JUDGMENT : Patra, J. - This is an appeal against a confirming judgment of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Berhampur in a suit brought by the Plaintiff-Respondent for declaration that his date of his is 12-8-1950 and not 10-1-1952 and for directing the Defendants-Appellants to correct the Respondent's date of his accordingly in the registers maintained by them. 2. The Respondent is a minor and has brought this action through his father guardian Dr. Indupalli Someswara Rao, a private medical practitioner at Parlakhemedi. In July, 1960 this boy was admitted into Class VII of the Magaraja's Boys High School, Parlakhemedi, when apparently on the statement made by the guardian his date of his was noted as 10-1-1952 in the Admission Register of the School (Ex. H). In due course, the boy was promoted to the Matriculation Class. In the application (Ex. A) dated 27-12-1964 which the boy submitted for admission to the High School Certificate Examination of the year 1965 he mentioned his date of his as 10-1-1952 On 1-5-1965, the boy's father and guardian Dr. Someswar Rao submitted an application (Ex. 3) to the Inspector of Schools, Ganjam stating that his son's date of his was inadvertently recorded as 10-1-1952 in the admission register of the School but that the correct date of his is 12-1-1950 and that it might be corrected accordingly. To this application were enclosed an affidavit sworn by Dr. Rao before a Fist Class Magistrate and a copy of the horoscope of the boy, and also a certificate from the Civil Surgeon regarding the age of the boy. The Inspector in his turn sent these documents with his letter Ex. 2 dated 4-5-1965 to the Secretary, Board of Education, Orissa, Cuttack, Defendant No. 2 stating that the claim appeared to be valid and requesting Defendant No. 2 to do the needful. The Secondary Board by this letter Ex. 6 dated 23-9-1965 addressed to the Inspector of Schools communicated to him that the Board had been pleased to reject the application of Dr. Someswar Rao regarding the correction of the date of his of his son. This communication of the Board of Secondary Education was based on the proceeding of the meeting of Examination Committee of the Board held on 5-5-1965 6-5-1965 and 8-5-1965 (Ex. J). Someswar Rao regarding the correction of the date of his of his son. This communication of the Board of Secondary Education was based on the proceeding of the meeting of Examination Committee of the Board held on 5-5-1965 6-5-1965 and 8-5-1965 (Ex. J). It may be stated here that as early as 27-4-1965 the Plaintiff's father appears to have approached Government in the Education Department with a prayer to correct the age of the boy. This is evident from Ex. 1 dated 3-11-1965 which is a letter addressed by the Education Department to Dr. Rao informing him that the application for correction of the date of his recorded in the Matriculation certificate is to be dealt by the Board of Secondary Education who have issued the certificate and that the Board had been requested to make necessary provision in this Regulations for considering the applications for correction of the date of his recorded in Matriculation Certificate issued by the Board and that if Dr. Rao so desised he might apply to the Board of Secondary Education in the matter. By the time Ext. 1 was received by the Plaintiff's father he had already approached the Board in the matter and on receipt of the Board's order Ext. 6 referred to above, he again approached the Inspector of Schools, Ganjam with his application Ext. 4 dated 31-10-1966 enclosing thereto an extract relating to the his of the Plaintiff from the his and death register maintained by the Municipal office, Visakhapatnam where the Plaintiff was born and also a certificate by the Civil Surgeon, Ganjam who had examined the Plaintiff and certified about his age. The prayer was made to the Inspector to correct the age in the School Register, in pursuance of note 2 of Article 235 of the Orissa Education Code. To this application he got a reply Ext. 11 dated 9-11-1966 from the Inspector stating that as the boy was then not reading in the High School but wag prosecuting his studies in the College, the Inspector was not competent to effect this change, in age. Having thus failed to obtain any redress from the Government, the Inspector of Schools and the Board of Secondary Education, the Plaintiff served a notice u/s 80, CPC (Ext. Having thus failed to obtain any redress from the Government, the Inspector of Schools and the Board of Secondary Education, the Plaintiff served a notice u/s 80, CPC (Ext. 7) on the Government and the Secretary, Board of Secondary Education intimating to them about his intention to file a suit to obtain a declaration that the date of his of his son is 12th August, 1950 and for an order directing the Defendants to correct the date of his of the Plaintiff accordingly in relevant registers and in the High School Certificate granted by the Board to the Plaintiff. Having failed to obtain any redress the Plaintiff instituted the suit which has given rise to this appeal. It was asserted in the plaint that it was within the competence of the Inspector of School to correct the date of his as provided in Article 235 of the Orissa Education Code and that Defendant No. 1 had failed to give such a direction to the Inspector. It was again within the competence of Defendant No. 2 to make the necessary correction, but without making necessary enquiries in the matter Defendant No. 2 arbitrarily rejected the application. It was averred that if the correct date of his is not mentioned in the certificate concerned, the Plaintiff would not be able to seek admission into the Medical College for admission in which the minimum age is 17 years. 