Judgment R.J. Bahadur, J. 1. On 3-5-63 one Dukhmochan Thakur, who described himself as a Novelist, Poet, Dramatist and Scenerio Writer, filed a petition of complaint before the Subdivisional Magistrate of Katihar, against the persons, one of whom is the present petitioner, who has been described as Film Story and Scenerio Writer. Film Director and Character Actor, and the other was one Bishwanath Prasad Shahabadi, who is described as Film Producer and Proprietor of Nirmal Pictures. The allegations in the petition of complaint were that there had been infringement of the copyright of the complainants Hindi Novel, named "Gaon Ki Gori", in the first half of the Bhojpuri Film "Ganga Maiya Tohe Piyari Charhaibo", which was written by the petitioners and was produced by the other person, namely, Bishwamith Prasad, and that the said film was a colourable imitation of the first part of complainants novel "Gaon Ki Gori", 2. The complainant was examined by the learned Magistrate on solemn affirmation who ordered on that date that the matter should be put up along with the Copyright Act on 6-5-68. The learned Magistrate again ordered the case to be put up on 21-5-63 for the purpose of enquiry and hearing. It appears that on 21-5-63, the complainant filed a petition, in which he gave details of the points, which, according to him, showed similarity in the said Novel and the film, thereby resulting in colourable imitation of his novel "Gaon Ki Gori". "He prayed therein that certain paragraphs be treated as part of the original petition of complaint. After a few dates, on 1-7-63, one witness on behalf of the complainant was examined by the learned Magistrate, who asked for a report, and on 27-12-63, he perused the report and took the view that a prima fade ease had been made out. He, therefore, took cognizance of the case for an offence under Section 63 of the Copyright Act, 1957 (Act XIV of 1957), hereinafter referred to as "the Act". The accused, namely, the petitioner surrendered in court on 29-4-64. On 5-9-64, 2 witnesses were examined on behalf of the complainant. On 3-12-64 three more witnesses were examined. He, therefore, took cognizance of the case for an offence under Section 63 of the Copyright Act, 1957 (Act XIV of 1957), hereinafter referred to as "the Act". The accused, namely, the petitioner surrendered in court on 29-4-64. On 5-9-64, 2 witnesses were examined on behalf of the complainant. On 3-12-64 three more witnesses were examined. After that, the matter made no progress, as Bishwanath took the matter to the High Court against the order of the learned Sessions Judge, who had ordered further enquiry into the case of the said Bishwanath Prasad, and the Prosecution against him was ultimately quashed on 26-7-67, The petitioner filed the present application on 24-10-67 in this Court for quashing the entire proceeding on the ground that the petition of complaint disclosed no offence. 3 Appearing on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Braj Kishore Prasad has, in the first place, contended that there is no resemblance in the two books, and, even if there is any, then it is purely accidental. He has given a catalogue of the allegations arising from the petition of complaint, and they are as follows : (i) The imitation of the noval is only upto the interval of the film and the other half of the film is entirely original work. (ii) even before the interval, there is a lot of modifications and alterations from the original. (iii) the book is a novel in part while the film is a drama. (iv) the book is in khari boli while film is in bhojpuri dialect and (v) the theme of the film is from the common and universal stock and, hence, the resemblance, if any, is only natural. The other contention. is that the petitioner is only a story-writer, and there is no allegation in the petition of complaint that he is the person who made the film. 4. Section 63 of the Act is in the following terms : Any person who knowingly infringes or abets the infringement of- (a) the copyright in a work, or (b) any other right conferred by this Act. "shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both. 5. 4. Section 63 of the Act is in the following terms : Any person who knowingly infringes or abets the infringement of- (a) the copyright in a work, or (b) any other right conferred by this Act. "shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both. 5. In order to appreciate the contentions raised by learned Counsel, we have perused the petition of complaint (annexure A to the petition) and have also looked into the petition filed by the complainant on 21-5-63; as also into the evidence of the 5 witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution. The substance of the allegations against the petitioner is that he is story-writer of the book, named "Ganga Maiya Tohe Piyari Char-haibo", which is a colourable imitation of the complainants novel "Gaon Ki Gori" and, is, therefore, responsible for distortion, mutilation and modification at several places. He has thus infringed the complainants copyright, 6. I do not wish to express any opinion on the merits of the case. I shall refrain from considering the validity of the allegations made in the petition of complaint or in the subsequent petition or in the evidence of the witnesses. All that we are required to see, for the present purpose, is whether this is a proper case, in which we can be asked to exercise our inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 7. The principles which govern the case of this kind are well established. The Supreme Court, in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab , laid down some of the categories of cases, where the inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings can and should be exercised. They are : (a) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceeding in respect of the offence alleged. (b) Where the allegations in the first information report or in complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged. (c) Where the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 8. Let me, therefore, consider the contentions of learned Counsel keeping the above principles in view. 9. (c) Where the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 8. Let me, therefore, consider the contentions of learned Counsel keeping the above principles in view. 9. Relevant portions of Section 14 of the Act read thus : 14. (1) For the purposes of this Act copyright means the exclusive right, by virtue of, and subject to the provisions of, this Act : (a) in the case of literary, dramatic or musical work, to do and authorise the doing of any of the following acts namely : (i) to reproduce the work in any material forms, (ii) to publish the work; (iii) to perform the work in public; (iv) to produce, reproduce, perform or publish any translation of the work; (v) to make any cinematograph film or a record in respect of the work; (vi) to communicate the work by radio-diffusion or to communicate to the public by a loud-speaker or any other similar instrument the radio-diffusion of the work; (vii) to make and adaptation of