Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff is the appellant; he is the elder son of the first respondent, the first defendant; and the second respondent, the second defendant, is the second son of the first respondent. The second appeal arises out of a suit for partition, which has been dismissed by both the lower courts. 2. The appellant and the first respondent together executed Ex. P1 in 1114 and took a site from the owner thereof. They lived together in a building on the site; but in June 1950, the appellant left the place and took another plot on kudikidappu right and started living there. The first respondent put up a new building on the property and assigned his rights thereto under Ex. D7 in August 1956 to the second respondent. The suit as laid was for the partition of the site as well as the building. Before me the claim for a share in the building has not been pressed; and the arguments are confined to a share in the site alone. 3. The first contention is that Ex. P1 was a lease arrangement. The Munsiff has considered this question and has held that the arrangement was only a kudikidappu and not a lease. The Subordinate Judge, however, thinks that the arrangement under Ex. P1 was a lease arrangement. Ex. P1 is called "coolicharthu"; and it contains a provision for payment of Rs. 12/- per year, one rupee to be paid every month. Mr. M. K. Narayana Menon, the counsel of the appellant, argues that "coolicharthu" means rental agreement. I do not think that the word "coolicharthu" should necessarily mean a rental arrangement. It may as well mean a kudikidappu arrangement, under which the transferee or licensee agrees to pay consideration for the use of the land. The word "pattacheettu" and the word "pattom" were common expressions well-known to the parties; and they did not choose to use those expressions and preferred to use only "coolicharthu". The provisions of the document also do not indicate that the arrangement was necessarily a lease arrangement. Therefore, I am in agreement with the view expressed by the Munsiff that the arrangement was only a kudikidappu arrangement. 4. This view will get support from the recitals in Ex. D7 executed by the first respondent in favour of the second respondent in August 1956. What was transferred under Ex. Therefore, I am in agreement with the view expressed by the Munsiff that the arrangement was only a kudikidappu arrangement. 4. This view will get support from the recitals in Ex. D7 executed by the first respondent in favour of the second respondent in August 1956. What was transferred under Ex. D7 was only the right of the first respondent to the building. No mention whatever was made in Ex. D7 that the first respondent had any right over the site. Of course, it may be argued (and it is argued too) that the recitals in Ex. D7 do not bind the appellant. I refer to Ex. D7 not because the recitals therein bind the appellant, but because one of the executants of Ex. P1 treated the right thereunder only as a kudikidappu right and not as a lease-hold right. It may also be noted that prior to Ex. P1 the site was held only under kudikidappu. 5. The next question argued by Mr. Narayana Menon is that the possession of a kudikidappukaran is the same as the possession of a tenant, so that by his mere leaving the premises he does not lose his right of possession of the property. The counsel has cited decisions like Vajravalan v. Abbu (13 CLR. 58) and Ouseph Pylikutty v. Cochin Sirkar (25 CLR. 571). In the former case it was held that a kudikidappukaran was entitled to value of improvements from the landlord; and in the latter case it was held that a kudikidappukaran had enough possession to file a complaint for trespass against the landlord, if the latter interfered with the enjoyment of the former. It is apparent that these decisions do not hold that a kudikidappu right is a lease-hold right. It is well-known that a kudikidappu right had only been a licence until the recent land legislation under which it has been equated to a lease. These decisions also do not in any way indicate that even after the licensee discontinues the exercise of his licence, he will still retain the right. As I have already stated, since the appellant left the property in 1950 for good, he cannot claim any right in the property thereafter. 6. The Subordinate Judge has held that under S.15 of the Easements Act the respondents obtained a right of support for their building, and therefore, the site is not capable of partition. As I have already stated, since the appellant left the property in 1950 for good, he cannot claim any right in the property thereafter. 6. The Subordinate Judge has held that under S.15 of the Easements Act the respondents obtained a right of support for their building, and therefore, the site is not capable of partition. He has referred to the decision of this Court in Chellappan Nadar v. Krishnan Nair (1963 KLT. 750), where Raman Nayar J. has laid down: "And the extent to which the authorities go in applying the rule that in India a building can be owned separately from the land, to a case where a person has unauthorisedly built on the land of another, is that where that person suffers a decree in ejectment, he must, at the option of the owner of the land, be entitled to demolish and take away the materials of the building leaving the land undamaged, or, in the alternative, be paid the value of his building as compensation." and again: "The owner of the land is not the owner of the building, but neither is the builder unless, as I have said, the word "building" is used to cover only the materials of the building. The only right which the builder has is that in the event of his being evicted, he should be allowed to take away the materials or be paid compensation." After citing this decision, the Subordinate Judge says: "The principle has to be applied in the reverse in the present instance". What the Subordinate Judge has done by the reverse application of the principle is to bring about a result just contrary to the one laid down by Raman Nayar J. When Raman Nayar J. says that the builder has only the right to the bricks and mortar of the building, the Subordinate Judge says that the builder has not only the right to the building as a building, but he will get the subjacent and adjacent site too! It has thus the effect of making the cart draw the horse, instead of the horse drawing the cart! 7. The second appeal is dismissed with costs. A copy of this judgment may be sent to the Subordinate Judge wherever he is.