JUDGMENT : A. Misra, J. - Defendants are the Appellants and the appeal has been preferred against a reversing judgment. Plaintiff Respondent's case is that Kuanr Khan, deceased father of Defendants borrowed Rs. 2,000/- from him on 16-1-1952 and executed the suit mortgage bond. Kuanr Khan died before repaying the loan and the Defendants have succeeded to his properties. Hence the suit was filed to recover the principal and interest due under the mortgage bond. It is further alleged by the Plaintiff that at the time of advancing the suit loan to Kuanr Khan, he had no money-lending business, though subsequently he got himself registered as a moneylender under the Orissa Money Lenders Act. 2. Defendant-Appellants, besides challenging the valid execution and attestation of the mortgage bond, resisted the claim on three grounds. Firstly, it is alleged by them that though a mortgage bond for Rs. 2,000/- was taken, actually Rs. 1,500/- had been advanced under the document. Secondly, it is alleged by them that the mortgage dues have been fully satisfied by payment of Rs. 700/- in cash in two instalments of Rs. 500/- on 31-7-1953; Rs. 200/- on 2-10-1954 and the balance was satisfied by giving ornaments worth Rs. 1,000/- described in the schedule. Lastly, it is alleged that the suit is not maintain able by the Plaintiffs as it is bit by Section 8 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act. 3. The trial Court accepted the aforementioned three contentions of Defendants and dismissed the suit on the finding that only Rs. 1,500/- and not Rs. 2,000/- had been advanced under the suit mortgage bond; that Rs. 700/- in cash had been repaid towards the mortgage dues and that the suit is not maintainable by the Plaintiffs under the provisions of Section 8 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act. The lower appellate Court reversed all these three findings and held that Rs. 2,000/- was advanced under the suit mortgage bond (Ex. 3); that the alleged payment of Rs. 700/- by Defendants has not been proved and that the suit is not hit by Section 3 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act as at the time of advancing the loan Plaintiff was not a professional money-lender and did not become a professional money-lender (sic) 1954. 4. 3); that the alleged payment of Rs. 700/- by Defendants has not been proved and that the suit is not hit by Section 3 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act as at the time of advancing the loan Plaintiff was not a professional money-lender and did not become a professional money-lender (sic) 1954. 4. The three points that arise for decision in this appeal are as follows: (1) Whether the suit mortgage bond is supported by consideration to the extent of Rs. 2, 000/-, as alleged by the Plaintiff or Rs. 1, 500/., as alleged by the Defendants; (2) Whether the mortgage dues have been satisfied to the extent of Rs. 700/- alleged to have been paid by Defendants in two instalments ; and (3) Whether the suit by the Plaintiff to recover the mortgage dues is maintainable, in view of the provisions contained in Section 8 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act. 5. The first two points are questions of fact and the lower appellate Court, on a consideration of the evidence, found that the suit mortgage bond is supported by consideration to the extent of Rs. 2,000/- and that Defendants have failed to prove the alleged payment of Rs. 700/- in two instalments towards the mortgage dues. These being findings of fact are not open to be reagitated in second appeal. 6. The points urged by learned Counsel for Appellants here are firstly that the lower appellate Court has erred in disposing of the appeal without passing any order on a petition filed by Appellants who were Respondents in the lower appellate Court for permitting additional evidence, and secondly that it has erred in law in holding that the suit is not hit by Section 8 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act. 7. Coming to the first contention, the record of the lower appellate Court shows that on 14-3-1964 arguments were heard and the appeal was posted for judgment to 303-1964. The Appellants who were Respondents there filed certified copies of the judgment and decree in M.S. 512/3 of 1961/64 with a petition supported by an affidavit for admitting them as additional evidence on 20-3-1964. On this application, an order was passed to put up the matter for further argument on the date already fixed for judgment, i.e. 30-3-1964. On this date, arguments were again heard in part and it was reposted to 16-4-1964: to hear further arguments. On this application, an order was passed to put up the matter for further argument on the date already fixed for judgment, i.e. 30-3-1964. On this date, arguments were again heard in part and it was reposted to 16-4-1964: to hear further arguments. On the said date, arguments were concluded and the appeal was posted to 15-5-1964 for judgment on which date judgment was delivered. For Appellants, it is contended that though they had filed the petition on 20-3-1964 for admitting additional evidence, no specific order was passed on it one way or the other, and therefore, an irregularity has been committed in disposing of the appeal. It is true that no Specific order has been passed on this application filed by the present Appellants on 20-3-1964 for admitting additional evidence, but the subsequent orders do not indicate that this petition was specifically moved or pressed. As it appears, on the subsequent two dates, i.e. 30-3-1964 and 10.4.1964, further arguments on the merits of the appeal were heard and there is nothing to show that in the course of arguments Appellants pressed their petition for additional evidence. In the circumstances, as the Appellants did not move the application subsequent to its filing and invite orders thereon, the absence of a specific order on the said application cannot affect the validity of the judgment of the lower appellate Court. 8. u/s 8 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act, a "money lender" is debarred from instituting a suit for recovery of a "loan" advanced by him after the date on which the said section came into force unless he was registered under the Act at the time when such loan was advanced. There is no dispute that Section 8 of the Act came into force during the early part of 1950. There is also no dispute that Plaintiff got himself registered as a money lender under the Act only in the year 1954. Section 2(j) Act defines the expression "Money-lender" for the purpose of Section 8 as a person who advances loans in the regular course of business of money-lending. Section 2(b) defines the expression. "Business of money-lending" as business of advancing loans and the expression "Loan" has been defined in Section 2(i) of the Act. 9. Section 2(j) Act defines the expression "Money-lender" for the purpose of Section 8 as a person who advances loans in the regular course of business of money-lending. Section 2(b) defines the expression. "Business of money-lending" as business of advancing loans and the expression "Loan" has been defined in Section 2(i) of the Act. 9. In the present case, the suit loan was advanced on a date subsequent to the date on which Section 8 came into force and prior to the date Plaintiff got himself registered as a "money lender" in the year 1954. The maintainability or otherwise of the suit therefore depends an the question whether Section 8 is applicable. The applicability of Section 8 will depend on the question whether the suit, loan was advanced in the regular course of money-lending business. According to Plaintiff, at the date the suit loan was advanced, he was not engaged in money-lending business and the said loan was not advanced in the course of any such business, but it was an isolated transaction and the loan was advanced by way of accommodation but of sympathy to Defendants' father who was well known to him. On the other hand, the contention of Defendant-Appellants is that Plaintiff was carrying an business of money-lending and the suit loan was advanced to their father in the course of the said business. They deny that it was an isolated transaction by way of accommodating a friend. Some decisions have been cited by the parties in support of their respective contentions as to the circumstances in which a loan can be said to have been advanced in the course of business of money-lending and the circumstances in which it is to be treated as an isolated transaction not in the course of any regular business. It is not necessary to refer to all the decisions cited as the question was considered in a decision of our High Court reported in Kotini Kashinath Senapathy v. Sadi Brahmanandam ILR 1904 Cutt. 941, in which the various decisions have been noticed and the correct position of law has been enunciated as fallows: On examination of authorities, the principle appears to be clear that in deciding the question whether there is regular course of business of money-lending, each case must be decided upon its own facts and peculiar features, and no hard and fast rule can be laid down. But one thing is manifest that to hold that the business is in regular course the Court must record a finding that not only there is a repetition of the loan, but there must be continuity in the transaction and the business of money-lending must be a part and parcel of a system. 