exigencies of business might require. Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that the petitioner was to remain in hospital except for a very short period temporarily and, in the circumstances, the authority taking into consideration his antecedent activities could normally decide that it was necessary to detain him to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial manner to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community if his illness abated and he came out of the hospital. This ground, therefore, also fails. 5. The challenge to the validity of the detention order' on the ground of mala fides may now be adverted to. This ground, therefore, also fails. 5. The challenge to the validity of the detention order' on the ground of mala fides may now be adverted to. This challenge is founded on toe allegations made in Paragraphs 3 to 7 of the writ application. It has been stated in those paragraphs that the petitioner had been of Congress leanings and had helped the Congress from time to time with men and money during the general elections, that after coming into power of the non-Congress Government in this State, three Mukhiyas namely, Shri Nirmal Kant Jha, Shri Sobha Kant Jha and Shri Jaduhir Jha, belonging to the Praja Socialist Party, in league with the Block Development Officer of Ghoghardiha Block, started pestering the petitioner for money and free gift of articles to them, but the petitioner, who was carrying on his business honestly and had faith in the authority and justice of law, refused to submit to their coercion, that the above named persons got as many as four unjustified searches made in the petitioner's shop in the hope that some irregularity will be detected but no irregularity whatsoever was found, that in 1962 the local police authorities in collusion with aforesaid Shri Nirmal Kant Jha had started a false criminal case against the petitioner which naturally failed, and that it was when all these several attempts to falsely implicate the petitioner had failed that the impugned detention order was obtained on the basis of imaginary and false allegations by the local police authorities in collusion with Shri Nirmal Kant Jha. The aforesaid allegations were made in the application which was filed on the 25th July, 1967, before the grounds for detention had been served on the petitioner. The application was admitted on the 26th July, 1967, and the 28th of July, 1967 was fixed for hearing the petitioner's application for bail. A counter affidavit, affirmed by an Upper Division Assistant of the Political (Special) Department, Government of Bihar, was filed on behalf of the State of Bihar on the 28th July, 1967. It appears that this counter-affidavit was filed mainly with a view to oppose the prayer for bail. Paragraph 3 of this counter-affidavit merely stated that “the contents of Paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7 are denied”. It appears that this counter-affidavit was filed mainly with a view to oppose the prayer for bail. Paragraph 3 of this counter-affidavit merely stated that “the contents of Paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7 are denied”. The allegation made in Paragraph 5 of the application to the effect that the three Mukhiyas named in Paragraph 4 in league with the Block Development Officer of Ghoghardiha Block had got four unjustified searches made in the petitioner's shop without any result was not even denied. Apart from the bold and general statement made in Paragraph 3 of the counter-affidavit denying the contents of Paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7 of the application, it will be noticed that in Paragraph 10 of the counter affidavit the deponent has stated that the contents of Paragraphs 3 to 7, Paragraph 3 being the relevant Paragraph, were true to his knowledge, derived from the records of this case. It is not understandable how any knowledge about the alleged activities of the three Mukhiyas belonging to the Praja Socialist Party or of the Block Development Officer of Ghoghardiha Block acting in league with them, as alleged in Paragraph 4 of the application, or about the local police authorities threatening the petitioner to involve him in litigation unless he submitted to the illegal coercion and demand for illegal gratification, etc., as made in Paragraph 6 of the application, could be derived from the records of this case. It is apparent, therefore, that the allegations made in Paragraphs 3 to 7 cannot be said to have been dislodged in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State on the 28th July, 1967. The petitioner's application for being enlarged on bail during the pendency of the application was allowed on certain conditions by order dated the 28th July, 1967, and an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against that order was rejected on the 4th September, 1967. Finally, on the 15th September, 1967, the show cause petition on behalf of the State of Bihar was filed supported by an affidavit of the same Upper Division Assistant, Political (Special) Department, Government of Bihar, who had affirmed the counter-affidavit on behalf of the State of Bihar in opposition to the prayer for bail. In