JUDGMENT 1. THIS is an appeal against an order of G. K. Mitter, J., dated the 25th November 1960. The facts are shortly as follows: The appeal relates to acquisition of lands under the West bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948 (Act XXI of 1948) (hereinafter referred to as the "said act"). The appellants are residents of village Kamdahari, Brahmapur and Naktala within the police station, of Sadar tollygunge in the district of 24-Parganas. On or about the 22nd November 1956 a notification was issued in the calcutta Gazette, being No. 18788 I-Dev dated 6th November 1956 under section 4 of the said Act the relevant part whereof was as follows: "Whereas it appears to the Governor that land is likely to be needed for a public purpose, viz., for the settlement of immigrants who have migrated into the State of West bengal on account of circumstances beyond their control in the village of Kamdahari. Police Station Tollygunge, District 24-Parganas, it is hereby notified that for the above purpose pieces of land comprising cadastral survey plots Nos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . altogether measuring more or less 66. 36 acres are likely to be required within the aforesaid village of Kamdahari. " 2. THE appellants are interested in some of the plots to be acquired. On or about the 19th December, 1956 they objected to the proposed acquisition and filed petitions of objection. Although complaints have been made about the violation of the rules of natural justice it appears that these objections were heard and for that purpose the Collector want to the vicinity of the land to be acquired on 12th and 13th February 1951 In fact, it is said that some of the parties interested were represented by lawyers. After considering all the objections, a report was given under section 4a (2) of the said Act, to the government, recommending that a substantial number of plots proposed to be acquired should be released. No copy of the report, however, was given to the appellants. After considering all the objections, a report was given under section 4a (2) of the said Act, to the government, recommending that a substantial number of plots proposed to be acquired should be released. No copy of the report, however, was given to the appellants. On 11th of September, 1957 some of the parties whose lands were proposed to be acquired made a representation to the Minister, Relief and rehabilitation, for release of their lands and it is admitted in that petition that previously the objections put forward had been heard by the Land Acquisition Collector. On 5th of December, 1957, two notifications were published in the calcutta Gazette, one being No. 2227 L-Dev dated 23rd November, 1957 by which certain plots which were proposed to be acquired by the previous notification were cancelled. The second notification being No. 22278 L-Dev was made under section 6 of the said Act. A declaration was made that the plots which had already been notified Under section 4 were required for a public purpose. The relevant part of the notification is set out below : "whereas it appears to the Governor that the land is needed for a public purpose namely for the settlement of immigrants who have migrated into the State of West; Bengal on account of circumstances beyond their control in the village of Kamdahari, jurisdiction list No. 49, Police Station, Tollygunge, district 24-Parganas it is hereby declared that for the above purpose pieces of land comprising cadastral survey plot Nos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . and [parts of cadastral survey plot Nos. 228 and 1119 and parts of cadastral survey plots nos. 228 and 513 and altogether more or less 36. 84 acres are required within the aforesaid village of Kamdahari." On the 22nd May, 1958 an application was made to this Court and a rule was issued calling upon the opposite parties to show cause why the acquisition should not be cancelled or set aside and for other reliefs. This rule was heard by Mitter, J. and was dismissed on 25th November 1960. It is against this order that this appeal is directed. 3. This rule was heard by Mitter, J. and was dismissed on 25th November 1960. It is against this order that this appeal is directed. 3. THE first point taken is that the collector did not follow the provisions of section 4a (2) of the said Act and did not give any opportunity to the appellants of being heard in support of their objections. Affidavits have been filed upon this point and the Land Acquisition collector has stated on oath that on 27. 12. 56 public notice of the substance of the notification and another public notice under section 4a of the said Act inviting objections were duly issued and published according to law. About 55 objections were received including that of the appellants. Local enquiry was duly held on 12. 2. 57 and 13. 2. 