JUDGMENT S.P. Singh J. – Srimati Urmila Devi, wife of Shri Harishankar Prasad Singh, resident of Mohalla Amgola, one of the quarters of Muzaffarpur town, has preferred this revision challenging the validity of the order dated the 25th of August, 1966, passed by Shri J.P. Sharma, a Magistrate of the First Class at Muzaffarpur in connection with a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal procedure. 2. The order in question is with regard to restoration of possession to Srimati Renu Ghosh, Opposite Party No.2 over a piece of land with houses standing thereon bearing Holding Nos. 594 and 595 in Ward No. XII of Muzaffarpur Municipality. It is noticeable that the property in question has been the subject-matter of a prolonged litigation. Both these holdings comprised an area of 16 kathas and odd and there is one pucca and one kutch a house standing over a portion of these holdings. Admittedly, they belonged to Nirmal Mukherjee and his two brothers, sons of Ambika Charan Mukherjee. Urmila Devi, the petitioner, claims to have acquired one third interest which belonged to Nirmal Charan Mukherjee whereas Renu Ghosh, Opposite Party No.2, wife of Dr. A.K. Ghosh, Opposite Party No.1, claims to have acquired two-third share belonging to the other two Mukherjee brothers under different sale-deeds executed in the year 1962. 3. A dispute arose with regard to the possession over these properties between Opposite Party Nos. 1 and 2 on one side and Opposite Party No.3, Rajendra Prasad Singh, a relation of Urmila Devi, on the other. As there was likelihood of a breach of peace on account of this dispute, a proceeding under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was started by the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Sadar, Mazaffarpur, on the 8th of June, 1962 on receipt of police report. On the 30th of July, 1962 that proceeding was converted into one under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This proceeding terminated on the 30th January, 1964 in favour of Dr. Ghosh and his wife Renu Ghosh who were the First Party to the proceeding. Rajendra Prasad Singh, who was the Second Party, preferred a revision to this High Court (Criminal Revision No. 278 of 1964). That Criminal Revision was dismissed on the 1st July, 1966 by a Division Bench of this court. Ghosh and his wife Renu Ghosh who were the First Party to the proceeding. Rajendra Prasad Singh, who was the Second Party, preferred a revision to this High Court (Criminal Revision No. 278 of 1964). That Criminal Revision was dismissed on the 1st July, 1966 by a Division Bench of this court. Only three days after the disposal of the Criminal Revision by this court, Krishna Devi, the mother of the petitioner, filed a suit for partition on the 4th July, 1966 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Muzaffarpur and prayed for a temporary injunction against Renu Ghosh and others. It is said that she died on the 24th August, 1966 and the present petitioner Urmila Devi was substituted in the place of her mother. The prayer for temporary injunction however, was rejected by the Subordinate Judge. On a petition filed by Srimati Renu Ghosh, Opposite Party No.2, the aforesaid order for her being restored to possession was passed by Shri J.P. Sharma, a Magistrate of the First Class, on the 25th August, 1966. It is against this order that the petitioner has come to this court in revision. 4. Shri Balabhadra Prasad Singh, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has urged that the order in question which amounts to delivery of possession, is bad because such a cause is not envisaged in any of the provisions of Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. His further argument is that the order in question was passed by a Magistrate who had no jurisdiction to pass it inasmuch as he was neither the Magistrate who had passed the final order in the proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure nor was he the successor in office of the Magistrate who had disposed of the proceeding. Lastly, learned Counsel's contention is that the petitioner Urmila Devi not being a party to the proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is not bound by the order in question. 5. In support of his first contention learned Counsel has placed reliance on the observation of the Supreme Court made in the case of Bhinka and others, Appellants V. Charan Singh, Respondent (A.I.R. 1959 Supreme Court 960). 5. In support of his first contention learned Counsel has placed reliance on the observation of the Supreme Court made in the case of Bhinka and others, Appellants V. Charan Singh, Respondent (A.I.R. 1959 Supreme Court 960). In Paragraph 13 at page 965 of the report, their Lordships have made the following observation : – “Can it be said that the appellants had taken possession in accordance with the provisions of S. 145 of the Code of Criminal procedure? The short answer is that S. 145 of the said Code does not confer on a Magistrate any power to make an order directing the delivery of possession on the date of the preliminary order made by him under Sec. 145 (1) of the Code. Under S. 145 (1) of the Code, his jurisdiction is confined only to decide whether any and which of the parties as on the date of the preliminary order in possession of the land in dispute. The order only declares the actual possession of a party on a specified date and does not purport to give possession or authorise any party to take possession. Even in the case of any party who has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months next before the date of the preliminary order, the Magistrate is only authorised to treat that party who is dispossessed as if he had been in possession on such date. If that be the legal position, the appellants could not have taken possession of the disputed lands by virtue of an order made under the provisions of S. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They were either in possession or not in possession of the said lands on the specified date, and, if they were not in possession on that date, their subsequent taking possession thereof could not have been under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure”. The facts involved in the case referred to above will, however, show that the question of restoration of possession to a party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed as contemplated under Section 145 (6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not in issue. The appellants in that case were claiming to have taken possession of the land by virtue of the order under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The appellants in that case were claiming to have taken possession of the land by virtue of the order under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. While repelling their contentions, their Lordships made the aforesaid observation; namely, that an order passed under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate that a person who was out of possession on the date of the preliminary order was entitled to take possession as a result of an order passed under Section 145 of the Code. In that case no order as contemplated under Subsection (6) of Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been passed. 