this show cause petition, none of the allegations made' in Paragraphs 3 to 7 have been denied or refuted. In this show cause petition, none of the allegations made' in Paragraphs 3 to 7 have been denied or refuted. By way of submission to the Court, it has, however, been submitted in Paragraph 8 of the show cause petition that “the local authorities had no intention to get the order of detention in order to cause insult or injury to the petitioner for the purpose of victimisation.” It appears from the affidavit portion of the show cause petition that-the content of this paragraph ha:, been clearly stated to be by way of submission to the Court. In view of the specific nature of the allegations made in the several paragraphs of the application, referred to above, it appears to me that the affidavit of a more competent person like the Block Development Officer of Ghoghardiha Block or some other responsible Officer from amongst the local officers, than a mere Upper Division Assistant working in the Secretariat at Patna, should have been filed by way of refutation of those allegations. As it is, on the state of the record, it must be held that most of the allegations bearing on the question of mala fides have remained unchallenged. It may, however, be pointed out that the allegations in the application in so far as they are against the three Mukhiyas are wholly ineffective in view of the fact that none of them have been impleaded as respondents in the application, and, as such, they had no opportunity to meet them, and, in the circumstances, no notice can be taken of that portion of the allegations in determining the question of mala fides. The residue of the allegations, however, remained challenged, but the difficulty is that they are so inextricably bound with the allegations made against the three Mukhiyas of which no notice can be taken that they have also to be ignored; and, once they are so ignored, the very foundation for the challenge to the validity of the detention order on the ground of mala fides disappears. The result is that even though the show cause petition filed on behalf of the State hardly purports to refute the charges as to the order of detention being collusive and being otherwise an abuse of the powers vested in the detaining authority, the petitioner having failed to implead the persons alleged to be the moving spirits behind the alleged collusion etc. his challenge to the validity of the detention order on the ground of mala fides must fail. 6. The contention on which great stress was laid on behalf of the petitioner at the hearing was one which has been mentioned as the first ground of attack to the order of detention in Paragraph 2 above. During the hearing of the bail matter, on the date on which the bail matter was heard, by way of reply to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State in that connection, a reply to the said counter-affidavit had been filed on behalf of the petitioner on the 28th July, 1967. By then, the grounds of detention had already been served on the petitioner. In Paragraph 6 of the affidavit in reply, while dealing with the grounds of detention, it was stated as under : “A true copy of the grounds is annexed herewith as Annexure ‘L’. Suffice it to say for the present purpose that the grounds are vague, mala fide, non-existent and illegal. Detailed reply in regard to the grounds served on the petitioner will be submitted at the proper time”. As already mentioned, the show cause petition on behalf of the State of Bihar was filed several days later on the 15th September, 1967. In the show cause petition, though the allegations that the order of detention was mala fide and that the grounds could not possibly or rationally support the conclusion drawn against the petitioner, were refuted, not a word was said about the allegation that the grounds were non existent. It may, however, be that as no such allegation was made in the main application, it was considered unnecessary to mention anything about the grounds being existent or non-existent in the show cause petition, though I fail to see why this should have been so. The affidavit-in-reply was filed in the presence of the State of Bihar; and, on the facts of this case, the main application having been filed even before the ground of detention had been served on the petitioner, the allegations made in the affidavit-in-reply should not have been lost sight of. The affidavit-in-reply was filed in the presence of the State of Bihar; and, on the facts of this case, the main application having been filed even before the ground of detention had been served on the petitioner, the allegations made in the affidavit-in-reply should not have been lost sight of. The petitioner, true to the averment made in Paragraph 6 of the affidavit in reply filed in connection with the bail matter and extracted above, submitted a detailed reply in regard to the grounds served on him by way of a supplementary affidavit on the 4th of November, 1967-the date on which the hearing of this application commenced. A copy of the supplementary affidavit had, however, been served on the learned Standing Counsel for the State of Bihar on the 28th September, 1967. In view of the