3. Both the Defendants contested the suit. Defendant No. 1 contended that as the Plaintiff did not apply for correction of the date of his within 6 months from the date of the original entry in the admission register as required under Article 235(1) of the Orissa Education Code no action could be taken by the Inspector of Schools. Defendant No. 1 however admitted that in spite of lapse of time, the Inspector was competent to make necessary correction in the admission register, but that power can be exercised only in cases of obvious mistake and misstatement, but as the present case is not of such category the Inspector rightly refused to make the necessary correction. Defendant No. 2 in his written statement disputed the Plaintiff's contention that he was the only male child and first issue of his father and that he was born at Visakhapatanam on 12-8-1950. Defendant No. 2 in his written statement disputed the Plaintiff's contention that he was the only male child and first issue of his father and that he was born at Visakhapatanam on 12-8-1950. The Board stated that after the Plaintiff filled up his application form on 6-1-1965 for appearing in the High School Certificate Examination the Inspector had no jurisdiction to correct the date of his, but the jurisdiction was solely with the Secondary Board and as the Plaintiff's father had not placed sufficient materials before the Board and the error was not a clerical one the Board rightly rejected the prayer made for correction of age. The Board also denied the allegation made in the plaint that there was any discrimination against the Plaintiff in this matter. It was finally contended that the suit was not maintainable. 4. The Learned Munsif framed the following 5 issues for determination: 1. Whether the Plaintiff's date of his is 12-8-1950 or any other date? 2. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to get his date of his corrected in the School registers at any time? 3. Whether the Plaintiff produced adequate materials before the Defendant for correcting this date of his and if so whether the Defendants have not unreasonably rejected his prayer? 4. Whether the Emit is maintainable in law? 5. To what relief? On the first issue the learned Munsif relied on Exs. 16 and 19, the former being the his certificate granted by the Superintendent, King George Hospital, Visakhapatnam to the effect that Sm. Indupalli Sarojini wife of Dr. Indupalli Someswara Rao was admitted on 12-8-1950 and delivered a livemale child at 10-50 P.M. on 12-8-1950 and Ex. 19 being an extract from the his register maintained in the Municipal Office, Visakhapatnam for the year 1950 to the effect that Saroja wife of Dr. Indupalli Someswar Rao delivered a male child on 12-8-1950 at the King George Hospital. His registers are maintained by public servants in the discharge of this official duties a duty specially enjoined on them by law and in the generality of cases the entries therein furnish the best evidence of the date of his unless they are shown to be wrong. It is not necessary to prove who made the entries and what was the source of his information. Bujhawan Singh and Others Vs. Mt. Shyama Devi and Others. It is not necessary to prove who made the entries and what was the source of his information. Bujhawan Singh and Others Vs. Mt. Shyama Devi and Others. It is true that the identity of the Plaintiff with the entry made in Ex. 19 has to be established independently and this is furnished by the oral evidence let in this case which both the Courts below have believed. The evidence is that the Plaintiff is the only male issue of Dr. Someswara Rao and the child's first his anniversary as celebrated in August, 1951 which was attended by several of his friends including p.w. 3. P.w. 5 is the astrologer who prepared the horoscope of the boy in which his date of his is mentioned as 12-8-1950. The evidence both oral and documentary bearing on this issue has been carefully and exhallstively considered by the Courts below and they have arrived at the conclusion that the date of his of the Plaintiff is 12-8-1950 and the correctness of this finding has not been seriously challenged before me by the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants. 5. On issues 2 and 3, the findings of the Munsif is in favour of the Plaintiff. The Orissa. Education Code which is a compilation of the orders of Government and Circulars issued by the Director of Public Instructions from time to time provides in Article 235 that at the time of admission of a boy into a school a written declaration is to be taken from the parent or guardian regarding the date of his of the boy. Note (i) there of says that no application for alteration regarding the age of the boy would be considered unless it is filed within 6 months of the date of the original entry. But note (ii) thereof gives power to the Inspector to revise an entry of age at any time in cases of obvious mistakes and misstatement and says that no such revised entry shall be made except after