JUDGMENT C.B. Capoor, J. - These revisions have been referred to a larger Bench at the instance of our brother Gyanendra Kumar, J. in view of a conflict of judicial opinion in this Court on the question as to whether it is open to a duly empowered Magistrate to take cognizance of a non cognizable offence investigated by a Police Officer without the order of a competent Magistrate. This question had cropped up before us on a reference made by our brother Yashodanandan, J. in Criminal Revision No. 1529 of 1965 connected with Criminal Reference No. 413 of 1965. The conclusion at which we had arrived in those cases was that if the Police investigates a non-cognizable offence without the order of a competent Magistrate and submits a charge-sheet to the Magistrate that charge-sheet may well be treated as a complaint or as a piece of information raising a suspicion that an offence has been committed; and if a Magistrate takes cognizance of the alleged offence on receiving such a charge-sheet, the taking of cognizance cannot be said to be illegal. We have given further thought to the question referred and our conclusions are to a certain extent different from those reached in Criminal Revision and Criminal Reference referred to above. 2. The cases which have given rise to, the revisions under consideration were non-cognizable ones and in each of them a charge-sheet was submitted by the police although as competent Magistrate had not ordered investigation into those cases as required by Sub-section (2) of Section 155 Code of Criminal Procedure but of which cognizance had been taken by the Magistrate concerned. 3. The question for consideration is as to whether it was within the powers of the Magistrate to have taken cognizance of those cases. 4. Sub-section (2) of Section 155 enjoins that no police officer shall investigate a non-cognizable offence without the order of a Magistrate of the Ist Class or Second Class having power to try such case or commit the same for trial or of a Presidency Magistrate, it has not been provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure as to what will be the effect of an investigation conducted by a police officer without the order of a competent Magistrate. Section 190(1) of Code of Criminal Procedure reads as below: Section 190(1)--Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf may take cognizance of any offence-- (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police officer; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed. Clause (b) referred to above was substituted by Section 45 of Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act 1923 (Act XVIII of 1923). Previously Clause (b) of the aforesaid section ran as below: Upon a police report of such facts. Prior to the amendment referred to above there was a conflict of opinion on the interpretation of Clause (b). One view was that the aforesaid clause was confined to police report in cases which could be investigated by the police Under Chapter XIV of the Code that is in easels of (a) cognizable offences and(b) non-cognizable offences into which the police had been ordered by a Magistrate u/s 155 to investigate. Stated differently according to the aforesaid view Clause (b) was limited to a report u/s 173 of Code of Criminal Procedure. The other view was that the aforesaid clause had a wider connotation and also embraced reports as to non-cognizable offences investigated by the police even without an order of a competent Magistrate. 5. It may, therefore, well be held that Clause (b) was amended by the legislature with a view to set at rest the aforesaid conflict. It is significant that the amended clause is wider in import than the clause which stood prior to amendment. A report contemplated by the amended clause need not necessarily be confined to a report u/s 173 of Code of Criminal Procedure. The substituted clause contemplates the report of any police officer and not of an officer incharge of a police station only. Again such report is to be of facts constituting tire offence and it is not necessary that it should also contain the opinion formed by a police officer as to the accusation made. The substituted clause contemplates the report of any police officer and not of an officer incharge of a police station only. Again such report is to be of facts constituting tire offence and it is not necessary that it should also contain the opinion formed by a police officer as to the accusation made. If the intention of the legislature had been that Clause (b) of Section 190(1) of Code of Criminal Procedure should be limited to a report u/s 173 of the Code nothing would have been easier for the legislature than to have said so expressly and to have used the expression a report submitted by the police officer u/s 173 Code of Criminal Procedure. It may, therefore, reasonably be held that the intent of the legislature in amending Clause (b) was to give legislative recognition to the wider interpretation and to indicate that Clause (b) was not to be confined to a report u/s 173 of Code of Criminal Procedure only. In this connection the observations made in the case of Premchand Khetry Vs. The State, AIR 1958 Cal 213 may usefully be referred to. In the case of Pravin Chandra Mody Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 1185 one of the contentions raised before the Supreme Court was that Clause (b) of Section 190(1) was limited to the report submitted by the police u/s 173 of Code of Criminal Procedure but the contention was repelled. Hidayatullah, J. speaking for the court observed as below at page 1186: In our judgment the meaning which is sought to be given to a police report is not correct. In Section 190 a distinction is made between the classes of persons who can start a criminal prosecution. Under the three clauses of Section 190(1), we have already referred, criminal prosecution can be initiated, (i) by a police officer by a report in writing; (ii) upon information received from any person other than a Police Officer or on the Magistrate's own knowledge or suspicion and (iii) upon receiving a complaint of facts. If the report in this case falls within (i) above, then the procedure u/s 251-A Code of Criminal Procedure must be followed. If