fact that the supplementary affidavit had been filed on behalf of the petitioner after the show cause petition had already been filed on behalf of the State and also in view of the categorical and specific nature of the statements made them, and the several annexures appended to the supplementary affidavit in support of those statements, the learned Counsel appearing for the State of Bihar was informed by the Court on the very first day of the hearing that if the State so desired, it may file a supplementary show cause controverting, if possible, the several statements made in the supplementary affidavit or challenging the correctness or authenticity of the several annexures appended thereto. For reasons best known to the respondent-State, the opportunity so given was not availed of and no reply or counter in regard to any of the statements made in the supplementary affidavit relating to the non-existence of the facts contained in the grounds of detention was filed, with the result that the statements made in the supplementary affidavit characterising the facts in the grounds of detention as wholly inaccurate, non-existent and misleading have remained unchallenged. In the supplementary affidavit, besides reiterating the petitioner's stand regard to the detention order being mala fide and his arrest having been effected in the night of the 18th July, 1967 and denying each of the allegations made in the show cause petition filed on behalf of the State, each of the facts contained in the grounds of detention have been taken seriatim under Sub-paragraphs (i) to (xvii) of Paragraph 12 thereof, and it has been stated that they were untrue and nonexistent. In each case practically, reliance was placed on one annexure or another. It begins with saying that it was palpably false and baseless to say that the petitioner was doing business with his brother Onkar Mal Saraf. The fact was that the petitioner did his business in the name of his firm ‘Omkarmal Satyanarain’, which firm dealt in kerosene oil, sugar, foodgrains and cement, and the petitioner looked after this business of the firm as a partner merely. It was also palpably false that "the petitioner was or is a transporting agent for carrying the Government goods from the Railway station to the Government godown”. The petitioner's firm was also not a transporting agent. True copies of the certificates issued by the Assistant District Supply Officer, Madhubani (Annexures F and F/l) have been referred to in support of the above statements. An affidavit of one Bisolal Saraf son of Onkarmal Saraf, stating that his father died about twenty years ago and that no licence existed in the name of his father and that the petitioner was not the brother of late Shri Onkarmal Saraf, has also been appended and has been marked Annexure 'G'. In regard to the charge contained in Paragraph 2 of the grounds of detention, it has been stated that there is no man of the name of Janak Rai of Laukahi Bazar within Phulparas Police Station, and, accordingly, no question of the petitioner selling 20 bags of sugar and 16 tins of kerosene oil or any quantity thereof to Janak Rai could arise. In support of this statement, a true copy of the certificate issued by the Mukhiya, Gram Panchayat, Laukahi, has been annexed and marked Annexure 'H'. In support of this statement, a true copy of the certificate issued by the Mukhiya, Gram Panchayat, Laukahi, has been annexed and marked Annexure 'H'. It has been further stated that the petitioner's firm was a whole sale dealer in sugar and kerosene oil, and it has to distribute the same to retail dealers in pursuance of the permits issued by the Supply Department including the Block Development Officer and the Subdivisional Officer, and accordingly, whatever quantities of sugar and kerosene oil were allotted to the petitioner were distributed on the basis of the permits. In support of this allegation, the true copies of the sale registers and permits have been annexed and marked Annexures ‘I’ series. Charge no. 3 has also been characterised as false. It has been stated that the petitioner was neither a stockist of Government food grains, nor he was a transporting agent for carrying the Government foodgrains. He was also not a dealer in fair-price shop, and, in the circumstances, there could be no possibility by any stretch of imagination to obtain milo and to sell it to anybody including Tapsi Sah. It has been stated that no case has been either instituted against the petitioner or against the petitioner's firm under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act for the alleged sale of mila; and, in this connection, a true copy of the first information report lodged by one Sukhdeo Singh constable at Laukahi Police Station on the 11th November, 1966 at 4.30 p. m. (Annexure 'J') has been annexed showing that a case in connection with the sale of milo has been really instituted against other persons and not against the petitioner, and further that Tapsi Sah has been shown in the first information report as a resident of Narhia Bazar and not of Laukahi Bazar at all. In order to further strengthen this case, a true copy of a certificate issued by the Mukhiya of Laukahi Gram Panchayat has been