careful enquiry as to the exact age of the student concerned. It is thus apparent from the aforesaid instruction that no time limit has been fixed for a correction to be made by the Inspector regarding the age of the student provided what is sought to be corrected is the result of obvious mistake or misstatements. It is thus apparent from the aforesaid instruction that no time limit has been fixed for a correction to be made by the Inspector regarding the age of the student provided what is sought to be corrected is the result of obvious mistake or misstatements. It has already been stated that the Inspector had at one time before him not only the horoscope of the boy showing his date of his as 12-8-1950, and the certificates of the Civil Surgeon granted in October, 1966 to the effect that the boy was aged 16 or 17 years, but also the extracts from the his register from the Visakhapatnam Municipality to the effect that a male child was born to Dr. Someswar Rao on 12-8-1950. The affidavit which had been sworn by the Plaintiff's father contains the statement that he has only one male issue. This should have convinced the Inspector that the age of the boy as recorded in the School register is a mistake and that the correct date of his is 12-8-1950. The Plaintiff's father in his affidavit Ex. T had explained the circumstances under which wrong entry had been made in the school admission register obviously two different dates of his relating to the same individual in two public documents should have convinced the Inspector that one of the entries is not correct. He should have given due weight to the entry made in the earlier document and held that in the circumstances mentioned in the affidavit the date of his subsequently mentioned in the school register was a result of mistake, and corrected the date of his accordingly. So far as the Secondary Board is concerned the cryptic resolution Ex. J passed by the Examination Committee of the Board refusing to correct the date of his of the Plaintiff does not give any reasons why the Plaintiff's prayer was rejected. As is clear from Ex. 6, the Board had before it the affidavit of the Plaintiff's father, the certificate of the Civil Surgeon and the copy of the horoscope of the Plaintiff. It is true that the extract from the his register of the Visakhapatnam 1 Municipality was not before the Board. As is clear from Ex. 6, the Board had before it the affidavit of the Plaintiff's father, the certificate of the Civil Surgeon and the copy of the horoscope of the Plaintiff. It is true that the extract from the his register of the Visakhapatnam 1 Municipality was not before the Board. But even so, I feel that the materials which bad been placed before the Board were sufficient to warrant, a closer and more detailed examination of the prayer made then what appears to have been done in this case. Reliance has been placed on the Appellant's side on a resolution passed at the meeting of the Examination Committee held on 22-4-1959. The resolution runs as follows: The committee in this connection considered the circumstances in which a change in the date of his should be allowed. It was felt that no change in the records of the Board in respect of the date of his of a candidate should be allowed except in the case of a clerical error. It was also felt that when applications were made for change in the date of his of a candidate and in cases where doubts were entertained, the original records should be obtained and placed before the Committee. In spite of this resolution of the committee it is found that the committee had allowed changes in the dates of his in certain poses which cannot at all come under the category of clerical errors. Ex. 1 itself shows that in case of one Prasanta Kumar Misra his date of his was changed from 5-2-1942 to 5-2-1944. Ex. K shows that in case of one Mahendranath Das, the date of his was changed from 15-1-1945 to 15-1-1914. In Ex. 0 the date of his of one Prafulla Chandra Gharai was changed from 25-6-1942 to 16-4-1940. Ex. C shows that Government in the Education Department ordered the change of date of his of one Monorama Devi, dallghter of Dr. R.N. Sahu, Principal, S.C.B. Medical College from 1-6-1949 to 1-6-1947 after perusal of certain documents produced by Dr. Sahu. This only illustrates that there no rigid rules were followed regarding correction of date of his, either regarding the point of time when corrections were made or regarding the authorities who are competent to order such correction. R.N. Sahu, Principal, S.C.B. Medical College from 1-6-1949 to 1-6-1947 after perusal of certain documents produced by Dr. Sahu. This only illustrates that there no rigid rules were followed regarding correction of date of his, either regarding the point of time when corrections were made or regarding the authorities who are competent to order such correction. In this circumstances the Plaintiff is right in alleging that his case did not receive the consideration it deserved from the authorities concerned. 