57 and parties were duly heard, some of them being represented by their lawyers. In fact, in the report made under section 4a (2) the. Collector recommended that a substantial number of plots should be released. In the said affidavit it has been pointed out that in the application made to the minister it was admitted that the objections were heard by the Land Acquisition Collector. The learned Judge in the court below, upon these facts, held that the objection as to absence of hearing could not be accepted. We agree with him. 4. THE second point taken before us is that a copy of the report of the collector under section 4a (2) was not made available to the appellants before the declaration was made under section 6 of the said Act. No provision anywhere has been shown which makes it incumbent upon the Collector to furnish a copy of the report to the objectors. Our attention was drawn to a Bench decision of the Mysore High court - (1) V. K. Kangan v. State of mysore, AIR (1967) Mys. 133. That was a case under the Land Acquisition Act, 1954. Under section 5a (as amended) of that Act, it is necessary that when a report is sent to Government the objector should be given notice that a report had been so sent, and it was only thereafter that a declaration under section 6 could be issued. 133. That was a case under the Land Acquisition Act, 1954. Under section 5a (as amended) of that Act, it is necessary that when a report is sent to Government the objector should be given notice that a report had been so sent, and it was only thereafter that a declaration under section 6 could be issued. The Mysore High Court held that if the law required that objectors should be told about the making of the report, it impliedly meant that they should have a copy of the same, otherwise there was no point in making such a provision. There is, however, no equivalent provision in the said Act and it does not appear to us that law requires that a copy of the report of the Collector must be given to the objectors, who already had one opportunity of preferring their objections and a second opportunity can only be insisted upon, provided there was legal provision for it. In the said Act there is none. The third objection put forward is that under the said Act homestead and agricultural lands cannot be acquired. The way it was propounded in the court below was that the Act does not justify acquisition of "agricultural and horticultural" lands. I do not see any provision in the said act which precludes acquisition of such lands. From the materials placed before us it does appear that the authorities have been careful to exclude homestead lands. However, the point urges a legal disability which has not been substantiated. 5. I now come to the fourth and the last ground which is really the ground which has been pressed before us. The point has been propounded as follows : Section 6 of the said Act requires that the State Government should be "satisfied" that the lands proposed to be acquired were needed for a public purpose. Under section 8 such a declaration is conclusive evidence that the lands in respect of which the declaration is made are needed for a public purpose. Section 14 of the said act enables the State Government to make rules for carrying out the purpose of the said Act. Such rules have been framed. Under section 8 such a declaration is conclusive evidence that the lands in respect of which the declaration is made are needed for a public purpose. Section 14 of the said act enables the State Government to make rules for carrying out the purpose of the said Act. Such rules have been framed. Under rule 4, the notification referred to in sub-section (1) of section 4 must be either in Form I or Form II appended to the said rules and under rule 7 the declaration referred to in section 6 has to be in Form III. In Forms I and II the expression used is - "whereas it appears to the Governor that the land in village. . . . . . is likely to be needed for a public purpose. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " and in Form III the wordings are-"whereas it appears to the Governor that the land in village. . . . . . . . . . is needed for a public purpose. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ". 6. THE argument is that section 6 requires that the Governor should be 'satisfied', and to say that "it appears to the Governor" is not in conformity with such a provision. Although the point has not been formulated exactly in this form in the pleadings, it is argued that the rules and forms are not in conformity with the Act and are, therefore, invalid. The learned Judge in the court below has expressed his surprise that there should be a departure in the forms appended to the rules from the wordings of the said Act. He held however that the words used are not really in violation of the provisions of the said Act. As regards section 4, it being issued at a preliminary stage, the learned Judge had no hesitation in stating that there was no violation of the law, but he has also noticed that under section 6 the position is slightly different because there is a certain finality about it. As regards section 4, it being issued at a preliminary stage, the learned Judge had no hesitation in stating that there was no violation of the law, but he has also noticed that under section 6 the position is slightly different because there is a certain finality about it. The learned judge, however, held that on the facts of the present case it must be taken that the Governor was satisfied, because the Collector had heard the objections and his report was before the Governor and she had not accepted the entirety of the report, but came to the conclusion that only 36. 