annexed and marked Annexure 'K'. In regard to Charge no. In order to further strengthen this case, a true copy of a certificate issued by the Mukhiya of Laukahi Gram Panchayat has been annexed and marked Annexure 'K'. In regard to Charge no. 4 the denial that there is no man of the name of Janak Rai in Laukahi has been reiterated; and, in regard to ground no; 5, it has been asserted that Shivajee Sah was the authorised dealer of sugar, and he held a licence for the same in the name of his full brother, Shri Bhola Prasad, and, accordingly, it was wrong to say that Shivajee Sah had no licence to sell sugar. It has been further asserted that the petitioner never sold 48 bags of sugar at a higher price to aforesaid Shri Shivajee Sah, as alleged, and that this was so was proved on the affidavit sworn to by Shri Shivajee Sah himself; a true copy of which has been attached and marked Annexure ‘L’. It appears from a perusal of the affidavit that the alleged purchaser Shivajee Sah had stated on oath that he had never purchased sugar on the 29th November, 1966 and that whenever he purchased, he purchased on valid permits issued by the Block Development Officer, Laukahi, on proper price. In regard to ground no.6, the sales of sugar or atta to Shri Sitaram Sah of Ghoghardiha on the 25th December, 1966 and of kerosene oil to Gangai Mandal on the same day have been denied; and, true copies of affidavits sworn to by Sitaram Sah and Gangai Mandal have been filed in support of the denial and have been marked as Annexures 'M' and 'Mil'. It has been stated that the charge was false and concocted. Likewise, in regard to ground no. 7, any sale of kerosene oil either to Panch Nath Jha of Ghoghardiha or to Chuthru Rout on the 29th December, 1966 has been denied; and, in support of the denial, true copies of their affidavits marked as Annexures 'N’ and ‘Nil’ have been put in. In regard to ground no. Likewise, in regard to ground no. 7, any sale of kerosene oil either to Panch Nath Jha of Ghoghardiha or to Chuthru Rout on the 29th December, 1966 has been denied; and, in support of the denial, true copies of their affidavits marked as Annexures 'N’ and ‘Nil’ have been put in. In regard to ground no. 8, it has been asserted that there was no man of the name of Panchu Mandal in Laukahi Bazar; and, in support of this assertion a true copy of a certificate of the Mukhiya of the Gram Panchayat had been annexed and marked Annexure ‘O’, In the circumstances, it has been stated that question of sale of kerosene oil to Panchu Mandal did not arise at all. In regard to the alleged sale of 16 bags of sugar to Shivajee Sah, reference has been invited to the affidavit of Shivajee Sah (Annexure ‘L’), wherein he has stated that he did not purchase sugar on the 30th December, 1966. This ground is also claimed to be wholly false. Ground no. 9 has also been characterised as fabricated and false. It has been stated that as will appear from the true copies of the affidavits sworn to by Bhagwat Sah and Bishwambhar (Annexures ‘P’ and ‘P/1’) they never purchased kerosene oil from the petitioner on any day whatsoever. In regard to ground no. 10, sale of kerosene oil to Shri Kedar Jha on the 5th January, 1967 has been denied; and, in support thereof true copy of the affidavit sworn to by Shri Kedar Jha himself has been filed and marked Annexure ‘Q’. The allegation that the petitioner's firm had sold 18 tins of kerosene oil to Shri Jha of Ghoghardiha has also been denied, and in this connection it has been pointed out that Shri Jha was himself a licensed dealer in kerosene oil since 1963, the licence standing in his full name which was Sri Narain Jha. A true copy of the certified copy of the kerosene oil licence granted in his name has been annexed and marked Annexure ‘E’. It has been further pointed out that aforesaid Shri Jha or Sri Narain Jha, as his full name is, has not come forward to swear any affidavit, because he was under the influence of his brother, Shri Nirmal Kant Jha, Mukhiya of Ghoghardiha, who was at the root of all the trouble. It has been further pointed out that aforesaid Shri Jha or Sri Narain Jha, as his full name is, has not come forward to swear any affidavit, because he was under the influence of his brother, Shri Nirmal Kant Jha, Mukhiya of Ghoghardiha, who was at the root of all the trouble. In regard to ground no. 11 as well, the alleged sale of either maida or of kerosene oil till the 5th May, 1967 to Panch Nath Jha and to Debu Mishra respectively have been denied; and in support of the denial, true copies of affidavits sworn to by the aforesaid two persons (Annexures ‘N’ and ‘S’) have been filed. It has been further pointed out that the petitioner did not deal in maida, and, as such, maida has never been allotted to the petitioner by the Government, and, therefore, the question of sale of maida to Panch Nath Jha or to anyone did not arise. In connection with the alleged sale of kerosene oil on the 5th May, 1967, the supplementary affidavit further points out that the available stock as on the 5th May, 1967 was the reserved stock of the Subdivisional Officer from which no quantity could be sold to anyone except on permit issued Ly the Subdivisional Officer. ‘The allegation