7. Mr. D.P. Mohapatra appearing for the Appellants did not seriously dispute the correctness of the findings of the Courts below on issues 1, 2 and 3 framed by the learned Munsif. What he contended is that the suit is not one which is contemplates u/s 34 of the Specific Relief Act which so far as material for this case runs as follows: Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny his title to such character or right, and the Court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is 80 entitled, and the Plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no Court shall make any such declaration where the Plaintiff, being able to seek further relief then a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. 8. Admittedly the relief that the Plaintiff seeks in this case is not one relating to any right to any property. What contended on his behalf is that be Reeks for a declaration in respect of his legal character. The ph rasa 'legal character' occur only in two statutes namely in Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act. But that phrase has not been defined in either of the said two Acts. This phrase came up for interpretation 'before the Division Bench of the Madras High Court. Ramakrishna v. Narayana ILR 39 Mad. 80. One of the contentions was that the Plaintiff's suit to declare that he had contractual rights as against Defendant No. 1 did not fall u/s 42 of the Specific Relief Act, (which corresponds to Section 34 of the present Act) because it was not a suit to declare a right to a legal character or a right to property. 80. One of the contentions was that the Plaintiff's suit to declare that he had contractual rights as against Defendant No. 1 did not fall u/s 42 of the Specific Relief Act, (which corresponds to Section 34 of the present Act) because it was not a suit to declare a right to a legal character or a right to property. In respect of this contention this Lordships observed: We take it that a man's 'legal character' is the same thing as a man's status. A man's status or 'legal character' is constituted by the attributes which the law attaches to him in his individual and personal capacity, the distinctive mark or dress, as it were, with which the law clothes him apart from the attributes which may he said to belong to normal humanity in general. According to Holland, the Chief varieties of status among natural persons may he referred to the following causes-(1) sex, (2) minority, (3) 'patria potestas', and 'manus' (4) coverture, (5) celibacy, (6) menta, defect, (7) bodily defect, (8) rank, caste and official position, (9) slavery, (10) profession, (11) civil death, (12) illegitimacy, (13) heresy, (14) foreign nationality, and (15) hostile nationality (see Banerjee's Lectures on Specific Relief). We think that a declaration that a valid personal contract still subsists between the Plaintiff and the first Defendant is not a right to 'declare a title to a legal' character or a title to right to property. Thus in that case 'legal character' had been taken to mean the same thing as man's status. The expression 'legal character' occurring in Section 41 of the Evidence Act came up for consideration in the Calcutta High Court in Punjab National Bank Vs. Balikram Kissenchand and Others. His Lordship observed that 'declaration of Legal right' is a different thing from a 'declaration of legal character': The words used are 'declares any persons to be entitled to a legal character'. A declaration of a legal right is a different thing from a declaration of a legal character. The word 'character' means status it is something more then a mere right. A declaration of a legal right is a different thing from a declaration of a legal character. The word 'character' means status it is something more then a mere right. The declaration of a person's right operates as against a particular person or group of persons against whom the right is claimed, whereas a man's status is something which defines his position not in relation to any particular person or group of persons but in relation to the rest of the world; his status distinguishes him from the rest of the world. To say that a person is not a partner of a fism is not to declare his status or legal character, it is merely to declare his position with respect to the particular fism. This judgment also lays down that legal character means status and that it is something more then a mere right. Mr. Mohapatra for the Appellants next relied on two decisions reported in Raja Bahadur Hishwanath Saran Singh and Anr. v. Ch. Mujtaba Husain and Ors. AIR 1941 Oudh 422 and Muhammad Israil Vs. Patna City Municipality. Neither of these two cases appears to be helpful in the present case. In the Oudh case the Plaintiff brought a suit for declaration that the amendments made to the Rules of British Indian Association, which was a registered body, were illegal and ultra vises and that the members of the Executive Committee of the Association were entitled to hold office for a certain period. The rules and the constitution of the Association showed that even if the amendments sought to be declared illegal and ultra vises were really so, similar amendments could validly be made under the constitution and the members of the executive committee could be unseated. In these circumstances Ghulam Hasan, J. held that the Court could not exercise its discretion in favour of the Plaintiff, u/s 42 of the Specific Relief Act as the decree which it might be prepared to grant was likely to prove futile and useless because the Association was governed by its own rules which were liable to modification, amendment or repeal at any time and any decree passed in such a case would therefore or 'brutum fulmen'. But the other member