KHAS JOYRAMPUR COLLIERY v. KAILASH NATH SHRIVASTAVA
1968-05-17
B.D.SINGH, R.L.NARASIMHAM
body1968
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT B.D. Singh, J. This application has been filed against the order dated the 15th December, 1966 (Annexure C) passed by Shri N. Venkata Kao, Presiding Officer of the Central Government Labour Court, Dhanbad, under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1948 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). 2. The material facts are these: The petitioner is a private limited company carrying on coal business. Kailash Nath Shrivastava, respondent no. 1, was employed as a Storekeeper under the petitioner company. He was dismissed from service with effect from 23. 10. 63. An industrial dispute in this regard was raised and the same was adjudicated by an award on 13. 6. 66 by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad. In terms of the award the respondent no. 1 and one Rajendra Pathak were reinstated in service with effect from the date of their dismissal with continuity of service and with full back wages and all other benefits. The operative paragraph of the said a ward reads as follows :- "15. The result, therefore, is that the dismissal of Sarvashri K. N. Srivastava, Storekeeper and Rajendra Pathak, Assistant Storekeeper, of Khas Joyrampur Colliery with effect from 23rd October, 1963 are held to be not justified and, therefore, the termination of their services with effect from 23rd October, 1963 is set aside and they are reinstated to their previous job with full back wages and other benefits to which they were entitled with continuity of service, till the date of their reinstatement". It was published in the Gazette of India on 23.7.66. 3. Subsequently an agreement was arrived at orally between the parties according to which it was agreed that the respondent no. 1 would be treated as retrenched with effect from 31. 7. 66. In pursuance of the said agreement the petitioner paid him Rs. 13,419.78 paise on 11. 8. 66, as per receipts Exts 0/1 and 0/2. After receiving the said amount the respondent no. 1 filed an application dated the 19th August, 1966 (Annexure A), under Section 33C (2) of the Act before the Presiding Officer, Central Government Labour Court, Dhanbad (respondent no. 2), for a declaration that he is entitled to a claim of a further sum of Rs. 5,562.85 paise from the petitioner. 4. In the said application respondent no. 1 had stated that the sum of Rs.
2), for a declaration that he is entitled to a claim of a further sum of Rs. 5,562.85 paise from the petitioner. 4. In the said application respondent no. 1 had stated that the sum of Rs. 13,419.78 paise paid by the petitioner fell short of the total amount lawfully due to him, by Rs. 5,562.85 paise. This sum is made up of the following items: 1. Quarterly bonus under the Coal Mines Bonus Scheme for 11 Quarters from quarter ending 31st December, 1963 till quarter ending 30th June, 1966, (both inclusive) at the rate of basis wages of Rs. 185/- per month....Rs. 2,035.00. 2. Bonus under the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 @ minimum 4%. (a) For the year 1964 on total emoluments of Rs. 3,415.80 P. Rs.136.60 (b) For the year 1965 on total emoluments of Rs, 3,561.36 p. Rs. 142.45 (c) For the year 1966 (7 months) on total emoluments of Rs, 2,105.48 p. Rs. 84.22 Rs. 363.27 3. Salary for earned leave not availed of- (a) For the year 1963- 4 days (b) For the year 1963-25 days (c) For the year 1964-25 days (d) For the year 1965-25 days (e) For the year 1966-15 days 94 days @ (seven months) Rs, 302.87 per month on the 26 day basis...Rs. 1095.00 4. Servant allowance for 33 months from November, 1963 to July 1966, (both inclusive @ Rs. 23.25 p, per month... .. ... ... ..Rs. 767.25 5. Railway fare-1st class together with the requisite bus fare from Lodna (E. Rly) to Akbarganj (N. Rly) and back for 3 years, i.e. 1963, 1964 and 1965 @ Rs. 100/- for one complete Journey to and fro... ... ... ... ...... Rs.300.00 6. One month's wages in lieu of notice. ...Rs. 302.87 7. Full retrenchment compensation due for 30 years' service (29 years and 9 months) in terms of Section 25F (b) of the Act, i.e , wages for 450 days on the basis of Rs. 302.87 p. per month on 26 day basis equivalent to Rs. 11.65p. per day... ... ... ... ... ...Rs. 5242.50 Less paid as retrenchment compensation on the wrongful calculation of half month's wages per year...Rs. 4543.04 Rs. 699.46p Balance due Rs. 699.46 Rs. 5562.85 (Rupees five thousand five hundred sixty two and eighty five paise only). The Labour Court by the said order allowed all the claims of respondent no.
