JUDGMENT : R.J. Bahadur, J. 1. These two applications under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure have been heard together at the request of learned Counsel for the petitioners, and this JUDGMENT : will govern both the cases. 2. The petitioner in each case owns a rice mill granted under the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act of 1958. The rice milling operation is carried on by a single huller. It appears that the Government of Bihar in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) made an ORDER :on 23rd December, 1967, known as 'Bihar Foodgrains Procurement ORDER :, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as the ORDER :). It came into force on the 1st December, 1967, and remained in force till 30th June, 1968. The petitioner in each case, during the period 1-12-1967 to 23-1-1968, milled certain quantities of rice on cultivators' account after having charged rates per quintal for conversion, without keeping any part of the rice so milled. It appears that on 9-1-1968, the Supply Inspector made some endorsements on the mill register of each of the petitioners. On 24-1-1968, the Additional District Supply Officer inspected the business premises of each petitioner and having found from the register that the petitioner in each case had actually manufactured certain amount of rice on cultivators' account, made a report on 30-1-1968 to the Sub-divisional Officer for demanding 25% of the production under Clause 13 of the ORDER :, and to further show cause why the milling licence should not be cancelled. On 1-2-1968, the petitioner was asked by the Sub-divisional Officer to show cause as to why he should not be prosecuted under Section 7 of the Act. The petitioner in each case showed cause and contented that the crushed paddy was in cultivators' account and the cultivators, on whose account the paddy was crushed, had already paid levy on the stock so crushed and as such there was no liability on the petitioner to pay any further levy on such de-husking. The show cause petition was rejeted and cognizance was taken in case No. 470 of 1968 on 23-2-1968, while in case No. 549 of 1968, cognizance was, taken on 7-3-1968 and the cases were transferred to the Munsif Magistrate, for disposal. The show cause petition was rejeted and cognizance was taken in case No. 470 of 1968 on 23-2-1968, while in case No. 549 of 1968, cognizance was, taken on 7-3-1968 and the cases were transferred to the Munsif Magistrate, for disposal. The petitioner in each has now come up to this Court to have the proceedings quashed, which is pending trial before the Munsif Magistrate of Jamtara. 3. Appearing on behalf of the petitioner in both cases, Mr. S.B. Sanyal has raised a number of points which may be stated in his own words, and they are as follows : (1) Clause 13 traverses beyond the delegation in Section 3(2)(f) of the Act; (2) The amendment dated 6-12-1967, by which exemption on cultivators' account was removed is ultra vires being discriminatory; (3) A delegated legislation can-not be unreasonable, partial, unequal or oppressive, and if that is so, it is ultra vires; and (4) This ORDER :invades arbitrarily and excessively fundamental rates as it amounts to stopping the husking of cultivators' paddy and does not advance the cause of the statute (the Act). I do not think that these points require consideration at this stage. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of R.P. Kapur v. The State of Punjab 1960CriLJ1239 , shows various categories that have been enumerated by their Lord ships as to when the jurisdiction of the High Court can be invoked under Section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Their Lordships have elaborately considered the nature of the case, which is to be found in paragraph 6 of the report. It appears from Kapur's decision that ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the high Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. The various categories have been mentioned there and in my opinion learned Counsel has not been able to show us the category in which the instant case falls. I, however, express no opinion on the merits of the case, which would prejudge or prejudice the case of either party. I have merely stated the points raised by learned Counsel and have not thought it fit even to express any opinion on the validity of those points. I, however, express no opinion on the merits of the case, which would prejudge or prejudice the case of either party. I have merely stated the points raised by learned Counsel and have not thought it fit even to express any opinion on the validity of those points. I feel that there is no manifest error on the face of the proceeding which requires interference at this stage. It can by no means be said that there is such error, because if I agree with the contentions of Mr. Sanyal, it would necessarily require a lengthy and elaborate argument to decide whether the contention raised are sound or not. A prima facie case has been made out and the whole matter is before the criminal court, and all the points can very well be raised before the learned Magistrate. In any case this is not the stage when the High Court can be asked to investigate certain facts, as it cannot be asked to make enquiry, either of facts or of law which is clearly the function of the trial court. 4. For the foregoing reasons 1 do not find any justification for exercising our extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as in my opinion, it is not a proper case in which this Court should interfere. 5. In the result, the application fails and is dismissed. P.K. Banerji, J. 6. I agree. Application Dismissed.