Judgment :- 1. The petitioners in these writ petitions challenge the admissions made to the Thirumala Devaswom Medical College, Alleppey and seek a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ, direction or order directing their admission to the College. The Thirumala Devaswom Medical College (referred to hereinafter as the T. D. Medical College for short) was till recently a College managed and administered privately by the Thirumala Devaswom Medical College Trust. On the averments made and the arguments advanced in these writ petitions it would appear that admissions to the T. D. Medical College while under private management were being regulated by a system of registering candidates in advance for admission, on payment of what has been described as "capitation fee". The stand taken by the petitioners' counsel in these writ petitions is that admissions were solely and exclusively governed by priority of registration and payment of capitation fee. According to the Government's counter-affidavit, by G. O. M. S.623/65/HLD. dated 23-7-1965, the Government specifically banned the receipt of capitation fee by the Management of the College. Proposals were afoot for the taking over of the management and administration of the College by the Government and a high level committee was appointed to go into the question and submit proposals. The committee reported that the Government should run the administration of the College for a period of five years. At the conference held on 25-8-1967, a Special Officer Sri. S. Padmakumar, Joint Secretary to the Government (Industries Department) was deputed to assess the assets and liabilities of the College. He submitted his report to the Government on 2-9-1967 in which, inter alia he communicated a list of 69 persons to whom the management stood, by reason of receipt of capitation fee or otherwise, morally committed in the matter of admission. The T. D. Medical College Trust was agreeable to transfer the management and administration of the College with its entire properties to the Government, for a period of five years; and an agreement dated 17-10-1967 (Ext. P-4 in O. P. No. 4180 of 1967) was accordingly executed between the Trust and the Government, to evidence the transfer of management and administration together with the properties of the college. G.O. MS. No. 5S6/67/ HLD. dt.17th October was issued placing on record the transfer of management and administration and constituting a Council of Administration for the College. By G. O. MS. G.O. MS. No. 5S6/67/ HLD. dt.17th October was issued placing on record the transfer of management and administration and constituting a Council of Administration for the College. By G. O. MS. No. 586/HLD dt.17-10-67 the Government re-constituted the Selection Committee for selecting students for admission to the College, and further ordered that with a view to ensuring the smooth transition of management, the commitments of the erstwhile management regarding admissions to the College as disclosed from the report of Sri. S. Padmakumar, Joint Secretary to Government will be respected as far as possible. (Vide Ext. P5 in O. P. No. 4180 of 1967). It is disclosed in the Government's counter affidavit that by a letter dated 24-10-1967, the Government addressed the University pointing out that the insistence on the conditions prescribed by the University for admission to the Medical Colleges would have the effect of elimination a large number of students who had paid capitation fee and that the same would result in hardship. The Syndicate of the University at its meeting held on 2-11-1967 considered the Government's letter, but was not agreeable to the Government's suggestion. The Syndicate's decision was informally communicated to the Selection Committee of the College on 3-11-1967 by the University's representative in the Committee, (Dr. Abraham), and a formal communication followed on 6-11-1967. This is a brief resume of the takeover of management by the Government and the regulation of selections for admission to the College for the academic year 1967-68. 2. It has transpired from the counter-affidavit and from the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents that a large number of the petitioners have been denied admission in view of the Ordinance passed by the University of Kerala prescribing a certain percentage of marks as the minimum qualification for admission to the College. The writ petitions have all proceeded either on no knowledge at all, or but imperfect knowledge, of the Ordinance passed by the University. But on the same being disclosed, or glanced at, in the counter-affidavit, the petitioners' counsel or some of them have sought to challenge the Ordinance. The Ordinance itself has amended S.1 of Chapter XLI of the Ordinances of the University. The Syndicate directed the amended Ordinance to come into force on 11-5-1966. But on the same being disclosed, or glanced at, in the counter-affidavit, the