11.65p. per day... ... ... ... ... ...Rs. 5242.50 Less paid as retrenchment compensation on the wrongful calculation of half month's wages per year...Rs. 4543.04 Rs. 699.46p Balance due Rs. 699.46 Rs. 5562.85 (Rupees five thousand five hundred sixty two and eighty five paise only). The Labour Court by the said order allowed all the claims of respondent no. 1 except item no. 6. 5. The main controversy between the parties is regarding the true effect of the order of reinstatement mentioned in above quoted Paragraph 15 of the award of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal. 6. According to the petitioner, respondent no. 1 having ceased to be a workman, cannot avail of the benefit of Section 33C (2) of the Act. Secondly the sum of Rs. 13,498.78 paise represented the aggregate amount payable to respondent no. 1 and he is not entitled to claim any further amount from the petitioner; whereas the stand taken by respondent no. 1 is that as per award he should be deemed to be in continuous service and, therefore, he is entitled to claim the entire amount under the six items as ordered by the Labour Court. 7. Mr. Ranen Ray, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has challenged the impugned order on the ground of want of jurisdiction for the following two reasons :- (i) Respondent no. 1 having ceased to be an employee with effect from the 31st July, 1966 had no right under the law to present an application under Section 33 C (2) of the Act. (ii) He is not entitled to any benefit under the statutory provisions. 8. I take up first point no. (i) Mr. Ray has contended that respondent no. 1 is no longer a workman and, therefore, he is not entitled to get any relief under Section 33C (2) of the Act. He urged that retrenchment of respondent no. 1 was not an industrial dispute and that the award dated 13.6.66 has concluded the industrial dispute. On the contrary, he was retrenched on 31.7.66 as per agreement arrived at between the parties. He further urged that the present dispute cannot be said to be an industrial dispute between a workman and an employer, in order to attract the provisions contained under Section 33C(2) of the Act. 9. In my opinion, the contentions of learned counsel cannot be accepted.
He further urged that the present dispute cannot be said to be an industrial dispute between a workman and an employer, in order to attract the provisions contained under Section 33C(2) of the Act. 9. In my opinion, the contentions of learned counsel cannot be accepted. A workman is defined under Section 2(a) of the Act, the relevant portion of which is as follows:- “ ‘Workman’ means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute... ..." 10. It will be noticed that the expression "in relation to an industrial dispute, inc1udes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched” is very wide in its scope. 11. In (1) Manicka. Mudelier (M) V. Labour Court, Madras, and another [1961 (1) L. L. J. 592 at page 593] the Madras High Court while dealing with the question whether a workman should be in service on the date of the application under Section 33C(2) of the Act, held :- “The result is that Section 33C (2) of the Act would not apply to a cast: where the benefit claimed relates to a period when the claimant was not a workman, i.e., when the claimant was not employed. The present case is not such an instance. Here the claim relates to a period when the claimant was employed and must be deemed to have been employed. The application was therefore quite competent." 12. In the instant case also the claim relates to the period prior to his reinstatement. 13.
The present case is not such an instance. Here the claim relates to a period when the claimant was employed and must be deemed to have been employed. The application was therefore quite competent." 12. In the instant case also the claim relates to the period prior to his reinstatement. 13. In (2) Tiruchi-Srirangam Transport Company (Private) Ltd. V. Labour Court, Madurai, and another [1961 (2) L. L. J. 729], a similar argument was advanced on behalf of the management, as in the instant case, that on the terms of the definition of 'Workman' a discharged or dismissed employee could not be held to be a workman and a proceeding under Section 33C(2) of the Act being one not relating to an industrial dispute but merely an individual dispute, a discharged workman could not, it was contended, resort to the machinery provided by Section 33C(2) for obtaining relief from the Labour Court. Sri Rama Chandra Ayyar, J., of Madras High Court held: "The argument is no doubt attractive but I am unable to accept the same. Section 33C(2) refers to a claim by any workman which prima facie will include a dismissed or -discharged workman as well". His Lordship further observed at page 733 : "Therefore, it is clear that the object of the legislature is to, provide for the adjudication of individual claims not necessarily by persons who are still under the employment of the management but by discharged persons as well...The words 'any workman' would mean a workman who would be entitled to benefits conferred under the Act and should necessarily include a discharged worker as well.” 14. It is true that these cases relate to a discharged or dismissed employee, but in my opinion, the same principle will equally apply to a retrenched workman in view of the last portion of the definition of "workman" given in Section 2(a) of the Act where dispute arising out of the retrenchment of the workman is expressly referred to. 15.