that 18 tins of kerosene oil were sold at the rate of Rs. 14/- per tin was untrue. In regard to ground no. 12 it has been stated that neither Bhola Jha nor Jagernath Jha of Ghoghardiha was a relation or friend of the petitioner, nor they were even on visiting terms with the petitioner. It has been further stated that on the 31st March, 1967, the Second Officer of Madhubani had visited the place of the petitioner and checked the account books and registers and stock but had not found anything wrong. The petitioner has disclaimed all connection with 51 bags of rice which, it is alleged, was being carried on Truck no. BRF 4322. A copy of the first information report of the case lodged in this connection (Annexure “T”) has been filed to show that t he petitioner was not named as an accused in that case. In substance, in regard to charge no. 12, the petitioner's case is that he or his men had nothing to do with the alleged smuggling of rice on the 31st March, 1967 through Truck no. In substance, in regard to charge no. 12, the petitioner's case is that he or his men had nothing to do with the alleged smuggling of rice on the 31st March, 1967 through Truck no. BRF 4322. In regard to ground no. 13, the last ground, it has been stated that the stock of cement with the petitioner was found correct as per stock register on the 15th May, 1967. The stock register showed 691 bags of cement and there were, in fact, 691 bags of cement in stock. 210 bags of cement, mentioned in the charge, were found and seized from the Railway godown and not from the godown or shop of the petitioner, and the petitioner had nothing to do with the said 210 bags of cement and has never claimed the same. It is true that in regard to 691 bags of cement, the petitioner was pursuing his legal remedies for getting them released, and Criminal Revision no. 1423 of 1967 in that connection was pending in this court. It has been further pointed out that cement was no longer a controlled commodity; and, neither its price nor its distribution was controlled by the Government. In substance, the petitioner has denied his connection in respect of 210 bags of cement; alleged to have been seized from the Railway godown, and it does not appear from the charge that there was any case in regard to 691 bags of cement found in the petitioner's godown. In conclusion, it has been stated that the charges were imaginary, baseless and factually incorrect, as they are based on non-existing facts. It has been pointed out that it is significant that though huge quantities of sugar and kerosene oil are alleged to have been sold by the petitioner illegally and in an unauthorised manner, no case has ever been started against the petitioner or his firm at any time; nor has any case been started against any alleged purchasers whose addresses were fully known, according to the charge, to the Government. It has been asserted on the other hand that the petitioner, who was a wholesale dealer, has been entering every sale in his sale register and has been preserving the permits for verification by the authorities, who have been checking those registers from time to time and have never found any foul play in any of the transactions. It has been asserted on the other hand that the petitioner, who was a wholesale dealer, has been entering every sale in his sale register and has been preserving the permits for verification by the authorities, who have been checking those registers from time to time and have never found any foul play in any of the transactions. They have rather granted certificates to the petitioner from time to time confirming the honest dealings and straightforward manner of the petitioner in respect of his business dealings. A true copy of one such certificate granted on the 22nd January, 1967 (Annexure 'U') has been attached to the supplementary affidavit. It will be noticed that except grounds 11, 12 and 13, the rest of the grounds all relate to a period before the grant of the certificate marked Annexure 'U', wherein the Assistant District Supply Officer, Madhubani (Darbhanga) has categorically stated that there was nothing in official records to show that the firm of the petitioner has been committing irregularities or has been using unfair means or has been indulging in mal practices in the conduct of its business. On the basis of the statements made in the supplementary affidavit, as summarised above, it has been urged for the petitioner that even if some of the grounds as furnished to the petitioner, if not all, were non-existent, the order of detention must be held to be bad. It has been urged, for intsance, that on the copies of the first information reports (Annexures 'J' and. 