JUDGMENT J.N. Takru, J. - This application in revision by Tirkha is directed against the judgment and decree of the learned II Additional Civil Judge, Bulandshahr, whereby he modified the judgment and decree of the learned II Munsif, Bulandshahr, and decreed the suit against the applicant as well. It appears that the opposite party No. 1 brought a suit for the recovery of Rs. 400/- with interest and costs etc. against the applicant and one Phundan, opposite party No. 2. The learned II Munsif decreed the suit, against Phundan only. Phundan filed an appeal in the lower appellate court, and that court modified the decree passed by the learned II Munsif and decreed the suit against the applicant as well. Feeling dissatisfied with that decision Tirkha has come up in revision to this Court. On behalf of the applicant the sole point pressed before me by his learned counsel, Sri Ganga Singh, was that as the opposite party No. 1 viz., the plaintiff, did not prefer any appeal to the lower appellate court against that part of the decree of the learned II Munsif whereby he had dismissed his suit against the applicant, the decree qua the applicant became final, and the lower appellate court acted with mate-rial irregularity and illegality in the exercise of its jurisdiction in reversing it and decreeing the suit against the applicant as well. After hearing the learned counsel I am however satisfied that this contention is not well founded. Now, Order 41, Rule 33, C.P.C., the provision under which the lower appellate court purported to have acted - in so far as it is material for the present purposes - reads thus: "33. After hearing the learned counsel I am however satisfied that this contention is not well founded. Now, Order 41, Rule 33, C.P.C., the provision under which the lower appellate court purported to have acted - in so far as it is material for the present purposes - reads thus: "33. The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection:" It will be noticed that the aforesaid provision is couched in very wide language, and authorises the appellate court to make any order which ought to have been passed or made in favour of any party although that party may not have filed any appeal or objection. On this view of that provision, the lower appellate court cannot be held to have acted illegally or with mate . rial irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction in modifying the decree in favour of the plaintiff opposite party No. 1, even though he filed no appeal or objection if it was of the view that the learned II Munsif should have passed a decree against the applicant as well. There is no direct authority on this point and the nearest case is that of Isri Prasad Singh v. Jagat Prasad Singh, A.I.R. 1937 (?) 628. That was a case for the enforcement of a mortgage, and one of the questions involved in it was of contribution bet-ween the defendants. The trial court did not fix any liability for the payment of the amount due to the plaintiff on defendant Nos. 8 to 11. The plaintiff filed an appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial court but did not appeal against that part of the decree of the trial court whereby defendant Nos. 8 to 11 were found not liable for the payment of any amount to him. 8 to 11. The plaintiff filed an appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial court but did not appeal against that part of the decree of the trial court whereby defendant Nos. 8 to 11 were found not liable for the payment of any amount to him. It was held in that case that the fact that the plaintiff did not prefer any appeal against that part of the decree whereby defendants Nos. 8 to 11 were held not liable for contribution did not make any difference, and he was not barred from raising the question of the liability of defendants Nos. 8 to 11 in his appeal. On behalf of the applicant reliance was placed on the Full Bench decision of this Court in Rangam Lal v. Jhandu, ILR 34 A. 32. So far as the broad principle underlying Order 41, R. 33, C.P.C. is concerned this decision does not help the applicant, as it clearly lays down that the words of this provision 'are no doubt very wide the only limitation being that 'care and judicial discretion must be applied by the appellate courts in the exercise of the powers conferred by the rule'. One of the cares which the appellate courts was supposed to exercise was that its orders should not 'lose sight of the other provisions of Code of Civil Procedure itself or of the Court Fees Act or of the law of limitation'. As in the present case the modification of the decree, of the learned II Munsif does not involve disregard of any of the aforesaid laws or any other law, this authority is of no help to the applicant. I am therefore, satisfied that the view taken by the lower appellate court is correct, with the result that this revision fails and is rejected, but as no one appeared to oppose it, I make no order as to costs. Revision allowed.