it falls in (ii) or (iii) then the procedure u/s 252 Code of Criminal Procedure must be followed. If the report in this case falls within (i) above, then the procedure u/s 251-A Code of Criminal Procedure must be followed. If it falls in (ii) or (iii) then the procedure u/s 252 Code of Criminal Procedure must be followed. The question as to whether cognizance can be taken of an offence on the basis of an invalid police report came up for consideration in the case of H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh Vs. The State of Delhi, AIR 1955 SC 196 wherein it was held that a defect or illegality in investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or trial and that it was not possible to say that cognizance on an invalid police report was prohibited and was, therefore, a nullity. It was further held in that case that cognizance so taken would only be in the nature of error in a proceeding antecedent to the trial and that to such a situation Section 537 of Code of Criminal Procedure would be attracted. 6. It is true that the aforesaid case related to a cognizable offence but the observations made by the Supreme Court were of a general nature arid were as much applicable to the investigation of a cognizable offence as to the investigation of a non-cognizable offence. If a competent Magistrate takes cognizance of a non-cognizable offence investigated by the police without the order of a competent Magistrate his act that is the taking of cognizance would be tantamount to according ex post facto sanction re: the investigation. 7. The scope of Section 190(1) of Code of Criminal Procedure was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Abhinandan Jha and Others Vs. Dinesh Mishra, AIR 1968 SC 117 . The question that arose for consideration in that case was as to whether a Magistrate has the power to direct the police to submit a charge-sheet in a case in which it had submitted a report u/s 169 of Code of Criminal Procedure. Vaidialingam, J. speaking for the court is reported to have observed as below at page 123: There is no express power, so far as we can see, which could give jurisdiction to pass an order of the nature under attack, nor can any such powers be implied. Vaidialingam, J. speaking for the court is reported to have observed as below at page 123: There is no express power, so far as we can see, which could give jurisdiction to pass an order of the nature under attack, nor can any such powers be implied. There is certainly no obligation, on the Magistrate, to accent the report, if he does not agree with the opinion formed by the Police. Under those circumstances, if he still suspects that an offence has been committed, he is entitled, notwithstanding the opinion of the police, to take cognizance, u/s 190(1)(c) of the Code. That provision in our opinion, is obviously intended to secure that offences may not go unpunished and justice may be invoked even where persons individually aggrieved are unwilling or unable to prosecute, or the police, either wantonly or through bonafide error, fail to submit a report, setting out the facts constituting the offence. Therefore, a very wide power is conferred on the Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence, not only when he receives information about the commission of an offence from a third person, but also where he has knowledge or even suspicion that the offence has been committed. It is open to the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence, u/s 190(1)(c), on the ground that, after having due regard to the final report and the police records placed before him, he has reason to suspect that an offence has been committed. 8. It would thus seem that Under Clause (b) of Section 190(1) of Code of Criminal Procedure a Magistrate can take cognizance on receiving a report u/s 173 of Code of Criminal Procedure with regard to a non-cognizable offence investigated by the police without an order of a competent Magistrate. 9. Complaint according to Section 4(h) of Code of Criminal Procedure means the allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate with a view to his taking action under this Code that some person whether known or unknown has committed an offence, but it does not include the report of a police officer. It appears to us that the expression "the report of a police officer" as used in the aforesaid clause is co-extensive with the report to which Clause (b) relates. Thus if a report is covered by Clause (b) it would not be a complaint. It appears to us that the expression "the report of a police officer" as used in the aforesaid clause is co-extensive with the report to which Clause (b) relates. Thus if a report is covered by Clause (b) it would not be a complaint. It has already been observed that in our opinion a report submitted by a police officer i.e. a non-confinable offence investigated to the police without an order of a competent Magistrate is covered by Clause (b) referred to above. 10. We are aware that there are single judge decisions of this Court and $he decisions of some other High Courts in which the view taken is that if a Police Officer investigates into a non-cognizable offence without an order of a competent Magistrate, authorising him to investigate and submits a charge-sheet to the Magistrate concerned the charge sheet would be complaint--e.g. Lallo Mal v. State 1965 AWR 115 ; Jai Prakash v. State 1961 AWR 149 ; Saramma Zacharia v. State AIR 1953 T.C. 43 ; King Emperor v. Sida ILR 26 Bom., 150 FB; Rustom Ardeshir Banaji v. Emperor AIR 1948 Bom 163 and Bhoormal Premchand Vs. Collector of Customs, Madras, AIR 1967 Mad 39 and it is after giving our most anxious consideration to those cases that we have respectfully differed from the view taken therein. 11. The next question that arises for consideration is as to what would be the procedure to be followed in such a case. The accusation against the Applicants was Under Sections 3 and 4 bf the UP Public Gambling Act. The cases therefore relate to offences which, are triable as a summons case and the Magistrate shall, while dealing with the cases, follow the procedure laid down in Chapter XX of Code of Criminal Procedure. 12. The applications in revision are accordingly dismissed.