petitioners' counsel or some of them have sought to challenge the Ordinance. The Ordinance itself has amended S.1 of Chapter XLI of the Ordinances of the University. The Syndicate directed the amended Ordinance to come into force on 11-5-1966. It is enough to notice that by the said Ordinance, briefly stated, the minimum marks for admission to the 1st M. B. B. S. Course have been prescribed in the case of science graduates as 50% in the Main and Subsidiary Subjects taken together, and in the case of those who had passed the Pre-Degree Examination of this University, or the Intermediate Examination, as 50% in each of the subjects of Biology, Physics & Chemistry. A relaxation of 50% was allowed for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes. The Ordinance has been attacked as not valid. The propriety and validity of applying the Ordinance to selections to the T. D. Medical College has been further attacked. The relaxation made to the extent of 5% in favour of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes and other Backward Classes has also been attacked. The case presented was, that but for the Ordinance, admissions would have been regulated by the sole test of priority in the matter of registration and payment of capitation fee. These contentions may first be examined. 3. The main attack against the Ordinance was that it has not conformed to the requirements of the Kerala University Act 14 of 1957. The transgressions complained of were in regard to the provisions of S.27 (1) and S.37 (3) of the University Act. S.27 of the Act reads: "27. Procedure for making Ordinances-(1) All Ordinances made by the Syndicate shall have effect from such date as the Syndicate may direct; but every Ordinance so made shall be submitted, as soon as may be, to the Chancellor and the Senate, and shall be considered by the Senate at its next succeeding meeting. The Senate shall have power by a resolution passed by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members present at such meeting, to cancel or modify any such Ordinance. (2) The Chancellor may direct that the operation of any Ordinance shall be suspended until such time as the Senate has had an opportunity of considering the same. The Senate shall have power by a resolution passed by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members present at such meeting, to cancel or modify any such Ordinance. (2) The Chancellor may direct that the operation of any Ordinance shall be suspended until such time as the Senate has had an opportunity of considering the same. (3) The procedure to be followed in making amending or repealing Ordinance in so far as these are not provided in this section shall be prescribed by the Statutes." S. 37 of the Act is entitled "miscellaneous" and the relevant provision contained in clause (3) thereof reads: "37. Miscellaneous- (1) x x x x x (2) x x x x x (3) The Statutes, Ordinances, rules and bye-laws passed in accordance with the provisions of this Act shall be published in the Gazette". 4. The Ordinance in question has neither been published as required by S.37 (3) nor been considered by the Senate so far, as required by S.27 (1). The result, it was contended was that there was no valid Ordinance which could in any way adversely affect the rights of the petitioners. Strong reliance was placed on the decision in Marie's case (AIR. 1951 SC. 467). There the question was whether the Jaipur Opium Act purporting to have been enacted by a resolution of the Council of Ministers appointed by the Crown Representative to look after the Government of Jaipur during the minority of its then Maharaja could be regarded as Law properly so-called without any promulgation or publication in the gazette or adoption of other means to make it known to the public. It was ruled that it was not. The question arose with reference to a prosecution launched under the provisions of the Act. It was ruled that it was not. The question arose with reference to a prosecution launched under the provisions of the Act. The Supreme Court referred to the provisions of S.3 (b) of the Jaipur Laws Act, 1923 which provided: "3 (b) Subject to the prerogative of the Ruler the law to be administered by the Court of Jaipur State shall be as follows: X X X (b) All the regulations now in force within the said territories, and the enactments and regulations that may hereafter be passed from time to time by the State and published in the Official Gazette." Bose J. speaking for the Court observed: "We do not know what laws were operative in Jaipur regarding the coming into force of an enactment in that State. We were not shown, any, nor was our attention drawn to any custom which could be said to govern the matter. In the absence of any special law or custom, we are of opinion that it would be against the principles of natural justice to permit the subjects of a State to be punished or penalised by laws of which they had no knowledge and of which they