of the Bench Agarwal, J. dissented from this view and held that as it could not be said that amendments similar to those complained of, would surely be made and the decree would be 'brutum fulmen', the Court could grant the declarations to the Plaintiff. But as the appeal was allowed on other grounds, this difference of opinion between the Hon'ble Judges did not affect the result of the appeal. In the Patna case, the Patna Municipality rejected an application by a butcher for renewal of license for the years 1936-1937. The Plaintiff instituted the suit which gave rise to the appeal before the High Court praying for a declaration that the order of the Chairman of the Municipality who rejected the application for renewal was illegal, void and ultra vises and for an order to direct the Municipality to renew the license. This appeal was decided in year 1942. This Lordships held that a declaration that the Plaintiff's license which was to be renewed annually, should have been renewed by the Municipality for the year 1936-37 would he perfectly useless when made in 1942 and will not be of any use or assistance to the Plaintiff in obtaining renewal for the year 1942 as there may be grounds in 1942 for rejecting the application for renewal where no such grounds existed in 1936, observing at the same time that the position would have been different had the license not beep an annual one which required renewal. In the circumstances they refused to exercise the discretion to grant relief u/s 42. These cases thus do not touch on the interpretation of the phrase 'legal character', but only illustrate the circumstances under which the Court may or may Dot exercise the discretionary jurisdiction to grant relief u/s 42 of the Specific Relief Act. The Guntur Tobacco Market Committee Vs. Yarabothu Narasaiah on which the Appellants rely; was a suit on behalf of the Accountant of the market committee for declaration that he continues to be a Secretary of the Committee and it was held that such a suit does not lie u/s 42 as the status of an accountant working as an employee in market committee's office is not such as will constitute legal character within the meaning of Section 42. The service of the employee depended upon a contract which he had entered into with the committee and the committee was free to terminate his service. If such termination of service is in violation of the contract, his only remedy is to sue for damages. It was held in a number of cases that when a right is claimed by a person under a contract, the same does not amount to legal character u/s 42. 9. On the Respondent's side reliance is placed on a series of decisions of the Madras High Court which have laid down that in the application of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act to any declaratory suit it is not a question of the Court having jurisdiction to grant the declaration but of the Court having a discretion in the matter and that stress is not to be laid so much on the question of its maintainability as on that of propriety and utility of granting relief by way of declaration. Desu Reddiar and Another Vs. Srinivasa Reddi by next friend Subba Reddiar and Others, and Nagammal Vs. Agoramurthi by his next friend and grandfather Veeraswami Pillai. The Andhra Pradesh High Court has adopted this view in Konduru Seshu Reddi Vs. Vemareddy Rama Raghavareddy and Others. None of the cases cited at the Bar relate to a declaration u/s 42 of the Specific Relief Act for correcting the age of the Plaintiff. But a case relating to correction of the date of his of the Plaintiff more or less in the circumstances existing in the present case bad been instituted u/s 45 of the old Specific Relief Act in B. Ramamurthy by next friend and father B.S. Chetti Vs. The Director of Public Instruction. But a case relating to correction of the date of his of the Plaintiff more or less in the circumstances existing in the present case bad been instituted u/s 45 of the old Specific Relief Act in B. Ramamurthy by next friend and father B.S. Chetti Vs. The Director of Public Instruction. Section 45 of the old Specific Relief Act empowered the High Courts of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay to make an order requiring any specific act to be done or foreborne, within the local limits of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction by any person holding a public office provided (8) that an application for such order be made by some person whose property, franchise, or personal right would be injured by the forbearing or doing (as the case may be) of the said specific act; (b) that such doing or forbearing is, under any law for that time being in force, clearly incumbent on such person or Court in his or its public character, or on such corporation in its-corporate character; (c) that in the opinion of the High Court such doing or for bearing is consonant to right and justice; (d) that the Applicant has no other specific and adequate legal remedy; and (e) that the remedy given by the order applied for will be complete. In that case an application was filed for a mandamus directing the Director of Public Instructions to entertain an application of the Applicant and to cause the alteration of the date of his of the Applicant from December 20, 1928 which was alleged to be a mistake to November 12, 1927 in his school leaving certificate