'T') and on the copy of the kerosene oil lincence standing in the name of Sri Narain Jha (Annexure 'R'), ground nos. 3, 10 and 12 or the salient facts' on which those grounds were based must be held to be non-existent on the face of them independent of the question of any evidence in regard to them. In regard to ground no. 3, 10 and 12 or the salient facts' on which those grounds were based must be held to be non-existent on the face of them independent of the question of any evidence in regard to them. In regard to ground no. 13, it has been pointed out that the fact of the seizure of 210 bags of cement, even if true, could not be said to have any rational connection with the objects for which the order of detention purports to have been passed, firstly, because the petitioner had no interest at all in those bags of cement, and, secondly, because on or about the date of seizure cement had been already decontrolled, and activities in relation thereto could hardly be considered to be connected with the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. In regard to the remaining grounds as well, it has been contended that the statements in regard to each of them, supported as they are by either affidavits or certificates of competent persons or by both having remained uncontroverted, should be accepted on their face value for the purpose of this application, and it should be held that all those grounds or the facts on which they rest were equally non-existent. Learned counsel for the respondent-State of Bihar has, on the other hand, contended that the facts alleged in the grounds must be taken to be correct, and no investigation as to their truth or otherwise so could be undertaken by the court. It has been urged that the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner was full of self serving statements, and. in any case, further investigation with a view to determine the truth or otherwise of those statements could not be ruled out, and, as no such further investigation could be undertaken in a writ application, the challenge to the order of detention on the plea that the grounds of detention or facts on which they were passed were non-existent, could not be entertained. Reliance has been placed on behalf of the respondent on certain observations made in a Bench decision of this court in (2) Madan Lal V. The State of Bihar and others (A.I.R. 1951 Patna 153). A careful perusal of that decision, however, shows that it lends little support to the respondent's contention. Reliance has been placed on behalf of the respondent on certain observations made in a Bench decision of this court in (2) Madan Lal V. The State of Bihar and others (A.I.R. 1951 Patna 153). A careful perusal of that decision, however, shows that it lends little support to the respondent's contention. In that case, the grounds on which the order of detention had been passed had been sought to be explained by the detenu concerned. In substance, the detenu had given his counter version of the case. In those circumstances Narayan, J., with whom Das, J. concurred in a separate judgment, made the following observation : “The explanations, in my opinion are not such as can be easily accepted............... The facts mentioned in the grounds did exist, and if two inferences including the one that was drawn by the State Govt. are possible on those facts, it is not open to us to say that particular inference should not have been drawn by the State Govt. This is not a case in which it can be held that the affidavit filed by the detenu discloses such strong circumstances as can show that the alleged facts or grounds are not in existence. “Later, after referring to certain decisions of the Federal Court and the Supreme Court, his Lordship made the observation on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the respondent. He observed that : “We can in no case undertake an investigation as to the truth or otherwise of the materials on which the satisfaction of the executive. authority is grounded. The facts alleged have to be taken to be correct and it will not be a ground for interference if the detenu merely puts forwards a counter-version. Putting a counter-version is not the same thing as placing circumstances which can go to establish that the alleged facts or grounds are non est”. Reading the two passages, extracted above, together in the light of the facts of that case, it is apparent that the existence of the facts mentioned in the grounds on which the order of detention had been passed in that case was not at all in dispute, for instance, it was admitted that five bales of saris and dhotis had been found in excess on the 4th October, 1951, when the stock of the detenu had been checked. The detenu, Madanlal, sought to explain away that fact by stating that the five bales of saris and dhotis found in his stock on the relevant date really belonged to different purchasers who had not removed them from the premises of the detenu, because they had not made the payments for those bales and further they had not been able to arrange for transport. In such circumstances, it was observed that that was a case in which it can be said that the detenu had disclosed such strong circumstances as could show that the alleged facts or grounds were not in existences. Das, J., who, as mentioned above, delivered a separate but a concurring judgment elucidated the point further in the following words : “We have had three kinds of affidavits filed on behalf of the detenus: one kind consisted of a mere denial of the grounds or facts alleged; the second kind consisted of an attempted explanation of the facts alleged, the truth of the explanation depending on credibility of evidence; & the third kind disclosed circumstances