could not even with the exercise of reasonable diligence have acquired any knowledge. Natural justice requires that before a law can become operative it must be promulgated or published. It must be broadcast in some recognisable way so that all men may know what it is; or, at the very least, there must be some special rule or regulation or customary channel by or through which such knowledge can be acquired with the exercise of due and reasonable diligence. The thought that a decision reached in the secret recesses of a chamber to which the public have no access and to which even their accredited representatives have no access and of which they can normally know nothing, can nevertheless affect their lives, liberty and property by the mere passing of a Resolution without anything more is abhorrent to civilised man. It shocks his conscience. In the absence therefore of any law, rule, regulation or custom, we bold that a law cannot come into being in this way. It shocks his conscience. In the absence therefore of any law, rule, regulation or custom, we bold that a law cannot come into being in this way. Promulgation or publication of some reasonable sort is essential." The Court examined the rule in England and noticed the decision "on a somewhat lower plane" in Johnson v. Sargant (1918-1 K. B-101) to the effect that an order of the Food Controller under the Beans, Peas and Pulse (Requisition) Act did not become operative until it is made known to the public. The Indian decisions which had accepted the principle were also noticed. Counsel who appeared for the University contended that the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Harla's case should be confined to its actual facts and to the statutory provisions that came in for notice. He further contended that the authority of the decision has been shaken by a later ruling of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hane George (AIR. 1963 SC. 722). In this latter case, a prosecution was launched under the provisions of S.8(1) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 read with a notification issued thereunder by the Reserve Bank of India dated 8th November 1962. The accused was a transit passenger on board a Swiss plane from Zurich to Manila which touched down at the Bombay Air Port; and he was prosecuted for carrying on his person 30 Kilos of gold bars without having it declared in the manifest of the air-craft as the same bottom cargo or transhipment cargo which was on through transit to a place outside India. The Reserve Bank's notification dated 8-11-1962 permitted gold bars to be carried only subject to such declaration being made. The defence was that this notification of the Reserve Bank of India was unknown to the accused, a foreign passenger, and had not been published or promulgated in any of the well-known forms so as to make its contents known. The majority judgment took the view that besides the voluntary bringing of gold no further mental condition such as knowledge of the notification was postulated to constitute the offence charged. Adverting to the argument that the notification of the Reserve Bank of India had not been published, the Supreme Court noticed the decision in Johnson v. Sargant (1918-1 KB. 101) referred to in Harla's case. Adverting to the argument that the notification of the Reserve Bank of India had not been published, the Supreme Court noticed the decision in Johnson v. Sargant (1918-1 KB. 101) referred to in Harla's case. The court referred to the criticism of Professor C. K. Alien in his "Law and Orders" 2nd Edition, page 132 about the said decision to the effect that the decision constituted an example of judgment made law, that there was no precedent for it, and that the decision in Johnes v. Robson (1901-I-KB. 673) which though not on all fours, militated strongly against the decision in Johnson v. Sargant was not cited before the same was rendered. Referring to this criticism of Professor C. K. Alien, the majority judgment observed: "We see great force in the learned author's comment on the reasoning in Sargant's case". Their Lordships then proceeded to observe that even accepting the view taken in Johnson v. Sargant, there was effective publication in India when the notification was published in the Gazette and that the accused's ignorance of the said notification was irrelevant. After an analysis of the position, the Supreme Court laid down the law as follows: "Where there is a statutory requirement as to the mode or form of publication and they are such that in the circumstances the Court holds to be mandatory, a failure to comply with those retirements might result in there being no effective order the contravention of which could be the subject of prosecution; but where there is no statutory requirement we conceive the rule to be that it is necessary that it should be published in the usual form i. e. by publication within the country in such media as generally adopted