the work; (viii) to do in relation to a translation or an adaptation of the work any of the acts specified in relation to the work in classes (i) to (vi) - (b)... (c)... (d) ... (2)... (a). Section 51 of the Act is as follows ; - Copyright in a work shall be deemed to be infringed- (a) when any person, without a licence granted by the owner of the copyright or the Registrar of Copyright under this Act or in contravention of the conditions of a licence so granted or of any condition imposed by a competent authority under this Act - (i) does anything, the exclusive right to do which is by this Act conferred upon the owner of the copyright, or (ii) permits for profit any place to be used for the performance of the work in public where such performance constitutes an infringement of the copyright in the work unless he was not aware and had no reasonable ground for believing that such performance would be an infringement of copyright, or (a) when any person- (i) makes for sale or hire, or sells or lets for hire, or by way of trade displays or offers for sale or. hire or (ii) distributes either for the purpose of trade, or to such an extent as to effect prejudicially owner of the copyright, or (iii) by way of trade: exhibits in public, or (iv) imports (except for the private and domestic use of the importer) into India. any infringing copies of the work. 10. It would appear that infringement of copyright is of two types -direct and indirect. Clause (a) of Section 51 deals with direct infringement of copyright. This clause makes it an infringement of copyright if any person does anything, the exclusive right to do which is, by this Act conferred upon the owner of the copyright. What these exclusive rights are is provided by Section 14. Clause (b) of Section 51 deals with an indirect infringement. Section 14 defines the term copyright. It means the exclusive right to do certain things which are specified in the section. 11. Learned Counsel has, with reference to those two sections, endeavoured to show from the petition of complaint that no offence, even if taken at its face value, has been made out, and, in support of his submissions, he has relied on a decision of the Madras High Court in Associated Publishers (Madras) Ltd. v. K.B. Shyam alias Arya . In my opinion, this case can be of no assistance to the petitioner for a variety of reasons. The said case is one under the Copyright Act, 1914. But copyright is now governed by the Copyright Act of 1957. It repeals and replaces the Act of 1914. The present Act has introduced several new features, e.g., a cinematograph film will have a separate copyright apart from its various components, namely stirtm nysicm etc., (see Section 14). In the instant case, we are concerned with a case of literacy or dramatic work, falling within the ambit of Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. This decision would come within the ambit of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14, which deals with artistic work, and, as the said case has explained, the term artistic work comprises paintings, drawings, engravings and photographs and works of architecture, etc. This decision would come within the ambit of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14, which deals with artistic work, and, as the said case has explained, the term artistic work comprises paintings, drawings, engravings and photographs and works of architecture, etc. The present case, which deals with a literary work and has been converted into a cinematograph film, has no resemblance with the facts of the case of Associated Publishers, Learned Counsel relied on a passage mentioned in the said case wherein their Lordships have considered the observations of the Privy Council in Macmillan and Co. Ltd. v. Cooper A.I.R. 1924 P. C. 75, which related to a literary publication. Their Lordships have quoted a passage from that decision, and learned Counsel laid great stress on the same in support of his submissions. I do not think that it is necessary to deal either with the Madras case or the observations of the Privy Council, because, in my opinion, infringement is not avoided by the fact that, in a subsequent publication or by performance, only part of copyrighted musical composition was appropriated. It is to be found as a fact whether the appropriation is insignificant or substantial. If the copying is substantial, then it can be said that copyright has been infringed. Copying is not confined to a literary repetition, but includes various modes in which the matter of any publication may be adopted, imitated or tampered with, more or less, colourable alteration. The result and not the intention is the relevant factor for determining the question of infringement. 12. In my judgment, it is entirely a question of fact whether the work is or is not a copy, and a copy would seem to include any material thing, by means of which the essential features of the work, or the ideas, or information in the work may be communicated. It is a copy, if the work is a reproduction of the fundamental idea of the original so far as possible in the material in which the copyist works. What this Court has, at present, to see is whether the petition of complaint discloses these materials or whether there is legal evidence or a criminal court to examine those matters. It is not possible for this Court to examine these matters. What this Court has, at present, to see is whether the petition of complaint discloses these materials or whether there is legal evidence or a criminal court to examine those matters. It is not possible for this Court to examine these matters. We are satisfied that there are ample materials which require investigation in a criminal court and that it would be expedient in the interest of justice to have them enquired into (See for instance : M.S. Sharifi v. State of Madras ). I must, however, repeat that I am not expressing any opinion on merits as we do not wish to prejudge or prejudice the case of either side. As was observed in R.P. Kapurs case by the Supreme Court, the criminal proceedings instituted against a person must be tried under the provisions of the Code and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. 13. I am satisfied that there is no manifest or patent injustice apparent on the face of the present proceedings, which calls for interference by the exercise of our inherent and extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 561-A. 14. It is unfortunate that there has been so much delay in the disposal of this case for which no one in particular appears to be responsible. The petition of complaint was filed more than 5 years ago and the trial has not so far been concluded. The learned Magistrate should make all endeavour to expedite the trial of this case and as far as possible he should give preference. He should not permit any party to ask for any adjournment and should an adjournment be necessary then the learned Magistrate should give a short adjournment and record his reasons for doing so. 15. In the result, the petition falls and is accordingly dismissed. P.K. Banerji, J. 16 I agree.