It is true that these cases relate to a discharged or dismissed employee, but in my opinion, the same principle will equally apply to a retrenched workman in view of the last portion of the definition of "workman" given in Section 2(a) of the Act where dispute arising out of the retrenchment of the workman is expressly referred to. 15. Moreover, reference may be made to Section 2-A of the Act which has been inserted by the Demanding Act XXXV of 1965, which reads as follows:- "Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute." 16. This amended section has made it crystal clear that the dispute in respect of or arising out of the retrenchment of an employee shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute. In the instant case, the disputes between the parties are regarding the benefits of retrenchment. The employee's claim is consequential to the award dated 13.6.66 by which he has been ordered to be reinstated by the petitioner and the subsequent agreement between the parties that the employee will be treated as retrenched with effect from 31.7.68. Thus, the contentions of learned counsel on this point must be rejected. 17. Turning now to the second point, Mr. Ray fairly conceded that, in view of the award of the Tribunal holding that the termination of the service of the petitioner with effect from 23rd October, 1963, was not justified, the petitioner should be deemed, in the eye of law, to have continued in service thereafter. He also conceded that he would be entitled to the full wages and the other normal benefits due to a person in service. But he urged that those special benefits which under the relevant statutory provisions, are available only to a workman who has actually put in attendance or performed certain quantum of work will not be available to the petitioner, and that the deeming concept should not be carried so far. 18.
But he urged that those special benefits which under the relevant statutory provisions, are available only to a workman who has actually put in attendance or performed certain quantum of work will not be available to the petitioner, and that the deeming concept should not be carried so far. 18. The quarterly bonus under the Coal Mines Bonus Scheme (hereinafter referred to as the Scheme) is payable to a workman who actually puts in attendance in a coal mine for a specified number of days as provided in Paragraph 4 of the Scheme, The only exception made is where leave is taken by the workman or where, due to lay-off or lock-out, the workman is unable to put in his attendance-see Paragraph 6. According to Mr. Ray, though the petitioner may be deemed to have remained in service, he cannot also be deemed to have put in attendance as required by the provisions of the Scheme so as to claim the bonus. Similarly, as regards the bonus under the Payment of Bonus Act, Mr. Ray relied on the language of Sections 8 and 13 of that act, which expressly restrict the eligibility for bonus of an employee to the period he has worked in establishment. According to Mr. Ray, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have worked in the establishment for the period mentioned in these sections. Following the same reasoning, he urged that the petitioner was not entitled to any leave salary during the relevant period. He relied on the language of Section 52 (1) of the Mines Act, which says that a person employed in a mine, who has completed a calender year's service, is entitled to one day for every twenty days of work performed by him. Sub-section 2 of that section Explains the meaning of the term "a calender year's service" by saying that it will depend on the number of days attendance either underground or above. According to Mr. Hay, merely by virtue of the order or reinstatement passed by the Labour Court, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have performed any work or put in the required period of attendance so as to be eligible for leave salary. The obvious answer to Mr. Ray's argument is that a person should not be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong.
The obvious answer to Mr. Ray's argument is that a person should not be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. The Tribunal held that the dismissal of the workman-respondent was not justified, and directed that he should be reinstated in his previous job with his full back wages and other benefits. But for the unlawful dismissal of the workman from service, he would have continued in service, put in the necessary attendance and performed the required work so as to be eligible for the bonus payable under the Scheme and under the Payment of Bonus Act and also to leave salary under Section 52 (1) (b) of the Mines Act. When the Tribunal expressly ordered that the workman should be reinstated with other benefits, it must be held as a matter of construction of the order that the workman will be entitled to all the benefits to which he would have been eligible had he continued in service and performed the required work, It is true that neither the Scheme nor the Bonus Act provides for a contingency where a workman is unlawfully dismissed from service. The authority, who is entitled to decide the question as to whether the dismissal was lawful or not (here the Tribunal), has the necessary ancillary power, in directing reinstatement, or order that all other consequential benefits should be given. It was also open to that authority to say that some of the benefits need not be given. But, in as much as, in the order of the Tribunal, no benefit was expressly withheld from the workman concerned, we must hold that all the benefits, which would arise if the workman had not been dismissed, should be granted to him. In Paragraph 6 (1) of the Scheme) express provision is made for counting the days of lay-off and lock-out as days of attendance. Similarly in Section 14 of the Payment of Bonus Act, are mentioned the special circumstances under which a workman who did not perform any work would be deemed to have performed such work. These provisions are an indication of the intention of the framers of the Scheme and the Bonus Act to give the benefit of the bonus where the workman is unable to put on the required attendance due to the unlawful act of the employer and other similar causes. If the argument of Mr.