to notify to all the persons concerned the making of rules. In most of the Indian statutes; including the Act now under consideration, there is provision for the rules made being published in the Official Gazette. It therefore stands to reason that publication in the Official Gazette, viz., the Gazette of India is the ordinary method of bringing a rule or subordinate legislation to the notice of the persons concerned. In most of the Indian statutes; including the Act now under consideration, there is provision for the rules made being published in the Official Gazette. It therefore stands to reason that publication in the Official Gazette, viz., the Gazette of India is the ordinary method of bringing a rule or subordinate legislation to the notice of the persons concerned. As we have stated earlier, the notification by the Reserve Bank was published in the Gazette of India on November 24,1962 and hence even adopting the view of Bailhache, J. the notification must be deemed to have been published and brought to the notice of the concerned individuals on the 25th of November 1962. The argument, therefore, that the notification dated November 8,1962 was not effective, because it was not properly published in the sense of having been brought to the actual notice of the respondent must be rejected". In the face of these observations of the Supreme Court, the broad proposition that in no case can a subordinate legislation or the Ordinance in the instant case-be regarded as effective, that the same is published, or made known to the party affected in some manner, may be difficult to accept. It is unnecessary to venture a final opinion on the question. 5. S.27 of the Kerala University Act which details the procedure for making Ordinances only requires that every Ordinance so made shall be submitted as soon as may be, to the Chancellor and the Senate, and shall be considered by the Senate, at its next meeting. The requirement of consideration by the Senate, at its 'next meeting' would seem to place that as the outer limit of time for submission to the Senate. But even such or a similar provision has been held to be only directory and not mandatory (vide Jan Mohammad Noor Mohammed Bagban v. State of Gujarat AIR. 1966 SC. 385). Besides, S.27(1) enacts that an Ordinance is to have effect from such date as the Syndicate may direct, and this is in no way qualified by any requirement as to publication or otherwise. Indeed, the indication available from the provision in sub-section 2 of S.27 authorising the Chancellor to suspend the operation of an Ordinance till the Senate has had an opportunity of considering the same, is that neither publication nor submission to the Senate is required to give vitality to the Ordinance. Indeed, the indication available from the provision in sub-section 2 of S.27 authorising the Chancellor to suspend the operation of an Ordinance till the Senate has had an opportunity of considering the same, is that neither publication nor submission to the Senate is required to give vitality to the Ordinance. Nor does the proposition stated by Bose J. of the Supreme Court in Harla's case AIR. 1951 SC. 467), as I understand it, in any way run the counter to the conclusion in the instant case. The statutory provisions of S.3(b) of the Jaipur Laws Act, there considered, required that a regulation, before it can be regarded as law, should be "passed from time to time by the State, and published in the Official Gazette". On the terms of the section therefore, publication in the Gazette was an integral process of the law making, and a regulation which had not gone through the process could not be regarded as law. Bose J. also took care to add the rider that it is only "in the absence of any special law or custom" that a law cannot come into being without promulgation or publication of some reasonable sort. The provisions of the Kerala University Act are materially different. Publication is not an integral process of Ordinance making under the Kerala Universities' Act, and the provisions in S.27(1) read with S.27(2) of the Act indicate that an" Ordinance springs into effect on the date appointed by the Syndicate. I am of the opinion that having regard to the provisions of the Kerala University Act, the Ordinance in question was effective from 5-11-1966, the date fixed by the Syndicate, and that the requirement as to the submission to the Senate contained in S.27(1), and as to the publication contained in S.37(3) of the Act are only directory, the non-compliance with which, would not render the Ordinance invalid. My learned Brother, Govindan Nair, J., in the judgment in O. P. Nos. 1926 and 1927 of 1963 also took the view that the requirement of publication in S.37(3) of the Act is only directory and not mandatory. I am in respectful agreement with the said conclusion. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Giriwar Prasad Narain Singh's Case (AIR. 1968 SC 90), does not sound a different note. The statutory provisions of S.3 and 4 of the Bihar. I am in respectful agreement with the said conclusion. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Giriwar Prasad Narain Singh's Case (AIR. 1968 SC 90), does not sound a different note. The statutory provisions of S.3 and 4 of the Bihar. Land Reforms Act ordaining publication of the notification, and the consequences flowing from the same, were materially different. 6. Although the Ordinance passed by the University was challenged in the course of the arguments, the University itself was made a party only in O. P. Nos. 4490, 4496, 4735, 4957 and 5057 of 1967. In O. P. No. 4422/67 C. M. P. 11689/67 to implead the University was pending on the dates of hearing. The rest of those writ petitions in which the petitioners can succeed only if they attack the University Ordinance and the prescription of minimum marks thereby, are open to the defect of non joinder and are liable to be dismissed on that ground. The case of some of the petitioners (including those in the five writ petitions noticed above) that they are entitled to relief on special facts and allegations even on the provisions of the Ordinance will be dealt with later in this judgment. 7. The contention that it is not open to the University to prescribe limitations or conditions in the matter of admission to a privately managed Medical College, taken over by the Government, can hardly be sustained. Under S.26 of the University Act it is open to the University Statutes and Ordinances to provide inter alia for the admission of students to the various courses of study. It has also come out from the averments made in these writ petitions that the petitioners were informed that the admissions to the T. D. Medical College, would be considered "subject to the rules of the Government and the University". (Vide: Ext. P1 in O. P. No. 4180 of 1967 and Ext. P-3 in O. P. No. 4262 of 1967: vide also Para.5 of the common counter-affidavit dated 20-11-1967 filed by the Government). 8. In making the selections for admission to the Ist M. B. B. S. Course for the year 1967-1968, 50% of the seats were thrown open to be filled by open competition on the basis of merit. P-3 in O. P. No. 4262 of 1967: vide also Para.5 of the common counter-affidavit dated 20-11-1967 filed by the Government). 8. In making the selections for admission to the Ist M. B. B. S. Course for the year 1967-1968, 50% of the seats were thrown open to be filled by open competition on the basis of merit. Objection was raised to this on the ground that pro tanto, the rights of those who had registered themselves by payment of capitation fee, had been prejudiced. I do not think that having taken over the management of the College, the Government was precluded from laying down just and efficient standards in the matter of admission. So long as the seats available were a few, and the persons to be selected to fill them were far more, it was necessary to have some basis for selection. Besides, granting that the Government took upon itself the obligation to honour the commitments of the previous management as far as possible, the remedy against the breach of such a contractual obligation is not "in these proceedings under Art.226. 9. The relaxation of 5% of the prescribed minimum of marks, in favour of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes, was objected to on the ground that it again trenched on the rights of those who had registered themselves, on payment of capitation fee. For reasons stated in the preceding paragraph, I am unable to sustain this objection. 10. It was contended that some of the petitioners in these writ petitions are graduates, being holders of the B. Sc. or other equivalent decrees, and that consistent with the rule obtaining in Government service of preserving a ratio of 3:2 between the graduates and non-graduates the same ought to have been applied in the matter of selection to the Ist M. B. B. S. course. I am unable to see how the graduate non-graduate ratio made applicable by a totally different process in other spheres of Governmental activity must perforce be applied, in the matter of the selections herein impugned. Indeed its application was opposed by the non-graduate elements among the petitioners. It was contended that the denial of weightage to graduates in the matter of selection, amounts to according equal treatment to those unequally placed. Indeed its application was opposed by the non-graduate elements among the petitioners. It was contended that the denial of weightage to graduates in the matter of selection, amounts to according equal treatment to those unequally placed. I am unable to see any case for the applicability of Art.14 in the circumstances or to the situation in question. 11. I have so far dealt with the general arguments advanced against the selections made. The challenge to the Ordinance failing, a large number of these writ petitions (to be specified hereinafter) where the petitioners have been refused admission for not complying with the minimum marks prescribed have to be dismissed. I now turn to individual cases depending on special facts and considerations. 