84 acres were needed for the purpose mentioned. He came to the conclusion that all these showed that the Governor had deliberated upon the facts and must have been satisfied that the lands notified for acquisition were in fact required for a public purpose. Various authorities were cited before us, but ultimately, as we shall presently see, the point is fully covered by a Supreme court decision in 1 (a) Rai Bahadur ganga Bishnu Swaika and another v. Calcutta Pinjrapole. Society and others, air (1968) SC 615. I shall, however, briefly notice the cases cited. The first is an unreported judgment of myself in Civil Rule No. 2172 of 1952 (2) Sri charandas Nath and others v. Mr. S. Banerjee and others (Judgment dated 1.6.53). That was a case under' the land Acquisition Act in which sections 4 and 6 are practically the same as in the said Act. I held that the expression "appeared" is not the same as "satisfied", but I took notice of the fact that under the Land Acquisition Act, notifications in this form were published for nearly half a century and decided that the two expressions were taken to be identical and so the declaration should be upheld. The next case is a bench decision of this Court - (3)Gouripada Bandopadhya and others v. S. Banerjee and another, AIR (1953)Cal. 704. In that case,, section 4 of the said Act was considered and it was held that the expression "appear" is not fatal. The case, however, did not) deal with a declaration under sec. 6. The next case cited was (4) Mahmudabad properties Limited v. State of West bengal, ILR (1957) 3 Cal 561. That was a case under the Land Acquisition act. The case, however, did not) deal with a declaration under sec. 6. The next case cited was (4) Mahmudabad properties Limited v. State of West bengal, ILR (1957) 3 Cal 561. That was a case under the Land Acquisition act. It was held that the expression "appears", even when appearing in a declaration under section 6 would not invalidate the declaration and Mookerjee, J., relied on my judgment mentioned above and held that a declaration in such form is valid. He said that a "clearer and better language is certainly desireable, but the form, as it stands, does not suffer from any vital defect". The next case cited is a Bench decision of this Court - (5) Shambhu Nath Ghosh and others v. Bejoy lakshmi Cotton Mills Limited and ors., air (1959) Cal. 552. In that case, the use of the expression "appears" and "satisfied" were not discussed. All that we find is that according to Das gupta, C. J. (as he then was), both under sections 4 and 6 of the said Act, the essential prerequisite of the notification was that Government should be "satisfied" that the land proposed to be acquired was needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose. The position, however, has now been set at rest by the abovementioned decision of the Supreme Court in 1 (a)Rai Bahadur Ganga Bishnu Swaika and another v. Calcutta Pineapple Society and others, (supra ). In that case, there was an acquisition under the land Acquisition Act and the point was as to whether a declaration under section 6 which uses the word "appear" and not "staisfied" is a valid one or not. It was held that there was nothing in the Land Acquisition Act to the effect that the declaration under section 6 should be in any particular form. Shelat, J., said as follows; "we are also told by the Counsel that no statutory forms are. prescribed by the West Bengal Government for such a declaration either under the Act or the rules made thereunder though there are model forms framed presumably for the guidance only of the officers of the Acquisition Department. Shelat, J., said as follows; "we are also told by the Counsel that no statutory forms are. prescribed by the West Bengal Government for such a declaration either under the Act or the rules made thereunder though there are model forms framed presumably for the guidance only of the officers of the Acquisition Department. There being thus no statutory forms and section 6 not requiring the declaration to be made in any particular form, the mere fact that the notification does not ex facie show the Government's satisfaction, assuming that the words 'it appears' used in the notification do not mean satisfaction, would not render the notification invalid or not in conformity with section 6. 7. APART from the clear language of section 6 it would seem that it is immaterial whether such satisfaction is stated or not in the notification. For, even if it is stated a person interested in the land can always challenge as a matter of fact that the Government was not actually satisfied. In such a case the Government would have to satisfy the Court by leading evidence that it was satisfied as required by section 6. In the present case no such evidence was led because the fact that the Government was satisfied was never challenged in the pleadings and no issue on that question was sought to be raised. Even when the first respondent society sought to amend its plaint it did so only to say that the notification did not state such satisfaction and therefore did not establish such satisfaction. The High Court no doubt thought that this question was covered by Issue No. 3 framed by the Trial court. But the contention said to be covered by that issue was not that there was no satisfaction on the part of the Government that the land was needed for a public purpose, viz., for the said Girls' School, but that the notification in the absence of words to that effect did not prove that satisfaction. That being the position and no issue having been raised on the factum of satisfaction, the State Government was never called upon to lead evidence to prove its satisfaction. That being the position and no