Judgment 1. This application in revision is directed against the final order in a proceeding under S. 145 of the Criminal P.C. recorded by a First Class Magistrate of Barh. The proceeding related to 23 plots of lands situated in villages Bazidpur Chondi, Daulatpur Chondi and Parandarpur Chondi, all within Barh police station, in the district of Patna. The petitioners, who were the second party to the proceeding, claimed to be in possession over all the plots in dispute, except plot No. 709 in village Daulatpur Chondi, but their possession has been declared with respect to only two of the plots, namely, plot Nos. 441 and 442 over which there is a pucca building. 2. It is undisputed that Mt. Bibi Husna Ara Begum (petitioner No. 1) is the daughter of Abdul Rashid (opposite party No. 1) and the grand-daughter of Habib Hussain (opposite party No. 8). Bibi Kolsum (opposite party No. 4) is the Nani (mothers mother) and Mohammad Shahabuddin (opposite party No. 2) is the brother of petitioner No. 1, who was married to Mohammad Shoib (petitioner No. 2) son of Mohammad Yasin (petitioner No. 3) in November i960, and in May 1961, she left her fathers home and came to her husbands home in village Rasulpur, Police Station, Fatwah, situated at a distance of about 25 miles from the villages where the disputed lands lie. 3. It appears that Bibi Kolsum (opposite party No. 4) bad executed a deed of gift dated the 9th July 1914, in favour of petitioner No. 1, who was then a minor, aged four or five years. During her minority, the gifted land was being managed by her father Abdul Rashid (opposite party No. 1). 4. According to the case set up by the petitioners, petitioner No. 1 attained majority in 1958. After that her father ceased to be her guardian, He continued to manage the gifted properties on her behalf until her marriage and Roksadi which were performed in November 1960, and May 1961, respectively. Thereafter the opposite party No. 1 discontinued to look after her properties and handed over the title deeds to her. On 25-7-1961, she executed a Mokhtamama in favour of her husband (petitioner No. 2) who began to manage the properties on her behalf. 5. Thereafter the opposite party No. 1 discontinued to look after her properties and handed over the title deeds to her. On 25-7-1961, she executed a Mokhtamama in favour of her husband (petitioner No. 2) who began to manage the properties on her behalf. 5. The further case of the second party petitioners was that 14 out of the 23 plots in dispute were covered by the deed of gift dated the 5th July 1944, but two of the gifted plots, namely, plot Nos. 711 and 985 were wrongly mentioned in the deed of gift as plot Nos. 314 and 412 respectively. In regard to five other plots (plot Nos. 612, 617, 618, 681 and 689), the case of the petitioners was that they bad been acquired out of funds gifted to petitioner No. 1 and her brother (opposite party No. 2) by her mother Bibi Humera who died sometime in 1944. In regard to three other plots (plot Nos. 619, 693 and 694), the case of the petitioners was that they had been acquired by Bibi Humera out of her own lunch and, accordingly, after her death they were inherited by the petitioner No. 1 jointly with opposite party Nos. 1, 2 and 4 as the heirs of Bibi Humera. Bibi Kolsum (opposite party No. 4) gifted away share in these three plots to petitioner No. 1 under the deed of gift dated the 9th July, 1944, and opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 also made an oral gift of their shares therein to petitioner No. 1. Regarding plot No. 599 (1/2 decimal towards north), it was alleged that opposite party No. 2 had made a gift of it to petitioner No. 1 under a registered deed of gift dated the 28th April, 1961, and it was amalgamated with plot No. 612, which had been acquired by Bibi Humera in the name of petitioner No. 1. The name of petitioner No. 1 stands recorded in Barh Municipality, in the serista of the former landlord and in the Land Reforms Department. It was, there, fore, claimed that the petitioners were in possession of the various plots of land mentioned above. 6. Opposite party Nos. The name of petitioner No. 1 stands recorded in Barh Municipality, in the serista of the former landlord and in the Land Reforms Department. It was, there, fore, claimed that the petitioners were in possession of the various plots of land mentioned above. 6. Opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 admitted the title of petitioner No. 1 by virtue of the deed of gift dated the 9th July, 1944, with respect to 12 of the plots mentioned in schedule A of their written statement, but they alleged that opposite party No. 1 had all along been in possession of the said plots of land and neither petitioner No. 1 nor petitioners 2 and 3 were in actual possession thereof. With regard to plot Nos. 711 and 985, the case of opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 was that they were not covered by the deed of gift aforesaid and opposite party No. 1 was in cultivating possession thereof on behalf of Bibi Kolsum (opposite party No. 4). With regard to plot Nos. 612, 617, 618, 631 and 689. it was alleged that they had been acquired by opposite party No. 1 out of his own funds and he was in possession thereof in his own right. With regard to plot Nos. 619, 698 and 694, it was admitted that they had been inherited jointly by petitioner No. 1 and opposite party Nos. 1, 2 and 4. But it was denied that opposite party Nos. 1, 2 and 4 had gifted their shares therein to petitioner No. 1 who was, therefore, entitled only to her share therein, but she was not in possession thereof and it was opposite party No. 1 who was in possession of sixteen annas share in these three plots. 7. Upon a consideration of the materials on the record, the learned Magistrate has upheld the possession of the opposite party over all the disputed plots, except plot Nos. 441 and 442. Against the decision of the learned Magistrate, the petitioner went up in revision to the Sessions Court, but they were unsuccessful there. Hence the petitioners have come up to this Court. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners baa put forward the contention that the possession of petitioner No. 1 ought to have been declared upon all the plots of laud mentioned in Schedule A of the written statement of opposite party Nos. Hence the petitioners have come up to this Court. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners baa put forward the contention that the possession of petitioner No. 1 ought to have been declared upon all the plots of laud mentioned in Schedule A of the written statement of opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 since those plots of land bad been admitted to be in possession of opposite party No. 1 in his capacity as the guardian of petitioner No. 1, and that it was not open to opposite party No. 1 to repudiate the possession of petitioner No. 1 over the plots covered by the deed of gift dated 9-7-1944. In support of this contention learned counsel relied upon Balak Das V/s. Bhagwan Das, A.I.R. 1960 Pat 60 where reference was made to Bajirao V/s. Mt. Dadibai, A.I.R. 1926 Nag 286 and it was held that the possession of an agent or a servant which is permissive cannot give him a locus standi as against his principal or master in a proceeding under S. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. Learned counsel also relied upon Nritta Gopal Singh V/s. Chandi Charan Singh, (1906) 10 C. W. N. 1088 where it was held that possession that can be pleaded in a proceeding under S. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, must be possession based on a claim of right to possession and that the possession of an agent or a servant which is permissive cannot give a party to such a proceeding a locus standi as against his principal or master. Similar view was expressed in Thyalyee Ammal V/s. Srirangaroya Goundan AIR 1923 Mad 60. But these decisions are really of no avail to the petitioners in the present case. In all those cases the agent or the servant was in possession over the disputed property while the relationship of principal and agent or roaster and servant was subsisting. Here upon the case of the petitioners themselves, the relationship of guardian and ward which, had subsisted between opposite party No. 1 and petitioner No. 1 had terminated in 1958 when petitioner No. 1 attained her majority, and in any event, opposite party No. 1 was not in possession on behalf of petitioner No. 1 since after May 1961, when she went away to her husbands home. Besides, opposite party No. 1 was not in possession of the gifted properties in the capacity of an agent or servant of petitioner No. 1. He had not been appointed by petitioner No. 1 as her guardian and it cannot be maintained that he was in possession of the gifted properties with the permission of petitioner No. 1, rather he was in possession thereof in his own right as the natural guardian of petitioner No. 1. The possession of such a guardian cannot be equated with the permissive possession of an agent OB a servant who is permitted to be in possession by the principal or the master of the property. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners then relied upon Jamadar Mian V/s. Amir Hassan, AIR 1957 Pat 213 . At page 218 of the report, it was observed : "The general rule of law is that where a person enters into possession of property be longing to a person under disability, such as a minor or a lunatic, and the relationship of the parties and the circumstances of the case are such as would, in equity, fasten on the person so entering into possession, a trust, actual or constructive, the possession of such person would be presumed to be that of a bailiff or agent of the person under disability, and not adverse to him. Thus, the possession of a de into guardian would be presumed to be on behalf of the minor as his bailiff or guardian and not adverse as laid down in the cases of Thomas V/s. Thomas (1885) 110 R R 107 and Ma Nagwe Naing V/s. Maung The Mating, AIR 1929 P C 55 as also in the cases of Ghulam Mohammad V/s. Ghulam Husain, AIR 1932 P C 81 and Howard V/s. Earl of Sherewsbury, (1874) 43 L J ch 495." That, however, was not a case under S. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. These observations were made in a Civil litigation where question of adverse possession within the meaning of Art. 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908 came up for decision before this Court. These observations were made in a Civil litigation where question of adverse possession within the meaning of Art. 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908 came up for decision before this Court. So far as a case under S. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, is concerned it is well settled that the Criminal Court has to maintain the possession even of a trespasser who is found to be in actual possession of the property since more than sixty days before the date of the institution of the proceeding. This decision is, therefore, of no avail to the petitioners in the present case. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners also relied upon Vasudeo Atmaram V/s. Eknath Balkrishna Thite, (1911) ILR 35 Bom 79. At page 89 of the report, the following observations were made : "But the law is, as pointed out by Lord Hardwicke in Morgan V/s. Morgan, (1737) 1 Atk 489, where any person, whether a father or a stranger, enters upon the estate of an infant, and continues in possession, this Court will consider such person entering as a guardian to the infant : (see other decisions to the same effect collated in the notes to the case of Taylor V/s. Horde, 2 Sm L C 10th Ed. 644-645. Ambus possession must, therefore, be deemed to have begun as that of a bailiff or agent for the minors and to have continued as such until, after the minors had arrived at the age of majority, she did something to convert it into a wrongful possession on her own account." These observations also are of no avail to the petitioners in the present case, because there also the Court was not considering the possession of a trespasser. In a proceeding under S. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the petitioners are not entitled to succeed in the present case on the basis of the relationship of guardian and ward which subsisted between opposite party No. 1 and petitioner No. 1 until the latter attained her majority in 1953, about four years before the present proceeding was instituted. 11 As regards the decision of the learned Magistrate about the remaining plots in dispute, no question of law has been raised on behalf of the petitioners. 12. The result, therefore, is that this application fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.