12. In the case of the petitioners in O. P.Nos. 4558, 4665, 4703, 4771 and 4844 of 1967, it was admitted by the Government Pleader that these petitioners have been selected for admission by the Selection Committee but were not actually admitted in view of the interim orders issued by this Court on the admission of some of these writ petitions, directing reservation of certain seats, pending final orders on the writ petitions. The Government Pleader agreed that the cases of the petitioners in these five writ petitions, will hereafter be dealt with on their merits. In the case of the petitioner in O P. No. 4558 of 1967, Sri A. S. Rajagopal, there is also an additional circumstance. It has been stated is supplemental counter-affidavit filed on 12-12-1967, that he fell short of the required minimum of marks in Physics by 2%, that this was discovered only after the selection and while checking up the certificates, and that his case been reported to the Chairman of the Selection Committee. The same will also be considered on its merits. 13. O. P. No. 4522 of 1967: It was contended that the petitioner herein satisfied the minimum marks for admission prescribed by the University but was still denied admission, and that four persons who are respondents 3 to 6 in O. P. No. 4574 of 1967, and who obtained less than the prescribed minimum of marks had been granted admission. In a separate counter-affidavit filed in this writ petition, it is stated that the petitioner in this writ petition had not paid any capitation fee and could only take her place from among candidates from the merit pool by open competition. In a separate counter-affidavit filed in this writ petition, it is stated that the petitioner in this writ petition had not paid any capitation fee and could only take her place from among candidates from the merit pool by open competition. The five persons selected from the merit pool were those who scored the highest number of marks. This is sufficient effective answer to the case of the petitioner in this writ petition. There is also the further fact that respondents 3 to 6, in O. P. No. 4574 of 1967 to whom the petitioner has alleged discriminatory and favourable treatment are among the 69 persons in Sri Padmakumar's list and report, in respect of whom there were commitments by the previous management which the government had undertaken to honour as far as possible. The Government Pleader further clarified that the 3rd and 4th respondents in O. P. No. 4574 of 1967 are not among those selected for admission. The petitioner in this writ petition is not entitled to any relief on special facts, 14. O. P. No. 4574 of 1967: The petitioner herein, like the one in O. P. No. 4522 of 1967, was one who competed from the merit pool. He had not paid any capitation fee. On the averments made in the counter-affidavit in O. P. No. 4522 of 1967, it is clear that the five persons selected from the merit pool were those who scored the highest number of marks. Respondents 3 to 6 herein are those in the list of 69 persons in Sri Padmakumar's report and list, in respect of whom the previous management had certain moral obligations, which the Government was bound to honour, as far as possible. The petitioner herein is not entitled to any relief. 15. O. P. No. 4735 of 1967: The petitioner contended that he was in fact selected to the 1st M. B. B. S. Course, but not actually admitted. There was no case that this petitioner did not satisfy the requirements as to qualifications prescribed by the Ordinance. The only contention was that having been selected, the petitioner was asked to appear between the 4th and 10th November 1967, but actually appeared only on the 11th. I consider that the case for admission of this petitioner should be considered by the appropriate authorities and direct accordingly. 16. O. P. Nos. 4512 and 4262 of 1967. The only contention was that having been selected, the petitioner was asked to appear between the 4th and 10th November 1967, but actually appeared only on the 11th. I consider that the case for admission of this petitioner should be considered by the appropriate authorities and direct accordingly. 16. O. P. Nos. 4512 and 4262 of 1967. The case of the petitioners in these two writ petitions may be considered together. These petitioners have passed the B. Se. Part I (Pre-Medical) of the Karnataka University. Exts. P-6 and P-9 filed in O. P. No. 4262 of 1967 are relied on to show that passing the B. Se. Part I (Pre-Medical) of the Karnataka University is sufficient in itself for admission to the 1st year M. B. B S Course in Kerala. In the counter affidavit, filed on 4-1-1968 in these writ petitions and in the arguments by the Government Pleader, the stand taken is that the mere passing of B. Sc. Part I (Pre-Medical) of the Karnataka University would not be enough and that the obtaining of minimum marks in the qualifying examination, viz., the Pre-Degree Examination was still necessary. The petitioners were assessed by the Selection Committee and found to have secured less than the prescribed marks in the requisite subjects, for the Pre-Degree Examination. I am not satisfied that these writ petitions have disclosed any ground for interference. 