issue having been raised on the factum of satisfaction, the State Government was never called upon to lead evidence to prove its satisfaction. The fact that section 5a inquiry was held and objections were filed and heard, the fact that the Additional Collector had recommended the acquisition and had sent his report to that effect and the government thereafter issued section 6 notification would, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, show that the condition precedent as to satisfaction was fulfilled. We are therefore of the view that the High Court was in error when it held that section 6 notification was not in accord with that section and that proceedings taken thereafter were vitiated. " 8. COMING now to the present case, we find that the provisions of sections 4 and 6 are almost identical. It is true, however, that in the said Act statutory rules have been framed and a form has been prescribed. Unfortunately however, the form prescribed does not require use of the word "satisfied", but uses the word "appears". If the word "appears" is not identical with the word "satisfied" then the forms under the said Act may be defective, but that does not improve the position of the appellant. It might have been otherwise if the prescribed form used the word "satisfied". Since it does not do so, the principles laid down in the supreme Court decision abovementioned can be applied to the facts of the present case. It would, therefore, be a question of fact to be decided on the materials placed before us as to whether the satisfaction of the Governor has been establishel or not. Upon a reasoning analogous to that which appears in the judgment of Shelat, J., it must be held that there was such satisfaction. In the present case there were objections to the acquisition and report had been made by the Land Acquisition collector under section 4a (2)of the said Act by which he recommended exclusion of a substantial portion of the land from acquisition. This recommendation was not accepted in its entirety, but only a. portion of the land proposed to be acquired was excluded. This recommendation was not accepted in its entirety, but only a. portion of the land proposed to be acquired was excluded. This shows that the Governor had gone into the facts of the case and it is reasonable to infer that she was satisfied that the lands which are the subject-matter of the application were required to be acquired for a public purpose. It is next argued that there are certain special facts in this case which shows that the Governor was not satisfied. The facts are as follows : in the court below, the original Rule was issued on or about the 22nd May 1958. The matter was disposed of by mitter, J, on the 25th of November L960. On or about the 24th January 1962, a petition was filed by appellants Nos. 1 to 5, 11, 12 and 13 stating that on or about 6th January, 1962 a letter had been issued by the Refugee and Rehabilitation Department of the State of west Bengal, intimating to the appellants Nos. 1 and 2 that out of their 45 as. plots shown in Schedule "a", state Government would retain possession of plots measuring more or less 6. 46 acres and release the rest. The appellants Nos. 1 and 2, therefore, expressed their desire not to go on with the appeal. The appellants Nos. 3, 4, 5, 11 and 13 stated that owing to their stringent financial circumstances they would not proceed with the appeal and asked for permission to withdraw. On applications made to court an order was made on the 8th February 1962 that appellants Nos. 1 to 5, 11 and 13 be transposed to the category of respondents. What is argued is that even after the filing of the appeal the Commissioner for Refugee and Rehabilitation was releasing a number of plots, and it followed that the Governor could not have been satisfied when making the declaration under s. 6, that the lands were really required for acquisition in respect of a public purpose. What is argued is that even after the filing of the appeal the Commissioner for Refugee and Rehabilitation was releasing a number of plots, and it followed that the Governor could not have been satisfied when making the declaration under s. 6, that the lands were really required for acquisition in respect of a public purpose. It appears from certain further affidavits that were allowed to be filed that what had happened was that in addition to the proceedings taken in the writ jurisdiction of this Court, a suit had been filed in the Alipore Court, being Title Suit No. 783 of 1959, in which the appellants were also parties, challenging the acquisition and it was in settlement of that suit that Government agreed to release certain plots. In our opinion, on these facts it cannot be said that a compromise in 1962 necessarily establishes that in 1957 when the declaration under section 6 was made, there was no satisfaction of the Governor. In fact, the circumstances had altered and it is conceded that in law there is nothing to prevent the Government from releasing lands which are the subject-matter of acquisition. That being so, we are unable to come to the conclusion that the release of the land of some of the original petitioners, who are now respondents in this appeal, establishes that there was no satisfaction of the Governor at the time when the declaration under section 6 was made in 1956. This point accordingly fails. 9. THE result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.