JUDGMENT : Barman, C.J. - This appeal filed by Defendants 1 and 2 carrying on business under the name and style of Govind Flour Mills at Cuttack town arises out of Plaintiffs' suit for removal of an alleged nuisance-dust, noise and vibration-with a prayer for permanently restraining the said Defendants 1 and 2 from carrying on their business of milling atta, splitting dal, husking paddy and preparing Churha or processing the grains for the aforesaid purpose by themselves or through their agents, servants, relations or friends in the premises in question-of which Defendant 3 was the owner and Defendants 1 and 2 were monthly tenants-adjacent to the Plaintiff's premises, all as described in the plaint with reference to boundaries. 2. The decision of the trial Court-which was upheld by the learned lower Appellate Court-as appears from the operative portion of the order dated April 26, 1966 is this: Defendants 1 and 2 are permanently restrained from carrying on the business of milling atta, splitting dal, husking paddy and preparing Churha or processing the grains for the aforesaid purpose by themselves or through their agents, servants, relations or friends in the premises of Defendant 3. This order will take effect from 13-5-1966. The Defendants filed an appeal to this Court being Second Appeal No. 526 of 1966 which was dismissed by a learned single Judge of this Court. It is from this decision that the Defendants have filed this appeal. 3. The point urged on behalf of the Defendants-Appellants is, in substance, this : The Defendants have a fundamental right to carryon their business. Their contention is that the effect of the decision of the trial Court-which was upheld both by the lower Appellate Court and this Court-is that they cannot carryon their business which however is 80 fundamental right guaranteed under the Constitution. 4. The correct position appears to be this : In the second appeal it is not that the learned Judge did not consider this aspect; in fact, in paragraph 9 of his judgment he clarified the purport and implications of the order of injunction against the Defendants. 4. The correct position appears to be this : In the second appeal it is not that the learned Judge did not consider this aspect; in fact, in paragraph 9 of his judgment he clarified the purport and implications of the order of injunction against the Defendants. He made it amply clear that the freedom to carryon trade, business or occupation must necessarily mean that the same has to be carried on in such a manner in which it can be legally carried on without infringement of the rights of other citizens; in other words, the freedom to carryon a profession or trade or business cannot mean that it will extend to the encroachment upon private rights of other citizens; such private rights necessarily include the right to have a certain amount of comfort and convenience and a right to protection against danger to their health, safety or property. It is also equally clear that the provisions of the Orissa Municipal Act under which the Appellants are said to have obtained a license for carrying on the business cannot afford the protection against the infringement of the rights of a private citizen where the carrying on of the business amounts to private nuisance. In order to avoid any ambiguity in the injunction order, the learned Judge in the second appeal made it clear in the following terms: Issue of such an injunction does not mean that the Defendants are denied their freedom of carrying on their business or trade as such. The relief sought is to prevent the Defendants from committing the nuisance which they will continue to commit, if they are allowed to run the mill in such a manner which produces disturbing noise causing, discomfort, causes vibrations which damage the Plaintiff's building, and discharge foul smell, dust, husk and coal gas which jeopardise the health of the occupants of the Plaintiffs house. The injunction granted being to restrain the Defendants from continuing to commit this nuisance, does not amount to restraint on the freedom of the Defendants to carryon trade or business, and as such, an injunction cannot be deemed to violate the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Therefore, this contention of the Appellants is not also acceptable. 5. The injunction granted being to restrain the Defendants from continuing to commit this nuisance, does not amount to restraint on the freedom of the Defendants to carryon trade or business, and as such, an injunction cannot be deemed to violate the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Therefore, this contention of the Appellants is not also acceptable. 5. It is true that the operative portion of the order of injunction passed by the learned trial Court which was upheld on appeal, is prima facie an absolute order; it should have been made clear in the order that the Defendants may however carry on their business without committing any of the nuisances or causing any of the injuries complained of. The implications of the injunction order, as clarified in paragraph 9 of the learned single Judge of this Court in second appeal, should be clearly brought out in the decree which should be drawn accordingly. 6. This, our view, is supported by the decision of the House of Lords in Fleming and Ors. v. Hislop 11 A.C. 68, where it was held that the words of an interdict of injunction against causing a nuisance ought not to be 110 drawn as to shut out all scientific attempts to attain the desired end without causing nuisance. There the action was raised in the Sheriff Court for a declarator that burning or ignition of certain heaps of mineral refuse would cause serious discomfort and annoyance to the proprietors of adjacent residential houses. The sole question on which the House of Lords thought it necessary to hear as in the present case was one really of form and not of substance of the injunction order against the Defendants (Appellants therein) restraining them from setting fire to any of the heaps "in respect that a nuisance would be caused thereby" which order was upheld on appeal. The House of Lords considered the question whether the interdict should be so absolute as against any burning or calcining of heaps or bings of blaes which were mentioned in the interlocutor of the sheriff-substitute. It was suggested at the bar that possible inconvenience of an unnecessary kind, not beneficial to the pursuers, and injurious to the defenders, might arise if the terms of the interdict are 80 absolute as they were there expressed to be. It was suggested at the bar that possible inconvenience of an unnecessary kind, not beneficial to the pursuers, and injurious to the defenders, might arise if the terms of the interdict are 80 absolute as they were there expressed to be. Their Lordships made variations in the injunction order in that the Defendants were to be interdicted from burning or calcining the heaps in the manner which they had previously practised with regard to the heap at the pit in question or from calcining or burning them in any other manner so as to occasion material discomfort and annoyance to the pursuers; if that interdict is complied with, the grievance complained of by the pursuers (Respondents therein) altogether disappears. 7. As to how the party aggrieved may be given full protection against such possible discomfort or annoyance, Lord Watson observed in the said House of Lords case as follows: These appear to me to be ample safe-guards and I do not think that any circumstances have been shown in this case which would warrant us in pronouncing such a judgment as that by no possibility can this proprietor never get rid (and it is desirable in the interest of all parties that he should get rid) of this material (heap of mineral refuse) which is lying upon his ground by (sic) the agency of fire (burning or ignition), even although the discoveries of science should enable him to do so without causing the slightest discomfort or annoyance to any resident in the vicinity. In other words, what the House of Lords laid down was that the words of such injunction against causing nuisance ought not to be so drawn as to shut out all scientific attempts to attain the desired and without causing a nuisance. 8. Once the Plaintiff has proved his right to an injunction against a nuisance or other enquiry, it is no part of the duty of the Court to enquire in what way the Defendant can best remove it; the Plaintiff is entitled to an injunction at once and it is the duty of the Defendant to find his own way out of the difficulty whatever inconvenience or expense it may put him to. 9. 9. In this view of the case as discussed above, the injunction order of the trial Court dated April 26, 166 which was upheld throughout is clarified to mean that while the Defendants are restrained from committing any of the nuisance or injuries complained of, they are however free to carryon their business without committing the nuisances or injuries; the Defendants, while carrying on their business, are to avoid discomfort or annoyance to the Plaintiffs. The decree should be drawn up accordingly. 10. Subject to the clarification as made above, this appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Ray, J. 11. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed