ORDER R.L. Gulatt, J. - This writ petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution arises out of certain consolidation proceedings under the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act. 2. During the consolidation operations opposite parties Nos. 10 to 13 who are the sons of one Sheo Dayal put in a claim that their names should also be recorded along with the names of the Petitioner in respect of the land in dispute. Their claim was based upon the allegation that they were the daughter's son of one Raghubar who was admittedly the co-tenure holder of the land along with the father of the Petitioner. The claim was not accepted by the Consolidation Officer, but on appeal the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) accepted the claim of opposite parties Nos. 10 to 13. The Petitioner had resisted the claim on two grounds, (1) that the opposite parties Nos. 10 to 13 were not the daughter's son of Raghubar, and (2) that the Petitioner had perfected his title by adverse possession. 3. So far as the question of adverse possession is concerned, the same was decided against the Petitioner and that matter is no longer in contest. So far as the question as to whether opposite parties Nos. 10 to 13 were the sons of the daughter of Raghubar as claimed by them or not, it was examined in detail by the Settlement Officer and thereafter by the Dy. Director of Consolidation before whom a second appeal was filed. Both these authorities recorded a concurrent finding of fact that the opposite parties Nos. 10 to 13 were in fact the daughter's sons of Raghubar as claimed by them. The Petitioner then went in revision before the Director of Consolidation. The Joint Director of Consolidation, who heard the revision, rejected the same by his order dated 18-3-1963. The Petitioner has now come up before this Court against the order of the Joint Director of Consolidation as also against the orders of the Dy. Director of Consolidation and the. Settlement Officer (Consolidation). 4. It appears that there was a previous litigation between the parties in respect of certain other plots of land. The Judicial Officer, Etawah, who tried the suit recorded a finding that opposite parties Nos. 10 to 13 were the sons of the daughter of Raghubar, but he dismissed their suit as he found these persons to be out of possession. It appears that there was a previous litigation between the parties in respect of certain other plots of land. The Judicial Officer, Etawah, who tried the suit recorded a finding that opposite parties Nos. 10 to 13 were the sons of the daughter of Raghubar, but he dismissed their suit as he found these persons to be out of possession. A certified copy of this judgment was filed before the Consolidation authorities as a piece of evidence. Oral evidence was also led by the parties in support of their rival contentions. The Additional Settlement Officer repelled the contention that the previous suit between the parties operated as res judicata. He, however, took into consideration the finding recorded by the Judicial Officer to the effect that the opposite parties Nos. 10 to 13 were the sons of the daughter of Raghubar. He also considered the other evidence on record and came to the conclusion that no reliable evidence had been adduced to rebut the finding of the Judicial Officer. 5. It appears that before the Dy. Director of Consolidation the Petitioner merely reiterated his plea of res judicata which was rejected by him on the ground that the land involved in the previous litigation was different than the land involved in the dispute before him. He went on to observe that the decision in the previous litigation about the parentage of Respondent Nos. 10 to 13 was a good piece of evidence which the Petitioner had not been able to rebut. The Joint Director of Consolidation merely confirmed the order of the Dy. Director of Consolidation. 6. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has advanced before me an entirely new argument. His submission is that by reason of Section 43 of the Indian Evidence Act, the judgment of the Judicial Officer in the previous litigation could not be taken notice of. No such contention was raised before the consolidation authorities, nor has any such contention been raised in the grounds of the writ petition. In fact, this contention is contrary to ground No. 2 of the writ petition which is in the following terms: Because the judgment in the previous litigation could only be a piece of evidence and not conclusive on the question as to whether the contesting opposite parties were the daughter's sons of Raghubar and Nanhey, and it did not absolve the opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 from the necessity of applying their own mind to the evidence produced in the instant case and recorded an independent finding, and they were plainly in error in acting otherwise. I am, therefore, not inclined to permit the Petitioner to raise this contention for the first time before me. Such a contention, apart from the fact that the same was not raised before the consolidation authorities and is contrary to the averments contained in the writ petition would lead to another question as to whether or not the Indian Evidence Act would apply to consolidation proceedings. Without expressing any final opinion on this question, to me it appears that the consolidation authorities not being courts, the proceedings before them are not governed by the Indian Evidence Act so that the consolidation authorities can rely upon the material which may not strictly be admissible according to the Indian Evidence Act. A judgment of the civil court in a previous litigation between the parties may or may not be strictly relevant under the Indian Evidence Act, but it is certainly a good material which could be taken into consideration by the consolidation authorities while deciding the issue like the one involved in the present case. It is, therefore, necessary that such a question should have been raised before the consolidation authorities so as to enable them to give a finding thereon. 7. In the alternative the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the consolidation authorities had merely relied upon the finding of the Judicial Officer and had not considered the other evidence on the record. This contention is obviously without substance. The Settlement Officer has stated in his order that he had heard the counsel for the parties and had gone through the evidence on the file. He, in fact, has discussed the evidence of the various witnesses. The Dy. Director of Consolidation and the Joint Director of Consolidation have both regarded the finding of the Judicial Officer to be merely a good piece of evidence which the Petitioner failed to rebut by the evidence produced by him. Merely because the consolidation authorities have found that the evidence produced by the Petitioner was not sufficient to support his contention, the Petitioner cannot say that the consolidation authorities have not considered the other evidence. They, indeed, have considered the evidence led by the Petitioner, but have disbelieved the same. Merely because the consolidation authorities have found that the evidence produced by the Petitioner was not sufficient to support his contention, the Petitioner cannot say that the consolidation authorities have not considered the other evidence. They, indeed, have considered the evidence led by the Petitioner, but have disbelieved the same. There is thus no substance in either of the two contentions raised by the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner. 8. The result is that this writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs.