BHARAT ELECTRONIC EMPLOYEES UNION v. STATE OF MYSORE
1968-10-08
NARAYANA PAI, SANTHOSH
body1968
DigiLaw.ai
NARAYANA PAI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner, Secretary, Bharath Electronic Employees Union, jalhalli, Bangalore, prays for the quashing of an order of the State Government dated 27th December 1965, declining to refer an alleged industrial dispute for adjudication and for the issue of a writ of mandamus to the state Government directing them to refer the said dispute under S. 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ( 2 ) THE subject matter of dispute was a disciplinary order made by the Management withholding increments with cumulative effect for a period of one year of two employees by name Sharavathi and Rangaswamy. It appears that the said two employees and four others were served with charge-sheets by the Management for the alleged misconduct of inciting, total down strike'. All the six employees mada identical replies denying the charge. The above named two employees were punished with the stoppage of increments as stated above. So far as the other four employees are concerned, only a warning was administered. Taking the view that the administration of a more severe punishment on the said two employees alone was motivated by the fact that they were office-bearers in the Union, the union adopted a resolution requesting the Management to withdraw the punishment. Because it did not have the desired effect, the question was raised as a dispute and conciliation proceedings were initiated. The conciliation officer, it appears, suggested to the Management that in the interest of industrial peace, they might consider the desirability of waiving the punishment and alternatively that parties may agree to voluntary arbitration under S. 10a of the Act. As the Management did not accept either of the suggestions, conciliation proceedings failed and the Conciliation Officer made a report to that effect to the Government under sub-section (4) of s. 12 of the Act. ( 3 ) THE petitioner moved the Government for making a reference for adjudication in view of the failure of conciliation proceedings. ( 4 ) THE Government, however declined to do so and issued to him what is described as an endorsement reading as follows: "endorsement.
( 3 ) THE petitioner moved the Government for making a reference for adjudication in view of the failure of conciliation proceedings. ( 4 ) THE Government, however declined to do so and issued to him what is described as an endorsement reading as follows: "endorsement. sub: Industrial Dispute between the workmen and Management of bharat Electronics Ltd , Bangalore, re: punishment awarded to emplovees of Assembly and Inspection Departments of the concern With reference to the above subject, I am directed to state that Government consider that the dispute in question does not merit reference for adjudication, for the reasons stated below - There was no malafide intention of the management against the above workmen and that punitive action agpinst them had to be taken based on facts revealed from the Report bv the Assistant works Manager Assembly) and the Security Report in respect of the lightning tool-down strike in the Assembly and Inspection departments of the Company on 28-11-64 The management decided to withhold the increments of the two workers namelv Sri rangaswamy and Smt. Sharavathi, only after the charges framed against them were found established. a full-fledged enquiry for this was not necessary under the certified Standing Orders of the Companv The employees were, however, given due opportunty to explain their cases and establish their innocence but they failed to do so and, instead, made irrelevant submissions. They also did not avail of the facility of appealing against the orders of punishment to the appropriate Appellate authority in accordance with the Rules. Yours faithfully, (Sd.) C. C. Purohit, Under Secretary to Govt. , Labour & Ml Admn Dept. " ( 5 ) ALTHOUGH the affidavit in support of the petition sets out several points by way of argument, the main questions fo'r consideration which are exhaustive of the case of the petitioner were formulated as follows by his learned counsel, Mr. Narasimhan: -"1. On a report of failure of conciliation proceedings under subsection (4) of S 12, the appropriate Government is bound to examine the entire situation in the light of sub-section (5) of the same section, and that the word 'may' in the said section does not import a mere discretion but indicates a duty; 2.
Narasimhan: -"1. On a report of failure of conciliation proceedings under subsection (4) of S 12, the appropriate Government is bound to examine the entire situation in the light of sub-section (5) of the same section, and that the word 'may' in the said section does not import a mere discretion but indicates a duty; 2. The reasons stated by the Government in their above endorsement are not strictly and clearly relevant to the issue or sufficiently explanatory of the conclusion that the Government are not satisfied that there is a case for reference and adjudication; 3. In the said endorsement, the State Government have actually gone into the merits of the case and stated categorical opinions on the points at issue and have therefore virtually taken upon themselves the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute whereas they had to decide only whether there was a case for adjudication; 4. The statement of facts in the endorsement is incomplete and in certain respects inaccurate; 5. The Government have given no reason why the recommendation of the Conciliation Officer that this was a case for reference should not be accepted and acted upon; and 6. The Government have acted on extraneous considerations in coming to the conclusions set out in the endorsement. " ( 6 ) SUB-SECTION (5) of S. 12 which is of direct relevance reads as follows:"if, on a consideration of the report referred to in sub-section (4), the appropriate Government is satisfied that there is a case for reference to a board, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, it may make such reference. Where the appropriate Government does not make such a reference it shall record and communicate to the parties concerned its reasons therefor. " ( 7 ) IT is not doubted, nor is it disputed in the course of the argument that although the occasion for taking a decision is what is dealt with in s. 12, the source of the power for making a reference is clearly S. 10 of the Act, the second proviso to which, to the extent relevant, leads: - "provided further that,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . it would be inexpedient so to do. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ".