register. The father of the Plaintiff in his affidavit stated that by the time the boy was sent to school be was away in service in another place and his wife gave the date of his as December 20, 1928. The student passed through the High School and in due course sat for the Secondary School leaving certificate examination in March 1942. He was successful but because he appeared from the school books to be under-aged he would not under the regulations be permitted to enter for his University course for that year. The student passed through the High School and in due course sat for the Secondary School leaving certificate examination in March 1942. He was successful but because he appeared from the school books to be under-aged he would not under the regulations be permitted to enter for his University course for that year. The father found this mistake and obtained a certificate from the Registrar of hiss to show that the date of his of the Plaintiff was 12-11-1927 and applied to the Director of Public Instructions for the alteration of the date in the certificate. The Director of Public Instruction turned down the application. He sent a further application to the Director of Public Instructions giving the full circumstances of the case enclosing thereto a certificate of the District Magistrate, but it was again rejected by the Director of Public Instructions on the ground that as there was no clerical error he was unable to alter the entry. An appeal to Government proved futile and hence the fat her of the boy filed an application in the High Court u/s 45 of the Specific Relief Act. The relevant Government order provided for correcting the date of his where there are obviously absurd mistakes in the certificate. Allowing the application His Lordship stated: To my mind to have on a school certificate a date which does not correspond with the certificate of the register of hiss is not only absurd but is one which should not be permitted to remain by any public authority. If the register of hiss is maintained under the public authority then it is proper that all Government documents should bear the date as shown in those registers and that information given to them by muddled or ignorant parents should not be finally and is revocable relied upon. The Court therefore directed that the Director of Public Instructions should consider and determine the application for alternation in accordance with the spirit of the rules and the Government of Madras order. What is important in this decision is that the right of the Plaintiff to have his correct date of his entered in the public registers was assumed to be a 'personal right' within the meaning of Clause (a) of Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act. Reference may also be made to the decision in Major General Shanta Shamsher Jung Bahadur Rana Vs. Reference may also be made to the decision in Major General Shanta Shamsher Jung Bahadur Rana Vs. Kamani Brothers Private Ltd. and Ors. Mody, J. defined 'legal character' in Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act in the following words: A legal right can be classified to be a personal right and would amount to one's status and is distinct from a proprietary right, when it involves a peculiarity of the personality arising from anything unconnected with the nature of the act itself which the person of inherence can enforce against the person of incidence. The personality recognized in the law of persons is such as modifies indefinitely the legal relations into which the individual clothed with the personality may enter. This appears to be the test of what is legal status or 'legal character' as mentioned in Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. After a careful consideration of the law on the subject it appears to me that the relief that the Plaintiff claimed in this suit giving rise to this appeal is a declaration relating to his legal character which can be granted u/s 42 of the Specific Relief Act. The importance of such declaration for the Plaintiff cannot be overstated. At the present moment if that declaration is not granted he would not be able to seek admission to the Medical College which he intends to do because according to the wrong date of his noted in the school register he would be under-aged. That apart it may affect him in several ways throughout his career if a date of his which is demonstrated to be wrong is allowed to remain in public registers. This is therefore a fit case in which it would be sound exercise of judicial discretion, to grant the declaration prayed for. 10. The only other argument advanced on behalf of the Appellant may now be noticed. It is contended that the father of the minor Respondent having made a representation to the School authorities that the minor's date of his was 10-1-1952 and having thus induced the School authorities to note this date in the relevant registers, he is now estopped from contending that it is not correctly recorded, but that the correct date is something else. In support of this contention reliance is placed on the decisions reported in Rajubala Dasi Vs. In support of this contention reliance is placed on the decisions reported in Rajubala Dasi Vs. Nidhuram Pandit and Others, Shrinibai Manchershaw Mehanty and Another Vs. State of Bombay. 