These provisions are an indication of the intention of the framers of the Scheme and the Bonus Act to give the benefit of the bonus where the workman is unable to put on the required attendance due to the unlawful act of the employer and other similar causes. If the argument of Mr. Ray be accepted, it will be giving a benefit to the employer consequent on his own unlawful act. 19. As regards servant's allowance, it was urged by Mr. Ray for the employer that, unless the workman concerned affirmatively establishes that he maintained a servant, he was not entitled to that allowance. This argument is based on a misconception. The Labour Court has granted this allowance to the workman concerned, and, if the employer wants to challenge this order of the Labour Court, he should have alleged in the writ petition filed before this Court that the workman did not keep a servant during the relevant period. No such assertion of fact was made in the petition, though, in one of the grounds in Paragraph 10(1), it was stated as• a proposition of law that the Labour Court acted without jurisdiction in awarding servant's allowance without an evidence regarding the employment of servant. As the employer has not cared to 'state on an affidavit that the workman concerned did not keep a servant, the question of the workman filing a counter-affidavit on the point did not arise. I, therefore, see no reason for modifying the order of the Labour Court in this respect. 20. As regards the claim under item no. 5, it was urged by Mr. Ray that, unless it is established that the workman actually went to his home on leave, he was not entitled to claim railway fare. It is true that the grant of railway fare to a workman to enable him to go to his home during leave is intended to encourage his going home for rest and recuperation, but Mr. Ray would not point out any provision which requires the workman to certify that he actually went home and paid the fare before he can claim this concession. In this respect, the conditions of service of the workmen in industries seems to be different from that of Government servants who are generally required to give such a certificate.
Ray would not point out any provision which requires the workman to certify that he actually went home and paid the fare before he can claim this concession. In this respect, the conditions of service of the workmen in industries seems to be different from that of Government servants who are generally required to give such a certificate. Moreover, here, the workman was unlawfully dismissed from service, and he could not, therefore, have gone home during leave. The order of his reinstatement with full benefits should, therefore, be construed to mean his eligibility to claim the railway fare also for going home during the relevant period, and he continued to remain in service. 21. Lastly, I take up the question as to whether, for the purpose of leave salary and retrenchment compensation (item nos. 3 and 7), month should be computed as thirty days or twenty six days, Mr. Ray urged that a month of thirty days should be taken as the basis for the calculation. But counsel for the workman has invited our attention to the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India in the Collieries Appeals, dated the 29th January, 1957, where, at page 126 it has been observed as follows :- "(c) To the monthly rated staff. For work done on a Sunday or the recognised day of rest or on a day which is closed holiday 1½ times of the daily wage, which shall be standardised at 1/26th of the monthly pay in addition to his monthly salary". To similar effect is note 2 to Rule 60 of the Mines Rules, 1955, which is as follows :- “In calculating the ordinary rate of wages or earnings in the case of a person paid by the month the daily wages shall be 1/26th of his monthly rate of wages...". This shows that, in industrial law applicable to workmen in mines, it is settled that a month should be calculated on a twenty six day basis. The Labour Court's order in this respect is also not assailable. 22. In the result, this application is dismissed with costs of Rs. 200/- to be paid by the petitioner to respondent no. 1. The amount of Rs. 5,259. 98 deposited by the petitioner in this Court in pursuance of the order dated the 8th February, 1967, is permitted to be withdrawn by respondent no. 1.
22. In the result, this application is dismissed with costs of Rs. 200/- to be paid by the petitioner to respondent no. 1. The amount of Rs. 5,259. 98 deposited by the petitioner in this Court in pursuance of the order dated the 8th February, 1967, is permitted to be withdrawn by respondent no. 1. NARASIMHAM, C. J. I agree Application dismissed.