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . it would be inexpedient so to do. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ". ( 8 ) IT has also been clearly and emphatically stated by the Supreme court in two rulings in State of Bombay v. K. P. Krishnan, AIR. 1960 SC. 1223 and Bombay Union Journalists v. State of Bombay , AIR. 1964 SC 1617 that although sub-sec. (5) of S. 12 imposes a certain duty upon a State Government, it is not prevented from acting in the light of the second proviso to S. 10. ( 9 ) THAT in making or refusing to make a reference under S. 10, the appropriate Government is doing an administrative act is also an undisputed proposition-vide Madras State v. C. P. Sarathy , AIR. 1953 SC. 53, ( 10 ) IN the light of these clear propositions of law, it is of course not possible for this Court to issue a mandamus directing the Government to make a reference. At the highest, if the conditions necessary for making such an order are established, the mandamus could only be in the nature of a direction to reconsider the position. What those conditions are and in what circumstances an order of that type can be made by Courts are also discussed in the first cited two rulings of the Supreme Court. ( 11 ) IN stating the principle, their Lordships proceed from the statutory requirement that the appropriate Government refusing to make a reference should record and communicate to the parties concerned its reasons therefor. It is deduced therefore that although it may not be possible for Courts themselves to come to' a conclusion that there is a case for reference and direct the appropriate Government to act on that view, the reasons on the strength of which the appropriate Government declines to act would be open to scrutiny by Courts. The nature and ambit of that scrutiny is also indicated by the Supreme Court in the above rulings. Thand normal rule of judging the right or wrong of the acts of statutory functionaries or the discharge of statutory duties is of course applied, viz'.
The nature and ambit of that scrutiny is also indicated by the Supreme Court in the above rulings. Thand normal rule of judging the right or wrong of the acts of statutory functionaries or the discharge of statutory duties is of course applied, viz'. that statutory functionaries or authorities exercising statutory functions or powers should act on considerations which are relevant to the function or the power and should not act to any extent on considerations which are extraneous. In the special setting of sub-section (5) of S. 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is pointed out that the reasons stated for the opinion that the Government is not satisfied that there is a case for reference should be reasons directly connected with such absence of satisfaction: that is to say, the reasons must have a direct bearing on the issues involved and must lead reasonably to the conclusion that there is no case for reference. ( 12 ) WHAT is stated above is a summary of the principles as formulated by the decisions of Supreme Court. Mr. Narasimhan has cited certain other decisions, of the High Courts to illustrate the application of the said principles to particular situations, viz. , those reported in f. T. and R. Co. , v. K. P. Krishnan , AIR. 1956 Bom. 273. K. P. W. Union v. Government of Kerala, AIR 1962 Ker 292 and A. K. Roy v. State oj Orissa , AIR. 1964 Orissa 255. These rulings of course do not add to the principles. ( 13 ) THE first point for consideration therefore is whether the reasons stated by the Government in the impugned endorsement can be attacked as irrelevant or as reasons which have no connection whatever with the matters in issue or to' the existence or otherwise of sufficient ground to satisfy the Government that there is a case or is not a case for reference. ( 14 ) AS already stated, the central point of controversy was the punishment by way of stoppage of increments imposed by the Management on two employees Rangaswamy and Sharavathi. Two matters are directly connected with it: - (1) whether the principles of natural justice have been satisfied or contravened in imposing that punishment and (2) whether the circumstances indicate that there has been any unfair labour practice or victimisation.
Two matters are directly connected with it: - (1) whether the principles of natural justice have been satisfied or contravened in imposing that punishment and (2) whether the circumstances indicate that there has been any unfair labour practice or victimisation. For answering the first question reference has necessarily to be made to the Standing Orders governing the establishment. The second matter raises an investigation into the intentions or bona fides of the management. ( 15 ) BOTH these matters are briefly dealt with in the endorsement. The endorsement states that the Management before imposing punishment have acted in accordance with the S. O. and only after finding that the-charges have been established. The Standing Orders, which give a long list of misdemeanours or- items of misconduct and indicate different varieties of punishment that can be imposed, direct that no punishment by way of dismissal can be imposed without giving sufficient opportunity to the delinquent and without holding an enquiry in conformity with the principles of natural justice. Prima facie, in other cases, the holding of a regular enquiry, it is stated, may not be necessary. Whether that view is correct or not; (as to which we find it unnecessary, to, express any definite opinion), it is not open, in our opinion, to the petitioner to say or argue that the State government in expressing that view acted with any unreasonableness. The legal accuracy thereof or the possibility of further argument in res- , pect of it is not, in our opinion, sufficient reason to hold that for purposes of due discharge of their duty under sub-section (5) of S. 12, what the government have stated in the impugned endorsement is either not relevant or not directly connected with the issues or the existence or otherwise of their own satisfaction that there is a case for reference or is totally irrelevant or extraneous. ( 16 ) LIKEWISE, their opinion that the Management did not act with any malafide intention against the, two workmen in question in imposing punishment on them is also an opinion which they could reasonably hold.
( 16 ) LIKEWISE, their opinion that the Management did not act with any malafide intention against the, two workmen in question in imposing punishment on them is also an opinion which they could reasonably hold. At any rate, no circumstances or special circumstances have been shown to have existed or made out by subsequent conduct to make the said opinion of the Government wholly unacceptable o'r so very wide of the mark as to suggest that they have not applied their mind to relevant considerations or they have permitted themselves to1 be moved by extraneous considerations. ( 17 ) THE same opinion is, according to the argument of Mr. Venkata- ramaiah for the State Government, sufficient answer to the argument of mr. Narasimhan that the Government have not applied their mind to the charge of victimisation or that they have totally ignored or paid no attention to or placed no value upon the views or opinions stated by or the suggestions made by the Conciliation Officer in his report. ( 18 ) THE argument that the Government have actually examined the merits of the case and discharged the function of adjudication and not a mere function of deciding to refer the matter of adjudication is a difficult argument from the point of view of the petitioner himself. In confining ' themselves to relevancies, it is inevitable that the Government should examine the merits of the case along with the attendant circumstances and possible consequences. It is not possible totally to keep their mind away from the merits of the case if they are to discharge their duty under S. 12 (5) fully and properly. Indeed such an argument was expressly repelled by the Supreme Court in AIR. 1964 SC. 1617- (Vide Paragraphs 5 and 6 ). Their Lordships observed in paragraph 6 as follows: -". . . . . . . . when the appropriate Government considers the question as to whether any industrial dispute should be referred for adjudication or not, it may consider, prima facie, the merits of the dispute and take into account other relevant considerations which would help it to decide whether making a reference would be expedient o'r not.
. . . . . . . when the appropriate Government considers the question as to whether any industrial dispute should be referred for adjudication or not, it may consider, prima facie, the merits of the dispute and take into account other relevant considerations which would help it to decide whether making a reference would be expedient o'r not. "it is of course unnecessary for the Government to come to definite and final decision nor will any opinion expressed by the Government be regarded in any circumstances as amounting to anything more than a tentative view; it cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as binding in other and subsequent cases in the same way as decisions of Courts or quasi judicial bodies may be. ( 19 ) THE only argument in support of the case that the Government were moved by extraneous considerations is that before taking the decision which they communicated to the petitioner by the impugned endorsement, the state Government had consulted the Defence Ministry (the central Government) or at least ascertained the latter's views on the question. It is suggested that in all probability, the Defence Ministry was averse to a reference being made and that it is for the said reason that the State government did not place the value on the opinion oi the Conciliation officer which they would otherwise have done. ( 20 ) THE answer made by Mr. Venkataramiah on behalf of the Government is that after all, the State Government was exercising not a judicial function but an administrative function and that it is not such a function which makes it inherently impossible or improper for the State Government to consult or seek the opinion of others. It, as Mr. Narasimhan contends, the Defence Ministry must be regarded' as an employer and therefore a party to the dispute, the other party cannot be heard to say that the employer, should not make his representations to the appropriate Government before the latter takes a decision to make a reference. Regarding the opinion, said to have been entertained by the Conciliation Officer, the argument is that it is not necessarily binding oh the Government and that the statutory function of Government under sub-section (. 5) of S. 12 is a superior function independent of the functions discharged or required to be discharged by the Conciliation Officer.
Regarding the opinion, said to have been entertained by the Conciliation Officer, the argument is that it is not necessarily binding oh the Government and that the statutory function of Government under sub-section (. 5) of S. 12 is a superior function independent of the functions discharged or required to be discharged by the Conciliation Officer. ( 21 ) IT appears to us that the only circumstance which would have made this argument or this aspect of the case valuable to the petition' would be that the State Government had been influenced by the superior pressure, if any, exercised by the Central Government. That is a matter which is not easy of proof at the hands of the petitioner, and in'the absence of clear evidence, it is not open to us to assume that the Ministers of the State Government would feel inferior to the Ministers of the Central government or that they could be expected to discharge their functions otherwise than fearlessly and in accordance with law. The law expects all persons occupying positions of authority to exercise their authority in accordance with law, and it is not open to Courts to assume the other way. ( 22 ) WE do not think therefore that the petitioner has made out any case of mala fides oh the part of the State Government or that they have acted on extraneous considerations or on any considerations other than relevant considerations. The Writ Petition fails and is dismissed. --- *** --- .