JUDGMENT Mahapatra, J. The defendants are the appellants. The suit out of which this appeal arises was one for declaration that the gift of the immovable properties, described in the plaint, by the defendant no. 1, widow of Gonjhu Munda, on the 13th August, 1958, in favour of Bhoodan Yagna Committee under the Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1954, was invalid, and not binding upon the plaintiffs. Gonjhu Munda was the owner of the suit properties. After his death, his widow, defendant no. 1, executed a Dan Patra on the 13th August, 1958, which was confirmed under Section 11 of the Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1954, by the Revenue Officer on the 5th November, 1958. When the plaintiffs (agnates of Gonjhu Munch) came to know of that, they objected against the Dan Patra on the 1st February, 1959, and on consideration of the: same the Revenue Officer cancelled his consideration of the Dan Patra by orders passed on the 2nd March, 1959. Against that, the present appellants went in appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, who by his order dated the 9th December, 1960, set aside the order passed by the Revenue Officer, which means that the confirmation of the Dan Patra, ,as made by the revenue Officer originally on the 5th November, 1958, was restored. Being aggrieved by that the present suit was instituted on the 5th May, 1961, and has been decreed by the court below. 2. Two points were raised on behalf of the appellants. Learned counsel urged that the suit was barred by limitation, inasmuch as it was not filed within six months from the date of confirm action of the Dan Patra by the Revenue Officer. He referred to Section 17 Sub-section (2) of the Bihar Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1954, which will be referred to hereafter as the Act. That Section provides as below: "(1) An appeal shall lie from an order of the Revenue Officer passed under Section 11 or 15(i) to the Commissioner of the Division, if such order was passed by the Collector, and (ii) to the Collector, if such order was passed by any other officer; and subject to the result of such appeal, the order of the Revenue Officer shall be final. (2) Notwithstanding any thing contained in Sub-section (1) any party aggrieved by the order or any other persons interested in the land who had no notice of the proceeding under Section 11 or 15 may, within six months from the date of such order, institute a suit in the Civil Court having jurisdiction for setting aside the order." The present suit, no doubt, is one of that nature. 3. From the narration of the events stated above, it appears that the order of confirmation of the Dan Patra under Section 11 was passed by the Revenue Officer on the 5th November, 1958, but another order cancelling the same was passed by the same officer on the objections of the plaintiffs on the 2nd March, 1959, whether that order of cancellation was right or wrong is a different matter, but there cannot be any doubt that that order of cancellation of confirmation passed by the Revenue Officer purported to have been made in exercise of the powers vested in the Revenue Officer under Section 11 of the Act. It was on that basis that the present appellants (defendants in the suit) went in appeal against that order to the Deputy Commissioner (who is the same as the Collector), as provided under Section 17, Sub-section (1) Clause (ii) and succeeded in obtaining the appellate order setting aside the order of cancellation of the confirmation as passed by the Revenue Officer. Clause (ii) of Sub-section (1) of Section 17 provides that the order of the Revenue Officer shall be final subject to the result of an appeal, if any, preferred against it. In other words, if there is no appeal, the Revenue Officer's order will be final. If there will be an appeal, then the appellate order becomes the last order. Sub-section (2) of Section 17 (which has been quoted above) provides that any party aggrieved by the order, within six months from the date of such order, may institute a suit in the Civil Court for setting aside that order.- The order, referred to in this provision, no doubt, is the order, which has become final within the meaning of Sub-section (l) of Section 17 of the Act. In other words, in a case where there has been an appeal under Sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act, the appellate order is the order within six months of which a civil suit is to be filed for setting aside that order within the meaning of Sub-section (2) of Section 17. In the instant case, such appellate order having been passed on the 9th December, 1960, and the suit having been instituted on the 5th May, ,1961, there is no question of limitation: 4. The other point urged by learned counsel was that the court below was wrong in holding that defendant no. 1, widow of Gonjhu Munda, had no right to make the gift of the suit properties. As held by the trial court, the tribal customary law of inheritance governing the Mundas is that the widow of a Munda gets life interest in the properties left by her husband and has no power to alienate the same by way of sale or gift. The book 'The Mundas and their Country' by Sarat Chandra Roy, M. A., B. L., which is recognised as a book of authority on the tribal people and their customs, bears this out. The trial court also went into this question and came to the same conclusion. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the Trial Court. Thus, the view taken by the court that defendant no. 1 had no power of alienation of the disputed properties by way of gift by making Dan Patra in favour of the Bhoodan Yagna Committee is not in any way erroneous. 5. Learned counsel's further contention was that the (defendant no. 1) having come in possession of the properties in her right for more than 12 years had acquired title by adverse possession. In support of this he referred to the case of (1) Sham Kuer V. Dah Kuer (I. L. R. 29 Calcutta 664- P. C.), of (2) Most. Kripal Kuer V. Bachan Singh (A. I. R. 1958 Supreme Court 199). I do not think, either of the two cases has any application to the facts in the present case. They were cases where a widow, who was not entitled to possession of the property, came in possession of the same without any arrangement with the heirs of the deceased to that effect. I do not think, either of the two cases has any application to the facts in the present case. They were cases where a widow, who was not entitled to possession of the property, came in possession of the same without any arrangement with the heirs of the deceased to that effect. In those circumstances the widow's possession was held to be adverse against the rightful owner. In the instant case the widow of Gonjhu Munda having a life interest in the properties left by her husband is entitled to remain in possession of the property as a limited owner and as long as she is in such possession and did not assert openly the higher right than her possession cannot in any way mature to an absolute title of ownership as against the rightful heirs of the deceased who would be entitled to succeed after the death of Munda widow, to the property. In that view, the contention that the defendant no.1 had title by adverse possession before she executed the Dan Patra cannot be accepted. 6. Secondly, as found by the trial court Gonjhu Munda died about 8 or 10 years before the suit. Assuming that learned counsel's contention about acquisition of title by adverse possession was correct in the case of Munda widow, defendant no. 1 was not in such possession for a period of 12 years or more. In that view also she was not competent to make Dan Patra and alienate the properties involved in the suit by gift to the detriment of the plaintiffs. 7. Both the contentions having failed, this appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case I would direct the parties to bear their own costs in this Court. Appeal dismissed.