17. O. P. No. 4397 of 1967: The petitioner had passed the Pre-Degree Examination in March 1966, obtaining a total of 242 out of 450 marks. Her complaint is that in spite of having paid the capitation fee on 24-1-1967, respondents 5 and 6 in her petition who got equal number of marks as she, or even less than her, had been admitted. Respondent 5 in this writ petition is A. S. Rajagopal, the petitioner in O. P. No. 4558 of 1967, previously noticed. His case has again been referred to the Selection Committee for being dealt with. Any grievance on the ground of the admission of the 5th respondent is therefore premature. Regarding the 6th respondent there is no averment that he scored equal number of marks as the petitioner, or less marks than she, but was nevertheless admitted. The only allegation against the 6th respondent is that he registered himself and paid the capitation fee later than the petitioner. Regarding the 6th respondent there is no averment that he scored equal number of marks as the petitioner, or less marks than she, but was nevertheless admitted. The only allegation against the 6th respondent is that he registered himself and paid the capitation fee later than the petitioner. No grounds for interference on what at best, is a breach of a contractual obligation has been disclosed. The payment of capitation fee both by the petitioner and 6th respondent was after the Government banned receipt of the same. On her own averments in Para.3 of her affidavit, she got only 72 marks out of 160 Physics, in the Pre-Degree Examination, and this is below the minimum prescribed by the Ordinance. The petitioner is not entitled to any relief. 18. O. P. No. 4398 of 1967: The petitioner is a Pre-Degree candidate having obtained 236 out of 450 marks. He paid the capitation fee on 10-7-1965. His complaint is that respondent 5 and 6, in the same position as he, had been selected. Respondent 5 herein is A. S. Rajagopal, the petitioner in O. P. No. 4658 of 1967, and any grievance on the score of his selection is as noticed already, premature. There is no allegation that the 6th respondent obtained lesser marks than the petitioner, but was still preferred. The only allegation is that the 6th respondent had registered himself for admission later than the petitioner. This is not a ground on which the petitioner can succeed in these proceedings, as, at best, it discloses only a breach of a contractual obligation. On the averments in Para.3 of his affidavit, the petitioner got only 72 out of 150 marks in Biology. He is not entitled to any relief. 19. O. P. No. 4421 of 1967: The petitioner in this writ petition claims to be a person belonging to the Backward Classes in whose favour the University Ordinance has made a relaxation by 5% in respect of the prescribed minimum of marks. He has secured more than the basic minimum of marks thus postulated in favour of persons belonging to the Backward Classes and his complaint is that persons belonging to the Backward Classes who had obtained less marks than he and even less than the relaxed minimum had been admitted. He has secured more than the basic minimum of marks thus postulated in favour of persons belonging to the Backward Classes and his complaint is that persons belonging to the Backward Classes who had obtained less marks than he and even less than the relaxed minimum had been admitted. The Government Pleader, after taking time, agreed that the petitioner is a member of the Backward Classes and that, on the averments made in Para.2 to 4 of his affidavit and the position disclosed by Exts. P-5 and P-6, the petitioner's case is entitled to re-consideration. I direct that this would be done. 20. O. P. No. 4957 of 1967: The complaint of the petitioner in this writ petition is that his daughter, E. Vasanthi had passed the Pre-Degree Examination of the Kerala University in March, 1966 with Physics, Chemistry and Biology as optional subjects and securing an average of 56% marks in those subjects, being thus fully qualified for admission to the 1st year M. B. B. S. Course. A capitation fee of Rs. 7,500 was also paid by her in March, 1967. The Government Pleader rightly pointed out that there is no averment that Smt. Vasanthi had secured the minimum number of marks (not less than 50%) in each of the subjects of Physics, Chemistry and Biology, that the mark list showed otherwise, and that the mere securing of an average of 56% in all the three subjects put together, as alleged by the petitioner, would not satisfy the requirements of the University Ordinance. The stand thus taken by the Government Pleader is correct. The petitioner is not entitled to any relief in this writ petition. 21. O. P. No. 4553 of 1967: The petitioner in this writ petition is a member of the Backward Classes and he seeks to make out his claim on the bald allegation that he had passed the Pre-Degree Examination and secured 49% marks. But, his own averment in Para.2 of the petition will show that he obtained only 37% marks in Physics, which is short of even the relaxed minimum in favour of the Backward Classes. The petitioner cannot therefore have any grievance. 22. O. P. No. 4490 of 1967: The petitioner in this writ petition has passed the Pre-Degree Examination of the Kerala University and, on his averments, has secured more than 50% marks in the optional subjects, Physics, Chemistry, and Biology. The petitioner cannot therefore have any grievance. 22. O. P. No. 4490 of 1967: The petitioner in this writ petition has passed the Pre-Degree Examination of the Kerala University and, on his averments, has secured more than 50% marks in the optional subjects, Physics, Chemistry, and Biology. On the averments made, which remain un-controverted, the petitioner has made out a case for consideration for selection and I direct accordingly. 23. O. P. No. 4496 of 1967: The petitioner's averments in paragraphs of his affidavit are that he had secured more than 50% marks in the optional subjects, Physics, Chemistry and Biology in the aggregate, and that he is fully qualified for admission to the 1st year M. B. B. S. Course. The Government Pleader is to some extent right in pointing out that there is no express averment that the petitioner obtained not less than 60% marks in each of the optional subjects. However, the allegation that the petitioner is fully qualified for admission to the course would seem to indicate that this requirement is satisfied. In this case there was no submission, as in the case of the petitioner in O. P. No. 4957/67 that the mark list showed that the petitioner was not qualified. I therefore direct that the case of the petitioner in this writ petition for admission be considered on its merits. 24. After the admission of some of these writ petitions interim orders were issued directing reservation of seats for the petitioners till final orders are passed on the writ petitions. As a result of the reservation of seats thus directed it is stated that 26 seats are now available in the College to be filled (See counter affidavit of the State in O. P. No. 4522/67). Pending these writ petitions, provisional admissions were directed in O. P. Nos. 4735/67, 484467, 4558/67, 4665/67, 4703/67 and 4771/67, making it clear that the said admissions are subject to the final orders in these O. Ps and will not by themselves confer any rights on those petitioners to continue in the College. In many, if not all, of these writ petitions one or more of the selected candidates were impleaded with the permission of the Court to represent all the selected candidates. In many, if not all, of these writ petitions one or more of the selected candidates were impleaded with the permission of the Court to represent all the selected candidates. The seats now available will be filled up and the admissions made provisional and otherwise will, if necessary, be re-examined and finalised in the light of the directions hereinafter issued. 25. In the light of the above discussion and conclusions I direct as follows: (1) The cases of the petitioners in O. P. Nos. 4558, 4665, 4703, 4771 and 4844 of 1967 for admission to the T. D. Medical College, will, as admitted be considered and decided in the light of Para.12 of this judgment. (2) The case of the petitioner in O. P. No. 4735 of 1967 will also be considered in the light of Para.15 of this judgment. (3) The case of the petitioner in O. P. No. 4421 of 1967 will be considered in the light of Para.19 of this judgment. (4) The case of the petitioner in O. P. No. 4490 of 1967 will be consi-sidered in the light of Para.22 of this judgment. (5) The case of the petitioner in O. P. No. 4496 of 1967 will also be considered in the light of Para.23 of this judgment. 26. The remaining writ petitions, namely, O. P. Nos. 4180, 4239, 4262, 4263, 4264, 4265, 4266, 4267, 4268, 4271, 4283, 4309, 4320, 4326, 4341, 4342, 4388, 4396, 4397, 4398, 4403, 4408, 4409, 4422, 4443, 4450, 4466, 4478, 4512, 4513, 4520, 4522, 4553, 4564, 4574, 4596, 4651, 4691, 4717, 4816, 4957 and 5057 are all dismissed as the success of the petitioners in these writ petitions depends entirely on the attack levied on the University Ordinance dated 11-5-1966, which I have repelled, and as nothing has been disclosed in these writ petitions that the petitioners satisfy the requisite minimum marks prescribed by the Ordinance. There will be no order as to costs in any of these writ petitions. Issue carbon copies of this judgment to such of the counsel as apply for the same.