JUDGMENT Mahapatra, J. Defendants are the appellants and the appeal arises out of a suit instituted for recovery of Rs. 1330/- as the price of half share in the mango crop grown on the land which had been given to the defendants by a registered instrument on the 5th of October, 1924 by the plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest. The land on which the mango crop was grown was a zirat land of the granter. Plaintiffs complained that though they were entitled to half share of the mango crop from the defendants, they did not deliver that to the plaintiffs after 1958. The suit was for recovery of the price of the plaintiffs' share in the mango crop for two years before the suit was instituted on the 23rd of July, 1960. In the plaint plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were licensees under the document dated the 5th of October, 1924. 2. The suit was resisted on several grounds, one of them being that after the vesting of the estate in the State of Bihar under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, the plaintiffs had lost any right in the land on which the mango crop was grown and, therefore, was not entitled to any share in the mango crop with the defendants. They also pleaded that the land involved was bakasht land of the intermediary and not zirat. 3. The suit was decreed by the trial court which found with reference to Exts. A and B that the land was zirat and not bakasht, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to half share in the mango crop from the defendants. It also held on a reference to Exts 5, 5/A and 4 that the plaintiffs' interest in the land had not vested in the State of Bihar and they were entitled to possession thereof on payment of rent to the State. 4. On appeal by the defendants, the decree of the trial court was also confirmed in favour of the plaintiffs. Hence this Second Appeal. 5. 4. On appeal by the defendants, the decree of the trial court was also confirmed in favour of the plaintiffs. Hence this Second Appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants urged that since the plaintiffs stated in Paragraph 6 of the plaint and also during the trial made the case that the defendants were in possession as licensees under them, the intermediary's interest having vested in the State of Bihar under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, the intermediary (predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs) could not have the benefits provided under Section 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, and as such, would not be entitled to recover any money in lieu of the mango crop from the defendants. Learned counsel further contended that the appellate court has not come to any clear finding as to whether the interest created in favour of the defendants by the ex-intermediary was a licence or lease. On reading the appellate judgment, I find that it held the interest created under the document dated the 5th of October, 1924 in favour of the defendants to be that of a lessee from year to year. The reasons in support of that view have been stated in the appellate judgment. No doubt, it considered the argument advanced on behalf of the defendants appellants before it in regard to the adverse character of possession of the defendants over the land after the death of the granter (licencer or lessor), on the ground that the licence was revocable. To repel that, the appellate court reasoned that if it was a licence, it was not so pure and simple, but was a licence coupled with profit and, therefore, was not liable to be revoked and was not to be deemed to have been revoked on the death of the licenser. This reasoning does not mean that the appellate court took the relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendants to be of licencers and licensees. Elaborate reasons have been stated in support of its conclusion that it was a lease from year to year. If that is right, then certainly the conclusion that the plaintiffs would be entitled to the benefits under Section 6(1)(a)(i) cannot be disputed. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants challenged the position that it was a case of lease from year to year. If that is right, then certainly the conclusion that the plaintiffs would be entitled to the benefits under Section 6(1)(a)(i) cannot be disputed. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants challenged the position that it was a case of lease from year to year. He referred to Paragraph 6 of the plaint to show that the case of the plaintiffs was one of licence and not of lease. The relationship between the parties was open to be determined by the court with reference to the facts and more particularly to the terms of the document dated the 5th of October, 1924. The view set up by the plaintiffs in regard to the legal character of relationship between the parties will not override the determination of the same by the Court. Learned• counsel further argued that the facts from which accrued the claim of the plaintiffs to the benefits under Section 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act were not specifically pleaded in the plaint. In my view the plaint taken, as a whole, and evidence adduced in the case could not present any obstacle in the way of the plaintiffs if the relationship between the parties is found to be based on a lease from year to year. 7. No part of the deed of the lease dated the 5th of October, 1924 was referred to by learned counsel for contradicting the view taken by the appellate court that it spelled a lease from year to year. 8. If it was a lease from year to year, then the question of khas possession of the plaintiffs on the date of vesting was not necessary. The possession of the defendants over the land on which mango trees were growing, on the date of vesting would not obstruct the plaintiffs from being deemed to have been settled with the land by the State on and after the vesting of the estate within the meaning of Section 6(1)(a)(1) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. 9. There was argument on both sides on the footing that there was a licence and not a lease created in favour of the defendants. It was argued that under the terms of that deed of licence, the plaintiffs were not entitled to take possession of the land until all the mango trees dried. 9. There was argument on both sides on the footing that there was a licence and not a lease created in favour of the defendants. It was argued that under the terms of that deed of licence, the plaintiffs were not entitled to take possession of the land until all the mango trees dried. Thus they were kept out of possession on the date of vesting, in which case the land and the interest of the intermediary therein vested completely in the State of Bihar under the Bihar Land Reforms Act. Thereafter, the plaintiffs would not be entitled to any interest in that land and much less to any share in the mango crop from that land. If really it was a licence, no interest in the land can be taken to have been created in favour of the licensee, and in that sense the licencer will not be taken to be out of possession completely from the land or the licensee to be in exclusive possession thereof. There will be no question of ouster of the licencer by the licensee. As long as that relation continued between the parties, they will be subject to the terms of the contract of licence. In that context, it will be necessary to consider if the possession of the licensee can inure to the benefits of the licencer intermediary to constitute his khas possession so as to attract the provisions of Section 6(1) in his favour. It is now well settled that a co-sharer's khas possession would be taken to mea n the khas possession of entire body of the co-sharers to attract the benefits of those provisions under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, on the ground that one co-sharer's possession is not exclusive and is on behalf of all other co-sharers. I am inclined to take the view that a licensee's possession will not be any the worse than a co-sharer's possession as against the licencer vis-a-vis other co-sharers. I am conscious of the difference between the relationship between the co-sharer intermediaries and licencer and licensee, but keeping in view the purpose and scheme of the Bihar Land Reforms" Act and more particularly of the provisions like those under Section 6, I think the licencer intermediary like the co-sharer intermediary not in khas possession can invoke the benefits of the tenancy under the State after the vesting of the estate. Learned counsel for the appellants refuted this position and pointed out that in all the decisions of this Court including (1) Ramrudhar Singh Versus Dileshwar Singh and others [A. I. R. 1965, page 117 (F. B.). I. L. R. 43 Patna, page 794] laying down the principle that a co-sharer-intermediary's khas possession will inure to the benefit of the entire body of the co-sharer intermediaries the basis was that there was khas possession of some body which was a basic requirement for the benefits of Section 6 and someone's khas possession was extended to be the khas possession of another on the settled principles of law. In that sense though a co-sharer intermediary was not in khas possession, he was given the benefits of tenancy under the State after the vesting of the estate. Learned counsel is, no doubt, correct, but that really does not put any impediment against construing the khas possession of the licensee to be the khas possession of the licencer in accordance with, here again, the settled principles of law which were not sought to be afflicted by the Bihar Land Reforms Act. 10. The possession of a lessee from year to year or for a term of years in a proprietor's private land does not stand in the way of the proprietor being deemed to be a tenant under the State and of retaining possession over such land after the vesting of his estate. That comes within the provisions of Section 6(1)(a)(i) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. It is unthinkable that the possession of a licensee over a proprietor's private land would have been thought to be more prejudicial against the proprietor than that of a lessee from year to year or for a term of years. In the view that I have taken, if the interest created in favour of the defendants was that of licensees, the plaintiffs (ex-intermediaries) can also claim to the benefit under Section 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. 11. The result is that this appeal will fail, but in the circumstances of the easel I would direct the parties to bear their own costs in this Court. Appeal dismissed.