396 Haradevi Vs. State of Andhra and Another, and Amritlal N. Shah Vs. Alla Annapurnamma, In Rajubala Dasi Vs. Nidhuram Pandit and Others a kabala was executed by a Hindu mother on behalf of the minor on the footing that she was competent to transfer the property of the minor. This position was accepted by the alienee who had obtained an advantage by the transaction of sale and had got the entice property, including the share of the minor and had agreed to recovery the property in its entirety. Subsequently he turned round and repudiated the authority of the mother to effect the sale on be half of the minor or to repurchase the property of the minor upon refund of the consideration money. It was held that the alienee would be estopped by her conduct from doing so, and she must fulfil her part of the obligation by reconveying the property in favour of all the alienors including the minor. In Shrinibai Manchershaw Mehanty and Another Vs. State of Bombay certain premises were requisitioned upon an intimation by the landlord of the vacancy. The landlord accepted the order and made representation that the same should not be enforced because he wanted to sell the properties. On the basis of that representation Government allowed him time and did not enforce the order till about a year. Later on he raised an objection that the intimation of vacancy given by him on which the order was based was not in proper form. The Court held that having led the Government to believe that be was not questioning the requisition order on any ground and thereby having persuaded the Government to allow him time for completing the sale of the property, the landlord was estopped from raising; the aforesaid contentions. In the aforesaid two cases therefore the party who made the representation had secured an advantage as a result of the other party acting to his disadvantages. Hence the principle of estoppel had been rightly applied in those cases. In Haradevi Vs. State of Andhra and Another Government wanted to requisition certain buildings and corresponded with the Petitioner's hushalld thinking that he was the owner of the premises. Hence the principle of estoppel had been rightly applied in those cases. In Haradevi Vs. State of Andhra and Another Government wanted to requisition certain buildings and corresponded with the Petitioner's hushalld thinking that he was the owner of the premises. Subsequently they get information that the owner of the house was the Petitioner and then served the requisition upon her treating her to be the owner of the premises. When the Petitioner challenged the validity of the requisition order, Government pleaded that she was not the real owner of the premises and that it belonged to her hushalld. It was held that Government were estopped from questioning the title of the Petitioner to the premises. In Amritlal N. Shah Vs. Alla Annapurnamma an application for eviction u/s 7 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1946 was rejected on the tenant's plea that as the premises did not fall within the definition of a building he was not It tenant within the meaning of the Act. In a subsequent Civil suit for eviction he put forth the contention that the lease related to a building within the beginning of the Act and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It was held in the circumstance that the tenant cannot be allowed to take inconsistent positions. 11. It has not been shown in the present case that the Plaintiff had acquised any advantage by reason of the original representation that his date of his is 10.1.1952. To invoke the doctrine of estoppel (sic) bodied in Section 115 of the Evidence Act, three conditions must be satisfied representation by a person to another, (2) the other shall have acted upon the said representation, and (3) such action shall have been detrimental to the interests of the person to whom the representation has been made. Where the first two conditions are satisfied but the thisd is not, there is no scope to invoke the doctrine of estoppel. Gyarsi Bai and Others Vs. Dhansukh Lal and Others, It is argued on the Appellants side that on the footing of the representation made by the Plaintiff's father that the Plaintiff's age was 10-1-1952 the authorities concerned proceeded to record that age in the relevant registers and thereby 'the authorities have acted upon the said representation' contemplated by section 115 of the Evidence Act. Dhansukh Lal and Others, It is argued on the Appellants side that on the footing of the representation made by the Plaintiff's father that the Plaintiff's age was 10-1-1952 the authorities concerned proceeded to record that age in the relevant registers and thereby 'the authorities have acted upon the said representation' contemplated by section 115 of the Evidence Act. Even assuming it is so the this condition referred to above is not satisfied. It has not been shown bow acting on this representation had been detrimental to the interest of the School authorities. It therefore appears to me that there is no scope to invoke the doctrine of estoppel in this case. 12. In the result, I find there is no merit in this appeal and it is dismissed. In view of the fact that it is the negligence of the Plaintiffs father that has resulted in this litigation, be should not be entitled to any costs. I would accordingly order each party to bear his own costs in this Court and in the Courts below. Leave granted. Final Result : Dismissed