6. In the instant case, we find that the facts and circumstances are wholly different. That being so, it can not be said that the Supreme Court decision goes against the specific provision of Sub-section (6) of Section 145 of the Code of Criminal procedure which runs as follows : – “If the Magistrate decides that one of the parties was or should under the second proviso to Sub-section (4) be treated as being in such possession of the said subject, he shall issue an order declaring such party to be entitled to possession thereof until evicted there from in due course of law and forbidding all disturbance of such possession until such eviction and when he proceeds under the second proviso to Sub-section (4), may restore to possession the party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed. This provision clearly authorises a Magistrate to restore to possession the successful party if the latter is found to have been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed as contemplated under the second proviso, to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and for the purpose of restoring the party to possession, the Magistrate has undoubtedly to take appropriate Measures. That being so, the order of the learned Magistrate in deputing a Magistrate of the First Class to put Opposite Party No. 2 in possession of the disputed house cannot be said to be illegal on this score. 7. Learned Advocate General, appearing on behalf of Opposite Party Nos. That being so, the order of the learned Magistrate in deputing a Magistrate of the First Class to put Opposite Party No. 2 in possession of the disputed house cannot be said to be illegal on this score. 7. Learned Advocate General, appearing on behalf of Opposite Party Nos. 1 and 2 has, in this connection, referred to a paragraph at page 350 of Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (Eleventh Edition) with a view to show that where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution. Undoubtedly, in this case if the aforesaid provisions of the Code has given jurisdiction to a Magistrate to restore a successful party to possession, the Magistrate cannot give effect to his order unless he evicts the person in unlawful possession of the property 8. So far as the next contention of learned Counsel for the petitioner is concerned, it is clear from a perusal of the record that on the 25th of August, 1966, when Shri J.P. Sharma passed the impugned order, he was acting as the Sub-divisional Magistrate. As a matter of fact, at the time of the admission of this revision application, a report was called for from Mr. J.P. Sharma to state the authority under which he passed the aforesaid order and from his report it is clear beyond doubt that on the aforesaid date he was acting as the Sub-divisional Magistrate. A perusal of the order sheet also shows that this Magistrate passed various orders in connection with this proceeding in the capacity of a Sub-divisional Magistrate in the absence of the permanent incumbent. Evidently therefore, it cannot be said that he had no jurisdiction to pass the order in question as the Sub-divisional Magistrate was the only appropriate authority to entertain an application for restoration after the disposal of the proceeding. 9. There is no merit in the third contention as well. If the petitioner was not a party to the proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and is not bound by the order passed in that proceeding, she cannot as well challenge the validity or otherwise of that order or any subsequent order passed in relation to that order. If the petitioner was not a party to the proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and is not bound by the order passed in that proceeding, she cannot as well challenge the validity or otherwise of that order or any subsequent order passed in relation to that order. It will appear from a perusal of the final order passed under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that Rajendra Prasad singh, Opposite Party No. 3 who was the Second Party to the proceeding, was claiming to be in exclusive possession of the property in dispute by virtue of his having acquired it through a sale-deed executed by Akhileshwar Prasad singh, one of the sons of Mahabir Prasad singh. His case in Section 145 proceeding was that the property in dispute, after the death of Bachu Singh, the original purchaser, passed on to the successors of Jhaman Prasad Singh after the latter's death, namely Mahabir Prasad Singh and Kashi Prasad Singh and that as a result of partition in the family of these two persons, the disputed property fell exclusively to the share of Akhilesh war Prasad Singh, one of the three sons of Mahabir Prasad Singh who sold it in January, 1962 to the Second Party who is Opposite Party No.3 here. The First Party, however, denied this: kind of partition in the family of Mahabir and Kashi and they claimed the entire property by virtue of purchases made from their heirs. It has been urged on behalf of the petitioner that Rajendra Prasad Singh, though happened to be a near relation of the petitioner, was in collusion with opposite party nos. 1 and 2 and as such, what he said and did in the aforesaid proceeding cannot have a binding effect on her. Be that as it may; the fact remains that the legality or otherwise of the order in question cannot be challenged by the petitioner. As a matter of fact, she has already instituted a title suit in the Civil Court with respect to the disputed property and her prayer for temporary injunction has been rejected by the court concerned. That being so, she cannot succeed here merely on the ground that she was not a party to the proceeding in question. 10. As a matter of fact, she has already instituted a title suit in the Civil Court with respect to the disputed property and her prayer for temporary injunction has been rejected by the court concerned. That being so, she cannot succeed here merely on the ground that she was not a party to the proceeding in question. 10. It would, thus, appear that there is no force in any of the contentions put forward on behalf of the petitioner. Her application is accordingly, dismissed. B. P. SINHA, J. I agree. Petition dismissed.