10. The trial Court relied on the averments in para 2 of the plaint besides proof of a transaction of money-lending by Plaintiff under Ex. A on 20-2-1950 and the fact that the transactions carried interest, to arrive at its conclusion that Plaintiff was entering into these transactions for the purpose of making gain by way of interest and disbelieved the Plaintiff's contention that the suit loan was advanced by way of accommodating a friend. The lower appellate Court, on the other hand, reversed this finding and held that Plaintiff was not engaged in the business of money-lending on the date of advancing the suit loan on the ground that there is nothing to show that Plaintiff had advanced loans to anybody else since the date of enforcement of Section 8 and within two years after that date. It has failed to take into consideration the averments in para 2 of the plaint as well as instances of money-lending admitted by the Plaintiff in his evidence while holding that Section 8 will not be applicable to him as he was not engaged in the business of money-lending on the date of advancing the suit loan. In paragraph 2 of the plaint, it has no doubt been averred that at the time of advancing the suit loan, Plaintiff was not engaged in regular money-lending business. At the same time, Plaintiff has admitted in the same para that as gradually there was an increase in the number to his debtors, he got himself registered as a money-lender with a capital of Rs. 5,000/- in the year 1954. This statement in the plaint is significant, inasmuch as, Plaintiff is conscious of the fact that there was a gradual increase in the number of his debtors subsequent to the date of the suit loan. He does not say that on any date subsequent to the date of the suit loan, he started money-lending business and thereafter there was a gradual increase of his debtors. The gradual increase referred to by him is in relation to the date of the suit loan. He does not say that on any date subsequent to the date of the suit loan, he started money-lending business and thereafter there was a gradual increase of his debtors. The gradual increase referred to by him is in relation to the date of the suit loan. Further, as already found by the Courts below, Ex. A is one of the transactions of money-lending by the Plaintiff in the year 1950 prior to the date of the suit loan. Ex. 2 has been filed by Plaintiff purporting to be the register maintained by him for his money-lending business. This Ex. 2 shows money-lending transactions from 24-12-1954, i.e. subsequent to his registration under the Money Lenders Act. In his evidence, however, Plaintiff admits to have advanced loans of Rs. 1,001/- to Sk. Baku; Rs. 1,000/- to Sk. Samad; Rs. 1,000/- to Sk. Samu ;Rs. 100/- to Sk. Waheb; Rs. 700/- to Sk. Jabar and RH. 300/- to Ganu Khan. Out of these admitted transactions, the advance of loans relating to Sk. Baku, Sk. Samad, Sk. Samu find place in Ex. 2 among other transactions which have been advanced subsequent to the date of his registration. Similarly, there is an entry relating to an advance of Rs. 500/- to Sk. Waheb in 1957. Plaintiff states that he cannot give the dates of advance of the loans Admitted by him in evidence' other than those that find place in Ex. 2. Admittedly, the loan of Re. 300/- in Ex. A to Ganu Khan was on 20-2-1950. Thereafter, there was the suit transaction of Rs. 2,000/- on 16.1-1952. The advance of loans of Rs. 100/- to Sk. Waheb; Rs. 700/- to Sk. Jabar which do not find mention in Ex. 2 must have been prior to the date of his registration in 1954. Of course, Defendants have not, adduced any evidence to prove other specific transactions of money-lending by Plaintiff prior to his registration in 1964. At the same time, the aforementioned transactions ranging from 1950 to 1964 together with the averments in para 2 of the plaint that gradually the number of his debtors increased after the date of the suit loan which necessitated his registration in 1954 leads to the reasonable inference that Plaintiff had engaged himself in money-lending business at least from 1950 onwards and that the suit transaction was not an isolated one, as alleged to accommodate a friend. Necessarily, the suit transaction being one among other transactions which took place during this period, must be deemed to be one advanced in the course of money-lending business. No doubt the concept of business imports notions of system, repetition and continuity, but this does not necessarily imply that unless a large number of transactions are proved, it will not amount to a business. In the present case, the transactions from 1950 on wards were all for interest and money had been lent to different persons from time to time on terms of such interest. Therefore, taking into consideration the averments in para 2 of the plaint together with the proof of transactions between 1950 and 1954 and the consciousness of Plaintiff that on gradual increase in the number of his debtors he got himself registered in 1954, there can be no room for doubt that Plaintiff was engaged in money-lending business at the date he advanced the suit loan and the loan was advanced in the course of the said business. Hence, I find that Section 8 is clearly applicable to this ease and the suit is not maintainable. 11. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the lower appellate Court is set aside and the judgment of the trial Court is restored with costs throughout. Final Result : Allowed