which rendered the grounds, or the facts on which the grounds were founded, completely non-existent; that is, inaccurate on the face of them, without the necessity, & independent of the question of any evidence.” It follows that if there is an affidavit on behalf of a particular detenu which falls in the category of the third kind of affidavit spoken of by Das, J. In the passage, extracted above, no investigation as to the truth or otherwise of the statements made in such an affidavit appears to be called for, and the court can always on the basis of those statements come to the conclusion that the ground or grounds on which the order of detention was passed were completely non-existent. It may, however, be pointed out that though normally a writ court will not and does not embark upon an investigation in to disputed facts by permitting the parties to lead such evidence as they might desire, there is nothing in law to prevent the court from doing so in an appropriate case, where the ends of justice so require. It may, however, be pointed out that though normally a writ court will not and does not embark upon an investigation in to disputed facts by permitting the parties to lead such evidence as they might desire, there is nothing in law to prevent the court from doing so in an appropriate case, where the ends of justice so require. it is, however, unnecessary to pursue this point any further in the instant case because, in my opinion, the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner besides being uncontroverted, even though sufficient opportunity was given to the respondent to do so if it so desired, has disclosed documents like true copies of first information reports, true copy of the relevant licence, copies of affidavits of numerous competent persons and of certificates as to the non-existence of a particular person of a particular village by the Mukhiya of that particular village and finally a certificate from the Assistant District Supply Officer, Madhubani (Darbhanga) dated the 22nd January, 1967 confirming the honest dealings and the straightforward manner of the petitioner in respect of his business dealings, at least up to the date when the said certificate was granted, which all taken conjunctively render the grounds of detention or at least ground nos. 3, 10, 12 and 13 or the facts on which those and the other grounds were founded wholly non-existent. In short, the supplementary affidavit in the instant case falls in the category of the third kind of affidavit described by Das, J. in the passage, extracted above, in the decision reported in (2) A.I.R. 1951 Patna 153 (x Madanlal's case). There appears to be no reason why the statements in the supplementary affidavit supported as they are by the various documents, mentioned above, should not be accepted as correct and true on their face. It is significant that the state with full knowledge of the implications of the several statements made in the supplementary affidavit including the contents of the certificate granted by the Assistant District Supply Officer, Madhubani (Darbhanga), Annexure 'U', has not filed any reply whatsoever. It is significant that the state with full knowledge of the implications of the several statements made in the supplementary affidavit including the contents of the certificate granted by the Assistant District Supply Officer, Madhubani (Darbhanga), Annexure 'U', has not filed any reply whatsoever. In a recent decision of this court in (3) Gaya Singh v. State (1967 B.L.J.R 771) at page 776, a Bench of this court, after repelling the contention raised on behalf of the State that it was not for this court to consider whether any of the grounds are non-existent, observed that if the ground on which the order of detention purports to be passed is non-existent in fact, the very foundation on which the order is based stands demolished”. In the result, I am constrained to hold that the first ground of attack to the order of detention on the basis that the facts stated in the grounds of detention were imaginary and non-existent is well• founded and must be accepted. The consequence is that the very foundation on which the order of detention rests disappears, and the order of detention must, therefore, be quashed. Even if it were assumed that only some of the grounds, namely, grounds 3, 10, 12 and 13 can be said to have been shown as nonexistent and not all the grounds, yet the result will not be different. It is now well settled that if some out of the several grounds are found to be non-existent, the court being unable to predicate what the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority would have been if those grounds had been excluded from consideration by the detaining authority, the order of detention itself must be quashed, because to uphold the validity of such an order despite the fact that some of the grounds were nonexistent would really amount to substituting the objective standard by the court for the subjective satisfaction of the statutory authority. 7. In the result, this application succeeds. The order of detention passed against the petitioner is quashed and he is directed to be discharged from his bail bond. Application allowed.